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“Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion.”—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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
January, 1905.

No. 1.

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LOCKE'S INFLUENCE ON MODERN THOUGHT.

The second centenary of Locke's death occurred October 28, 1904. It was observed with commemorative exercises by several of our universities and learned societies. In these gatherings, men who differ as widely from one another as they do from Locke himself on philosophical and religious questions, paid him the tribute either of frank admiration or of honest criticism. That the teaching of the great Englishman will thereby gain in actuality or that our judgments of him will undergo any serious modification, is not to be expected. The significant thing is that after two hundred years during which not only the content but the very structure and foundation of human knowledge have been so closely scrutinized and, by some thinkers, so rudely shaken, Locke's influence should be felt and acknowledged. This fact in itself is of sufficient importance to warrant a review of the conditions in which his philosophy was produced and of its bearings on modern thought.

I.

The political status of England in the seventeenth century was not favorable to the study of philosophy. The struggle for constitutional government had resulted in the Petition of Right which Parliament drew up in 1628, four years previous to the birth of Locke. The civil war of the Cavaliers and Roundheads, the doings of Cromwell and the Revolution of

1688, kept the nation in a ferment at home; while colonial expansion led to conflict abroad. The worst feature of all this strife was that it grew for the most part out of religious differences. The Catholic Church suffered as a matter of course, especially in the days of the Protectorate. But Protestantism also, being consistently divided into various bodies, had its own troubles. One has only to recall such names as "High Church," "Puritan," "Non-Conformist," and "Presbyterian" in order to realize the impression that must have been created in thoughtful minds by the incessant quarrels of party with party and of each party with the State.

Locke was drawn into this turmoil not so much by his own inclination as by the force of circumstances. His connection with Lord Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury, afforded him indeed an opportunity to study at close range the political and religious situation, and seems to have suggested his "Treatises on Government" as well as his "Letters for Toleration." But he paid for his experience and his loyalty to Shaftesbury by the loss of his studentship at Christ Church and by his exile, not altogether voluntary, on the Continent. Like Bacon and Hobbes he approached the questions of philosophy from the practical side, with a knowledge of men and affairs, which counted for more, in the final shaping of his thought, than what he had gotten from books and academic training.

When Locke, in 1652, entered Oxford, the Chancellor of the University was Cromwell, and the Dean of Christ Church the Puritan divine, John Owen. Still, neither the political character of the one nor the religious views of the other had wrought any radical change in the teaching of philosophy. Aristotle was still the master, and scholasticism the method. But it was not the scholasticism of the thirteenth century. It had no longer the breadth and the vigor which had characterized Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Already in its decline, it was unable to resist the influences which were working its downfall. Its effect upon Locke was the more unfavorable because, as he seems to have cared little for the historical aspect of philosophy, he would naturally class all schoolmen in the same category, without taking the trouble to

inquire what scholasticism may have meant in its better days. He was not even aware that the basic principle of his own philosophy was explicitly stated in the "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas.

On the other hand, the more brilliant among his contemporaries were reducing to practice what Bacon had taught in the *Novum Organum*. Boyle at Oxford and Newton at Cambridge were leaders in an intellectual revolution that paralleled the upheavals in Church and State. The natural sciences were attracting students who had lost all relish for dry speculation. The universities were invaded by the new spirit; and Locke himself, as a student of medicine, turned eagerly from metaphysics to experimental research.

The growth of the sciences was accelerated at this period by epoch-making discoveries in mathematics. Newton in England, Descartes in France and Leibniz in Germany furnished science those instruments of analysis and calculus which have since been used with such remarkable success in the study of nature and the exact formulation of physical laws. But those great thinkers were also the pioneers in modern philosophy. Descartes had died just a year before Locke entered Oxford; Leibniz was still a student at Leipzig when Locke began his political career. Spinoza, born in the same year as Locke, was polishing lenses in a village near the Hague, and meditating on those world-wide problems which the "Ethics" was intended to solve. Though Locke spent several years in France and Holland, he did not associate with the brilliant men who were then so deeply interested, either as advocates or as critics, in the Cartesian philosophy. Descartes indeed had become for his contemporaries and successors what Peter the Lombard and later St. Thomas were for the medieval student—a source of inspiration. But the men who were thus inspired wandered far from the source. The dualism of Descartes was followed by the occasionalism of Geulinx and Malebranche, the monism of Spinoza and the monad theory of Leibniz. Each of these systems grew out of the problems which Descartes had striven to solve and out of modifications which his fundamental concepts received at the hands of his critics. The influence of Descartes

is more evident in the work of those who attacked his philosophy than in the achievements of his loyal disciples.

Locke, in a sense, went beyond them all by striking at the basis of the Cartesian theory of knowledge; but his own theory was in turn sharply criticised by his contemporaries and by those who came after him. The effects of the reaction are best seen in the idealism of Berkeley and the scepticism of Hume. Both found their starting-point in the teachings of Locke; but in developing his ideas they moved in opposite directions. Within fifty years, there appeared in the British Isles three systems of philosophy whose authors were natives, respectively, of England, Ireland and Scotland. All three attacked the same fundamental problem of human knowledge; each narrowed the range of our cognition; none arrived at a satisfactory solution. One thing, however, is sure: the net result of their teachings is fatal to metaphysical speculation.

II.

The *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* appeared in 1690. The circumstances which led to its composition are set down by Locke in his Epistle to the Reader. "Were it fit to trouble thee with the history of this *Essay*, I should tell thee that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had awhile puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this Discourse; which having thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humor, or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retire-

ment where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it."

The importance of this statement lies in the fact that it formulates a problem which has ever since been fundamental in philosophy. In the words of Professor Fraser: "Locke inaugurated the modern epistemological era, characteristic of philosophy in the eighteenth century which culminated in Kant. . . ." The deliberate attempt to determine the origin, value and extent of human knowledge which was made in the *Essay* opened the way for what is now known as philosophical criticism. Whatever may be thought of Locke's theory of knowledge, the method he introduced has become a permanent and indispensable possession of philosophy. Empiricism and rationalism, realism and idealism, the various forms of agnosticism and the eccentric views of subjectivism, are but so many results of the application of that method.

In reading the *Essay*, one is impressed by what seems to be a confusion of two different, though allied, problems. We now distinguish quite clearly the scope of epistemology from that of psychology. The one asks: What is the value of our knowledge; the other, what is the nature and manner of development of our mental processes. How far does our thought correspond to objective reality? This is a question for epistemology. How do we come to have any thought at all? The answer must be sought at the hands of psychology. Locke was in part aware of this distinction; for, in the introduction to the *Essay* he declares: "This, therefore, being my purpose: to inquire into the original certainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent—I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or no. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon."

This demarcation of the two fields occurs frequently in

the *Essay*; but, for all that, Locke's inquiry is largely psychological. His empiricism, in fact, obliges him not only to show that all knowledge is derived from experience but also to examine into the nature and origin of ideas; and since in this examination he is concerned only with the mental processes and not with the substance of mind, he is the pioneer of phenomenalism in psychology as he is of empiricism in epistemology.

His criticism of the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas is vigorous and, for his own purposes, successful. Whether his argument reaches the position of Descartes or not is a point that may be passed over here. The interesting feature of the discussion is that Locke regarded his own position as something quite new. He is evidently sincere when he follows his own thoughts in the search of truth, though they lead him "out of the common road" and away from "established opinion." But the path was well-worn. St. Thomas, following in the footsteps of Aristotle, had taught quite clearly that there are no innate ideas. The very arguments he employs (*Summa Theol.* I. Q. LXXXIV) are those which Locke reproduces at greater length. Even the metaphor taken from Aristotle that the intellect is *sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum*, is easily recognized in Locke's description of the mind as "white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas." And when he says that "men barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions," he is nearer than he suspects to the scholastic theory of knowledge.

Where he does depart from the teaching of his medieval predecessors is in the limitation that he places upon our knowledge. The scholastics held that the qualities, properties and modes of activity which the mind perceives in the external object, are manifestations of its essential nature. They consequently maintained that this nature or substance, though not accessible to sense, could nevertheless be known by the intellect. And this conclusion they based on the principle that the essence or real being of a thing is the ultimate cause and source of its phenomena.

Locke indeed admits the reality of substance; it is attested, he says, by experience. But he denies that substance can be known; and this denial, as we shall presently see, refers to body and spirit alike. It is the beginning, in English philosophy, of that agnosticism which culminates in Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable. It results from the attempt to isolate in thought that something which lies beneath appearances. Once the phenomena are brushed away, any inquiry as to the residual *Ding an sich* is of course useless. At best it can only lead to the further denial of the objective reality of substance and confine our thinking about it to the question regarding the origin and development of the substance-idea.

Another step in the same direction is taken by Locke in his distinction of primary and secondary qualities. "The ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all." Secondary qualities, in a word—colors, tastes, odors and sounds—are just the effects produced in us by the bodies to which we ascribe them; while primary qualities—bulk, number, figure and motion—have an objective reality. This partitioning removes Locke's theory from the standpoint of naïve empiricism; but it also prepares the way for the other extreme of subjectivism. Berkeley, setting aside the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, took both back into the mind, and denied the reality of the material world apart from our perception. When Hume finally reduced substance and cause to mere ideas begotten by "custom," there was left scarcely a vestige of the real existence for which Locke had contended.

The agnostic tendency which appears in his theory of knowledge did not affect Locke's belief in a Supreme Being. On the contrary, he holds that "it is as certain that there is a God, as that the opposite angles, made by the intersection of two straight lines, are equal." And further, that the knowledge of a God is the most natural discovery of human reason. But he argues on this very ground that, the idea of God not being innate, no other idea can pretend to be innate. As to the idea itself, it is made up of the simple ideas we receive

from reflection: "having from what we experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration, of knowledge and power, of pleasure and happiness, and of several other qualities and powers which it is better to have than to be without; when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our idea of infinity; and so putting them together make our complex idea of God." This statement suggests a method of forming our conception of God, which, so far as it goes, is helpful; but it by no means equals, in accuracy or critical severity, the method which St. Thomas thought out and applied. Nor does Locke suspect how closely he is following Aquinas in denying that the idea of a most perfect being suffices to prove the existence of God, and consequently in taking for the principle of his proof the saying of the Apostle "that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." But there is a lesson worth pondering in the words with which he closes his chapter on the knowledge of the existence of a God: "If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you can not comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens can not contain."

This confession of our limitations is in keeping with the broader view on which his whole theory of knowledge rests and to which he so frequently returns when his inquiry reveals anew the imperfection of human knowledge. "If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state. For, though the comprehension of our understandings comes exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being for that proportion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, so far above all the rest of the inhabitants of this our mansion. Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them since he hath given them (as St. Peter says) . . . what-

soever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue; and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provision for this life, and the way that leads to a better." Here Locke plainly indicates that practical criterion which has ever since been kept in view by English philosophy. In substance he says: why fret over the shortcomings of our knowledge since what we can know is amply sufficient for our purposes as rational beings. Or again, in his own words: "the candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes . . . if we will disbelieve everything because we can not certainly know all things, we shall do much what as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish because he had no wings to fly."

III.

The connection between Locke's epistemology and his psychology has already been pointed out. There remains now to show how he dealt with the facts of mental life and in what degree his teaching exerts an influence on the modern science of mind.

It may be at once admitted that none of his writings could serve as a text-book of psychology in the schools of to-day. He does not discuss the special problems which at present engage psychological research, nor does he suggest those details of method which the progress of physiology has made possible. But he lays down certain fundamental principles which are now tacitly assumed by many psychologists, and he draws on sources of information which we, with the varied channels of scientific knowledge at our disposal, are far from exhausting.

The very scope of psychology as it is now understood, shows plainly enough Locke's influence. He does not, it is true, admit that thinking is the essence of the soul, nor would he have defined mind as the aggregate of conscious states. He insists upon the distinction between the soul and its actions or operations, contrasting the intermittent character of thought with the permanence of the mind. "We know certainly by experience that we sometimes think, and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us that has

a power to think; but whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no farther assured than experience informs us." And the verdict of experience is negative, for "every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine who teach that the soul is always thinking."

But when we come to speak further of this soul-substance, "we talk like children who, being questioned what such a thing is, which they know not, readily give this satisfactory answer, that it is something; which in truth signifies no more, when so used either by children or men, but that they know not what; and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark." "The substance of spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us." "Our idea of substance is equally obscure or none at all in both; it is but a supposed I know, not what, to support those ideas we call accidents." From this point, evidently, epistemology has but a short road to the conclusion that our inner experience, being immediately given, does not require us to form the idea of substance as a support of mental states. And psychology, no longer vexed with the problem of an unknown substantial soul, can content itself with seeking the laws and connections of that which is known.

This agnostic conclusion does not, however, prevent Locke from discussing at some length a problem which more than any other concerns the nature of mind. For if it be difficult or impossible to learn anything about the soul when sensation and reflection have enriched the mind with ideas, the inference would seem to be that the attempt to define its condition on first coming into existence, is worse than hopeless. Locke's vigorous and successful attack upon the theory of innate ideas was a necessary prelude to his theory of knowledge, but it also opens the way to a purely empirical psychology. So long as the psychologist could fall back upon innate ideas, his natural tendency would be to cut short the tedious work of analysis, and so increase the original capital of the mind as to leave but a narrow margin for experience. When, on the contrary, the senses are required to "furnish the yet empty cabinet" of mind, both the furniture and its arrangement

abound with problems which only patient research can solve.

The older metaphysical psychology had handled these problems in its own systematic fashion. The scholastics taught that the inner nature or essence of the soul could not be directly known because it is never, as such, presented in consciousness. But they held that it reveals itself in its activities, and because these are not all of the same sort nor perpetually in operation, they referred each mode of activity to a special "potentia" or power. So they travelled back from object to action, from action to power, and from power to the essential principle which energized through the various powers.

From the influence of this traditional theory, Locke could not wholly free himself. He would not deny "there are faculties, both in the body and mind; they both of them have their powers of operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate." He would not deny "that those words and their like have their place in the common use of languages that have made them current. It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by; and philosophy itself, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet when it appears in public, must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country, as far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity." At the same time, he does not attach much importance to this way of talking. "The introducing into discourses concerning the mind, with the name of faculties, a notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves, as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties in the operations of the body has helped us in the knowledge of physick." Nay more, such manner of speech, he suspects, "has misled many into a confused notion of so many distinct agents in us, which had their several provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several actions, as so many distinct beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity and uncertainty in questions relating to them." The faculties, in other words, from being the servants or instruments of the soul, had risen to the position of heads of departments. "For it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say

that it was the digestive faculty. What was it that made anything come out of the body? the expulsive faculty. What moved? the motive faculty. And so in the mind the intellectual faculty, or the understanding, understood; and the elective faculty, or the will, willed or commanded."

But if these petty powers be dethroned—if they are no longer to play the rôle of distinct agents—it follows that there is no such thing as mutual action or influence between them. "The power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing, nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking; no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing, or the power of singing on the power of dancing; as any one, who reflects on it, will easily perceive . . . it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers; it is the man that does the action, it is the agent that has power, or is able to do."

This criticism, while it tolerates the use of the term "faculties," obviously strips the term of its original meaning, and suggests the question: What then is the function of a faculty, and what service can it render to the science of mind? Psychology has long since given its answer, though it has not entirely put off the tendency to make entities out of functions and permanent structures out of fleeting events. Still, when it says, officially at least, that ideas are not things but processes, and that every process involves, to some extent, the various forms of mental activity, it only utters the meaning which Locke, for fear of seeming affected, would not fully express.

What he *did* say, however, maps out, if only in a negative way, the field of psychological research. The substance of mind being unknown is evidently left out in the exterior darkness. Innate ideas rooted out, the virgin soil is prepared for experience; and, the faculty fences removed, the psychologist is free to make such divisions as he may see fit—or to make no divisions at all.

Locke, it must be admitted, did not indicate the methods which should be employed in the study of mind. Yet the establishment of his principal thesis exemplifies a procedure which has proved of great value in the hands of modern investigators. The genetic method as now applied in psychology

owes its relative perfection to the progress that has been made in other sciences. But the principle which underlies it was clearly understood by Locke. Psychology tells us to-day: to understand the mind, you must understand its development, and Locke tells us: to ascertain the nature and value of knowledge, you must study its beginnings and its gradual modification through the course of experience. "We are often ignorant," he says, "for want of tracing those ideas which we have or may have; and for want of finding out those intermediate ideas which may show us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have one with another." The argument against innate principles is based in part upon the observation of children's minds; the origin of such processes as perception, discerning and retention is sought in the same source; and the analysis of complex ideas is carried back to the earliest manifestations of thought. The essentials of genetic method could not be more clearly and concisely expressed than it is in these words from the *Essay*: "Follow a child from its birth, and observe the alterations that time makes, and you shall find, as the mind by the senses comes more and more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time it begins to know the objects, which, being most familiar with it, have made lasting impressions. Thus it comes by degrees to know the persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from strangers; which are instances and effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the ideas the senses convey to it. And so we may observe how the mind, by degrees, improves in these and advances to the exercise of those other faculties of enlarging, compounding and abstracting its ideas, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these."

To this "historical plain method," Locke adds, though less conspicuously, the comparative method, as where he denies to the lower animals the power of abstraction and comparison. Occasional references to the defects of idiots and madmen, show that he did not altogether overlook the evidence from pathology. But his chief contribution to psychological method is the careful analysis by which he reduces the more complex processes to "those simple ideas which, being each in itself

uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas." Out of such elements of experience are built up all our ideas of modes, substances and relations, of space, time and infinity, that seem the most remote from those originals. "If we trace the progress of our mind and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection, it will lead us farther than at first perhaps we should have imagined. And I believe we shall find, if we warily observe the originals of our notions, that even the most abstruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem from sense, or from any operations of our own minds, are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself by repeating and joining together ideas, that it had either from objects of sense, or from its own operations about them; so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection, being no other than what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does attain unto."

What is lacking in this account of mental elaboration is the analysis of affective states. If we except the brief chapter, "desultory and superficial," on Pleasure and Pain, Locke gives us no account of the emotions. In fact he expressly declares that he does not mean, even in that chapter, to give a discourse of the passions. The omission is intelligible enough if we keep in view only the main purpose of the *Essay*, and seek merely to show how the ideas we have of the passions are derived from sensation or reflection. But when Locke comes to discuss the activity of the will and its freedom, he goes beyond the analysis of their respective ideas and treats the problem from the psychological standpoint. His concern is to show, not merely what the sense of freedom is as a conscious process, but also the meaning of the statement that man or man's will is free. When, therefore, he raises the question: What is it that determines the will? one might naturally expect some account of the feelings, so far at least as they influence volition.

Locke, however, reduces all emotional influences to the "uneasiness of desire"; and finds that "the greatest present uneasiness is the spur to action that is constantly most felt, and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action." It is true that he concedes to the will a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires—a power which he calls the "hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings"—and that he exhorts us to correct the "relish of our minds" in view of a greater and more desirable end. How far he thereby lays himself open to the charge of vacillation or inconsistency, is a question that need not detain us. It suffices to note that in his chapter on the "Idea of Power" Locke proposes, if he does not fully establish, that theory of psychological determinism which in our day is so widely accepted, either as a necessity of scientific thinking or because, as Locke himself suggests, it is the very improvement and benefit of freedom, the end and use of our liberty.

Whatever may have been his theoretical conclusions regarding the will, he never loses sight of the practical relations of philosophy. Even in the *Essay* he declares: "Our business here is not to know all things but those which concern our conduct." And having examined the nature of knowledge, he proceeds to formulate the rules that should guide us in the conduct of the understanding. Similarly, in the "Thoughts concerning Education," he brings his psychological principles to bear upon those practical issues which, in part at least, still engage our pedagogical interest. In this larger fashion, therefore, he is the precursor of modern psychology, so far as this seeks, with or without the unanimous approval of psychologists, to be of service in the work of education.

Viewed, therefore, in its totality, both as speculative and applied, Locke's doctrine marks a period of transition. And this in a twofold sense; it shifts the inquiry concerning mind from metaphysical grounds to the data of experience, and it begins to differentiate the problem of epistemology from that of psychology.

In the eyes of his contemporaries, his teaching was a new way of ideas that strangely amused the world. In his own judgment, it was but a new history of an old thing. And we,

however we appreciate its value, may at any rate agree with its author's attitude when he says in the *Conduct of the Understanding*: "That was once new to them—the men of former ages—which any one now receives with veneration for its antiquity, nor was it the worse for appearing as a novelty; and that which is now embraced for its newness will to posterity be old, but not thereby be less true or less genuine. There is no occasion, on this account, to oppose the ancients and the moderns to one another, or to be squeamish on either side. He that wisely conducts his mind in the pursuit of knowledge will gather what lights, and get what helps he can, from either of them, from whom they are best to be had, without adoring the errors, or rejecting the truths, which he may find mingled in them."

EDWARD A. PACE.

HISTORY AND INSPIRATION.

INTRODUCTION.

I. The conditions confronting Catholic biblical critics at the present time, are strongly suggestive of the state of affairs, which existed in the Church at the end of the second and the beginning of the third century, when Christianity and *philosophy* first came into direct contact.

“The multitude are frightened,” writes Clement of Alexandria, “at the Hellenic philosophy, as children are at masks, being afraid lest it lead them astray.”¹ To the minds of the Christians of that time philosophy was, in a certain way, a *heathen* science, dangerous to Christianity.

Pope Gregory IX expressed the views of many of his contemporaries, when he wrote to St. Thomas, that we ought “to confine ourselves to what was told us by the fathers; because faith has no merit if human reason affords arguments.”² But in the days of Clement of Alexandria, those Christians, who regarded philosophical studies merely as a loss of time, and perhaps an indirect evidence of intellectual arrogance, were by no means the most violently opposed to the introduction of philosophical studies among the faithful. “I am not oblivious,” says Clement, “of what is babbled by some, who in their ignorance are frightened at every noise, and say that we ought to occupy ourselves with what is most necessary and what contains the faith; and that we should pass over what is beyond and superfluous . . . Others think, that philosophy was *introduced into life by an evil influence, for the ruin of men*, by an evil inventor.”³

A writer on philosophy, at that time, “did not of course

¹ “Stromata,” VI, 10. The translations are taken from the American edition of the “Ante-Nicene Fathers,” The Christian Literature Company, New York, 1893.

² “Contenti terminis a patribus institutis . . . quoniam fides non habet meritum cui humana ratio praebebat experimentum,” Epistola ad theolog. Paris. 1233. Denzinger, *Enchir.*, n. 379.

³ “Stromata,” I, 1.

imagine that any composition could be so fortunate as that no one would speak against it."¹ There was "great danger in divulging the secret of true philosophy to those whose delight it is unsparingly to speak against everything, not justly; and who shout forth all kinds of names and words, indecorously, deceiving themselves and beguiling those who adhere to them."² Because my work, says Clement, "contains, as the exigencies of the case demand, the Hellenic opinions, I say thus much to those who are fond of finding fault."³

These early Fathers were called on to demonstrate the very fact, that philosophy, although studied first by the heathen Greeks, was simply the search for truth, according to scientific methods. They had to show, that "philosophy does not ruin life by being the originator of false practices and base deeds, although some have calumniated it," and that it does not "drag us away from the faith, as if we were bewitched by some delusive art."⁴ It was necessary for them to write books, in order to convince the Christians that philosophy was "the clear image of truth, a divine gift to the Greeks";⁵ "that philosophy was in a sense a work of Divine Providence."⁶ But, in point of fact, Clement seems to have been quite satisfied, if he succeeded in convincing his contemporaries, that "there is then in philosophy, though stolen as the fire by Prometheus, a slender spark capable of being fanned into flame, a trace of wisdom and an impulse from God."⁷ "For it is the work of Divine wisdom and excellence and power, not only to do good, but especially to ensure that, what happens through the evils hatched by some, may come to a good and useful issue, and to use to advantage those things which appear to be evils."⁸

Christian philosophers were compelled moreover to protest that "those can not condemn the Greeks, who have only a mere

¹ Ibidem.

² "Stromata," I, 2.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ Ibidem.

⁵ Ibidem.

⁶ "Stromata," I, 1.

⁷ I, 17.

⁸ Ibidem.

hearsay knowledge of their opinions, and have not entered into a minute investigation of each department, in order to become acquainted with them.”¹

“Of course,” says Clement, “the teaching, which is according to the Saviour, is complete in itself, and without defect, being ‘the power and wisdom of God’; and the Hellenic philosophy does not, by its approach, make the truth more powerful; but rendering powerless the assault of sophistry against it, and frustrating the treacherous plots laid against the truth, is said to be the proper ‘*fence and wall of the vineyard.*’”²

Between the human knowledge of that time and the Christian religion, philosophy had to build a bridge. The Gospel, preached to the faithful, required a sound apologetic basis, reduced to a scientific system. And inasmuch as philosophy was *the* science of those days, Christian apologists were called on to show, that the teaching of Christianity agreed in all points with true philosophy.

The one great difficulty, which the Fathers had to deal with, was, that all philosophical works were looked on with distrust by Christians. It took them a long time to realize, as Origen wrote to Gregory, “that the children of Israel were commanded to ask from their neighbours, and those who dwelt with them, vessels of silver and gold and raiment, in order that, by spoiling the Egyptians, they might have material for the preparation of the things which pertained to the service of God. For from the things which the children of Israel took from the Egyptians, the vessels in the holy of holies were made,—the ark with its lid, and the cherubim and the mercy-seat, and the golden coffer, where was the manna, the angels’ bread.”³

The philosophical works of the Fathers and medieval scholastics are a “wall of the vineyard of Christ,” which could be built only by giants. But the avowed admirers of this gigantic wall of Christian apologetics, do not remember, as a rule, that, when laying the base or foundation course, “every one of the builders was girded with a sword about

¹ I, 2.

² I, 20.

³ Letter of Origen to Gregory.

his loins." "With one of his hands he did the work, and with the other he held a sword"¹ to defend himself against those of his fellow-Christians, who professed to be vindicators of "tradition."

From being speculative, philosophy has become nowadays more positive. The main grounds of contention for modern scholars are the natural sciences, history and literature. At the present time mankind is living in quite a different intellectual world from that of Clement and St. Thomas. The wall built by the giants of the Middle Ages, will weather the storms of time; the men of the "Dark Ages" used good mortar: but they did not and could not make a bridge between Christianity and modern science.

This union must be effected by the work of Christian critics. Critical history is a new-born science; and it must be confessed that present day apologetics feels the need of sound critical studies, which the Fathers could not furnish. A great amount of new material has been discovered; moreover history is studied according to new and truly scientific methods. Hence modern unbelief is very largely the work of historians, or at least of those who pretend to be such. They try to show that the history of the world is merely the result of natural evolution.

Biblical criticism is of Catholic origin. But, as a matter of fact, the large majority of biblical scholars, who have worked in the "quarries" of criticism during the last fifty years, were non-Catholics. Until quite recently Catholic critics were very few. This fact explains sufficiently the distrust which many Catholics entertain for biblical criticism. Christians "of little faith" do not understand that Greek philosophers and modern unbelievers alike, unconsciously carry on the work of the heathen Sidonians, who prepared the stones from which the temple of Jehova was built in the days of Solomon. But the history of all ages teaches us, that the work of the sons of Belial "prepares the way for the truly royal teaching," as Clement of Alexandria said of Greek philosophy. Or as Origen said, "the things brought from Egypt, which

¹ II Esdras, IV, 17, 18.

the Egyptians had not put to a proper use, are afterwards used for God's service by the chosen people, guided by the wisdom of God."¹

Materials more precious than our forefathers ever dreamt of, are to be found in the huge heaps of ore, which surround the entrance to the mines of modern science. During the last century unbelief has been striving to undermine the deepest foundations of Christianity: "the foundations of the mountains were troubled and were moved." "But—as we read in Holy Writ—the just shall be delivered by knowledge." History has only to be freed from the slag of false philosophy in the furnace of true criticism.

When biblical criticism first made its appearance, it was received with acclamation by the enemies of Christianity: but we are approaching the mountain-top from which Balaam blessed the chosen people whom he had been summoned to curse. The tide of religion in the modern world is no longer ebbing. "He that hath ears to hear" hears already, from behind the dunes, the song of the returning waves.

Truly scientific criticism *can be nothing else* than an apology for truth; and every apology for truth is, of course, an apology for Christianity itself.

II. On the other hand, criticism has to be dealt with very cautiously. The lamp that illuminates may burn the house. "The Sacred Scripture," says Origen, "is wont to represent as an evil the going down from the land of the children of Israel into Egypt, indicating that certain persons derive harm from sojourning among the Egyptians, that is to say, from meddling with the knowledge of the world. [Jero-boam,] so long as he was in the land of Israel, and had not tasted the bread of the Egyptians, made no idols. It was when he fled from the wise Solomon, and went down into Egypt, as it were flying from the wisdom of God, and was made a kinsman of Pharaoh, that he did this. Wherefore, although he did return to the land of Israel, he returned only to divide the people of God, and to make them say of the golden calf 'These be thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee

¹ Letter of Origen to Gregory.

up from the land of Egypt.' And I may tell you from my experience, that not many take from Egypt only the useful, and go away and use it for the service of God; while [Jeroboam] has many brethren. These are they who, from their Greek studies, produce heretical notions and set them up, like the golden calf, in Bethel, which signifies 'God's house.' In these words also there seems to me an indication, that they have set up their own imaginations in the Scriptures, where the Word of God dwells, which is called a figure Bethel. The other idol, the Word says, was set up in Dan. Now the borders of Dan are the most extreme and nearest the borders of the Gentiles. Now some of the devices of these brethren of [Jeroboam,] as we call them, are also very near the borders of the Gentiles."¹

We have quoted this long passage from Origen's letter to Gregory, because it reveals so clearly the striking parallelism between the beginnings of philosophy in the early Christian Church and those of criticism nowadays. Origen, as we see, knew well the dangers to be feared from the study of philosophy. But let us not forget, that he wrote this beautiful letter to encourage and urge Gregory, his disciple, to give himself entirely to the study of philosophy and to "extract from the philosophy of the Greeks what may serve as a course of study or a preparation for Christianity."²

It may be said with truth that the labors of so many faithful Christians have robbed criticism of much of that heathen appearance, which philosophy still had in the days of Clement and Origen. Catholics are beginning to see more clearly that criticism is nothing more than a scientific method of bringing forth "the clear image of truth" and is "a divine gift" to mankind in more recent times. Some of them realize already that criticism is at the present time what philosophy was in the days of Clement: "a work of Divine Providence." In a new world Christianity needed a new apologetic.

The mediæval theologians never studied history according to a critical, scientific method. Many of their "traditions" are

¹ Letter of Origen to Gregory.—Origen confounds in this passage Hadad, the Edomite, with Jeroboam.

² Ibidem.

borrowed from the Jews, without sufficient historical investigation. Travellers in Europe are often shocked at seeing the marvellous beauty of Gothic cathedrals disfigured by shops and stores, which conceal the mighty walls. But has not the Catholic Church, the Church of Christ and his Apostles, been itself surrounded, in the course of time, by numerous small structures which do not in any sense belong to the edifice itself? We shall never cease to admire the philosophical systems, on which mediæval genius built the cathedrals of Christian science and scholastic theology; but from an historical point of view, we can not be blamed, if the work of ancient theologians sometimes produces upon us the same impression, which travellers feel when they see the splendid mediæval cathedrals hidden by mean and insignificant shops.

The collapse of those buildings, put up by theologians—who, as we said, borrowed a great deal of their materials from the Jewish Talmud—by no means signifies the collapse of the Catholic Church! On the contrary, by pulling down these unworthy structures, criticism will show the Church of Christ in the true outlines of its divine architecture.

Sometimes the critic may perhaps shock those who are more pious than learned, or irritate the poetic, by pulling down the ivy which in the course of time has grown around the ogives of the sanctuary and the niches of the saints. But the questions put to the apologists of the Catholic Church are not questions of poetical taste. They have simply to find out the truth. "Let my barking critics listen," says St. Jerome—another Father, who, when he wrote the Vulgate, was so bitterly attacked by the vindicators of a would-be tradition—"when I tell them, that my motive in toiling at this book was not to censure the ancient translation. . . . Let those who will, keep the old books with their gold and silver letters on purple skins, loads of writings rather than manuscripts, if only they will leave for me and mine, our poor pages and copies, which are less remarkable for *beauty* than for *accuracy*."¹

Moreover, as a matter of fact, the critic does not in any way impair the poetical beauty of the Catholic Church. There

¹ Preface to Job.

is an abundance of truly and strictly historical events, which show its divine origin and character. And legends born of the faith of many generations of Christians, do not by any means lose their poetical beauty, if we recognize that they are not history, but poetry. In history we see the golden dome of the Catholic Church gleaming and glittering in the sun-light of eternal *truth*. In the poetry of the semi-historical and religious legends, left by the childlike mediæval giants—who with the same hand, which made the Saracens tremble, wove at home little garlands and wreaths for the Virgin Mother and the holy patrons of their towns and villages—critics admire the divine *beauty*, which Christ, the divine author of so many wonderful but not historical parables, has lavished upon His Spouse, the Catholic Church.

Nevertheless, as we have said, criticism has to be handled very cautiously. This is true especially with regard to questions treating of *the literary character of biblical history*, where carefulness and prudence are imperiously required from those who know and realize, that the whole Bible is the Word of God. The historical value of the sacred narrative depends on its literary character, and many of the theological arguments, found in our text-books, presuppose the historical character of the biblical passages from which they are drawn.

We must not, however, fall into the opposite extreme. Provided that we do not lose sight of the lighthouse on the rock of St. Peter, there is no reason why we should be afraid to set sail. There is no science in which some Catholics have not run aground. But the running aground of one or even several critics will never be a sufficient reason, why biblical criticism itself should be condemned: especially by theologians, in whose high seas the Church found it necessary to set up so many beacons, in order to warn Catholics against the innumerable crags and cliffs of philosophical heresies.

We know perfectly well that all questions dealing with the literary character of the biblical narratives have very far-reaching consequences. But, on the other hand, if Catholic scholarship is to keep abreast of the times and is to satisfy the requirements of the modern world, it is absolutely impossible to avoid these questions.

III. It is a foregone conclusion that the Catholic doctrine of the inerrancy of the Bible allows of no compromise whatsoever. On this point a Catholic ought to be always very explicit. It is impossible to admit a single error in the sacred writings, without either perverting the Catholic notion of inspiration or making God himself the author of error. The whole Bible is inspired, in all its parts, in all its sentences, and even in its *obiter dicta*. Every affirmation of the Bible is unfaillingly true.¹

But every sentence of the Bible, of course, must needs be true only in that sense in which God and the inspired author wish it to be understood. We read, for instance, that, in the days of Noe, "it repented God, that He had made man on the earth" and that "He was touched inwardly with sorrow of heart" (Gen. VI, 6). This is evidently true only in an anthropomorphical sense. In a philosophical sense it is untrue. But it is clear that this philosophical sense was not *intended* by the sacred writer! And for this very simple reason such a text offers by no means any difficulty against the doctrine of inspiration.

There is no error without a *judgment* or an affirmation; no judgment without the *intention* to judge. Hence it is manifest that we never can impute an error to the inspired author of a book, or charge his book with containing untruth, unless we take book, passages and sentences *in the very sense in which they are affirmed* by the writer.

¹In the last number of the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, Dec., 1904, pp. 250-266, Professor Rev. Leclair wrote an article on *L'Erreur dans la Bible*, in which he maintains that errors, in the strict sense of the word, are undoubtedly to be found in the Bible. But the learned Jesuit, Father Prat, does not affirm too much, when he says: "Si la tradition Catholique n'est pas une chimère, si le consentement unanime des Pères n'est pas un vain mot, si la constance, la perpétuité et l'universalité d'une doctrine constituent une règle de foi, il n'est pas de dogme plus solidement établi que l'inerrance de l'Écriture" ("La Bible et l'Histoire," p. 45). "Le mot *erreur*"—Leclair writes—"est effrayant: quel blasphème d'attribuer à l'Écriture des erreurs: c'en est aussi un grand de lui attribuer des inexactitudes ou des vérités relatives" (p. 265). If we take "relative" in that sense which Leclair here attaches to this word, his remark is very just: understood according to our Catholic tradition, the *divine authorship* of a text is absolutely incompatible with the smallest inaccuracy of judgment on the part of its author. But we hope to show in these pages that, nevertheless, there is no opposition whatever between the Catholic doctrine on this point and the biblical texts themselves.

It stands to reason, furthermore, that an author, in order to make himself understood, must observe the rules of human speech and literary custom. But if he does, and if nevertheless readers misunderstand the true sense, the readers themselves, and not the author, are responsible for the error. In such a case there is no error in the writings, but only in the mind of the reader.

In order to set forth the true sense intended and expressed by the sacred writer, it is not sufficient, as everybody knows, merely to examine the words and grammatical construction of single sentences. We must also consider the *context*; not only the immediate context, but at the same time—what theologians frequently seem to forget—the more *remote* context, that is to say, *the literary character* of the whole passage or even of the whole book.

A narrative may be a parable or a *midrash*, it may be strictly historical, symbolical or merely poetical: everything depends on the kind of literature, chosen by the inspired author in addressing himself to his readers.

Thus, what we ought to know first of all, is the *intention* of the writer. And inasmuch as we can not ask the ancient writer himself, we must examine his book, written according to the prevailing literary customs of his time. Consequently, the only way to know the *intention of the author* is to study the *literary character of his writings*. The same sentence, in an idealistic or symbolical passage, may have quite a different value and meaning from what it would have in a strictly historical work. Drawn from such a symbolical passage, theological arguments, which presuppose its historical character, would lose at once what is apparently their most unshakable strength. For instance, the argument drawn from Genesis, to prove that Adam was created from the dust of the earth, and Eve from the rib of Adam, would have no value, if it could be proved that the sacred author did not intend to write history but merely to play upon the Hebrew words for “man” and “woman”—and to deliver, in this fictitious form, a moral doctrine.

Sometimes the Bible states explicitly to what class of literature a narrative belongs. In the Gospels, for instance, we

are told several times that some narratives are parables. In other cases the literary character is self-evident. It would *e. g.* be quite superfluous to say that Ezechiel's description of Israel's restoration in Canaan can not be understood in every instance in a strictly historical sense. But there are still other cases in which the literary character is by no means self-evident. Critics, who by their studies live in the world of the ancient authors, will very often pass on biblical narratives a different judgment from that of theologians living in the world of Suarez or St. Thomas. Theologians are exposed to the danger of losing sight of the enormous difference between ancient history and the modern science of that name. Perhaps, as far as history is concerned, persons whose minds were never trained in scholastic studies, will even understand the intention of the authors of some biblical passages better than those learned men, who read and analyze and interpret the sentences of the Bible as they do the positive affirmations in the philosophical and scholastic works of our great Christian theologians. Biblical history is written, not in a scientific, but in a popular form.

Nevertheless, as there is such an immense ocean of time between us and the world of the ancient Hebrew authors, and as the literary standards of ancient Semitic peoples are so entirely different from those of Western peoples in the twentieth century after Christ, it becomes every day more evident, how far Protestantism was mistaken in leaving the final interpretation of the Bible to the people themselves. Wherever the literary character of a biblical narrative is doubtful, *criticism* has to pass judgment. "I have no doubt," says Origen, speaking of the intention of the biblical author to write strict history, "that an attentive reader will in numerous instances hesitate."¹ "It is no easier," says Mgr. Mignot, "for a man who has made no special studies, to unravel a question of biblical criticism than it is for one who is neither a chemist,

¹ "De principiis," lib. IV. n. 19. A recent writer seems to deny that Origen has any authority in biblical matters. The Fathers had quite a different idea of this great ancient scholar, especially St. Jerome. A man may be a good observer of facts, without interpreting them correctly.

a surgeon, a physician, nor an historian, to solve a problem of chemistry, anatomy, pathology or history.”¹

IV. We can not expect from those theologians who continue the work of the mediæval scholastics, the solution of the great modern “ biblical question,” which has given rise to such heated discussion. This question must be settled by exegetes and critics. As the literary character of the sacred writings is the foundation of so many theological arguments, Catholic critics themselves ought, of course, to be thoroughly trained in the study of theology. But, as von Hummelauer points out in his recent exegetic treatise on inspiration: if in questions of morals, we appeal to moralists, in questions of canon law to canonists, it stands to reason that questions regarding the literary and historical character of Holy Scripture ought to be referred first of all to the Catholic scripturists.

Pope Leo urged the Catholic scripturists to study biblical history according to a truly critical method. If they act up to the full letter of this command, Catholic scripturists may expose themselves to various dangers, which menace them from many and different sides; but, no doubt, they will follow the example given by St. Jerome, who in his Preface to the four Gospels, which he addressed to Pope Damasus, writes: “ You urge me to revise the old Latin version. The labour is one of love, but at the same time both perilous and presumptuous; for in judging others I must be content to be judged by all; and how can I dare to change the language of the world in its hoary old age and carry it back to the early days of its infancy? Is there a man, learned or unlearned, who will not, when he takes this volume into his hand and perceives that what he reads does not suit his settled tastes, break out immediately into violent language, and call me a forger and a profane person for having the audacity to add anything to the ancient books, or to make any changes or corrections therein? Now there are two consoling reflections which enable me to bear the odium: in the first place, the command given by you who are the supreme bishop (Pope Damasus); and secondly, even

¹ Lettre sur l'Apologétique.”

on the showing of those who revile, readings at variance with the early copies can not be right.”¹

Leaving the reader to apply these words of St. Jerome to the modern Catholic critics, we approach the task of setting forth the true notion of biblical history, paying special regard to its inspired character. As a rule “General Introductions” to Holy Scripture, written by Catholics, do not give sufficient attention to some preliminary questions, which can not only be no longer neglected, but ought nowadays to be brought more and more into prominence.

I. A BOOK WITHOUT ANY ERROR.²

Ancient books naturally and necessarily bear traces and vestiges of the common opinions of their time, regarding either scientific or historical matters.

This thesis may seem very simple. Truth is nearly always so. But this simple thesis has such far-reaching consequences, that, once rightly understood, it explains nearly all the difficulties, which some theologians find in the works of Catholic critics. There would be more harmony between critics and scholastics if both took as their starting-point this simple, undeniable fact.

Because of its great importance, there is no reason why we should, on account of its simplicity, abstain from submitting it to a somewhat detailed psychological analysis. There are many theologians who do not seem to realize its far-reaching consequences. Nevertheless we are convinced, and we repeat, that if we agree on this, our starting-point, some of the most deplorable misunderstandings between critics and scholastics are bound to disappear. Would it not therefore be wise if, in future, critics more urgently drew the attention of theologians to the natural consequences of this fact, as plain as it is important? Agreement on a question depends very often on the way the question is put.

¹ Preface to the four Gospels.

² In this chapter we hope to establish the soundness of the distinction already set forth and briefly explained in the articles we wrote, in “Het Centum,” against Professor Bolland’s “Oude gegevens uit het verre verleden der Kerk.” These articles, in a later reprint, form the “Appendix” of *Sloet*, Bolland’s *Lichtkogels*, Enschede, 1899. The readers may compare this chapter with *Lagrange*, *La Methode Historique*, Paris, 1903, pp. 95 & ff.

I. Let us, for instance, take an author of the thirteenth century, who may have written a number of books on different subjects, and whom we shall suppose to be infallible, *as author*.

Such an author will, of course, never affirm anything that is not true. Inerrancy excludes anything that in later centuries will prove false. Nevertheless, in his *manner of speaking about* the names of books, ancient Egyptian and Babylonian history, natural sciences, etc., such an infallible author will frequently afford to critics arguments by which they will be able to demonstrate, that his books were written in the thirteenth century.

Why? Because in his *manner of speaking about* these things they recognize *opinions of the thirteenth century*. Each century has on a great many subjects its own characteristic opinions. These opinions are characteristic—mark it well—not of any one particular person, but of the whole century.

The real “subject” of these opinions is thus not any particular person, but the people of that time. *For*, when an ancient work is discovered, we can not prove by the presence of such characteristic opinions, that it was written by this or that particular author, but only that it belongs to a particular time, for instance, the thirteenth century.

If these opinions are *false*, the century, that is to say, the generation of that century, is mistaken. But these errors do not affect at all the veracity of a man living and writing at that time, as long as he does not himself affirm them personally.

We can not say that an author is personally guilty of error in his writing, that is, *as author*, if he *relates* such opinions without affirming, either explicitly or implicitly, that they are true; even if he does not know, that they are untrue. In many cases the author of a book who touches on subjects having no bearing on what he teaches, is simply the representative of his age. Can such a representative be blamed for the common errors of his age if he does not affirm them personally? Not any more than the representative of an absent witness, in a law-court, could be considered the real “subject” of a testimony which he simply relates or translates into another language.

The only difference is that, *as man*, the author is of course himself part of his generation. But if he does not affirm these common opinions *as author*; if he does not affirm *in writing*, explicitly or implicitly, that they are true; if he does not guarantee the truth of those opinions *personally*; that is to say, if he does not affirm them as a man distinguished from and speaking to the other members of his generation: *the author, as such*, can in no way be considered the *subject* of those errors, and *the man*, who writes, is their subject only in as far as he is the *representative of his generation*.

Bossuet does not affirm any error if, in his Philosophy of History, he *starts from* a common opinion of his time, that the world had existed only four thousand years before Christ. Bossuet does not teach this to his readers. And none of his readers suppose that such was his intention. But both, author and reader, starting from this common opinion of their age, the former leads the latter to acknowledge that God himself, and God alone, is the Lord of the history of mankind and of nations. An author does not speak *as author* where he does not address himself to his readers.

II. A brief examination of an article in the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas will serve to show, that this distinction between author and generation is by no means a subterfuge, but is rooted in the very nature of literature.

Let us take, for instance, III, q. 44, a. 2. Here St. Thomas proves that there is no reason why Christ should have restricted his miracles to men and "lower creatures," and could not have extended them, *e. g.*, to the sun.

His argument is manifest. First he appeals to Holy Scripture. In St. Luke we read that when our Lord died on the cross "there was darkness all over the earth until the ninth hour. And the sun was darkened" (23, 44). But in his argument St. Thomas makes no use of this text and merely points out that, because the purpose of the miracles of Christ was to prove His divinity, such a miracle was even more "in keeping with" the aim of God than other miracles concerning creatures of a lower order. This argument from reason is illustrated as follows: "*And this is what Dionysius says in his*

letter to Polycarp: 'It is evident that nobody could interfere with the order and movement of celestial bodies, but He that moves all at his beck.' " The thesis which St. Thomas defends "in corpore" of this article, is therefore not that the darkening of the sun was a miracle, but merely that such a miracle would be perfectly "in keeping with" the aim of God.

It would be difficult to find any fault in this teaching of St. Thomas. He does not affirm any error. Where he writes "*and this is what Dionysius says*," the sense *intended* by St. Thomas is: "and this we read in the letter, which according to the common opinion of our time, was written by Dionysius." The designation of his source by the name of Dionysius the Areopagite is no *personal* affirmation of St. Thomas concerning the authorship of this letter and the book containing it, but belongs merely to the *form* of St. Thomas' personal teaching. This form is drawn from the common opinion of *his generation*. St. Thomas did not know his generation was mistaken; but, as we shall afterwards see more clearly, he does not affirm this error personally, neither explicitly nor implicitly.

Among the objections proposed by St. Thomas was this, that "according to the motion of the celestial bodies, the courses of time are designated, as we read in *Gen. 1, 14*: 'Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven to divide the day and the night, and let them be for signs, and for seasons and for days and years.' Thus, then, the course of the heavenly bodies being changed, the distinction and order of time was changed. But we do not read that this was perceived by the astronomers who 'gaze at the stars and count the months,' as is said by *Isaias (47, 13)*. Therefore it seems to follow that through Christ no change was made with regard to the course of the heavenly bodies."

How does St. Thomas meet this objection? He points out "that through this miracle of Christ the order of time was not reversed."

"For according to *some*, the darkness or obscurity of the sun, which occurred at the time of the passion of Christ, was due to the fact that the sun's rays were withdrawn, no change

being made as regards the motion of the heavenly bodies. Hence, *St. Jerome* says. . . . But *Origen* states that this happened through the interposition of the clouds. . . .”

St. Thomas gives these opinions of “some” for what they are worth. The great question was whether the miraculous darkness was confined to Jerusalem and Palestine. *St. Thomas* thought he knew an eye-witness of the event who observed it outside of Palestine. Therefore the explanations of *St. Jerome* and *Origen*, contending that this miracle could not be observed in other countries, seemed to him to be illusive.

“But with regard to this we must rather believe *Dionysius*, who, an eye-witness, saw that this happened by the interposition of the moon between us and the sun, for he says: ‘We suddenly saw the moon approaching to the sun,’ living as they were in Egypt, as the author says in the same place: and he points out four miracles.”

For each one of these four miracles *St. Thomas* quotes a text of *Dionysius*, and he shows that the facts related by *Dionysius* are indeed true miracles, starting from the then common knowledge of physical science. Thus, for instance,

“The third miracle is that the natural eclipse always begins from the western part of the sun and proceeds in the direction of the East: and this because the moon according to its proper motion, by which it is moved from the West to the East, is faster than the sun in its proper motion. And therefore the moon, coming from the West, reaches the sun and passes it, going toward the East. But then the moon already passed the sun and was separated from it by about half a circle, on the other side. Whence it must have returned to the East in the direction of the sun, and have reached it in the first place from the Eastern side, proceeding towards the West. And this is what *Dionysius* says: ‘We also saw the eclipse beginning from the East and coming usque ad solarem terminum (because the whole sun was eclipsed) and afterwards returning.’”

The difficulty that no other authors mention so stupendous a miracle is met by saying “that the astronomers, who were living at that time in other parts of the world, did not pay attention to it and did not think of observing it, because it was not the time of a (natural) eclipse; they thought that the

obscurity was caused by some trouble or darkness of the air; *but in Egypt*, where clouds seldom appear on account of the clearness of the atmosphere, *Dionysius and his companions were struck*, so that they observed about the obscurity what we said before."

With regard to these passages of the *Summa* we observe first of all that St. Thomas may be mistaken in his *personal teaching* and *affirm* or teach his readers an *error*, concerning either the real nature of the event mentioned by St. Luke, or the scientific explanation of this event. *This* would be of course impossible in inspired writings. Even in the hypothesis that the affirmation should be contained in conclusions of mere *argumenta ad hominem*, all personal affirmations of the inspired authors themselves, speaking to their readers, must necessarily be true.

Whether or not St. Thomas here positively teaches an error, preferring the authority of Dionysius to the authority of St. Jerome and Origen, is a question which for our purpose is of little importance. Some readers may hold that the real and indeed personal affirmation of St. Thomas is only this, that in judging of an event, the authority of an eye-witness is to be preferred. Must we say, therefore, that, because of this principle, St. Thomas makes himself responsible for all that is contained in the statement of Dionysius? Or does he *only* affirm that the grounds,¹ upon which one interpretation is founded, are stronger than those of the other? Does "*magis credendum*" signify a positive affirmation?

Let us suppose that St. Thomas does indeed teach an error; which, as we said, would be impossible in the Bible. Of far more interest, however, is the fact that in these same passages we find several inaccuracies which certainly do *not* belong to St. Thomas personally, *as author*.

St. Thomas shows clearly by his manner of using and speaking of the works "*of Dionysius*" the Areopagite—which at the present time we know to be apocryphal—that he admits, with regard to them, the opinions of his time. Nevertheless, that these works were written by Dionysius is by no means an *error*, which is *affirmed or taught* by St. Thomas in this article of the *Summa*.

¹ The authenticity of the Works of Dionysius being supposed.

St. Thomas admits also, that *Dionysius the Areopagite lived in Egypt*; and that he *saw there a miraculous eclipse of the sun* on the day of our Lord's death. But St. Thomas does not teach this. His contemporaries and he himself found this statement in the apocryphal books, which they believed to be authentic. The authenticity and the historical character of these works were admitted by everybody. St. Thomas has not the slightest idea of teaching this to his readers; nor do these so understand him. But author and readers are reasoning together and discussing *another* question, starting from this common opinion, about the truth or untruth of which no question was raised, nor answer was given. Thus then St. Thomas does not affirm as author, that is to say, does not teach his readers that Dionysius the Areopagite lived in Egypt; neither that these works are of a strictly historical character.

St. Thomas admits the different facts quoted by Dionysius and builds upon these facts his arguments, proving that, according to the narrative of Dionysius, the event, mentioned by St. Luke, was indeed a great miracle and could be observed all over the world. But these arguments are built *upon* those facts. The facts belong to Dionysius the Areopagite, not to St. Thomas. He had a right *to make use of them*, because he and his generation considered them historical. The intention of St. Thomas was not however to teach this at all. But author and readers had to start in their discussion from a certain amount of generally admitted truths and opinions, among which was *e. g.* the common opinion regarding the historical character of the "Works of Dionysius." As far as they belong to him personally, the arguments of St. Thomas are correct. The *basis* of his arguments was of course the common opinion, which held these works to be historical. But this basis was not the work of St. Thomas. The collapse of this basis in later times, therefore, does not mean that St. Thomas' *personal* teaching *to his generation* was untrue; but what is untrue, is the teaching *of his generation to succeeding generations*, reading the works of St. Thomas and other representatives of this century. The arguments of St. Thomas, as author, addressing himself to his contemporaries, remain therefore *true* arguments. But they are called *argumenta ad*

hominem, because they are not arguments of such a kind as are *absolutely* true and valid at all times and for *all* generations.

In the Bible also we find *argumenta ad hominem*; on this point all scholars nowadays agree. But, as we said, the conclusions affirmed personally by the inspired author himself, must necessarily in every case be *absolutely* true, at *all* times.

St. Thomas admits, moreover, the opinions of his time concerning physical and astronomical science. Basing his arguments *upon* the facts mentioned by Dionysius, and *upon* the common opinion that "Dionysius" was an eye-witness and a trustworthy historian, he proves the miraculous character of those facts; and this he does by *making use of* the common knowledge of natural science possessed by the people of his time. But St. Thomas has no intention whatsoever to teach natural science; he *starts from* the scientific knowledge and opinions of his generation. The error is not in any personal affirmation by which he addresses himself to his contemporaries, but in the opinions themselves, whose "subject" is again not the author, *as such*, but the generation, writing by its *representative*, St. Thomas.

Of course, St. Thomas *says explicitly*, that Dionysius and his companions were in Egypt when "the sun was darkened"; he says that they saw how this happened. Nevertheless, he does not *teach* it. His *personal affirmation* is only that he reads so in a work which his generation held to be authentic and historical. He affirms of course implicitly the existence of this common opinion; but as regards its truth or untruth, there was again neither question raised, nor answer given.

Many other similar examples might be quoted from this masterpiece of theological works. Whenever St. Thomas touches on history, literature, physical sciences, etc., which are not the object and do not belong to the sphere of the great philosopher and theologian—we are immediately confronted with the generation of his time and hear no longer the teaching of the Angelic Doctor himself. Merely making use of the knowledge of his time, St. Thomas simply becomes the representative of his backward generation. A few other instances may show us more clearly that, as a rule, it is very easy to dis-

tinguish those places, where St. Thomas does not speak *as author*, from those where he indeed addresses himself to his readers.

Against the thesis (III, q. 46, a. 10) that Calvary, "a hill outside of Jerusalem," was "a proper place for the death of Christ," this difficulty was urged: "A remedy or medicine must correspond to the illness. But the passion of Christ was a medicine against the sin of Adam. Now then Adam was not buried at Jerusalem, but at Hebron: as is said in *Josue 14, 15*: 'The name of Hebron before was called Cariath-Arbe: Adam the greatest was laid there among the Eniacim.' Hence it seems that Christ ought to have suffered at Hebron, and not at Jerusalem."

St. Thomas answers: "We reply that *Jerome* says: 'some explained that the place of Calvary signifies where Adam is buried, and owes its name to the fact that the *head* of Adam was buried there. This interpretation may be pleasing to the ears of the people, but is nevertheless untrue. For outside of the city, without the gate, are places where the *heads* of the condemned are cut off; and these places received the name of Calvary. Hence Christ was crucified here, because, where the common place of the condemned had been, there had to be erected the standard of the passion. Adam was buried near Hebron and Arbe, as we read in the book of *Jesu the son of Nave*.' It was indeed more fitting that Christ should be crucified in the common place of the condemned than near the grave of Adam, in order that we might see that the cross of Christ was not only a remedy against the personal sin of Adam, but also against the sin of the whole world."

Adam was not buried near Hebron. In the book of *Josue* we read: "And the name of Hebron before was *Kirjath-Arbe* (*Town of Arabia*, who was) the greatest *man* (adam) among the *Anakim*." In the Vulgate St. Jerome was influenced by a well known tradition or speculation of the Jews, which he relates in the text quoted by St. Thomas. Our English Catholic version "*Adam, the greatest among the Enicim*, was buried there" renders neither the Hebrew nor the Latin text. The Vulgate refers to Adam, the progenitor of mankind.

All scholars agree that the reading of the Vulgate is not a correct rendering of the original text. Nevertheless, St. Thomas follows the Vulgate. He admits, therefore, that Adam, our progenitor, was buried near Hebron. But his "opponent," whose difficulty is quoted in the objection, admits and says the same. As far as the question raised in the *Summa* is concerned, both *start* from this common opinion. St. Thomas affirms and explains only, that, although Adam was buried near Hebron, according to the common opinion of his time, yet Calvary was "a convenient place" for the death of Christ.

Especially in the interpretation of those "speculations" about what is or should be "convenient," we ought to be very cautious and must not assert too readily *positive affirmations* of the mediæval theologians.

In several places, however, St. Thomas relates the common errors of his age in such a way, that they become errors personal to himself, *as author; because he affirms them.*

We would of course merely show our own ignorance, if we should blame this genius of the Middle Ages for the fact that his generation, and he himself, did not know more about ancient history and natural sciences. As every individual, so mankind at large develops its faculties in the course of time. Nevertheless, it is clear that St. Thomas himself affirms an untruth, and that his book teaches an error, if he himself affirms personally, that is, as author, a common opinion which is false.

So we read, for instance, an incorrect answer of St. Thomas to this objection: "It would seem that celestial bodies can influence the very demons. For in certain phases of the moon the demons torment some men, who are therefore called *lunatics*. Thus the demons are subject to the influence of the heavenly bodies" (I, q. 115, a. 5).

The Angelic Doctor replies by saying that "the fact that demons torment men in certain phases of the moon, happens because of two things. In the first place, because they (the demons) intend to defame in such a way the creature of God, that is the moon, as Jerome and Chrysostom say. Secondly, since they can not do anything except by means of natural



forces, they study the fitness of bodies for the purposes which they intend. But it is manifest that the brain is the most fluid ("humidissimum") of all the parts of the body, as Aristotle says (*De Somn. et vig. Cap. 5 post med.*), and therefore especially subject to the influence of the moon, which of its nature affects liquids. But the animal or sensitive forces have their seat in the brain: and therefore the demons trouble men's imaginations according to the changes of the moon, since they perceive the brain to be liable to it."

Here the personal teaching of Thomas is evidently the very affirmation of the common opinion, which we may suppose to be false.

The same can be said of what St. Thomas writes a few lines further: "We answer, that, as Augustine says: 'Demons are attracted by different kinds of stones, herbs, logs, animals, songs and rites, not as animals by food, but as spirits by signs'; in so far as these are offered to them as a sign of divine honour, for which they are eager."

In those instances St. Thomas not only *makes use of* the common opinions of his time, and builds his own arguments and affirmations *upon* them, but he *affirms* them himself *as author*.

In some other instances it may be doubtful whether St. Thomas either affirms or merely relates the common opinion of his generation. So, for instance, where he says that is it "*credible*" that also in other parts of the world, not only in the Orient, some events happened which were "signs" of the birth of Christ: "as at Rome oil flowed and in Spain three suns appeared, which gradually merged into one (*Eusebius in Chron. et Innocentius III, sermone de Nativitate*)."
III, q. 36, a. 3, ad 3.

Here St. Thomas *says* that those miracles occurred at Rome and in Spain. But if we remember the way in which history was written in earlier days (see further), it is by no means evident that St. Thomas intended to affirm personally and positively the historical truth of those facts. He may have merely intended to quote or relate what he found in his sources. Perhaps he intended simply to affirm that it was possible or likely; which seems to be the true meaning of "*credible*."

III. So much for St. Thomas. After this it will be easy to convince my readers of the absolute impossibility of writing a number of books, dealing indirectly with several kinds of science, without making any use of the common opinions of the time, and without taking them sometimes simply for what they are worth.

It is of course impossible for any one man, at any one time, to teach mankind all the natural truths which will be known in later centuries.

But the consequence of this impossibility is as important as it is simple. If an author of the first century after Christ had indicated writings whose literary origin was studied and discovered afterwards, by names other than those used by his contemporaries; if in his book the earth was spoken of as a sphere; if in referring to the history of Babylonia and Egypt, the author did not use the knowledge of his time, but started from data which have been revealed to us, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, by the study of the cuneiform inscriptions and hieroglyphics; if, when touching indirectly on questions of astronomy and physical science, the author had spoken, not as a man of his own generation, but as a student of Laplace; if he *could* have written such a work in the first century—his book would have been in many respects unintelligible to the author's contemporaries, and would necessarily in some regards have been considered foolish or absurd. If the Apostles could have written such a book, nothing would have kept the people away from the teachings of the Gospel more than this.

God, who inspired the sacred books, did not prepare men to read these books, by revealing to them all historical and scientific truths!

It is therefore easy to understand that even an infallible author could by no means write a book which touched indirectly on innumerable questions of various kinds, and which should contain nothing but absolute truth, recognizable in every century—even in the *forms* wherein the affirmations of the author are embedded, and in the *manner* in which all things are spoken of.

God himself could not write such a book. Why? Because such a book evidently implies a contradiction. What is recognizable as true and held to be such nowadays, was in

many cases ridiculed some centuries ago. What we ourselves laugh at in the twentieth century, was in former centuries frequently regarded as true. Therefore a book can not touch upon all kinds of questions and still correspond to the knowledge of *all* centuries. At least it can not correspond to it in such a way that not only the author's personal affirmations, but even their *forms*—which have to be borrowed from the world in which the author lives and from the knowledge of *his generation*—should coincide with the knowledge of *all* generations and *each* of them.

A painter can not paint in the air, he needs canvas and a frame. An author can not write on *nothing*; his canvas is the knowledge of his time; his frame is made up of a great number of universally admitted truths and opinions, which, of course, it is impossible *to use* and *to start from* without ever *mentioning* them.

The author of an historical book can not begin with the first principles of philosophy, and, after having demonstrated their truth, continue his demonstration along the whole line of the philosophical and scientific opinions of his time . . . before commencing to treat of his own subject! His *starting-point* is the mass of opinions generally admitted by his generation; it is the knowledge of his time.

We do not contend that it is absolutely impossible for a cautious author to avoid *untruth*! We do not say that it is impossible for an author, to restrain from *affirming* and making himself *personally* responsible for the truth of the generally admitted opinions from which he draws! In an inspired book this goes without saying. But it is absolutely impossible that any *generation*, which did not enjoy a special revelation or inspiration, should have entertained no opinions which will afterwards prove to be untrue. And it is *for this reason* that *a book*, dealing at least indirectly with a wide range of subjects, can not avoid reflecting some errors. The passages quoted from St. Thomas show sufficiently, that the writer of a book not only makes personal affirmations, but that, *as member and mouth-piece of his generation*, he also gives expression to many opinions, of which his generation is the subject, and from which he himself, *as author*, starts. This distinction has to

be made in the analysis of *any* book. "Tell me, sharpest of disputants," says St. Jerome, "which is greater, to hang the vast weight of the earth on nothing, and *to balance it on the changing surface of the waves*, or that God should pass through a closed door?"¹ Nobody will contend that here St. Jerome himself affirms an error!

We acknowledge evidently that common opinions, committed to writing, contain implicitly an affirmation. This affirmation is furthermore twofold, and has a twofold "subject."

The subject of the affirmation, which is contained in the common opinions themselves, is the generation of the time. The subject of the affirmation, which is implied in the writing of these opinions, is the author.

The only question is, what does the author affirm by writing them?

We shall see, that, especially in compilations of olden times, this does not necessarily mean that the author makes himself responsible for the scientific or historical truth of every detail. But we are dealing here with *any* book, written at *any* time; the only condition is that, in the passages in question, the authors do not address themselves to their readers, but simply mention some common opinions, or make use of those common opinions, which are their starting-point. In those cases the common opinions are what we called canvas and frame of the picture painted by the author himself. This being supposed, we contend, that by the simple fact of committing these opinions to writing, the authors *never* affirm *more* than that they *do not know* whether these opinions are true or false. But even this affirmation is not necessarily and *per se* implied. For, *argumenta ad hominem* have been always lawful. We can know the personal opinion or judgment of the man who makes use of these common opinions, only by examining the whole context, and, if possible, by comparing several passages or books. The only affirmation necessarily and *per se* implied in the fact of writing them, is, that the author judges he can make a lawful use of them.

¹ "Treatise against John of Jerusalem," n. 35.

But it stands to reason that an *author* does not *write an error*, if his generation and he himself, as part of that generation, *do not know* that a common opinion, which he as author makes use of, is untrue. An error supposes a judgment; but “not to know” is by no means a judgment.

If we consider those opinions *in themselves*, they are *formal* errors of the generation of that time; unless they were merely held to be the best hypotheses then possible. In such a case they would not be positively and definitely affirmed as absolutely true. And without this, there can be of course no question of a positive error.

But *in the book*, where those opinions are only mentioned—because the book itself, that is, the author, does not affirm them—(1) there is no *personal* error at all on the part of the author, *as author*, because there is no personal judgment as to their truth. (2) As far as the generation of that time is the “subject” of the affirmations, those opinions—which *outside of the book*, are *formal* errors of the generation—are *in the book*, where they are not affirmed, only *material* errors of the generation and of its *representative* and interpreter, who personally in all likelihood *does not know* that they are untrue.

This Principle applies to the Bible.

Since our general principle—which distinguishes between the author himself and the generation, whose representative the author is *as man*—applies to *any* book, we would expose ourselves to the danger of misunderstanding the sacred writings, if we paid no attention to it in interpreting Holy Scripture.

It would be useless to quote here a great number of passages. As far as *the principle* is concerned, a single example proves just as much. Therefore we shall confine ourselves in this chapter to a few texts.

I. In the *Epistle of St. Jude* we read: “*When Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing speech, but said: ‘The Lord command thee.’ But these men blaspheme whatever things they know not: and what*

things soever they naturally know, like dumb beasts, in these they are corrupted" (vv. 9-10).

"Now of these Enoch also, the seventh from Adam, prophesied, saying: 'Behold, the Lord cometh with thousands of his saints, to execute judgment upon all, and to reprove all the ungodly for all the works of their ungodliness, whereby they have done ungodly, and all the hard things which ungodly sinners have spoken against God'" (vv. 14-15).

"And the angels who kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation (ἀπολιπόντας τὸ ἴδιον οἶκητριον) he hath reserved in everlasting chains unto the judgment of the great day (εἰς κρίσιν μεγάλης ἡμέρας)" (v. 6).

St. Jude merely makes allusion to the dispute between the devil and Michael about the place where the body of Moses was buried. He supposes that this fact is known to his readers. According to Origen, Didymus, Clement of Alexandria and other early Christian writers, St. Jude drew his information from the apocryphal book "*Assumption of Moses*." The Greek text of this book has been lost, and the fragment of the Latin version does not reach as far as the death of Moses, where this dispute between Michael and the devil had to be related. But there is no reason at all why we should not admit the testimony of the Fathers, who knew the whole text of the original Greek book. Moreover, the passage quoted by Gelasius of Kyzikus (Mansi II, 857) shows that this quarrel was indeed related in the apocryphal book, known to the readers of St. Jude. The quotation of the very words "The Lord command thee" is also more natural, if we admit that St. Jude refers to a written source.¹ But even if we suppose that St. Jude had never seen this apocryphal work and took his example from the oral tradition, we will nevertheless have to apply our general principle.

This mention of the dispute between Michael and the devil is, as we said, merely an allusion to what is supposed to be known. St. Jude does not *teach* his readers the historical truth of this source or tradition. He simply *makes use of* the

¹ Cf. Zahn, "Einleitung," II, p. 107, and Chase, "Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible," s. v. Jude.

general knowledge of it. He illustrates his own teaching—that the blasphemers, whom he is blaming and rebuking in his epistle, commit a dreadful sin—by drawing a parallel between their language and the words used by the archangel against the devil himself, according to the well known tradition. About the historical truth of this tradition no question was raised nor answer given.

In verses 14 and 15 the case is still more evident. Nowadays everybody knows, of course, that the Book of Enoch, of which several recensions have been discovered, is apocryphal. Nevertheless it is quoted in the following way: “*Enoch, the seventh from Adam, prophesied, saying: Behold, the Lord cometh with thousands of His Saints. . . .*”

That St. Jude quotes the apocryphal book is very easily seen. Since we know several recensions of it, we have simply to open it. Readers who have no edition of the Book of Enoch at their disposal, will find sufficient information in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible (s. v. Jude) and Zahn's Introduction to the New Testament, II, p. 106. The fact has been, moreover, already recognized *e. g.* by Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, St. Jerome and St. Augustine.

The words “Enoch, the seventh from Adam” contain the affirmation that this apocryphal book was written before the Flood by Enoch himself, who was the seventh patriarch after Adam. But this affirmation is no *personal* affirmation of the author, *as such*. The author has no *intention* to inform his readers about the literary origin or authorship of the book of Enoch. The same is to be said as regards the affirmation, implied in the word “*prophesied,*” which, of course, refers to Enoch as the author of the book.

If St. Jude makes no use of the apocryphal book itself, but follows simply the oral tradition of the rabbins, the real subject of both affirmations is the generation of the first century, or at least that part of this generation among whom St. Jude lived and to whom he addressed his letter. The apostle is here, not *formaliter* as author, but simply as man, the representative and mouth-piece of his generation. As *author* he makes use of what he knows as a *man* and a representative of his time. *His writing of these words* is no affirmation with

regard to the literary origin of this apocryphal book; but *the written words* are the photograph or echo of the living tradition, whose affirming "subject" is: the generation of that time.

This distinction between author and generation must be admitted by every critic. For a Catholic there is moreover a higher reason to agree with our explanation. We know indeed that the Word of God can not affirm a single error. But how is it possible, in the Epistle of St. Jude, to deny the presence of any error, if we make no distinction between St. Jude himself, as author, and the generation of his time? If St. Jude himself were the subject of the affirmation, that this apocryphal book was written by Enoch the seventh patriarch from Adam, the error would be evident.

That verse 6 (cf. v. 7) has been drawn from the same Book of Enoch becomes the more probable if we notice in how many places the Epistle of St. Jude bears unmistakable vestiges of this apocryphal source. Chase (l. c.) and Zahn (l. c.) show us this very clearly. As regards verse 6 itself, the Book of Enoch treats in several places of these angels ἀπολιπόντες τὸν οὐρανὸν τὸν ὑψηλόν; we read there how ὀῖσον αὐτοὺς ἐβδομήκοντα γενεάς εἰς τὰς νύκτας τῆς γῆς μέχρι ἡμέρας κρίσεως αὐτῶν. Here, and especially vv. 14-16, the Epistle of St. Jude approaches very near to the Book of Enoch. The angels, whose fall through sexual lust is one of the main subjects of this apocryphal work, are evidently "the sons of God" (Gen. 6, 2), who, before the Flood, sinned with the daughters of men.

But we have again to repeat what we said for so many other texts: St. Jude himself does not affirm the historical truth of this fact. He only *uses* the knowledge of this fact. In his epistle this fact, which was known by his generation, reading the Book of Enoch, is merely mentioned as an *illustration* of his own doctrine. He compares the fornicators of his time to the angels of the Book of Enoch and the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah. In verse 5 he says, explicitly, that he merely intends to *put them in remembrance of what they know*.

Nobody can maintain that such a comparison implies an affirmation of the historical truth of Enoch's tale. In order to illustrate religious doctrines, Christ himself invented merely

fictitious tales. St. Jude makes no more realistic use of this story of Enoch than Christ *e. g.* of the story of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16, 18-31). If it was allowable to illustrate personal doctrines by inventing a story, why should an author, writing for the same religious purpose, have made no use of stories already existing and well known? His purpose was not to teach or correct history. If his readers considered some well known, but fictitious, stories to be really historical, this could by no means be a reason why the author should make no use of them. The stories became rather the more fit to illustrate his doctrine. Moreover the author himself generally did not know whether these stories were true. God did not reveal to him things which were "in no way profitable to salvation."

We have no right to suppose, for example, that God has revealed to St. Paul, when he wrote II Tim. 3, 9, the names of *Jannes and Mambres*. The apostle found those names in the tradition of his time. He knew even an apocryphal book called by this very name. But writing: "*Now as Jannes and Mambres resisted Moses, so these resist the truth*, men corrupted in mind," St. Paul has of course no intention to teach his readers, that the two Egyptian sorcerers of the days of Moses originally bore these names. He simply compares the men of whom he speaks to the two well known sorcerers. In calling them by the names used in his time, *e. g.* in the apocryphal work of *Jannes and Mambres*, the apostle is simply the representative of his generation. Even if we supposed that the apostle refers to an unhistorical narrative of this apocryphal work, according to which these sorcerers had "resisted Moses" in a special way, this allusion would offer no difficulty whatsoever. St. Paul had here evidently no intention to teach history. He had a right to make use of this tradition, or fiction, for the good purpose of illustrating his personal teaching.

St. Paul only makes use of the custom of his contemporaries to designate the two sorcerers by the names of *Jannes and Mambres*. But St. Jude seems, in point of fact, to use the *written* source itself. After the discovery of several recensions of the Book of Enoch, it seems to us impossible to main-

tain any longer the hypothesis of those scholars, who contend that St. Jude merely drew from the oral tradition of the Jewish rabbins. Among several other things literally quoted by St. Jude, we read in the Book of Enoch the very words *ἑβδομος ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ*, "the seventh from Adam."

However, as far as our principle is concerned, this makes no difference. In quoting his source, the apostle remains the representative of his generation, which did not know the true literary origin of the Book of Enoch. As *author*, St. Jude *uses* texts of two apocryphal books, according to the common opinion of *his generation* regarding their value for practical purposes. No critic can contend that St. Jude would affirm personally, as author, or tell his readers, that this apocryphal book had been written by Enoch.

It would be easy to show how, for instance, the New Testament authors make use of the common opinion of their generation, that the end of the world was very near. But our solution is again the same: the sacred authors do not *teach* this to their readers. They *start from* this common opinion of their time in teaching the necessity of saintly living. To this *personal* teaching of the sacred writers such a common opinion was a very fit instrument, which they could hardly leave unused; for God, in point of fact, had not revealed to them, that this common opinion was untrue.

II. Our principle applies, of course, not only to whole passages and sentences, but just as well to *single words*. We have thus merely to show that the sacred authors make use of some words as representatives of their generation, without affirming personally the truth of the application of those words to their subjects in the Bible.

A. Let us hear how St. Jerome explains the fact that in Holy Scripture St. Joseph is called the *father* of Christ and the Virgin Mary the *wife* of St. Joseph.¹

"Excepting Joseph and Elizabeth and Mary herself, and some few others who, we may suppose, heard the truth from them, *all considered Jesus to be the Son of Joseph*. And so far was this the case that even *the Evangelists, expressing*

¹ "Adversus Helvidium," n. 4.

the opinion of the people, which is the true law of history (quæ vera historiæ lex est), called him the *father* of the Saviour: as, for instance, ‘And he (that is, Simeon) came in the Spirit into the temple; and when the *parents* brought in the child Jesus’; and elsewhere ‘And his *parents* went every year to Jerusalem.’ And afterwards ‘The boy Jesus tarried behind in Jerusalem and his *parents* know not of it.’ Observe also that Mary herself, who had replied to Gabriel with the words ‘How shall this be, since I know not man?’ says concerning Joseph: ‘Son why hast thou thus dealt with us? behold, *thy father* and I sought thee sorrowing.’ We have not here, as many maintain, the utterance of Jews or mockers. *The Evangelists* call Joseph *father*; Mary says he was *father*. Not, as I said before, that Joseph *was really* the father of the Saviour: but that, to preserve the reputation of Mary, he *was regarded by all* as his father. . . . But we have said enough, more with the aim of imparting instruction than of answering an opponent, to show *why* Joseph is called the *father* of our Lord, and why Mary is called Joseph’s *wife*.”

In his commentary on St. Matthew 14, 9, St. Jerome applies the same principle, which he calls “the law of history,” to the statement read in the Gospel that King Herod “*was struck sad*,” because the daughter of Herodias said: “Give me here in a dish the head of John the Baptist.”

St. Jerome does not believe that Herod was sorry. “*It is the manner of Scripture*,” he says, “*that the historian relates the opinion of the multitude, as it was commonly viewed at that time.*” (Consuetudinis Scripturarum est opinionem multorum sic narret historicus quomodo eo tempore ab omnibus credebatur.) As Joseph was called, even by Mary herself, the *father* of Jesus, so here Herod is said to have been *struck sad*, because the *banqueters* thought he was. The hypocrite indeed and the homicide simulated sadness in his countenance, although he was really joyful in his heart.”

Thus then, the great scripturist admits, that the error of the *banqueters* who were deceived by Herod, was the origin of the common opinion among the multitude, which, according to Jerome’s “law of history,” the sacred historian has committed to writing. We shall see that, especially as regards

ancient Semitic history, this "law" is by no means a fiction of St. Jerome. The mind of St. Jerome is clearly this: the common opinion of contemporaries contains as a rule true history: here we have an exception: the people were mistaken: but because it is a "custom" of the sacred writers "to relate the opinion of the multitude" there is no error in the Gospel, which indeed relates the common opinion of the multitude with regard to the sadness of King Herod. St. Jerome is convinced that this time the common opinion was deceived; but, in his mind, the *Evangelist* by no means affirms and teaches an error, because *his intention* is to relate *the common opinion*. According to St. Jerome, the *Evangelist* had no intention of guaranteeing the strictly historical truth of the fact, but confined himself to mentioning this common opinion of his generation. In the same way, he says, Joseph is called the father of Jesus, because "all considered Jesus to be the son of Joseph" and "the *Evangelists* express the opinion of the people, which is the true law of history."

The author of the recent book "*Autour de la question biblique*" misunderstands the interpretation of St. Jerome. He makes him say that in the mind of the *Evangelist*, to say "Herod was struck sad" means simply "he *simulated* sadness." This is false. According to St. Jerome, the *banqueters* thought the king was sorry, because "the hypocrite *simulated* sadness in his countenance." But the *Evangelist* writes that Herod was struck sad "because the *banqueters* thought he was," and because "it is the manner of Scripture" to speak of events as they were commonly viewed at the time by all. The *Evangelists* and Mary did not call Joseph the *father* of Jesus because Joseph "*simulated*" to be the father of the divine child! St. Jerome gives quite another and better explanation. But it is not only here that the author of "*Autour de la question biblique*" misinterprets the true meaning of this great Father of the Church. Neither does he grasp the meaning of certain other passages in St. Jerome, which we quoted in our *Critiek en Traditie*, and in which the Doctor Maximus, when properly interpreted, says very distinctly that he does not admit the strictly historical sense of some biblical texts, and that *for this reason* he recurs, either

to "the true law of history," or to a spiritual sense: "*littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat.*" This we shall show in our chapter on the doctrine of the Fathers.

Where we have to explain the fact, that the Evangelists call Joseph the *father* of Jesus, Mary the *wife* of Joseph, we follow thus in the tracks of St. Jerome if we say, that the real subject of the affirmation, implied in the application of those words, is the people, the multitude, the generation of that time. The affirmation does not belong to the Evangelists, *formaliter* as *authors*, distinguished from their generation and teaching this to their contemporaries. Therefore *the Gospel* does not affirm the truth of the common opinion, which it follows in its *manner of speaking*.

For this very same reason, says St. Jerome, the Seventy had no reason to omit in their Version the word "*prophet,*" which the Book of Jeremias applies to Ananias.

In his commentary on Jeremias 28, 10–11, the great interpreter of Holy Scripture writes: "The Seventy do not translate the clause 'two years.' Neither do they speak of Ananias as a *prophet*, lest they should seem to *call* him a prophet who was not a prophet: as if many things were not spoken of in the Sacred Scriptures according to the opinion of that age, in (or of?) which the events are related, and not according to the intrinsic truth of a thing itself (quasi non multa in Scripturis Sanctis dicantur juxta opinionem illius temporis quo gesta referuntur, et non juxta quod rei veritas continebat). Even Joseph is called in the Gospel the *father* of the Lord." A little further in his commentary on Jer. 29, 5 ff., St. Jerome repeats: "How could Holy Scripture thus call him a prophet, although it is denied in Holy Scripture itself that he had been sent by the Lord? But *truth and the law of history is observed*, as we said before, *not according to what was, but according to what was believed at that time* (Sed *historiæ veritas et ordo servatur, sicut prædiximus, non juxta quod erat, sed juxta id quod illo tempore putabatur*)."

It is evident that speaking of this *prophet*, of the *father* of Jesus, of the *wife* of Joseph, the sacred writers *knew* perfectly that the opinion of that time—which, according to St. Jerome, is at the bottom of those words—was not true. If the Evan-

gelists knew also that Herod was not "struck sad," Jerome does not say so. The text of the Gospel seems even to exclude this supposition. "And the king was struck sad: *yet because of his oath, and for them that sat with him at table*, he commanded it to be given." We read, of course, in verse 5 that Herod would have put John to death, *if* he had not "feared the people: because they esteemed him as a prophet." But in verse 9 the Evangelist says explicitly that Herod, *who feared the people*, was indeed "struck sad" when the daughter of Herodias asked the head of John the Baptist. The king granted what was asked "*because*" he had "promised with an oath to give her whatsoever she would ask of him," and *because* he would not be foresworn "for them that sat with him at table" and had heard his oath. It is very unlikely that Jerome should have misunderstood the clear meaning of this verse. Moreover Jerome emphasizes and repeats that it is the "true law of history" to relate the common opinion of the time: he applies even his principle to this very verse of St. Matthew! *If* the Evangelist *knew* that Herod was not sorry, he must have told *purposely* what he *knew* was not true. No other hypothesis is possible, because, if St. Jerome is right, the words of the Evangelist are bound to mislead the reader. Such a hypothesis is its own condemnation. But St. Jerome does not say that the Evangelist knew the real truth and thus purposely misled his readers! According to St. Jerome, the subject of the affirmation contained in this common opinion is the generation of that time; the Gospel, which mentions this opinion, does not affirm its historical truth. In other words, the *intention* of the sacred writer was to relate the tradition told to him; God, as we said, did not reveal to the authors of Holy Scripture the truth or untruth of prevailing common opinions, if this revelation was "in no way profitable to salvation."¹

B. This exegetic principle which maintains that in every book things are sometimes only mentioned and not affirmed by

¹ As a matter of fact, we believe that, not the Evangelist, but St. Jerome was mistaken. King Herod was indeed "struck sad" because he feared the people. But this mistake does not, of course, touch our question about the *exegetic principle* of St. Jerome. Cf. *Against Helvidius* n. 18.

the author is the less strange on the part of St. Jerome, because it is applied continually in his own works. There was more reason in writing commentaries on Holy Scripture to distinguish the author's personal interpretations from other, perhaps heretical, interpretations, than there was in writing history, to distinguish the personal affirmations of the writer from the common opinions of the writer's generation, which were neither prejudicial nor profitable to salvation. Especially if the human author did not know that they were untrue! Especially if such was "the true law of history" and "the manner of Holy Scripture"! In this case it was not necessary to make a clear distinction, because the original readers of ancient history—who certainly did not find in the Bible all *those* difficulties which made the Alexandrian *philosophers* so often recur to a "spiritual" sense—ought to know this "law," at least implicitly; just as St. Jerome supposes that every scholar reading his works ought to know that he himself does not affirm all they contain.

So he says for instance in his preface to the Book of Jeremiah that his commentaries, as far as affirmations are concerned, belong as much to the ancient interpreters—whose opinions he mentions although he does not quote them—as they belong to himself: "*ipsos commentarios tam veterum scriptorum esse quam nostros.*" A man who does not know that and attacks his commentaries, is called by St. Jerome "an ignorant traducer" who "does not know *the laws of commentaries* (*leges commentariorum*)." In one of his letters to St. Augustine (LXXV, 4) St. Jerome writes: "Storing up in my mind very many things which they (scilicet, the works of ancient authors, orthodox and heretic) contain, I have dictated to my amanuensis sometimes what was borrowed from other writers, sometimes what was my own, without distinctly remembering the method, or the words, or the opinions which belonged to each. I look now to the Lord in His mercy to grant that my want of skill and experience *may not cause the things which others have well spoken to be lost*, or to fail of finding among foreign readers the acceptance with which they have met in the language, in which they were first written. If therefore anything in my explanation has seemed to you to

demand correction *it would have been seemly for one of your learning* to inquire first whether what I had written was found in the Greek writers to whom I have referred; and if *they* had not advanced the opinion which you censured you could then with propriety condemn *me* for what I gave as *my own view*, especially seeing that I have in the preface openly acknowledged that I had followed the commentaries of Origen and had dictated sometimes the views of others, sometimes my own, and have written at the end of the chapter with which you find fault: 'If any one be dissatisfied with the interpretation here given, by which it is shown, that neither did Peter sin, nor did Paul rebuke presumptuously a greater than himself, he is bound to show, how Paul could consistently blame in another what he himself did.' By which I have made it manifest that I *did not adopt finally* and irrevocably that which I had read in these Greek authors, but *had propounded what I had read*, leaving to the reader's own *judgment* whether it should be rejected or approved."

In the same way the authors of ancient profane history, *e. g.* Herodotus and even Thucydides, remind their readers occasionally that they have no intention of personally affirming all that they write. With regard to the relatively small amount of materials of which they disposed, and the still very imperfect method of historical study at that time, it would indeed have been impossible, in many cases, to distinguish the strictly historical truth from the more poetical than historical traditions.

How far St. Jerome has gone in applying his principle of "the true law of history" to Holy Scripture, we shall see in another article. This is of no importance with regard to the truth of the *principle* itself.

III. Our exegetic principle which distinguishes between author and generation is entirely independent of the question whether or not the inspired authors themselves¹ *knew* always the real truth, although they spoke or wrote as representatives of their time, following the common opinion.

Nevertheless we do not see any reason, why we should admit that generally they knew more than their contemporaries about profane things, which God did not reveal to them.

¹ Speaking as authors, they know, of course, always the truth of what they themselves affirm!

St. Augustine says they *knew*. But the theory which forms the basis of this opinion of St. Augustine is false.

“The question is frequently asked,” says St. Augustine (“De Genesi ad litteram,” II, 9, 20), “what, according to the Scriptures, we must believe with regard to the form and shape of the heavens. For there are many, who like to dispute about such things, which with greater prudence our (sacred) writers passed over in silence, and which are of no use as regards eternal life; and, what is worse, who spend the precious time, which ought to be given to salutary things, in the study of such a question. What is it to me whether the heavens everywhere encircle the earth, poised in the midst of the universe, as a sphere, or whether they cover it on one side like a disc? . . . It can be said briefly that, in regard to the shape of the heavens, our authors *knew* the real truth, but that the spirit of God who *spoke* through them did not wish to *teach* men things in no way profitable to salvation.”

Either God revealed this to his authors or He did not. If He did not, the authors did not know more about “*nulli saluti profutura*” than their contemporaries. If He did, then such revelations ought to have been written down; because there was no reason for revealing a thing, if God would not communicate it to the readers of the inspired books. In any case we have no right to *suppose* a revelation of things which, in fact, God would *not* reveal.

But if we had not to make a distinction between *the author, as such*, who in his *teaching* has his intellect supernaturally illumined, and whose thoughts or judgments are thus in a certain way the thoughts and judgments of God himself—and *the man*, who, in *mentioning* these common opinions, is simply the representative of his generation, which was not inspired—we should easily understand why St. Augustine admits that the inspired authors *knew* everything about a subject, although they did not *express* all they knew.

In his interpretation of the Bible St. Augustine sometimes follows nearly the same exegetic rules as the Jewish scribes, who attempted to find all kinds of mysterious meanings in the single words and even in the several letters of a sentence. So we read for instance in his fifteenth *Homily on St. John* a

truly haggadistic interpretation of St. John 4, 6: "*Jesus therefore being wearied with His journey, sat thus on the well. It was about the sixth hour.*"

After having warned his readers in the very beginning that in this chapter of St. John "truly the things there said are great mysteries and similitudes of great things," St. Augustine writes: "*Jesus is weary; and weary with his journey; and sitteth; and it is beside a well He sitteth; and it is at the sixth hour, that, wearied, He sitteth. All these things hint something; they point to something; they put us upon the stretch of expectation; they bid us to knock.*"

The real sense of this interpretation becomes particularly clear if we read after this, for instance, the 31st Chapter of the 12th Book of his *Confessions*.

"So when one says 'Moses meant as I do,' and another, 'Nay, but as I do,' I suppose that I speak more reverently, 'Why not rather as both, if both be true?' And if there be a third, or a fourth, yea if any other sees any truth in those words, why may he not be believed *to have seen all these*, through whom the One God has tempered the Holy Scriptures to the senses of many who would see therein things true but divers? For certainly (and fearlessly I speak it from my heart) were I to indite anything to have supreme authority, I should prefer so to write, that *whatever truth any could apprehend on those matters, might be conveyed in my words, rather than to set down my own meaning so clearly as to exclude the rest, which not being false, could not offend me.* I will not therefore, O my God, be so rash, as not to believe that *thou vouchsafedst as much to that great man (Moses).* He without doubt, when he wrote those words, *perceived and thought of what truth soever* we have been able to find, yea and whatsoever we have not been able, nor yet are, but which may be found in them."

Nobody, of course, admits this extravagant opinion of truly Jewish origin. But we repeat: if inspiration was, as the Jews held, a kind of mechanical inspiration or rather dictation of each word;¹ if in the sacred writings we had not to distinguish

¹The true notion of inspiration supposes the words themselves to be inspired—not only "res et sententiae." The words were chosen by the sacred

the affirmations of the inspired author himself from what he merely relates as a man and representative of his generation: this Jewish opinion, admitted by St. Augustine, would hardly seem so very strange. It would even seem more strange that the inspired authors sometimes express *doubts*; as for instance *John 6, 19*.

IV. How does our distinction between author and generation agree with the doctrine of the Encyclical *Providentissimus Deus*? We contend that this distinction is merely an appeal to three principles, which apply to biblical passages referring to scientific matters, and which, as the Encyclical says explicitly, apply also to biblical history.

The three principles of the Encyclical are: (1) The Holy Ghost “did not intend to teach men those things, which were in no way profitable to salvation.” (2) Hence the inspired writers “did not seek to penetrate the secrets of nature, but rather described and dealt with things in more or less figurative language, or *in terms which were commonly used at the time*, and which, in many instances, are in daily use at this day, even by the most eminent men of science. Ordinary speech *primarily and properly* describes what comes under the senses; and *somewhat in the same way* the sacred writers—as the Angelic Doctor also reminds us—‘*went by what sensibly appeared,*’ or put down what God, speaking to men, *signified*, in the way men *could understand* and were *accustomed to.*” (3) In things which do not belong to faith or morals the Fathers of the Church simply followed the common opinion of their generation. In those matters therefore the interpretation of the Fathers does not restrain the liberty of modern Catholic scholars.

The readers know what “to signify in the way men could understand and were accustomed to” means: the author of *any book* must sometimes necessarily, in his manner of speaking, follow the opinions of his time. They know that the real

authors’ supernaturally elevated will, influenced and guided by their inspired or supernaturally illumined intellect. See *Critiek in Traditie* pp. 57–79 and *De Katholiek* 1898 pp. 408 f. But this notion of inspiration is the very opposite to what we styled here a mechanical dictation.

subject of the affirmation contained in these expressions and "terms, which were commonly used at the time," is the generation of those days; not the author *as such*. The Bible does not *teach* that the earth is a flat disc, resting upon the waters, that there are waters above the firmament, which was conceived as a solid structure, etc.; *because* the affirmations implied in these expressions are not *personal* affirmations of the inspired authors, *as such*. The authors *use* these expressions, which represent the opinions of themselves merely as representatives of their *generation*.

"Haec ipsa deinde ad cognatas disciplinas, ad historiam præsertim, juvabit transferri."

Applying these three principles to history, we say: (1) "God did not intend to teach men (*such* historical) things, which were in no way profitable to salvation." (2) The interpretation of the Fathers in merely historical matters does not affect the liberty of modern Catholic scholars. (3) Applied to the other principle (*"ea secuti sunt quæ sensibilibiter apparent"*), the term "*transferri*" can not be understood of course in a mechanical sense! In historical matters eye-witnesses are the very highest authorities. Nevertheless the distinction between "sensible appearance" and reality in history is clear. It is the distinction between the facts or events and the traditions or sources. In the days of the biblical historians the facts themselves, which they relate, or at least many of them, had disappeared long ago. They could not perceive them but by written sources or oral traditions, which are the "sensible appearance" of historical reality. This principle of the Encyclical, applied to history, is therefore nothing but St. Jerome's "law of history."¹

¹ If a tradition is *oral* and related everywhere, the real "subject" of such a tradition, or common opinion, is evidently the generation of that time. *Written* sources may frequently be called at the same time oral traditions, in this sense that they were related, known and admitted by the people. As a matter of fact, written traditions were generally, in olden times, merely lifeless photographs of living oral traditions. Moreover there was a *common opinion regarding the uses to which history might be put* by authors of religious books; taking history, either in a rigorous or in a wider sense, as they actually found it in the existing written sources and oral traditions.

V. The author of a book needs what we called canvas and frame. This canvas and frame, *used* by the author, are the common opinions of his generation, concerning either historical or scientific matters, which the author himself does not affirm. We have seen that in those passages, where the author simply *mentions* a common opinion from which he *starts*, this “*sensible appearance*” of the historical reality is merely the background of his personal teaching, *because* it is the common opinion of his generation, whose mouth-piece the author is as a man, but not formaliter as an author, who teaches something to his readers. As author, we said, he makes use of what he holds as a man and representative of his time. It is in this sense that we understand and admit St. Jerome’s “law of history.”

Another question is whether or not *history*, whose strictly historical truth is *not connected with a religious doctrine on faith or morals*, belongs nearly as a whole to “canvas and frame”; whether, in other words, it is a rule that the biblical authors merely relate this “profane” history according to its “sensible appearance,” and “did not seek to penetrate the secrets” of its strictly historical reality. St. Jerome’s interpretation of the text of the Gospel, which says that Herod was “struck sad,” and his appeal on this occasion to the “law of history” seem to suppose that, at least here, he ascribes such a *literary character* to ancient history. Otherwise his appeal to this “law” or “custom” is in this instance without any meaning. But we leave the solution of this question to another and more suitable occasion, where we shall have to deal with the general character of ancient historiography. The accurate distinction between the real teaching of a book and its background is a question of literary criticism. *What* is background, *what* is personal teaching, is no question of principle, but of *facts*. All depends on the literary character of ancient history, which we can not make, but must take as we find it.

On this canvas and in this frame of the common opinions of the time the inspired writers have painted their own picture. The picture must necessarily be worthy of its principal author, the Eternal Truth Himself. The very idea of error

implies here contradiction. But the canvas, without which no picture is conceivable, remains of common *human origin*.¹

The divine picture is a *religious* picture. But it would be absurd to contend that for this reason it could not be an *historical* one! The religious doctrine of the Old Testament culminated in the election of Israel, as the people of Jehovah, among all the nations of the world; it reached its acme in what the prophets preached, that Israel, notwithstanding so many dreadful sins and terrible punishments, still remained the people elect, the people of the coming Messiah. This religious teaching was so deeply rooted in history and so intimately connected with history, that it was at the same time and essentially an *historical* doctrine. The inspired authors had therefore evidently *the intention* to write history; the only question is *what kind* of history. And this, we said, will be examined in another chapter.

Literary customs have changed—a natural consequence of the difference of conditions under which the ancient authors wrote and modern historians work. Nowadays in scientific writings an author has to guarantee the truth of all the opinions which are set forth in his book and do not belong merely to what, *at the present time*, is considered *the form* of his personal teaching. This form has become much less free. To relate a fact means to affirm it personally. Where the author makes a restriction, this restriction must be each time explicit. Therefore, if readers find fault with our studies on history and inspiration, we can not appeal, as St. Jerome so often did, to implicit restrictions! But if some isolated expressions seem to be lacking in strict accuracy, the readers are kindly requested to explain those expressions according to the context or general tenor of the whole chapter.

With regard to the manner in which we applied to history the three principles quoted from the Eycyclical, we shall show in the continuation of this study that:

1. As far as the authority of the Fathers is concerned, this application offers no difficulty whatsoever.
2. As regards the distinction between the author and his

¹ That sometimes inspired authors *make use of* what they hold or feel *as men*, even where they are not the representatives of their generation, will afterwards be seen.

generation, that is, between the historical reality of the events themselves and the oral or written sources, we can not better explain this principle than by studying:

3. What kind of history belongs to "*nulli saluti profutura*"; which, inasmuch as it was not the aim of the inspired authors to teach this kind of history, may perhaps not be affirmed by them personally, as authors. Thus this study will show how far it is true that the inspired *authors* do not always *personally affirm* the strictly historical truth of the sources and traditions, *related in their books*. For so far as they do not, we have to apply the principle, which makes a distinction between historical reality and its "sensible appearance."

A DIFFICULTY.

We can not part from our readers without first having met an objection, which certainly will be brought against the thesis which we defend.

Will it not be difficult to recognize the really personal affirmations of the sacred authors themselves? How will it be possible to determine accurately the limits between divine teaching itself and those opinions which form merely its background?

Of course, the boundary between the natural and the supernatural is nowhere clearly defined. But we shall see that as far as the *religious or moral teaching* of the Bible is concerned, our principle offers no difficulty at all. Everything depends on *the intention* of the writer; and that the authors have the intention to *teach* the biblical *moral* doctrine is clear; even though this teaching be delivered in the form of history. If occasionally the moral teaching of a biblical passage is doubtful, we have for practical purposes simply to compare with it other biblical passages where this moral doctrine is more clear. It will moreover be very easy to show that instead of finding here a difficulty in the application of our principle, we are on the contrary quite unable to defend even the moral teaching of the Bible on all points, unless in some laws we make a distinction between divine teaching and certain customs or common opinions which are "permitted" by the Bible, that is to say, which in reality belong to the *generation*, because of whose "hardness of heart" polygamy, for instance, was allowed.

We do not maintain, of course, that the religious teaching of the Bible is *so* clear that in matters of interpretation the divine authority of the Church is not necessary. Theologians sometimes seem to be afraid when they find in the works of Catholic critics the natural consequences of the very doctrines, which they themselves defend against Protestants.

In regard to biblical *history*, it must be stated first of all, that wherever a positive religious doctrine supposes necessarily the truth of an historical fact, this historical fact becomes *per se* a "dogmatic fact," and belongs thus to the *religious* teaching of Holy Scripture. Therefore we have to deal here only with those passages of Holy Scripture whose history is independent of any question of faith or morals. In regard to which there is: (a) no more difficulty in distinguishing the personal teaching of the author from the background of his teaching, than there is in any ancient Semitic book of history.¹ (b) The historical value of Holy Scripture, as an apologetic basis for its religious teaching, remains intact; and this is, of course, from a theological standpoint, the chief concern.²

As a matter of fact, it is generally sufficiently clear, what, on the one hand, the author himself personally affirms and

¹ Against our theory some readers may urge that it seems to be dangerous on account of the difficulties of its *application*. But the difficulties, to which they refer, do not result from a fault or imperfection of that theory, but from the biblical narratives themselves. We can not make the Bible more easily understood than it is in point of fact. The literary character of ancient narratives may seem strange to us, who live in quite a different world from that of the biblical authors. The only way for theologians to resolve the difficulties is to become critics and to study the character of ancient historiography. We are confronted with literary *facts*. No theory can change them. But we have to explain them in such a way, that these facts do not imply errors on the part of the inspired authors. As soon as we know the *facts*, that is to say, the literary character of the narratives, the application of our principles offers no longer any difficulty. If the opinions of some theologians do not agree with those *facts*, critics have no right to change the facts, but theologians have to change their opinions.

² See further. It is evident, that, if the world could now see *e. g.* "the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven, with much power and majesty" (Matthew 24, 30) apologists would have *additional* arguments to prove the truth of our Christian faith! But if the dependency of the religious doctrine of the Bible on historic facts were understood in this way, no telescope would be strong enough to see the end of the long line of "dogmatic facts"!

teaches, and what on the other hand belongs to the background of a book, and which therefore, being both author's and reader's starting-point, is simply "mentioned." Nevertheless we admit that there are passages where this limit is not clear. In order to explain the consequences, let us take a narrative where it remains doubtful, even after a critical analysis, whether the author himself intends to affirm the strictly historical character of the tradition or common opinion which he relates:

1. As long as the arguments against the historical character of the narrative are not convincing, nobody is justified in denying it. For, in any case, it possesses the same scientific value, which it had in the source, made use of by the biblical author. The only thing we are not sure of is whether the historical truth of this source or tradition is warranted by *divine* authority.¹

2. Such a doubt has nothing to do with the evident doctrine of St. Augustine, that the divine authority of the whole Bible would be undermined by even the possibility of a single false affirmation or error. Every biblical passage enjoys a divine authority if we take it *in that sense* in which the inspired author has personally *affirmed* it. But in our case there is only a doubt as regards *the fact*, whether indeed the inspired author *intends* to affirm personally a common opinion which he relates; in other words, whether or not the scientific value of the source, quoted in the Bible, is guaranteed by his *divine* authority.

3. Some Catholics seem to think that the whole Bible becomes doubtful, yea, nearly useless, as soon as we admit the possibility of even a "material" historical inaccuracy; that is to say, as soon as we express any doubt concerning the *divine* authority of a biblical passage in regard to its *strictly historical* character. But how? Every Catholic knows that in the Bulls and Encyclicals of the Pope we can rarely point out a single sentence which we are perfectly sure is affirmed by the Pope, as *the infallible Head of the Church*. If thus there are so few sentences in the official writings of the Head of the Church, respecting which we have *no doubt* about the *divine* authority of even their *religious* teaching: how then can some Catholics sound

¹Therefore apologists do not lose any argument. Unbelievers do not of course admit a *divine* authority of the biblical texts.

the alarm if we have to admit that in the Bible there can be some doubt regarding the *divine* authority of some *merely historical* statements? In fact the passages in question are all of *less importance*: the truth of the Biblical *religious* doctrine is entirely independent of them.

We do not by any means lose sight of the great difference between an Encyclical or Bull of a Pope and an *inspired* book or passage. But our remark is nevertheless perfectly *ad rem* with regard to the trouble which "would" result, if we admit the possibility of a doubt concerning the intention of the inspired author to guarantee the historical truth of a passage which he makes use of for a religious purpose.

In the *oral* tradition of the Church of Christ, the sayings of the Fathers and the Popes regarding scientific and historical matters have no higher authority than that of the sources quoted; the Fathers did not know anything more about natural sciences and history than their heathen contemporaries. Christ has not revealed in His *divine oral* teaching the secrets of strictly historical truth with regard to the traditions and common opinions of his time. Would it be so strange, let us ask, if in the *written* tradition there were *related* some traditions and sources, concerning which we are not sure, whether God revealed to His inspired authors their strictly historical truth? Without a special revelation it was of course impossible, in more recent times, to distinguish in the later traditions the strictly historical reality of some events—for instance, of the days of Jacob, Noe or Adam. Would it therefore be so strange, in other words, if sometimes there were a doubt, whether the inspired author really intended to guarantee the historical truth of a source, of which *in any case* he could make a very lawful use? If in the days of the Church Christ himself did not teach men history, which was in no way profitable to salvation, why should it be so strange if the inspired authors of the Synagogue had not *taught* this kind of history to the Jews? The inspired character of the Bible does not require a revelation of the secrets of this kind of history.

The Fathers were no critics. But nevertheless, as we shall see, they had many "doubts" about the strictly historical char-

acter of some biblical passages. It was often on account of those "doubts" that they had recourse to a "spiritual" sense of the biblical texts.

To weight Christianity with a view of biblical history, which, when confronted with the facts, is at once seen to be refuted by them—is a responsibility, which no Catholic would take upon himself, if he realized it.

HENRY A. POELS.

RICHARD FITZRALPH OF ARMAGH AND THE FRANCISCANS (1349-1360). I.

The history of the Church in Ireland has yet to be written. This is especially true of the period between the English Invasion and the Reformation. But we can not hope for any final general history of this or any other period of Ireland's religious life until the ground has been prepared by a long series of special studies. We may well expect, however, that the present revival of Irish learning shall accomplish this task.

The Church history of Ireland in the period of which we speak was naturally formed along two distinct lines. There were two distinct peoples in the land, as far apart as the poles in language, laws, character and ideals. They had little in common but their Catholic faith and this unity of faith was utilized, in accordance with the policy of medieval conquest, for the advancement of the interests of the conquerors. Ecclesiastical offices, as well as civil, were filled by members of the dominant race. Thus we find in Ireland that the majority of ecclesiastics in high places were either Englishmen or Anglo-Irishmen, and identified themselves with England and the English colony in Ireland rather than with the native race.

One of the greatest of the Anglo-Irish bishops was Richard Fitzralph of Armagh, a man who has not yet found his true place in Church history. He has been passed over by most Catholic writers as one of those about whom the less said the better, while on the other hand Protestants have hailed him as a forerunner of the Reformation. Perhaps the latter estimate is the reason of the former. Both are, of course, unjust.

When we consider the liberty of thought and speech that the children of the Church enjoyed in the days of universal Catholicism, we must not be surprised to find men who in many things contradicted the opinions or scored the vices of their day. Nearly all such are claimed by many Protestants as "pre-Reformation worthies," forerunners of Luther and Calvin. Perhaps, if there had been more of such men, there

would have been no Luther and no Calvin. Fitzralph has been hailed as a "pre-Reformation worthy" for having been the so-called intellectual father of Wicliffe, and especially for his attack on the Friars. It is not our purpose here to study his manifold activities. We shall confine ourselves to a short sketch of his life with a detailed statement of his position in regard to the Friars. There is a growing interest in the study of the Franciscan movement among modern social and religious leaders. They find many parallels between the social and religious conditions of the thirteenth century and those of our day, and they turn wistfully for light to the movement that revolutionized the former age. Hence the importance of studying both the sources of weakness and the sources of strength of that movement as it worked itself out historically. These considerations induce us to confine our statement of Fitzralph's contentions against all the Friars to their bearing on the Franciscan order in particular.

Richard Fitzralph, often referred to simply as Arma-chanus, from his See of Armagh was born at Dundalk,¹ County Louth, probably in the last years of the thirteenth century. John Prince puts forward a poorly supported claim that he was a Devon man,² but the tradition that he was born in Ireland is almost universal, and is borne out by the popular name of Richard of Dundalk. It is also evident from a letter of John XXII, cited below, in which he is mentioned as belonging to the diocese of Armagh; but no other connection with the diocese of Armagh than that of birth can well be established. It is probable that he was of mixed Irish and English blood.³

Fitzralph was educated at Oxford, where he is said to have been a disciple and friend of the celebrated Carmelite, John Baconthorpe.⁴ It is as an ex-Fellow and *Magister* of Balliol College that he took part, in 1325, in the decision of the ques-

¹ "Chronicon Angliæ," p. 48. "Annals of Ireland ad an 1337, 1360 in Chartularies of St. Mary's Abbey" (ed. Gilbert), II, pp. 381, 393.

² Prince, "Worthies of Devon," p. 364 ff.

³ *Irish Eccl. Record*, First Series, Vol. I, pp. 487-8.

⁴ Foxe, "Acts and Monuments," II, 749.

tion whether the fellows residing there should be allowed to follow any other course than the Liberal Arts.⁵ He seems to have been very successful in the rôle of teacher at Oxford. According to John Leland, besides being an accomplished logician and philosopher, he was so exceedingly versed in theology and the laws that the whole university flocked to his lectures as bees do to their hives.⁶ Poole rejects the assertion that he was also at one time a fellow or scholar of University College.⁷ He is mentioned as Doctor of Theology in 1331 in a letter of John XXII to the Bishop of Exeter, to whom this Pope granted the faculty of assigning to Richard, son of Ralph, of the Archdiocese of Armagh a canonry in his church and of reserving for him a prebend of the same.⁸

There is an interesting notice of Fitzralph given by William de Chambre in speaking of Richard de Bury, Bishop of Durham: "*Continuatio Historiæ Dunelmensis, in Historiæ Dunelmensis Scriptores Tres*," p. 128, Surtees Society Publications (1839), Vol. IX. *Multum enim delectabatur de (comitatu) clericorum; et plures semper clericos habuit in sua familia. De quibus fuit Thomas Bradwardyn, postea Cantuariensis Archiepiscopus, et Richardus Fyzt-Rauf, postmodum Archiepiscopus Armachanus, . . . Et quolibet die in mensa solitus erat habere lectionem, nisi forte per adventum magnatum impediretur; et post prandium singulis diebus disputationem cum clericis prænominatis, et aliis suæ domus, nisi major causa impediret. Richard de Bury, perhaps the most romantic "book-lover" of the Middle Ages, criticises the friars of his time (in England) for their neglect of study and their carelessness in regard of books. His *Polybiblion*, several times translated into English, is a most unique plaint for a renaissance of intellectual life among the children of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. The *Dunelmensis* writes probably of the period subsequent to Richard de Bury's elevation to the Bishopric of Durham in 1333.*

⁵ Fourth Report of the Royal Comm. on Hist. MSS., Part I, pp. 442-3. The question was decided in the negative.

⁶ "Comm. de Script. Britt.," p. 372.

⁷ Poole, in "Dictionary of National Biography" (D N B.), XIX, 194.

⁸ Bliss, "Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland," II, p. 355.

It seems certain that Fitzralph was Chancellor of Oxford University in 1333,⁹ although Anthony à Wood claims that he was only Commissarius or Vice-Chancellor.¹⁰ But we should expect to see some confusion in the list of chancellors at this time, as the office was in a state of transition from its original functions in the round of Episcopal duties to its academic character.¹¹ He was appointed to the chancellorship of Lincoln Cathedral on July 10th, 1334,¹² and there is an interesting letter of Pope Benedict XII in the following year making provision for Fitzralph "of the canonry and prebend of Lichfield, void by the death of John, Bishop of Marseilles, notwithstanding that he has canonries and prebends of Crediton and Bosham, and has had provision made for him of the Chancellorship of Lincoln, and of the canonries and prebends of Armagh and Exeter, all which he is to resign."¹³ He was probably about this time also made Archdeacon of Chester. At least Le Neve mentions him with this title under the year 1337.¹⁴ In this latter year he was raised to the Deanery of Lichfield by provision of Pope Benedict XII.¹⁵ He retained this office until he was appointed Archbishop of Armagh (July 31, 1346) by provision of Benedict XII. It is interesting to know that he was also the choice of the Chapter of Armagh, which attempted to elect him in ignorance of the fact that the appointment was reserved to the Pope.¹⁶ He was consecrated at Exeter on July 8, 1347, by Bishop John de Grandison, assisted by three other prelates,¹⁷ and received the pallium shortly afterwards at the hands of the Bishops of Ardagh and Cloyne.¹⁸ But already on the tenth of April, 1347, Pope Clement had commissioned Arch-

⁹ Poole, l. c. Ware-Harris, "Works Concerning Ireland," I, p. 82.

¹⁰ "Fasti Oxon.," p. 21.

¹¹ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," II, pt. II, p. 364 ff, 418 ff. Willard, "Royal Authority and the English Universities," passim.

¹² Le Neve, "Fasti Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ," II, p. 92.

¹³ Bliss, op. cit., II, p. 524.

¹⁴ "Fasti Eccl. Angl.," I, p. 561.

¹⁵ "Fasti Eccl. Angl.," l. c. Chesterfield, *De Episc. Cov. et Lich. lapud Wharton*, "Anglia Sacra," I, 443.

¹⁶ Bliss and Johnson, "Calendar," III, 217. Theiner, "Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum historiam illustrantia," p. 286.

¹⁷ Chesterfield, l. c. "Ware-Harris," Vol. I, p. 82.

¹⁸ Bliss, *Cal.* III, 262; Theiner, p. 288.

bishop Fitzralph and the Archbishop of Cashel to make inquiry on the part of the Holy See into some charges brought against the Archbishop of Dublin by the Bishop of Ossory.¹⁹ It is evident from these various appointments that Fitzralph was held in high favor at the papal court; but it seems certain that he was never made Cardinal, as stated by Raphael Volterra.²⁰ In 1349 Archbishop Fitzralph was charged by Edward III to plead in the royal name before Clement VI for the grace of a jubilee on behalf of the subjects of the English Crown.²¹ Accordingly we find him at Avignon in August of this year, and it is this visit which first brought him, so far as is known, into that conflict with the Mendicant Orders which lasted till the end of his life; on July 5, 1350, he presented a memorial from the English clergy reciting certain complaints against the Friars.²² He does not, however, seem to have had much aversion toward them at this time. He had often preached in their convents at Avignon, and in this very year, 1349, he preached in the Church of the Friars Minor on the occasion of the feast of St. Francis.²³ Still it is not improbable that his position as Chancellor of Oxford and his views as a Realist had some influence in shaping his subsequent attitude toward them.

In the meantime Pope Clement appointed a Commission, consisting of Fitzralph and two other Doctors, to inquire into the points at issue concerning the Friars. They seem to have come to no definite decision, and Fitzralph was requested by some of the Cardinals to write an independent treatise on the subject.²⁴ This he accomplished in his famous work, "*De Pauperie Salvatoris*," which we shall examine more at length in the course of this study.

It was probably during this visit also that Fitzralph became interested in the work of uniting the Armenians with the Church. Negotiations were being carried on about this time at Avignon between the papal court and the Armenian pre-

¹⁹ Bliss, III, 227, 231 and 432; Theiner, 286, 287, 299.

²⁰ See Malone, "Church History of Ireland," II, p. 36 ff.

²¹ Cf. list of works *infra*.

²² *Ibid*.

²³ Poole, D N B., XIX, 195.

²⁴ Cf. "Dedication of the *De Pauperie Salvatoris*."

ates, Nerses, Archbishop of Melasgerd, and John, Elect of Khilat. Fitzralph took part in the interviews arranged with the Armenian bishops, and at their request composed an elaborate apologetico-polemic work in nineteen books examining and refuting those doctrines of the Armenians in which they differed from the Church.²⁵ The work is entitled "*Richardi Radulphi Summa in Quaestionibus Armenorum*," but the first book is headed "*Summa de Erroribus Armenorum*."²⁶ These studies covered almost the entire field of Catholic controversy with the Greeks and Armenians, and also furnished a notable contribution to Christian Apologetic by defending the religion of Christ against Jew and Mussulman.²⁷

The wonderful knowledge of Fitzralph in the domain of Sacred Scripture was used with great effect in this controversy with the Armenians. He borrowed the weapons of his opponent (who did not admit the authority of the Holy See), and drew his arguments almost exclusively from Sacred Scripture. This fact makes his writings extremely valuable in modern controversy. Indeed he might be said to have already refuted by anticipation many of the errors of the Reformers, and he spread throughout Europe that fame as a theologian and especially as a profound exponent of Sacred Scripture which he had already enjoyed at home. He emphasized more definitely than any preceding commentator of Scripture the view that the Holy Ghost did not form the expression of the sacred writers, but only inspired them with the content²⁸ of Scripture. There is no evidence, however, to show that he translated the Bible into Irish as conjectured by Foxe²⁹ and Bale, and seemingly countenanced by Dixon³⁰. Foxe (l. c.) testified to the existence of the Irish Bible "by certain Englishmen, which are yet alive and have seen it." The story goes that Fitzralph had it in one of the walls of his church with the inscription "*cum hic liber inventus fuerit; veritas toti mundo*

²⁵ Cf. Bellesheim, "*Geschichte der kath. Kirche in Ireland*," I, 525 ff, 1890.

²⁶ See list of writings infra, p. —.

²⁷ *Irish Eccl. Rec.*, I, 491.

²⁸ Kaulen, "*Geschichte der Vulgata*," p. 294, Mainz, 1869.

²⁹ "*Acts and Monuments*," II, 766.

³⁰ "*Introduction to the Sacred Scriptures*" (1st Am. ed.), p. 140.

³² Rashdall, "*Universities of Europe*," II, pt. II, p. 541.

manifestabitur, vel Christus orbi non apparebit," and that it was found again about the year 1530 on the occasion of some repairs on the church. We find, however, no further trace of it.³¹

But Fitzralph's intellectual activity was not confined to the study of the Scriptures and the fathers. The intellectual revival of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had opened up new fields in the study of Greek science and philosophy and Roman jurisprudence. The scope of theology had been widened. It was henceforth that magnificent architectonic science that gathered the results of all other sciences and organized them into one great Catholic system. Hence the great men of those times were men of encyclopedic minds, who reached out for all knowledge that they might adopt it, and incorporate it with revealed truths. A mere glance at the list of Fitzralph's works is enough to show us the wide scope of his intellectual activity. Rashdall aptly styles him "the greatest scholastic luminary of Wycliffe's younger days."³²

JOHN J. GREANEY.

(To be continued.)

³¹ Usher's "Works," XII, 345.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Sacrorum Bibliorum Fragmenta Copto-Sahidica Musæi Borgiani,

Vol. III. Novum Testamentum, edidit P. J. Balestri Ordinis Eremitarum S. Augustini. Romæ: ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1904. Large 8°, pp. lxxviii + 509. Tabulæ (1-40), Roma: Fototipia Giulio Danesi, etc., 4°.¹

With this magnificent volume and the accompanying album of phototypic plates, Father P. J. Balestri completes at last a long-interrupted publication of paramount importance for the study of one of the most interesting versions of the Bible, the Copto-Sahidic Version which obtained in the monasteries and churches of Upper Egypt from the fifth (if not from an earlier date) until the eleventh or the twelfth century.² With the exception of a few books this version of the Bible has come down to us only in the shape of fragments, and among the various collections in which such fragments are preserved the *Musæum Borgianum* unquestionably ranks first for the importance as well as for the number of its manuscripts. The publication of those precious relics of the Church of Egypt has been one of the longest felt desiderata of Biblical scholarship. We feel, therefore, particularly thankful to Fr. Balestri for having resumed and brought to completion Fr. Ciasca's edition, so long suspended as a consequence of his promotion to the rank of archbishop and cardinal rather than because of his premature death.

Although following in a general way the plan and the method of his predecessor, Fr. Balestri has found the means of improving on them in some cases, while in others he had the good sense to depart from them altogether. Like Fr. Ciasca, he gives us the text with the strictest accuracy, without the slightest attempt at emendation even where it is manifestly wrong; but instead of printing the text in a continuous way, on one column of page-size, he reproduces it line for line on two columns as in the original, so as to make it easy for the reader himself to account for the number of missing letters or lines when the Coptic manuscript happens to be mutilated or illegible. In

¹ Cf. our review of Vol. I of this publication in the *Bulletin Critique*, 1886, pp. 61-63.

² On the Coptic version as a rule we beg to refer to our "Étude sur les versions Coptes," *Revue Biblique*, Vols. V and VI, 1896-1897. See also Forbes Robinson "Egyptian Versions" in Hasting's "Dictionary of the Bible."

the Prolegomena (pp. i-lxviii) the description of each fragment is carried out with even greater thoroughness than in the preceding two volumes. The religious care with which apparently trifling details of a paleographical nature have been noted down, will eventually facilitate the identification of the Borgian fragments with those of other collections, as it often happened that a manuscript was torn into its several quires in the hope of increasing the profits by selling it to different parties. We regret indeed, that it was not thought worth while to have each plate of exactly the same size as the original, as was done in the Old Testament volumes; but this small drawback is more than compensated for by the handier form in which the plates now appear, printed as they are on strong paper and bound in the shape of a separate album, instead of being as before printed on common material and folded at the end of the volume.

If, however, Fr. Balestri deserves particular praise it is for having known how to remain within the limits of his task, in leaving out the text, or the variant readings of all fragments not belonging to the Borgian collection, and especially in giving up the comparison of the Sahidic text with the other versions or the Greek original. In the present uncritical condition of the Texts and Versions, he judiciously remarks: "such an undertaking would be quite premature and could only lead to inadequate and erroneous conclusions." In one case only were variant readings from other fragments than the Borgian ones given the right of citizenship, viz. when Woide's edition differed from the text of the Clarendon Press manuscripts which it purports to reproduce; in which case Fr. Balestri gives the variant readings from a collation that G. Horner, the well-known editor of the Bohairic version of the New Testament³ had prepared for the late Cardinal Ciasca.

But even restricted to its own limits, the material on which Fr. Balestri had to labor was extraordinarily ample, although consisting merely of fragments. If some of the shorter books, like the Epistle to Titus and that to Philemon, are totally wanting, several of the larger ones appear almost entirely restored. Of the Gospel according to St. Matthew, eighteen chapters are complete, or very nearly so, while not a single one is entirely missing, and only one chapter in each of the other three Gospels is not at all represented. Several of the larger Epistles are almost complete if not entirely so.

We shall not insist on the importance of this publication for New

³ Cf. our review, BULLETIN, Vol. IV, pp. 515-518.

Testament criticism; the subject is not ripe for that purpose.¹ One remark, however, we may venture by way of conclusion: if we are to have some day a critical edition of the Versions of the Church of Egypt, it will be the fruit of conscientious and intelligent preliminary editions such as the one just issued by Fr. Balestri.

H. HYVERNAT.

De Matrimonio. Ad Usum Scholarum ex Summa Theologiæ Moralis exprimendum curavit H. Noldin, S.J. Cœniponte, Rauch. Pp. 203. 1904. 8°.

Father Noldin's tractate "De Matrimonio" has been out some time. Written primarily for students and priests of Austria with whose matrimonial laws it deals, it has the general excellence of clearness and orderliness. The publication of the different tracts of Theology in separate volumes like this of Fr. Noldin is commendable. A priest in his active ministry will take up and carry about with him for study such a book when the larger and more cumbersome volume will be left untouched. We think, however, that the present professors of theology in their publications would do well if instead of covering the whole matter of a tract they would direct their attention to a more detailed treatment of special parts of it of more actual importance, neglecting those portions which have been already sufficiently expounded in our theological manuals.

JOHN WEBSTER MELODY.

De Virtute Justitiæ et de Variis Statuum Obligationibus. Auctore Ad. Tanqueray, S.S. Desclée: Lefebvre et Soc, Tornaci, 1904. Pp. 547.

Dr. Tanqueray's second volume of moral theology has just come from the press. Already the theological manuals of this writer have merited for him an international name and this latest work "De Virtute Justitiæ et De Variis Statuum Obligationibus" will go to sustain his acquired reputation. As the authors of our theological manuals are obliged to cover a wide extent of matter within a narrow compass, the student of our seminaries comes from his course very often quite unaware of the grave difficulties involved in many of the questions he is called upon to study and, to a certain degree master. These question necessarily dispatched quickly in the class room he sees only in their elementary expression, rarely realizing their far

¹To gratify the curiosity of some of our readers we may state here that the four famous passages, Luke xxii, 43, 44; John vii, 53; viii, 1-11; I John v, 7, have been designedly omitted in the Borgian fragments.

reaching grasp. Again any idea of historic growth or evolution in the subject matter of his text-book, hardly presents itself to the ordinary seminarist. Even the positive law he reads of he is apt to regard as having existed from the beginning much as it now is—the several tracts of theology having sprung into being like Minerva fully equipped and developed from the very outset.

It must be said that Dr. Tanquerey has guarded against such results occurring in the mind of those who shall use his manuals, especially this his last one. For the copious notes and the references to more extensive works that abound throughout the volume prevent the arising of any complacent idea that the handling of the various important questions is anything like as exhaustive as it would be in a more special treatise.

Again, the student will gain from this handbook a notion of the character of growth and development in moral theology. In the evolution of moral science we must distinguish three essential elements,—principles, institution and facts. While the first of these are objectively immutable and as such independent of time and place, institutions and facts are ever shifting and changing, requiring new applications and unforeseen interpretations of ancient principles. Even these latter in the view of novel conditions, are often discovered to us in somewhat of a new light. In his "*De Virtute Justitiæ*" our author shows that he is conversant with the changed exigencies of the industrial and commercial world, and has formulated his principles accordingly. In the tract "*De Justitia et Jure*" the one subject calling for especial treatment to-day is the great question of Socialism. After briefly summarizing the three different phases in the history of this doctrine, the author argues against it in its various forms with a knowledge of his matter not sufficiently evinced, we dare to say, by all Catholic writers in their contentions against Socialism. Again it is his recognition of present economic conditions that has prompted the author to give a more detailed attention to the questions "*De locatione operarum seu de contractu laboris*" and "*De Speculationibus Bursæ*."

But it is especially in his treatment of the question of interest that we would commend Dr. Tanquerey. The theological student need not of course be told that the conception of interest on money loans entertained by the Fathers was radically different from that which obtains throughout the business world to-day even among men of conscience and honor. And not only the ancient but nearly all the modern theologians have taken up and repeated the views of the Fathers. Our author after giving an historical sketch of the doctrine

of interest in the Old and New Testament; among the ancient philosophers, among the Fathers and in the Councils of the Church up to the twelfth century, among the scholastics and in the councils down to the sixteenth century and finally of the doctrine of Benedict XIV and the Roman Congregation, passes to the modern theories on the subject and wisely reaches the conclusion that in our altered methods of commercial dealings money can be said to be really prolific and that the contract by which it is loaned is not properly the one described as "mutuum" nor that known as "locatio pecuniæ" but is of a character peculiar to itself and which may be styled "contractus crediti." The practise of our modern industrial world can therefore within due limits be fully reconciled with sound moral principles.

JOHN WEBSTER MELODY.

The Principles of Moral Science, An Essay by Rev. Walter McDonald, D.D. Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1904, 8°, pp. xi + 250.

This volume, dealing with the fundamental principles of ethics, is one which will amply repay a close examination by the moral theologian as well as the student of ethics. One is so accustomed to find any new work on this subject from a Catholic source to be but a mere iteration of traditional teachings and methods, that when a book appears containing fresh views and important deviations from the beaten track, such boldness almost takes away one's breath. An inordinate attachment to the motto *jurare in verbum magistri* has led us to forget that, like every other science, ethics ought to progress, and that moral theology can not yet claim to have attained its complete and perfect development.

It is not to be understood that Dr. McDonald in any essentials strays from the established teaching of the *schola*. On the contrary, the main purpose of the book is, as he says, to defend the "definite system of moral science taught for centuries in the Catholic schools." When he parts company with the leaders usually followed it is, in most instances, not to challenge a conclusion, but to direct destructive criticism against some notable principle commonly received, and to propose instead what he considers a sounder one for the support of the same conclusion. The general principles formulated in the treatise on human acts he looks upon not as axioms to furnish a deductive basis for inferences concerning the particular virtues, but as a synthesis of conclusions gathered from the study of these virtues. Hence, these principles must be tested by measuring them with well ascertained special conclusions concerning particular virtues; and if

they will not stand this test then they are faulty and ought to be rejected or amended.

Pursuing this method, the author, underterred by the prestige of great names, impugns the validity of some very weighty principles. For instance he condemns the one commonly offered to justify an action from which flow two results, one good, the other evil. Again he rejects the axiom which has made the chief dialectic defense of probabilism: *Lex dubia lex nulla*. We doubt whether many probabilists will be willing to give up this principle for the alternative which the author proposes. On the nature of penal laws he rejects the teaching of Saurez; and his explanation of the meaning of the natural law is different, though not fundamentally so, from the classic scholastic exposition.

A merit of the book is that it contains a sufficiently detailed examination of the theories of Mill and Spencer, comparing and contrasting them with scholastic doctrine in a manner that brings out forcibly the weakness of both forms of utilitarianism. Concerning Kant's system, Dr. McDonald frankly states that he has not been able to understand it—many of Kant's critics leave the reader to discover the situation himself—so he confines himself to noting the chief difficulties in which he became entangled when endeavoring to make his way through the mazes of the Königsburg philosopher.

Full of acute, and in many places, original reasoning, this book will prove stimulating to the student. Those who will refuse to surrender to the Doctor's argument—and these will be many—will find their reward in being compelled to thoroughly re-inspect, and, in some instances, strengthen the traditional positions which he assails.

JAMES T. FOX.

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La Bible et l'Histoire. Par le R. P. Prat, S.J. Paris: Bloud, 1904.

Priests who have to teach biblical history, either in schools and colleges or from the pulpit, nowadays meet with many difficulties, of which twenty years ago their predecessors did not dream. Nobody will expect them to solve all difficulties unaided. As a rule their labors leave no time for thoroughly scientific researches. Nevertheless, not only in scientific reviews, but also in popular magazines and even in the secular press of the day, many biblical questions are raised, which can no longer be ignored: parish priests need a solution. Catholic Scripturists are bound to speak; it is their duty to do so cautiously, but clearly.

It was no doubt for this reason that Father Lagrange wrote his "La Methode Historique" (3ième ed. Paris, Lecoffre, 1904) and Father von Hummelauer his "Exegetisches zur Inspirationsfrage" (Freiburg, Herder, 1904). Father Prat does not touch upon all the questions dealt with by these two Catholic scholars; for instance, of the book of Genesis he does not say a single word. Notwithstanding this incompleteness, "La Bible et l'Histoire" is a booklet (61 pp.), which will soon find a place, we hope, in the libraries of our American clergy. In a few pages it explains the true principles of modern Catholic exegesis.

The first chapter contains a short but solid refutation of two systems, held by some Catholics before the appearance of the encyclical "Providentissimus Deus" (pp. 11-18). In the second chapter he examines "the distinctive character of the sacred books," and explains the connection in Holy Scripture between divine teaching and the scientific and historical data of the Bible (pp. 18-30). After this he indicates the specific character of biblical history (pp. 30-39). Finally in the fourth and last chapter, Father Prat shows plainly, though briefly, that the inspired authors do not always guarantee strictly the historical character of the sources, which they quote, either explicitly or *implicitly* (40-56). In his conclusion the learned Jesuit calls the attention of his readers to the fact, that sometimes, *doubts* are expressed in Holy Scripture; and he tries to reconcile these doubts with the *divine authorship* of the sacred writings (57 and 58). The last pages of the pamphlet are an answer to the objection, that, once we admit the theory of the critics, the sense of Holy Scripture should everywhere become doubtful: "On pourra flairer partout une métaphore, une allégorie, une citation implicite" (59-61).

This highly interesting booklet can be heartily recommended to the American clergy. It is as excellent as it is cheap. Nevertheless it is our opinion that on a few points the author's solutions of difficulties are not quite satisfactory.

We cannot agree with his explanation of *doubts*, expressed in Holy Scripture (p. 58). Prat seems to admit that the sacred authors, *even as authors*, entertained and expressed such doubts. He tries to explain the difficulty by "l'union admirable de la nature et de la grace dans la production de l'acte surnatural": the very same act is produced by two causes, God and man. But we do not see how this distinction affords a solution, and we believe that those "*doubts*" ought to be explained in another way. God cannot be the subject of a doubt. But he can inspire a man, without resolving the

doubts of this man with regard to things which are not taught in the inspired book. Although St. Luke, for instance, had been chosen by God to be the author of an inspired book, he had doubts concerning a great many things which God did not intend him to write, and therefore did not reveal to him. *As author* St. Luke does not write anything else, *Acts*, xxv, 6, but that he, *as a man*, doubted whether Festus stayed in Jerusalem "*eight or ten days.*" The affirmation of the author is positive: Festus stayed *some time* in Jerusalem. The length of this time is indicated by the author in a vague and general way: the man's *doubt* is thus merely a vague determination of the *object* of the author's positive affirmation. The supernatural intellectual *act* itself was a positive judgment, on the part of the *human* author also, that is to say, *as author*. The same must be said where St. Paul affirms that he *does not know* certain things; he does not know them *as man*. God could inspire a man *to write* his doubt, which revelation did not resolve: but the *subject* of this doubt itself or of this lack of knowledge is the writer, not formaliter *as inspired author*, but *as man*. He is inspired *in writing his doubt*, but he does not doubt *formaliter* as inspired author.

If biblical texts referring to scientific matters are proved to be false in their proper and natural sense, Prat seems to admit, that we are to understand them in a figurative sense: "Mais il n'est pas impossible qu'une decouverte ultérieure oblige à l'abandonner pour recourir au sens figuré" (p. 26). But how is it possible to understand, e. g., those passages of the Bible in a figurative sense, where the author speaks of the earth as being flat and resting upon the waters? Did the men who wrote thus, believe that the earth rested upon the waters, or not? We think that the only solution of this difficulty is to be found in the distinction between the affirmations of the *author* and the echoes of the opinions of *his time*, as we hope to have shown to the readers of this number of the BULLETIN.

H. A. POELS.

Aubrey De Vere: A Memoir Based on His Unpublished Diaries and Correspondence. By Wilfred Ward, author of "W. W. Ward and the Oxford Movement," "The Life and Times of Cardinal Newman," "Problems and Persons," etc. With two photographic portraits and other illustrations. London, New York and Bombay: Longmans, Green and Co., 1904. 8°.

The prose of Aubrey De Vere, in spite of its correctness and the value of its content, has not received the attention it deserves. It is intellectual and reflective prose, but it lacks that charm of person-

ality which make his letters so interesting and which made the man himself so much more attractive than even his poetical expressions. In his poetry "Alexander the Great" reaches the highest mark that can be set by any reasonable critic for unactable but sublime tragedy, and there was no poetry more sincere or more elevated in the Victorian era. The pleasure that these pages give through their presentment of the heart of the man will endear to many readers one who gave much that was good in him to the public, but kept the best for his friends. He had a genius for friendship; he was the Horatio of a fortunate circle that was never too large for his heart. The recent death of his elder brother, Sir Stephen—the translator of the odes of Horace—will perhaps let loose more reminiscences of the De Vere father and brothers, and there can not be too many. One finds in every page of this book,—so thoroughly and satisfactorily edited by Mr. Ward,—a stimulating thought, a touch of wit, wisdom or humor—a photograph of some celebrity, or an anecdote that keeps the pencil of the note-book maker at work. It is as full as the memoirs of Grant Duff or those of the Marquise de Créquy. Mr. De Vere's admiration for his father's dramatic work, for that of Sir Henry Taylor and "Alfred's"—Tennyson's—is inexhaustible. He quotes Macready's opinion on a much mooted question to-day, which neither Rostand nor Stephen Philips has settled even by success. "Amongst other things he (Macready) said that there was no greater mistake than in imagining that a play was the less adapted to stage purposes because it contained eminently poetical passages. No passages, he said, tell more on an audience than the poetical, provided only that the poetry be dramatic in its character and introduced appositely. Shakespere, he said, was as wonderful in his knowledge of stage effect as in every thing else, and all the alterations in his text made by managers have been for the worse."

The heart of the man shows itself in his descriptions of his experiences during the Irish famine. "In one day," he says speaking of his visits to the poor during the famine, "I have sat within nearly eighty mud hovels, without windows or chimneys—the roof so low that you could not (in some cases) stand upright, and within and around, a mass of squalidness and filth. Many, a trait of native goodness, or even refinement, I have noticed in such an abode—many a countenance I have marked traced with the characters of goodness, long endurance, and piety, though seen dimly through a veil not only of pallor and smoke, but one worn by the blasts and rain of many an adverse year. And in the midst of these horrors I have seen such strange gleams of humor, and heard many a sad tale told with a gay indifference."

His efforts to relieve the suffering of the famine were unremitting, and his brother was not less energetic and generous. The letters which tell without exaggeration of the terrors of this time are almost too painful to read. From Rome, in 1852, he writes to Mrs. H. N. Coleridge a note which shows that he was not one of those converts,—from whom only the fires of Purgatory can cleanse the Calvinism,—who seem to think that persons are to be hated, as well as errors. “Do not imagine for a moment,” he writes, “that a convert to Roman Catholicism loses any portion of sympathy with his old friends. I find exactly the contrary to be the case. Rome is half thrown away upon me from the degree in which my thoughts revert to those whom I most value, and my affection for whom seems to make newer friends of little interest.” He adds, “I do not think I could have continued a Christian, had I not become a Roman Catholic.”

This “Memoir” tempts the sympathetic pen to go on for many pages and to leave little for the reader of taste to discover for himself; Mr. Ward deserves all the thanks he will get from those who know a good book when they see it.

MAURICE FRANCIS EAGAN.

A History of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe: From the Earliest Texts to the Present Day. By George Saintsbury, M.A. (Oxon: Hon. H. D. Aberd), Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in the University of Edinburgh. 1904. 8°. Volume III, Modern Criticism. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.

The periods with which Mr. Saintsbury dealt in his two previous volumes of this work were more remote from the interest of the mass of moderns than those covered by this volume. He has not escaped the censure of philologists, which, in one or two instances, he seems to have deserved, and, it must be admitted that his attitude towards their methods has been in no wise conciliating. The professional classical philologist may be exacting and sometimes excessively dogmatic, but, at least, he submits his results to a scientific test. The literary critic who tries to isolate literature, as Mr. Saintsbury does, may become just as irritatingly dogmatic without offering his conclusion to any test more convincing than his own opinions. The scholarship and industry evinced in this work are equalled only by the abundant energy and inexhaustible freshness of mind it shows on every page. Mr. Saintsbury cannot be reasonably accused of “amateurishness” and “superficiality,” as some of his more exacting critics have carelessly phrased it, but any critic of the school of Anatole France must be prepared to hear such objections made to his presentment when he

assumes to write "history" and not "impressions." It is unusual to name Saintsbury and France in the same paragraph unless by way of antithesis, and yet there are many passages in this third volume that are "inspirational" rather than accurately historical. At the same time, "A History of Criticism" is the most valuable work of its kind yet produced in English. It does not make an epoch, but it marks an epoch—an epoch when the serious student of literature must acknowledge that criticism itself amounts, in importance, to a branch of literature which should be treated by itself, and which demands the highest qualities of the mind, the most exact knowledge, the widest grasp, the strictest concentration, and the exactest balance. Whether it is a sign of decay or not, the time has come, especially in France, when authors would have little to do, if they did not write about one another.

This volume deserves more attention than space permits. The appendix,—a kind of waste basket adorned with British colors,—into which Mr. Saintsbury puts "American criticism"—is a part of the work which he might, to his own credit, have omitted. A certain condescension in foreigners—handsomely celebrated by one of our own critics,—is delightfully evident here. Mr. Saintsbury is flippant in an elephantine way and always engagingly kind; but he is so important,—he has done so much to destroy the mere *dilettante* and belletrist, that one hates to see him in the attitude of Pooh-Bah, in Mr. Gilbert's very literary book of the opera of the "Mikado." He greets the American critics with such evident benevolence that the modern barbarians will almost forgive his pleasant salutation: "If all living American critics were to be carried off by a special epidemic, I should be sorry for two reasons—first of all, because several of them are my personal friends, and, secondly, because I should have to extend this preface to an almost unmanageable length." The appendix concerns itself, following the scheme of the book, with dead authors. Mr. Saintsbury is fair enough to Sydney Lanier, who was, first of all, a poet and an impressionist and little of a critic; and he does justice to Ticknor. Of Poe's "Rationale of Verse," he says, truly, "it is one of the best things ever written on English poetry," but he adds, with just a touch of condescension, that it is, "quite astonishingly original."

To return to Ticknor—it strengthens respect for Mr. Saintsbury's perception to note his saying that the "History of Spanish Literature" is likely to retain its position, not merely as a classic, but as an authority. Mr. Saintsbury implies as a fault in Ticknor that he is rather less of a critic than he is of a historian,—his grouping of

facts, his investigation and connections are all a little superior to his appreciation pure and simple. The objection reversed, may apply to Mr. Saintsbury's point of view and method; it ought to be remembered that Ticknor set out to be a historian, and fulfilled his purpose; but "the lesson of criticism," as Mr. Saintsbury says, "is tolerance."

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.

The Arab Conquest of Egypt and the Last Thirty Years of the Roman Dominion. By Alfred J. Butler. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902. 8°, pp. xxxiv + 563.

The story that Dr. Butler relates of the conquest in the seventh century by the followers of Mohammed of a province that ranked among the most important in the possession of the Roman Empire is of great historical interest. Eventful as this conquest was there were few problems in history more obscure than that which related to the invasion of Egypt by the Arabs, and their rapid subjugation of the Delta of the Nile. All that was known on the subject until recently may be summed up as follows: The Arab general 'Amr, probably aware of the internal dissensions of Egypt, invaded that country in 639 or 640, and was received by the Jacobite Copts rather as a deliverer than as a conqueror. Perenum or Farma was taken with the help of the friendly Copts. Subsequently 'Amr defeated the imperial forces in two battles and after a siege of several months captured the strong fortress of Babylon. The fall of this stronghold decided Mukaukas, the Coptic Governor of Egypt, "to yield to the Arabs, and exchange the yoke of Constantinople for the yoke of Mecca"; the Governor made peace with the conqueror and agreed on behalf of the Copts to pay a moderate tribute. From Babylon 'Amr marched on Alexandria, and en route defeated the Romans in several battles. After a siege of fourteen months Alexandria yielded and in December, 641, the victorious Muslim general made his entry. Such in substance was the history of the Arab conquest of Egypt hitherto current. The work of Dr. Butler will necessitate a general revision of the accounts of this event previously accepted. How difficult was the task the author has so well performed we learn from his preface. The meager and unsatisfactory chronicles of Byzantine writers like Theophanes and Nicephoras, had to be supplemented, and still oftener corrected, by the scattered references in a host of Arab, Coptic and Syrian writers. Of the new documents at the disposal of the author he assigns the first place to the Chronicle of John, a Coptic bishop of Nikiou who was born about the time of the Conquest and wrote

towards the end of the seventh century. "It is the acquisition of John's MS. by the British Abyssinian expedition which has made it possible to write a history of the Arab conquest of Egypt" (p. ix). This work of John of Nikiou, originally written partly in Coptic and partly in Greek, now exists only in an Ethiopic version translated by Zotenberg. In the MSS. of the version there are unfortunately many corruptions and lacunæ; the most serious of the latter concern the period from the accession of the Emperor Heraclius to the arrival of 'Amr before Babylon (610-640). What remains of the Chronicle is however of great importance and is regarded by the author as of "unimpeachable authority."

Founding his revised narrative of the conquest of Egypt on this authority, supplemented wherever possible by many other writers, Dr. Butler opens his work with the Revolt of Heraclius. And even in this first chapter the author parts company with the historians who have followed Gibbon in accepting the story of a race for an Empire between the younger Heraclius and his friend Nicetas. The author regards this account of Heraclius' plan of campaign as "childish," and after examining his reasons for this conclusion one cannot help agreeing with him. For, in the supposed competition scarcely would there be one chance in a hundred in favor of Nicetas. Heraclius proceeding by sea had little or no obstacle to encounter, except the possible one from the elements; but, on the competition theory, Nicetas had to march to Egypt, there encounter and overthrow the army of occupation commanded by officers of Phocas, and then continue his long and difficult journey by land through Palestine, Syria, Cilicia and Asia Minor, on his way to the imperial capital. Had Nicetas accepted a proposition such as that he has been supposed to have agreed to he would certainly not deserve to be esteemed for a large degree of mental acuteness. It is much more natural to suppose, as Dr. Butler points out, that his real and only objective was Egypt, the source of the imperial capital's food supply, which he was to conquer and hold for his colleague Heraclius.

In the history of the Arab conquest of Egypt the leading parts in what was destined to be a great historical tragedy were played by three persons: the Emperor Heraclius, the Patriarch Cyrus and the Arab General 'Amr. The Emperor Heraclius mounted the imperial throne at a time when the very existence of the Roman Empire was threatened by the powerful Chosroes, king of the Persians. Was the young Emperor equal to the task of hurling back the invaders whose forefathers had so often experienced disaster and defeat at the hands of a Roman Emperor? Or on the other hand was the taunt of the

dethroned tyrant Phocas, "Are you the man to govern the Empire better?" to prove well-founded? At first it seemed as though the sneering scepticism of Phocas accurately enough summed up the limitations of Heraclius. Four years after his coronation, in 614, the Persian hosts invaded Syria, and by the end of May of the following year they were masters of Jerusalem. In the autumn of 616 Chosroes, having subjected to his rule one fair province of the Empire, advanced to the conquest of the still more important province of Egypt. In the spring of 617 the strong fortress of Babylon at the head of the Delta of the Nile was taken, and by the end of this year the capital of the province, the strongly fortified city of Alexandria, was occupied by the Persian army.

Nor did the triumphant progress of the Persians stop with their conquest of Egypt; they swept across Asia Minor and entered the city of Chalcedon whence they could see the capital of the Empire itself, from which only the Bosphorus separated them. Heraclius was equally unfortunate in defending his European territories: hordes of Tartars and Huns roamed at will through the province of Thrace up to the walls of Constantinople.

And while his Empire was thus rapidly dismembered how was the Emperor occupied? In his fight for an empire he had proved himself an able and energetic commander; but once seated on the imperial throne discouragement at the disorganization he encountered seems to have taken complete possession of him. It was at one time even believed that he meditated abdication and flight from his capital. But here the Patriarch Sergius interposed, and by his exhortations brought Heraclius to register a solemn vow in the Church of St. Sophia that he would fight as became a Roman Emperor for the deliverance of his dominions from a barbarian yoke.

How well Heraclius kept his vow his wonderful campaign against the Persians showed. In the spring of 622 the Emperor took the field, and six years later the last Persian had disappeared from the soil of the empire. The great Chosroes himself, after the capture of Dastagerd, sought refuge in flight; but he was not destined long to survive so many disasters: he fell into the hands of his successor Siroes, and was put to death. Covered with glory the Emperor returned home, and in the year 629 the Holy Cross, which he had recovered from the Persians, was restored to its former place in the Holy City.

Heraclius was now the hero of Christendom. The great war he had so triumphantly waged was primarily a holy war; the victor, consequently, deserved and received the thanks of Christians the world over. But as so often happens in the careers of men, the

moment of his greatest triumph marked the beginning of his decline. While still in Jerusalem accusations against the Jews began to pour in from all sides to the Emperor. The Jews were charged, and our author regards the charge as "probably true," with "more guilt than the Persians for the slaughter of the Christians and the demolition and burning of the Churches." The Emperor was evidently convinced that the Jews were guilty. He issued an edict expelling them from Jerusalem and forbidding them to come within three miles of the city in future. A deplorable massacre of the Jews followed, sanctioned, the author thinks, by Heraclius. It was about this time also that the project for the reconciliation of the Monophysite heretics with the Church began to take definite form. Several years previously the Patriarch of Constantinople, Sergius, had proposed a compromise to the Emperor which, he thought, would be acceptable to the Monophysites. While holding fast to the definition of Chalcedon relative to the two natures of Christ, Sergius put forward the opinion that nevertheless in the "Word Incarnate there is but one operation." Among the earliest adherents of the compromise of Sergius was Cyrus, Bishop of Phasis in the Caucasus. Dr. Butler (p. 136) refers to Cyrus as a Nestorian, but this statement is incorrect. While engaged in the Persian war the Emperor could give but little attention to Church controversies; but now that the Persian war was over, now that the Empire was free from the dangerous enemy, he began to take energetic measures for the reconciliation of the Monophysite sectaries to the Church. Cyrus the Caucasian seemed to him a suitable instrument for his purpose, and accordingly the Bishop of Phasis became Patriarch of Alexandria (631). Cyrus arrived in his new see with instructions to win back to the Church the Coptic Monophysites who formed by far the larger part of the population of Egypt. At first the Monothelite Patriarch seems to have met with some success, and he was able to forward to Constantinople rather glowing reports of his satisfactory progress. But this state of things soon changed. The Catholics saw that the compromise was really a surrender to the Monophysites, and on the other hand, the Monophysites, though they perceived the value of the concession made to them, could not be induced to accept the hated Council of Chalcedon. Cyrus, thereupon, exasperated at his failure, began a persecution of the Copts which lasted ten years. During at least a portion of this period Cyrus appears to have exercised supreme temporal, as well as supreme spiritual authority. The author, in fact, identifies him with the mysterious Al Mukaukas whose name occurs frequently in the chronicles of the time as playing a prominent part in connection with the Arab con-

quest. Although many of the Copts conformed to the Monothelite doctrine during this period, the great majority remained firm in their Monophysite belief. The only result of the policy of coercion was to strain the allegiance of the Copts to the breaking-point. Yet, persecuted as they were, Dr. Butler maintains, apparently on good grounds and contrary to the generally received opinion, that the Copts did not either coöperate with the Arabs or look with favor on their invasion. But, since the charge of treason against the Copts is unfounded, the ease with which 'Amr, the Arab general, entered Egypt, and the little opposition he met with from the imperial troops, are still more inexplicable, especially when it is remembered that Heraclius, the conqueror of the Persian hosts, was still alive. With barely 4,000 troops, wholly unskilled in siege warfare, 'Amr undertook the conquest of Egypt. At no time in this expedition did he have more than 16,000 men under his command; yet in less than two years 'Amr was master of Egypt: he entered Egypt in December 639, and Alexandria capitulated November 641. The Patriarch Cyrus, as Governor of Egypt, figures prominently in the scenes of these two memorable years, and his part is by no means heroic. The author indeed makes Cyrus appear somewhat in the character of villain. According to his account of the conquest the Patriarch-Viceroy is chiefly responsible for the deliverance of Egypt to the Muslims without any defence worthy of the name. In this opinion, however, we cannot quite agree with him. The Emperor Heraclius was primarily responsible for the defence of Egypt, and for the policy of coercion which alienated the Copts. The imperial generals also, for their incompetency, and the slight efforts they made to stem the tide of invasion, must bear their share of blame. How little some of these imperial officials regretted the change from Roman to Arab rule is shown by the fact that the three highest in rank among them, after the Perfect of Alexandria, apostatized to Mohammedianism, and were continued in office under the new government (p. 362). Cyrus must, of course, bear a large share of the responsibility for the loss of Egypt, but the imperial pretension to dictatorship in religion, admitted in practice by Sergius of Constantinople and the Monothelite party, was at the root of the matter. But the author candidly accepts a brief for the Copts, and at the same time acts as devil's advocate for Cyrus. For this personage we have not the slightest sympathy, no more than for any of his contemporaries who admitted, nay often encouraged, the pretensions of the Emperor to rule both Church and State. But the Copts were by no means guiltless. They themselves saw, as the author admits (p. 180), that the Monothelite compromise was prac-

tically a surrender of the doctrine of Chalcedon; but the very name of Chalcedon threw them into a rage, and they would not move a single step to bring about the unity of Christendom. To the fanatical Monophysite the Melchite was, in the words of Abba Samuel to Cyrus, "a son of Satan, Antichrist, Beguiler," and a "Chalcedonian Deceiver" whose faith was "defiled" (p. 186 sq.). And although they did not coöperate with the Arabs against the Empire they became reconciled to the new state of things in a surprisingly short period of time. Before the surrender of Alexandria we find the Copts of the Fayum killing "any Roman soldier they chanced to encounter" (p. 319). How long the majority of them persevered in the faith whereof at this date they would not make the slightest surrender, is shown by some interesting statistics. In the treaty of Alexandria, by which Egypt was surrendered to the Muslims, it was stipulated that a capitation tax of two dinars (about \$5) a head should be paid annually by the subject or non-Mahommedan population to the new government, an exception being made in the case of very old men and young children. At the conquest this tax amounted to 12,000,000 dinars; the Christian population consequently was then over six millions. Towards the end of the ninth century, one hundred and fifty years after the conquest, this poll-tax had fallen to 3,000,000 dinars. That is to say that in a century and a half the Christian population of Egypt diminished by 4,500,000 (p. 463). These figures prove only too well that the Copts who so detested the name of Chalcedon, enrolled themselves *en masse* under the standard of Mohammed.

With this reservation regarding what seems to us a too warm advocacy of the Copts, the tone of Dr. Butler's work is calm and dispassionate. It can be recommended as a valuable contribution to the history of Egypt in the seventh century. The picture of the Muslim general 'Amr shows the conqueror in a favorable light. Two chapters on Alexandria at the Conquest and The Library of Alexandria are especially interesting. On page 418 the author speaks of Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret as writers of the early part of the *fourth* century. Fourth should read fifth.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

De la Clandestinité dans le Mariage. Par L'Abbé R. Bassibey. Paris: Oudin, 1903. Pp. 416.

M. Bassibey who has already won favor by his "Procédure Matrimoniale Générale," gives us in this new work a very complete and accurate discussion of the workings of the celebrated decree

"Tametsi." His treatment of this intricate matter leaves nothing to be desired, and there is no doubt that officialities who find some of their greatest difficulties in the application of the Tridentine decree will thank the author for a very great and a very real service done them.

The work has, however, a more general interest and a wider utility. Though the title correctly describes the main subject which the author designed to investigate, it hardly conveys any idea of a number of other allied matters which he found it necessary to discuss, matters which have considerable importance in the eyes of those who are not obliged to concern themselves practically with the diriment character of the impediment of clandestinity. A complete study of the Tridentine decree was impossible without taking into account certain canonical topics that are closely connected with the celebration of marriage and that offer themselves for actual consideration in places where the "Tametsi" has never been promulgated. Hence, this work of M. Bassibey will appeal to every priest whose ministry continually brings him face to face with difficulties relating to the contract of marriage, and who will be able to find here a thoroughly modern exposition of the law on domicile and quasi-domicile, on the rites of the marriage ceremony, on the publication of the banns, on the proper method of dealing with public sinners, with free-thinkers, with members of condemned societies. This volume should find a welcome far wider than its title would at first sight seem to justify.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

The Young Priest: Conferences on the Apostolic Life. By Cardinal Vaughan. London: Burns and Oates. Pp. 347. 1904. 8°.

Like his great predecessor, Cardinal Vaughan has left a work addressed exclusively to priests. In "The Young Priest" of the late Archbishop of Westminster, we fail to note, it is true, anything like the profound thought, the original presentation, or the high literary style, that made the "Eternal Priesthood" a classic for those for whom it was written. Yet, the spirit of sacerdotal piety, in this more humble work is none the less striking in that it finds a homelier expression. An extrinsic interest attaches to the book from the fact that it was written, as his brother tells us, as a work of devotion when the Cardinal, stricken with disease, was no longer able to discharge the duties of active life. In sending forth these conferences the author has principally in mind that class of young priests who, in the first years of their ministry are plunged into a life of missionary activity,

which tends to withhold them from the study and reflection necessary for the stay and development of the inner life. The Cardinal well remarks that "It were greatly to be desired that the period of preparation for the ministry could be systematically lengthened. The advantage of two or even three additional years given to study in Rome or elsewhere after the ordinary curriculum would tell powerfully on the spiritual influence a priest would exercise over his flock." In our country happily, it is not necessary to go to Rome to gain the advantages of the finished training which as a rule is unattainable in the seminaries. We have an institution where the young priest freed as yet from the pressure of parochial work may acquire a greater spirit of study and come to that development not only mental but spiritual which will be his surest safeguard in the distractions and temptations of the busy life that may afterwards await him.

The author declares that his conferences are not addressed to those priests who seek only to fashion their conduct on the loose interpretation of the principles of moral theology. Of course to the priest who sets out with only the purpose of avoiding grave sins by such means these discourses will appeal in vain. But we are convinced that not a few priests in more or less good faith, at least with no positively evil design, have not infrequently regulated their actions according to the principles of moral theology through failure to understand the pathological character of these principles. To such the conferences of the late Archbishop of Westminster will bear a salutary message and indeed all in the sacred ministry will find helpful spiritual reading in "The Young Priest."

JOHN WEBSTER MELODY.

The Divorce Problem in the United States. By Patrick L. Crayton, S.T.L. Boston: Thomas J. Flynn and Co., 1904. 8°, pp. 58.

This treatise written originally in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Licentiate in Theology is meant to "illustrate the fact that divorce, with its present legislation in the United States, is an appalling menace to social order and morality; to demonstrate that the reforms ordinarily proposed do not meet the exigencies of the case and suggest the remedy for the existing disastrous condition of affairs." After recording the findings of the statistics compiled by the Hon. Carroll D. Wright according to instruction of an Act of Congress in 1887, the author points out the marked annual increase in the number of divorces for these last thirty-six years. He tell us that in the year 1903 the number of marriages set aside by our divorce courts

was no less than 68,499. From these startling figures Fr. Crayton proceeds to a discussion of the divorce laws in the United States. The causes for severing the marriage bond in this country are, according to the statistics of Mr. Wright, no fewer than 42. It is observed however that in this number are included the grounds for annulment which of course are not grounds for divorce in the strict sense of the word.

The different divorce laws of the several states being indicated the conflict between them is well set forth. The clash between these different statutes, next to their laxity, is largely responsible for the evil the author is considering and this clash it is which constitutes, Fr. Crayton justly says, "the second problem of our divorce legislation." What now is the remedy for these conditions. Two have been advocated, one: reform, to be brought about by the individual States, the other: action by the federal authority. Our author addresses himself to an examination of each of these proposed measures. Clearly the first movement in the reform of our divorce legislation should be to secure a uniformity in the laws of the various States. Not much hope, however, is placed in any action to be undertaken by the separate Commonwealths for the securing of this end. State prejudice and traditions operate to prevent it. Besides an accepted standard to appeal to is lacking.

Neither can we expect anything like a radical change for the better in the event of the Federal authorities being given the jurisdiction that now belongs to the State courts. Congress, the author says would seek to effect the desired reform in one or all of the three following ways: (1) By the restriction of marriage, (2) by the restriction of re-marriage; (3) by the institution of civil marriage and divorce. It is shown satisfactorily enough that any one or all of these methods would be for the most part futile to bring about the proposed end. For it is not to legislative enactment, concludes Fr. Crayton, that we must turn for anything like a remedy thorough in this matter, but to a more enlightened public sentiment above all to aroused moral and religious convictions. It is in this educational and uplifting work that the exalted doctrine and practice of the Catholic Church regarding marriage is seen to be a most potent agency. The author mentions the other influences that may operate powerfully to undo the evil of which he writes,—literature, the press, voluntary associations, such as, for instance, to give only one example, the American Bar Association. In the literature above referred to, his own brochure will take no mean place; for Fr. Crayton has presented us with an excellent dissertation, and its clear forceful statement must

bring home to every reader not only the idea of the menacing character of this social and moral problem pervading our land but of the means to which we are to turn, if we are to hope for its solution.

We would call the author's attention to several points in his brochure that are not, however, of vital significance. He says (p. 13): "A valid Christian marriage (i. e., baptized persons) not consummated (*ratum et non consummatum*) may be dissolved by the spiritual death of one of the parties who takes the solemn vows of a religious order." "Spiritual death" is hardly the expression to describe entrance into a religious order. On the contrary such action is said to be the choosing of a higher spiritual life. Sin only is spiritual death; and adultery is said by many to dissolve marriage just because by it the sinful party dies in the character of a consort to the innocent partner. But we would not dispute about words. Speaking about the law of the absolute indissolubility of marriage as it obtains in South Carolina, Fr. Crayton says: this legislation "has not tended to produce a very enviable morality in that State." The author bases this assertion upon the authority of J. P. Bishop ("Marriage Separation and Divorce," Vol. I, Nos. 58 and 59). He might also have brought forward the testimony of President Woolsey who, in his "Divorce and Divorce Legislation" (p. 203) passes the same stricture on this law. If this charge be true, it is clear the opponents of the absolute indissolubility of marriage would have right at hand an argument drawn from the social working of the law they would condemn that would be of no small moment. But the charge is not true. We would refer Fr. Crayton to a letter written by ex-Judge Benet and published in full in the *Columbia, S. C., State* for the thirteenth of October last. In this communication ex-Judge Benet shows that the criticisms of Bishop and Woolsey have for their foundation an opinion of Judge Nott, handed down in 1818 defining a statute enacted in 1795 which in turn was grounded upon a former act promulgated no later than 1703. Conditions existing nearly a century ago in South Carolina offer a poor basis, indeed, upon which to rest a criticism of the present workings of a law in that State, especially when the original representation of these conditions was made by one who, if we are to credit ex-Judge Benet was not above the suspicion of being prejudiced against the State of which he spoke.

JOHN WEBSTER MELODY.

The Right to Life of the Unborn Child. A Controversy between Professor Hector Treub, M.D., Rev. R. Van Oppenraay, D.D., S.J., and Professor Th. M. Vlaming, M.D. New York: Joseph T. Wagner. 1904. 8°, pp. 125.

No Catholic confessor need to be told of the increasing extent to which the right to life here referred to is disregarded. How great has been this increase may be gathered from the fact that before the year 1840 according to the testimony of American physicians abortion was not practised very generally, while at the present day if we are to credit the report of a special Committee on Criminal Abortion in the United States, appointed some few years ago, the number of women who die from the immediate effects of this crime in the United States is not less than 60,000 annually. It must be said that reputable physicians everywhere are, as a rule, strongly adverse to the practise of abortion. An exception to this rule, however, is to be noted in the case of Dr. Treub, Professor at the University of Amsterdam, the greatest of Dutch gynecologists and a specialist of international reputation. In him the opposition to the teaching set forth by the Church on this matter finds one of its ablest champions. His contention is given in full in this book, and the answers to it, by Father Van Oppenraay and Dr. Vlaming, have therefore the value of being directed against the actual position of a skillful opponent. We know of no better exposition of the doctrine of the Church on the right to life of the unborn child than that found in the arguments of Father Van Oppenraay and Dr. Vlaming.

JOHN WEBSTER MELODY.

The O'Briens of Machias, Me. Patriots of the American Revolution: Their Services to the Cause of Liberty. By Rev. Andrew M. Sherman. Boston: For the American-Irish Historical Society, 1904. 8°.

The subject-matter of this little book is sufficiently indicated by its title. Suggested by the same theme, and not unrelated to it, is a sketch of the Clan O'Brien by Mr. Thomas Hamilton Murray. Together these historical studies make an interesting little volume of 87 pages.

Mr. Sherman's part of the volume was embodied in a discourse in New York before the American-Irish Historical Association. His paper was read, January 12, 1904, on the occasion of the society's annual meeting and dinner at the Hotel Manhattan. In such circumstances the entertainment of his audience is commonly regarded by

the speaker as a legitimate object, often, indeed, as the sole consideration. Mr. Sherman, however, not only succeeded in interesting his hearers but contrived to recall to their memories the feeble beginnings from which sprang the navy of the Revolution, a navy which, with leaders like Barry and Jones, gave examples of genius and daring that with greater armaments challenged in a later generation England's dominion of the seas.

The reverend speaker, himself a descendant of the fighting O'Briens of seventy-six, also suggested a topic which, except for an occasional monograph, has received at the hands of historians but scant consideration; that is, the services of the Irish in the War for Independence.

The paper before us keeps strictly within the domain of history. Strong as must have been, from the nature of his theme, the temptation to give scope to his imagination, Mr. Sherman nowhere appears anxious to throw around his narrative the glamor of romance. Indeed, the actual achievements of the O'Briens were more attractive than those commonly ascribed to the heroes of fiction.

Where the author touches the broader history of the United States, one finds an occasional slip, as for example, his statement that Maine entered the Union about 1835. Students of the great national issues are aware that when the application of Missouri for admission as a State aroused the dangerous anti-slave agitation, Maine came in, in 1820, as a sort of make-weight to preserve between the North and the South an equality of representation in the United States Senate.

The book includes also a brief sketch of Mr. Sherman, a presbyterian clergyman of Morristown, N. J., and as has been stated above a somewhat ample account of the O'Briens who have acquired fame in America and elsewhere. Better, perhaps, than any evidences that could now be furnished by the genealogist, Mr. Murray, by an account of their achievements proves the descent of a long list of O'Briens from the clan of that valiant old king who broke forever the power of the Danes at Clontarf.

C. H. MCCARTHY.

Foclóir Gaedhilde Agus Béarla: An Irish-English Dictionary, being a Thesaurus of the words, phrases and idioms of the Modern Irish Language, with explanations in English. Compiled and edited by Rev. Patrick S. Dinneen, M.A. Dublin: published for the Irish Texts Society, Gill and Son. London: David Nutt, 1904. 8°, pp. 803.

The completion of this Irish-English Dictionary is unquestionably

the greatest achievement of the modern Gaelic language movement. Students of the modern language were already provided with a number of grammars of Modern-Irish, of which the most recent and by far the best is that by the Christian Brothers ("Graiméar na Gaedhilge leis na Bráithreachaibh Críostamhla," Dublin, Gill and Son, 2d ed. 1902) which, though far from being perfect, are quite sufficient for ordinary purposes. But the students' other indispensable tool, a handy Irish-English Dictionary, was wanting. To be sure there existed several dictionaries, but they were out of date, hard to find, and in many ways unsuitable for students' use. Even the most widely consulted, O'Reilly's, which appeared in 1821, remains unchanged to this day, in spite of the specious statement on the title page that it is "a new edition carefully revised and corrected"; for on closer inspection it clearly appears that it is, to borrow the quaint description Ebel gave of it, "*nihil nisi eiusmodi artificium, ne dicam mendacium, quo callidi atque astuti redemptores decipere conentur emptores veterum librorum recoctorum ac vix recoctorum.*" O'Reilly's dictionary, though it contains an abundance of valuable material, is badly arranged, pays no attention to the spoken language, is cumbersome, dear, and scarce, and not the kind of book we look for in a students' dictionary.

The appearance of Fr. Dinneen's work is, besides, one of the most hopeful signs of the Gaelic language movement and it gives evidence of the progress that has been made in the study of Modern-Irish in one generation. A quarter of a century ago, an Irish dictionary compiled with the method and good judgment displayed in Father Dinneen's work would have been well-nigh inconceivable. Father Dinneen does not claim that his dictionary is exhaustive or final, but we are deeply indebted to him for producing a work of which it cannot be gainsaid "that it contains a larger number of words used in the living Irish language and in the more modern written compositions than any Irish dictionary yet published; that it gives the various words fuller grammatical treatment; that it explains them more in detail and with greater precision and accuracy; that it gives a fuller account of local usage and pronunciation; that it treats more fully the more important words which form the basis of the main idioms that constitute the core of the language; that it gives a greater number of peculiarly poetical expressions, a fuller list of technical words, and a more copious supply of examples drawn from the living speech of the people; that it has a more abundant list of references to modern standard works; that it deals more exhaustively and with fuller illustration with the various particles whose uses and functions are calculated to puzzle the student" (preface).

As all students of Irish know, we shall not have a complete dictionary of the language, whether it be from Irish into English or wholly in Irish, with illustrative quotations in chronological order, until the most remote dialects and sub-dialects will have been registered accurately and scientifically, as has been done, in part at least, for the Aran Irish in Franz Finck's *Die Araner Mundart* ("Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung des Westirischen," Marburg, 1899). This is one of the first tasks to which students of Irish should devote their greatest energy, to save from oblivion the tens of thousands of words which do not find a place in Father Dinneen's Dictionary, and which are irrevocably passing away.

Father Dinneen had already done excellent lexicographical work in connection with his editions of the Munster poets, of whom he is the recognized historiographer, and in his Dictionary we may expect to find the Munster usage especially well treated. As a corrective of any possible predominance of the Munster dialect he has had the cooperation of some of the best native Irish scholars from all parts of Ireland, whose names are a guarantee of the reliability of their contributions and, in addition, he has drawn from the classical and current literature since Keating's time and from the existing Irish-English dictionaries in print or in manuscript. In connection with this subject it may not be out of place to suggest that now is the time to publish these MS. dictionaries, for they will not fail to be instructive, because of their system of orthography and other peculiarities, on several phases of the Irish of the time and place at which they were written.

The *Foclóir* embraces the language from the works of Keating to our day. For details as to syntactical usages, orthographical variations and some additional meanings of words, it will of course have to be supplemented by Atkinson's Vocabulary to "The Three Shafts of Death," A. and F. Finck's "Glossary to Donlevy's Catechism" (*Archiv für Celtische Lexicographie*, II Band, 1-2 Heft) and Father Hogan's "Phrase Book" and "Handbook of Irish Idioms."


One of the greatest difficulties to be contended with in Irish lexicography is the unsettled condition of the orthography of Modern Irish. Doubtless a uniform system of spelling will soon be decided upon and the soon the better, before the incorrect forms become more deeply rooted. The most striking reform (?) on this point in Father Dinneen's work is the uniform spelling of initial *sp*, *st*, *sc* (the so-called *s-impuro*) in preference to *sb*, *sd*, *sg*, the last of which is the more familiar form in modern writings. This step was taken with the approval of some distinguished Irish scholars, and in so far as

it tends towards uniformity and system, it may be a step in the right direction. The form *sc*, is the form found in the oldest writings, and is etymologically to be preferred. That it is a more phonetic spelling than *sg*, is not so certain. Father Dinneen does not go so far as to say that in all cases the second element of the group, the guttural, is voiceless; in fact, he admits that in some cases the sound may be *g*. There is considerable difference of opinion on the subject which can only be decided by the use of phonetic registering apparatus in the study of each dialect and each group of words; it is likely that it will then be found that the pronunciation of the combination varies and depends on influences and analogies which remain to be discovered. In the plural endings—(a)*i* and—(a)*ide* the longer and more familiar, though less phonetic, spelling has been chosen.

Father Dinneen has prudently left unnoted the pronunciation of the words and has not attempted to trace their derivation. To have done so would have enlarged unduly the size and cost of the book, which is intended above all to promote a wider reading of Modern Irish literature in the original and this end would not have been served in the least by the addition of notes on the origin of the words, the great majority of which would have been purely conjectural, which would have led far afield into Old and Middle Irish and the other Celtic and cognate languages, topics which less than one-tenth of those who will use the Irish Dictionary are able to follow and appreciate. The time is not yet ripe for an etymological dictionary of the Irish language and when it comes it properly belongs apart.

The reviewer regrets that the time at which the BULLETIN is to appear does not permit him to examine the Irish Dictionary with the consideration and scrutiny that the book is entitled to. It is eminently a practical lexicon, convenient in size, clearly printed and not dear; it will give a great impulse to the reading of Irish periodicals and newspapers, and it will no longer be necessary when publishing an Irish story to provide it with a glossary except in so far as it may contain words, *tournares* or other peculiarities of language not noted in Father Dinneen's work. The book deserves to take its place with the best of our college dictionaries of modern languages into English, and should be a prize book in every Gaelic school.

Father Dinneen has the heartfelt thanks of all to whom the tongue of the Gael is of concern for the zeal and the labor he has given to this work, and for the spirit that runs through it, and when, thanks to him and the earnest band of Gaelic Leaguers who succoured her in the time of storm and stress, the Irish language shall again



express the soul and spirit of the race, his name will be remembered among those that have done most for the saving of the Nation.

J. J. DUNN.

Le Réglementation Du Travail. Par A. Béchaux. Paris: V. Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 200.

This volume contains a sympathetic study of labor legislation on the continent. Assuming the need of such legal intervention, the author reviews recent labor legislation and gives particular attention to the Berlin Conference of 1890. He holds rightly to the idea, so dear to the French, that relief must be expected for industrial distress and insecurity from three correlated sources: the individual, organization, and the State. This study is made in harmony with that point of view, hence it will appeal very generally to all who are interested in the legal aspect of the labor question. Conditions in the United States are not dealt with in the work.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

Au Pays de "La Vie Intense." By Félix Klein, Professeur de l'Institut Catholique de Paris. Paris: Plon-Neurrit, 1904. 8°.

The Abbé Klein's book is easy reading, and for that reason and for the reason that it must put every American Catholic—who is either too young or too old to be cynical—in a good humor with himself and his country, it is popular. One would hardly put "Au Pays de la Vie Intense" on the same shelf with De Tocqueville or Bryce but it might easily go with Paul Bourget's amusing impressions of life among us; it is better written than Bourget's *brochure*, and it is without that taint of snobbishness which spoils some of Bourget's interesting interpretations of our way of living. To read it after a course of the more analytical volumes on America, especially the analytical volumes written by Englishmen, is like taking a glass of Bénédictine after a heavy dinner—only, of course it is less monastic than Bénédictine. One of the qualities which disarms censure and invites generosity in this book—*amando quare amandum*—is the fact that the *spirituel* and the spiritual Abbé has a long memory for kindnesses. This is not always the way of travellers. He has, too, a nice discrimination in the choice of friends. As the book is literature of the most personal and delightful kind, the heresy hunters will not probably think it worth their attention. It has been already widely read in France—it is in its fourth edition—and it will be very widely read in our country which will gladly welcome a guest so manifestly sympathetic with all that is best in American life.

MAURICE FRANCIS EAGAN.

Documentary Exposition of the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations Between the Holy See and the French Government.

New York: Catholic Truth Society, 1904. Pp. 48.

The Catholic Truth Society has done a notably good work in offering this translation to our American public. The value of the documents is more than a passing one. They will always remain a striking object-lesson of the merits of the respective cases of the Holy See and France in the present religious conflict. Their permanent importance was demonstrated only a few weeks ago by Mr. Combes who thought it advisable to make them the matter of a lengthy address. They ought to be given the widest possible circulation in the United States.

The friends of the Truth Society must, however, be permitted to express the hope that a second edition of this pamphlet will be free from the errors which disfigure the copy which we have just read, and which are neither few nor unimportant. "Rélations seculaires" are not precisely "civil relations." The Pope in the third article of the Concordat expected every sacrifice from the bishops of France, even the resignation of their sees; this translation represents him as excepting such resignation from the sacrifices to be made. "Réglements de police" can hardly be translated as "regulations of policy." Especially unfortunate is the error which dates document IV—July 3, instead of June 3, as the date of this letter has a peculiar bearing on one point of the controversy.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

Staats-Lexikon, Vol. V. *Sitte-Zwischenherescher*. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1904. 8°, pp. 756. \$4.75.

This volume completes the new third edition of Herder's *Staats-Lexikon* to the professed student of social science. It is probably the most interesting of the series, since it includes the articles on Socialism, Social Democracy, on the philosophical and the historical ideas of the State, Sovereignty, Sociology, Social Politics, the Syllabus, Toleration, etc. There is also a very serviceable article on *Staatslexicka* themselves. The article on the United States is of particular interest. The writer seems to look with suspicion on our recent expansion achievements, but his spirit is moderate compared with much that Americans themselves say and think. American readers will find the main facts of our life put in a setting which is not without some charm, though it does not show things in just the light in which we view them.

Brief notices of these volumes appeared currently with their publication. However, the completion of the work seems to offer occasion for a word concerning it as a whole. We owe much to the enterprise of Herder in bringing out this new edition as it involves immense labor and is a considerable financial risk. The best Catholic scholarship in Germany has gone into the work in a way that invites every confidence. It is unfortunate that the lexikon is available only for those who read German, but we may hope that a translation will some day be made, with such additions as English and American conditions make necessary.

A lexikon such as this labors under two difficulties. Its articles must be brief, judiciously written, in a way to get things in true perspective. Then, the work is one of varied authorship. A general unity of plan and purpose, and unified supervision are of course demanded, but the work remains that of many men. To overcome the dangers from both sources and produce a strong clear, harmonious lexikon is a very creditable piece of editorial work.

This lexikon is an expression of Catholic thought for Catholic minds. We miss without regret the abandon of free thought and the atmosphere of hypothesis throughout. The Church is accorded generous space in her historical and canonical phases. Relations of Church and State are treated from many standpoints, but always was to be expected, in sympathy with the Church's standards. Hence the value of the work from a Catholic point of view is very great. But its value as an encyclopedia of social knowledge is a feature of it to which I would call attention.

A lexikon combines into material unity the diverging lines of scientific thought. It recognizes the organic unity of knowledge and the need of so presenting it, that the relations of things be apprehended. We may have a question of social reform; it suggests an economic fact and a question of political philosophy. This has historical bearings without which we miss its meaning. Thus we go from sociology to economics, to politics, to history, in order to know in right relations the question at issue. The lexikon serves just this purpose. We may take an illustration. We find socialism carefully exposed in 16 pages and organized social Democracy in 13 pages in volume V. The vital question on which all thought turns is that of property. In Volume II we find a brief clear discussion of it in 14 pages. Socialism as an expression of social discontent is organically related to that discontent as manifested in what we call the Labor Question. In volume I we find a succinct clear statement of it in 16 pages. In volume V we find an exposition in 7 pages of

social politics—a name employed in Germany to indicate the whole aim of reform legislation. Here we discover the principles involved. We then find in volume I Labor legislation treated in 18 pages, Insurance of laboring men in 22 pages, while throughout, references to other discussions of minor points are given. Likewise organization of labor, industrial courts, etc., receive brief, clear treatment. In and through all this, appear the principles underlying the relations of State and Society. A discerning reader may find in articles on the State, its function, origin and philosophy, and on Liberalism, the broad and decisive principles involved. All this study and even more is necessary if we would understand relations of things and estimate accurately, the relations of Socialism. The lexikon renders this great service to the general student and often indeed to the specialist, hence it merits a very wide circulation. It is representative, dignified and accurate and it covers the field of social and political science completely enough to meet every ordinary demand.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

Konversations-Lexikon, Vol. III, Elea-Gyulay. Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1904. Large 8°, pp. 909. \$3.50.

This third volume of Herder's *Konversations-Lexikon* advances greatly the work undertaken. It is literally packed with information, far beyond what one would expect, owing to a careful system of abbreviation. The hundred plates illustrating Gothic and Greek art found in the volume are remarkably beautiful. The illustrations given with the articles on electricity in its varied relations to modern life, on protection against fire, telephone, the glass industry and similar important topics, make the narrative most interesting and facilitate reading greatly. The earlier volumes have been mentioned in former numbers of the *BULLETIN*. On the occasion of the appearance of the last volume, an extended notice of the whole work will be given.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

The Provincial Committees of Safety of the American Revolution. By Agnes Hunt, Ph.D. Cleveland (Western Reserve University): 1904. 8°, pp. 87.

The origin, the organization, the powers and duties of the American Committees of Safety are ably set forth in the monograph of Miss Hunt. For those who have neither the leisure nor the inclination to search through State and Federal archives there is collected in

this little volume a body of information which shows clearly the agency which this important institution had in effecting the change from a state of dependence to one of independence. Except for the professional student of history there will be found in the book an array of facts sufficient to reveal to the reader governmental conditions during the period of transition. Its utility is in no way impaired by the addition of a good bibliography

C. H. MCCARTHY.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Life of His Holiness Pope Pius X. With a preface by His Eminence James Cardinal Gibbons. New York: Benziger, 1904. 8°, pp. 491.

The anonymous author of this biography deserves praise for the industry with which he has collected so many interesting details of the life of our Holy Father, Pope Pius X. The various activities of the new Pope's long and fruitful career as a pastor of souls are here set forth in a highly entertaining manner. Sketches of Leo XIII and of the conclave in which his successor was elected form the first part of this volume, and serve the purpose of an interesting introduction.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

University Exhibit of Catholic Charities.—The Exhibit of Catholic Charities prepared by Professors Neill and Kerby for the St. Louis Exposition was signally honored by the Jury of Awards. A grand prize was voted to the exhibit as a whole and two gold medals were awarded to separate sections. Both of the exhibitors received gold medals in recognition of merit in the form of presentation of the exhibit.

The Board of Trustees of the University tendered an unanimous vote of thanks to Drs. Neill and Kerby for their labors in the preparation of the exhibit and determined to have it placed permanently in McMahan Hall. It is hoped that work may be continued and that within a short time, a good beginning will have been made for a complete and systematic record of the charity work of the Church in the United States. A description of the exhibit was published in the October, 1904, BULLETIN.

University Collection for 1903. *Additional Items.*—The diocese of Sioux Falls contributed \$610.00. An additional sum of \$302.05 has been received from Brooklyn, making a total from that diocese of \$4,727.19, and \$58.00 from Ogdenburg which together with the sum already acknowledged makes a total from that diocese of \$418.00. The total reached is now \$105,051.58.

Knights of Columbus Chair of American History.—A further evidence of the interest taken by the Knights of Columbus in the University was furnished by a contribution of \$3,258.80 which with the sum already contributed makes a total of \$53,258.80 for the Chair of American History.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees.—The Board of Trustees met at the University on November 16 and 17. The present financial condition of the University was very thoroughly examined with the gratifying result that instead of there being any need of curtailment it was decided that the project approved at the meeting last spring should be at once put into execution, and that the University should establish a fully equipped department of undergraduate studies in the coming academic year.

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No. 2.

“Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion.”—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.*, c. 6.

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IS OUR VIEW OF "FALLEN MAN" PESSIMISTIC?

The climate of the human mind changes. The culture of each age creates a mental atmosphere more often hostile than favorable to views surviving from the olden time. It is a matter of fine appreciation to determine the nature and extent of this influence of environment on the acceptance or rejection of ideas. For our immediate purpose it is sufficient simply to call attention to the fact that the "psychological climate," as it is called, has again changed decidedly, and to draw some pertinent illustrations from the present trend of thought and culture toward an optimistic view of Man.

The charge is frequently made that Christianity teaches pessimism professedly in the doctrine of a "fallen" humanity. This accusation is largely the result of a powerful movement in modern thought away from "the old misery-habit" of brooding over one's imperfections, with which religion is said to have been identified. By a strange coincidence, an equally strong, though far more moderate current of optimistic thought started in the Middle Ages only to have its development checked by the Reformation. In consequence of this interruption, these "streams of tendency" have never united in "secular" thought. It is the object of this article to bring them together, and incidentally to show that the theology of the mediæval cloister finds the present conditions of mental weather more to its suiting than seems to have fallen to the lot of some, at least, of the

Reformation confessions. Let history, therefore, speak, and the logic of events tell its own story.

When the theory of evolution some fifty years ago made its second entry into human thought, it had a chilling effect for a while on the spiritual and moral ideals of the race. Men turned away disheartened from the low and unseemly origin to which all that is best within us could apparently be traced. The pedigree of man seemed but a degree removed from that of the beast; he was no longer "a little less than the angels." The trail of the serpent was visible over all his history, only this time the serpent was not the loquacious one mentioned in Genesis, but the grim, crawling monster of Necessity. Articles were written on the "Unrelenting Cosmos," the "Sorrows of the Atoms," and the "Sadness of Science." The idea gained ground rapidly that human character is nothing else than the accumulated drift of heredity and circumstance. Professor Huxley declared that the physical and the spiritual were in a death-grapple, with the chances for the latter's survival slim. Mr. Spencer took for his model of primitive man the modern savage, and never quite recovered from the effect which this composite photograph produced. It was not long before the novel began to revive the well-worn theme of the ancients—Man conquered by Circumstance. The stream of consciousness could not rise higher than its source. Nature was "red with tooth and claw."

"We are no other than a moving row
Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go
Round with the sun-illumined Lantern held
In Midnight by the Master of the Show;

"But helpless Pieces of the Game He plays
Upon His chequer-board of Nights and Days;
Hither and thither moves, and checks, and slays,
And one by one back in the Closet lays."

This attempt to make man's history a sort of last chapter to physical science brought about a profound reaction in favor of a more healthy-minded view. Science is not committed to the material theory of causality any more than it is to the spiritual,

being in fact indifferent to either, so long as it remains true to its own methods, keeps well within its own bounds of inquiry, and does not seek to inflate itself to the dignity of a universal philosophy. It was only by accident that the interpretation of evolution fell at first into the hands of men prepossessed in favor of a materialistic view of reality. They saw everything from the physical standpoint, and sought to understand the highest in man through the lowest in nature. Matter variously distributed in forms of motion sufficiently accounts for all.

The philosophy of mind was not slow in wresting from its historical rival—materialism—the territory over which the latter had extended its claims. Our knowledge of reality, it was shown, is not exhausted in looking backward with science to some remote physical antecedent out of which the actual world of the present slowly emerged by an inner law of necessity; the mind can also look forward with philosophy and behold an order of development in accord with rational foresight. The man of science was accordingly reminded that, however true it may be that the quantity of energy in the world always remains a constant sum, there are differences in the qualities of the energy displayed for which no "merely physical" explanation will suffice. The history of man's progress in science, religion, morality, art, and statecraft cannot be reduced to the level of a problem in mechanics; nor can the idea of Nature's uniformity be converted into a law of physical necessity, so as to yield a self-administering world.

"Neither matter nor energy," says Sir Oliver Lodge,¹ "possesses a power of automatic guidance and control. Energy has no directing power. Inorganic matter is impelled slowly by pressure from behind, it is not influenced by the future, nor does it follow a preconceived course nor seek a pre-determined end." Man is and ever has been a purposive agent acting in view of an end and initiating new series of consequents. How then can design and purpose be excluded from the universe when humanity itself possesses these attributes? Is the philosopher, like the photographer, to leave himself out of the picture which he takes? Is nature to be judged by the

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, Jan., 1905, p. 327.

highest term of its manifestations which is man or by the meanest which is unconscious energy?

Once attention was drawn away from the narrow study of man as one among many other natural objects, and fastened upon the study of man as a conscious purposeful agent in a world of subjects, the philosophy of the impersonal began to lose its hold. The universe was read in the light of the end rather than the beginning, and the question of origin and pedigree was seen to be a thing apart from the question of content and value. Not what man was originally, but what man is actually, engaged attention. The human individual was no longer conceived as a passive resultant of physical, chemical, and other forces. Human initiative received the recognition that is its due, and the individual was described as an elementary force controlling Nature to some extent and bringing it slowly to realization. This energetic conception of the individual as of one able to shape his own ends and influence his environment, displaced the pessimistic notion that he was a mere creature of circumstance, a storage-battery of forces over which he exercised no control.

This rescue of human personality from the very maws of Fate deserves praise unstinted. But, as is usually the case in all reactionary movements of this kind, the very force of the reaction carried those who shared in it over to the opposite extreme. Thought in such cases is not placid enough to seek its level. An extravagant optimism succeeded the outgrown pessimism, and endeavored to construct a theoretical and practical scheme of life in which all things would be made good by the mere magic of our thinking. Nothing's bad but thinking makes it so. It is this prevalent optimism that is now attacking the Christian doctrine of sin, whether original or personal, as a misery-making habit of thought not worth taking into account.

Many lesser streams of tendency, besides the general reaction just described, have poured their contribution into the success of the new optimism. For the past twenty-five years the "mind-cure" movement has shown the good effects to be derived from cultivating healthy habits of mind. It is no longer considered good form to speak of the disagreeable. Anything

that savors of the morbid or tends to discourage rather than to enhearten, is politely eliminated. The etiquette of the drawing-room is endeavoring to set itself up as a working philosophy of life, despite all that a sensational press may be doing to make moral scavengers of the masses. The suppression of cruelty to animals has grown into a positive kindness to criminals. The modern tendency which Francis Parkman deplored is the tendency to discover objects of sympathy in vagabonds, thieves, and ruffians. Belief in future retribution has vanished into thin air. It has been replaced by a vague feeling that the world of men and things is on the way to betterment and that the good alone will finally triumph.

It would only be pedantic commonplace to recount here the wonders of the subconscious region of the soul, the almost automatic life of the mind which hypnotism has revealed; the suggestive influence of muscular processes on ideas, and the inhibitive influence of ideas on muscular processes. "Forethought and not fearthought has become the new evangel." Stress is laid on the dignity rather than on the depravity of man. The result of these many tendencies is a growing persuasion that it is better to forget than to remember the disagreeable facts of our mental life; better to let our consciousness of evil suffer a total eclipse than to be forever detecting sun-spots in our consciousness of the good.

"Christian science" represents the high-tide mark in this so-called healthy-minded movement against pessimism. Practically, it is nothing more than "mind-cure" with a dash of the old Indian metaphysics thrown in for seasoning. It has special designs on the medical profession and the use of drugs—superstitions of the "carnal-mind"—which do not concern us here. On its theoretical side it professes belief in the identity of man's spirit with the world-soul or God. By realizing this spiritual unity man will grasp the saving truth that sin is a destructible human belief, not a divine fact. So long as man believes sin to be real, he is punished for his belief. Once he professes faith in the "allness of spirit and the nothingness of matter," sin ceases to have reality. It is only "incorrect thinking" which lies at the root of the sin-conception. The

spiritual understanding that evil physical and moral is unreal and undivine, is the essence of eternal life.

The conception of sin first became attenuated in modern thought when the theories of man's animal origin and descent passed from the lecture-hall and the laboratory into the receptive head of the "man of the street." It seemed so natural to believe that the "submerged savage" within us should once in a while come to the surface and have his say and fling. It remained for "Christian science" to abolish the reality of sin altogether by conceiving the human soul as divided into two compartments—the "carnal mind" and the "spiritual"—by passing from one to the other of which we could leave sin behind as an occupant of the "ground-floor." This transfer of sin from the order of right action to the order of correct thinking so as to make of it a blunder and not a crime, escapes detection by the unwary. It seems so ingenious to keep the books of life on such a convenient system of double-entry with one page for mistakes, and the other for corrections!

Students of the history of philosophy are familiar with this sort of thinking which solves a problem, or rather goes through the motions of solving it, by suppressing one set of facts altogether and by diverting the attention of the mind to others. To be asked to cultivate such a habit of ignoring the evil that is in certain actions in order to accept a babel-tower of metaphysics in which we may take refuge therefrom, is hardly an invitation to be heeded if pains are taken to inquire into the insecure foundations and structure of the tower. After all, the Manicheans were not quite so far astray in personifying evil as are our contemporaries in whitewashing it with a large metaphysical brush.

And students of the history of theology do not need to be reminded that this invitation to "lie down in the stream of life and let it flow over you" comes originally from the Reformers. Luther's doctrine of justification by faith was just such a gospel of relaxation. Practical illustration of it was furnished by the man in the story who, when asked if he needed help to hold the wild animal he was wrestling with, replied by saying that the help he stood most in need of was not to hold, but to let go. Salvation consisted in loosening one's hold on one's self rather

than in tightening it. The function of the Christian religion was to declare men "not guilty" of punishment; to cover sin with a cloak, not actually to extirpate it. It was with this thought in mind that Luther once likened nature and grace to a "dunghill covered with snow." "Christian science" has merely detached justification-by-faith from its old Lutheran anchorage in total depravity and associated it with the counter idea of man's total goodness.

The success of the movement here under review cannot, therefore, be appreciated unless by force of contrast with what it displaced. The conception of human nature as an inert, sinfull mass upon which the Spirit occasionally acted, was worthy neither of God nor man. It implied that salvation was from the outside and not from within, an influence that man underwent passively, but did not work out vitally by his own inherent, even though borrowed, powers. It soon gave way perforce to the mystic view that a remnant of man's sinless state survived the fall and dwelt still within him in the guise of a "spark divine," by fanning which into flame man might slowly recover the rest of his lost spiritual heritage. Through a natural evolution this total eclipse of human powers by evil was gradually modified so as to become only partial, and has now disappeared altogether from the "new" thought. The idea of indefinite progress, with sin regarded as a mere incident in man's development somewhat as the child's stumbling in learning to walk, has taken its place. Salvation is from within, not from without. All thought of a re-birth through grace is dismissed as a part of the old externalism. The kingdom of God is within us. The conception of sin had become so strongly and wrongly associated with belief in man's inherited depravity that the accessory met the same fate as the principal. The problem is no longer how to make the wholly depraved man good, but the good man better. And to this end the door of the conscious mind must be kept tightly shut to the delusive thought of sin. *Turpius eicitur quam non admittitur hospes.*

The complex movement which we have just tried to analyze out into its component factors has destroyed whatever belief there still remained in total depravity. In this it has done Christian thought no mean service. It has shown that the

mediæval trend of theology in favor of an optimistic view of man was in the right direction until interrupted by the Reformers and diverted into pessimistic channels; it has also shown the mistake of thinking that the Christian doctrine of man is that of the evil-sodden, vile creature which Luther conjured up before the religious imagination. No doubt it will surprise many to have the statement made that Christianity is not and never was committed to the thesis of man's utter spiritual ruin through sin; and that the idea of "progressive" man has no terrors for the theologian whose knowledge of his subject dates from the days before the Great Revolt. It is only those who do not take the pains—nobody nowadays takes pains where theology is concerned—to investigate what is meant by the adjective "fallen" when applied to "man" in this connection, who devote themselves to refuting imaginary theologians. The whole question at issue is the meaning of an adjective—the adjective "fallen." We have already traced the success of the modern movement against the gruesome meaning which Luther attached to this expression. It is interesting to know what little reason for hostility or opposition this adjective would have furnished if its history prior to the Reformation had been borne in mind by the modern optimists. Needless to say, we are not here concerned in establishing the fact of the Fall, but only in determining its significance as understood during the course of theological development.

We may begin this rapid survey of history with St. Augustine—that "sombre genius" who is sometimes, and wrongly, credited with having invented the doctrine of original sin. When the Manicheans called into question the essential goodness of human nature, no one more than he insisted to the contrary. It is only when the Pelagians attempted to place actual man on the same level and footing with the first man—the highly gifted Adam of Genesis and Tradition—that he repudiated the parallel with a set of opprobrious adjectives against human nature that have since become historic. A question of fact and of history was raised by the Pelagians. To meet it, St. Augustine sharply contrasts the ideal man described in Genesis—innocent, just, impassible, and imperishable—with the forlorn creature of the present, dispossessed of these quali-

ties at birth, and subject to concupiscence, sin, suffering, and death. The result of this contrast between man's present and primitive condition was the positive idea of the corruption, vitiation, and wounding of human nature in all its powers, the darkening of the intellect, weakening of the will, and consequent difficulty in the accomplishment of good. This historical contrast between man as he was and is, dominated St. Augustine completely. He had no other point of view. For him human nature embraced at the outset all that Adam is described in Holy Writ as possessing. How could Pelagius dare to measure the height of such a creature by the shortened stature of fallen man?

It never occurred to the Bishop of Hippo to ask himself whether all the qualities ascribed to Adam were simply his natural belongings as man, or freely bestowed bounties over and above his due and deserts. These were days when men did not think under the categories of the natural and the supernatural as they did in the Middle Ages. St. Augustine never attempted to sift rights from privileges, or to appreciate human nature for its own sake apart from the description of it furnished by Revelation. His only concern was the poor equipment for life which man, as he is, undeniably showed by comparison with man as he first came into being, perfect and ideal. The influence of this point of view on the writings of St. Augustine is not sufficiently taken into account, even by critics of the temper of Harnack. They fail to see that St. Augustine did not so much discuss the question of fallen man on its merits as with regard to the issue raised by Pelagius. In one passage of the *Retractations*,² St. Augustine himself seems conscious that he went too far. Overborne by the controversy in which he was engaged, he gave a positive turn to the meaning of the Fall and its consequences, especially concupiscence, which it took the reflection of centuries to correct. Concupiscence thus appeared to him not merely a consequence, but a formal constituent of original sin. The theologian needs the philosopher's point of view to appreciate his own properly, and St. Augustine wrote only from the theologian's standpoint against Pela-

² Lib. I, cap. 26. "Quod non ita accipiendum est quasi totum amiserit homo quod habebat de *imagine* Dei." See *Contra duas epist. Pelag.*, lib. I, cap. 2, no. 5.

gius. The vividness of the contrast which he was forced to draw between Adam and his descendants misled him to liken the effects of original sin to those of physical heredity, and to fill the adjective "fallen" with a meaning which the uncritical reader does wrong to take according to the letter.

In the thirteenth century, a new problem arose and pressed for solution. These were the days of the philosopher-theologians who learned to keep apart for purposes of distinct appreciation the interests of Faith and Reason in this question of man's primitive innocence and lapse. It was gradually recognized that Reason could construct a conception of humanity altogether distinct from that furnished by Revelation. Man could be appreciated for his own sake and with regard to his natural environment and end. The direct vision of God which Faith proclaimed to be man's final destiny thus appeared in the clear light of a superadded privilege to which human nature, analytically studied by the philosopher, had no right or claim. Two competing conceptions of humanity—the natural and the supernatural—were accordingly constructed, the former as possible, the latter as actual fact. The two views were set over against each other in contrast, and a problem unknown to Saint Augustine began to be discussed, namely: what does the adjective "fallen," which the theologian employs, add to the pure conception of "man" which the philosopher frames? In other words: what is the difference between "fallen" and "natural" man?

Though thought was divided on the answer, the persuasion slowly grew that there is no difference whatsoever between the two. Man simply fell from a high spiritual estate to the conditions of normal humanity; below this level he did not fall, nor were any of his rights and powers as man invaded or injured. His fall was relative, not absolute; he lost privileges, but he retained all his natural belongings as unimpaired as if he had been created on a purely human plane and had never sinned. The effect of original sin was privative; it implied that certain superadded gifts were withdrawn, but it meant nothing in the line of inherited habit of evil or of positive disposition to run a degenerate's course unhindered. The only inheritance it implied was the inheritance of a privation—a

superexcellence which man should have had as his birthright was no longer his. Fallen man, therefore, so far as equipment for his natural environment went, is the same as normal man would have been in an order of existence wholly natural.

The immediate result of this new point of view was to reverse the strong phrases of St. Augustine that had by this time become almost axiomatic. Nature was not corrupted, vitiated, or wounded, because what the just man lost was not nature, but grace. He could not lose the image of God—namely, his spiritual powers of thinking, willing, and doing—to which as man he was entitled; it was only the special, not the essential qualities, which had disappeared. The Church at the time of the Council of Trent said nothing either for or against this new phase of doctrinal development. From an historical standpoint, the council merely repeated the traditional language of the Church, and declared it of faith that "the first man Adam was changed for the worse" after his transgression. Whether this "change for the worse" was to be understood in the sole light of a privation, or as a positive element of vice introduced into human nature itself, the council did not determine. The theory of total depravity had not yet been clearly formulated by the Reformers, and the Church had no occasion to close the question which reason raised in the person of the schoolmen. She spoke, as is her wont, from the point of view of faith, Scripture, and tradition. Wrappage is not always a sure indication of contents, and many have mistaken the letter of this conciliar language for the spirit.³

But the time soon came for a statement of the mind of the Church on the rational issue which the Middle Ages, especially St. Thomas, had made prominent. It came in the sixteenth century. Michel de Bay, a professor at Louvain, raised the alarming cry that St. Augustine was being slowly eliminated from Catholic thought, and advocated a return to the Great Father whom he wished to see restored outright in spirit and

³ Dominicus Soto, one of the theologians of the Council of Trent, says that the "deterioration" in question is relative to man's condition before the Fall. "*De Nat. et Gratia*," lib. I, cap. 13.—Ita Pallavicini, Vega et al.—Trent merely repeats the language of Mileve and Orange without changing the state of the question.

in language. De Bay, however, like the Reformers, overlooked one essential fact which proved his undoing, and led to such a war of subtlety and recrimination, with Jansenists, Quietists and Port-Royalists all engaged in making confusion worse confounded, as has seldom been seen of men. The fact overlooked was simply this: St. Augustine, when writing against the Pelagians, never even so much as had in mind the thought of distinguishing the natural from the supernatural, much less of deciding the question whether a purely natural condition of humanity was conceivable. Accordingly, if St. Augustine was to be restored, his language should not be so misread as to make it solve a problem that did not occur to the human mind until centuries later. Yet this is what De Bay attempted. Augustine writing against the Pelagians became for him Augustine writing against the Schoolmen. De Bay, consciously or unconsciously, crossed two divergent lines of thought when he held that Reason could not construct an ideal of humanity distinct from that of Faith. To his way of thinking, the conception of a normal man, created to run his course in a natural environment, was physically impossible, as it was morally impossible to the mind of the Jansenist. To the day he died, De Bay labored under the misapprehension that in condemning him the Church had condemned Augustine.

The fact of the matter is that one may speak or write correctly from either the historical point of view, or the philosophical, may describe the man of history, or the unhistorical man of speculation. The two views act as mutual correctives, not as exclusive opposites. To employ one against the other, to belabor St. Thomas with texts detached from St. Augustine, or vice versa, is not scholarly. The Church was compelled to disentangle the situation by showing that even fallen man is capable of some good without grace; and that the conception of a normal humanity was neither physically nor morally impossible, but fully consistent with the rights of man and with the mercy, love, and justice of the Creator. Perhaps the most redeeming feature in this great civil war of Catholic theologians is the decided stand which the Church took against allowing the Lutheran pessimism a foothold within her pale. Harnack says the Church at this time sacrificed Augustine to appease the ris-

ing spirit of rational criticism. This statement only goes to show the wisdom of the saying that "in a point of view, it's the point that will bear watching more than the view."

One thought stands out luminous in this development of doctrine. It is that the adjective "fallen" has within it no meaning incompatible with the idea of "progress." Fallen man is no more, no less than normal or natural man, because the relation which his fall expresses is one of privation, not depravity. No positive inheritance of vice handicaps man in beginning his career on this planet. Whether this career was one of slow progress, or of rapid decline, is a matter for history and science to determine. The Christian doctrine of the Fall is not bound up with the admission of either theory; the fact of belief may remain the same even when the interpretation of it changes with the larger growth of human knowledge.

It is beside the point, therefore, to speak of a radical opposition between the scientific view of man as a rising, and the religious view of him as a fallen, being. The Old Testament mentions side by side the scientific and the religious ideals of humanity. It tells the story of man's progress in clothing himself first with leaves and afterwards with the skins of beasts; in seeking to subsist on the flesh of animals after having been long content with wild herbs; in iron-making, brass-working, and in the building of tents and towns. Yet some naively imagine that whoever believes in man's fall must needs accept the thesis of a high primitive civilization from which he fell.

Need the critic be reminded that science and history never, so far as facts go, reach beyond the "primitive?" that it is only by the "constructive imagination" that we are able to reach the "first" of anything? that the religious condition of the first man was not likely to leave "fossilized remains" behind for our purpose of reconstruction? and that fallen man stood equally ready to run his course of "rhythmic progress" as did the rising creature which science hails first member of the race?

Nor should it be forgotten that the history of man is large enough and mysterious enough to give all our partial reconstructions of it representation in the whole. The mistake is

in considering any single one of our incomplete views, such as the scientific, so adequate and final as to crowd all others, especially the religious, off the scene. Primitive man is largely made in the modern study, and smells of the lamp or laboratory. He is savage or civilized according to prepossession. The puppets of our own imagination thus take the place of concrete man. The real first man was more complex in nature than the "barely conscious" creature which we build up out of "select" material to suit the requirements of a favorite theory. The moral, religious and intellectual elements of human nature were not acquisitions in the course of time, but an original endowment progressively developed. It is all a question of making our analysis complete before we start to build.

Of course, to the eyes of Christian faith, it is not enough, nor indeed the divinely established order, that man should be born with the mere human essentials when his destiny is *special* and other than natural. The active presence of God in all humanity is one thing and the indwelling of the Divine Spirit in the souls of the just, another. The insufficiency of the individual to live out fully the life commanded by his moral ideals and aspirations, unless aided by those divine helps to all offered and to none denied, is a conclusion written all over the pages of human history. But it is only the *human essentials*, after all, that concern the philosopher; and if the theologian offers him at the outset, just such an essentially intact human being as science requires, why should he not mind his own business, and stay within his own sphere of study undisturbed?

But no! He must rush forth with the proclamation to the people that he cannot accept for the working purposes of science a wholly depraved creature. Christianity enjoins no such acceptance; his quarrel is with Lutheranism. He will insist grandiloquently with Professor Haeckel that he would rather be the descendant of a progressive ape than of a degenerate Adam. There's no disputing about tastes according to the old proverb, but we might ask him, notwithstanding, where he found this alternative. Christianity has no objection to these two adjectives exchanging places. In very truth, they have become attached to the wrong nouns by those who so

dearly love an antithesis that they invent one where it does not exist.

Looking backward, they say, is unhealthy. The fate of Lot's wife awaits those who indulge in this curiosity. The scientist will surely resolve you into physical and chemical elements if you allow him to show you your "real antecedents," and the theologian has that old Adam always ready to trot forth on occasion as his first object lesson in ancestry. Look forward! Face the future with courage, and not the past with fear! The "ideal man" was not once made and then forever lost, rather is the human ideal being slowly realized through progress. "Are we to teach our children that they are diseased offspring of a remote sire, physical and moral degenerates, victims of an inheritance which they cannot hope to overcome? Inspiring doctrine this, to call Christian!"

Aye, there's the rub, to call it Christian! The price paid for this false association has been very dear. Teach your children the enormity of actual personal sin. This is the positive factor in depravity and heredity, which holds back the individual and the race from increasing the total amount of good and diminishing the sum of moral evil. The present condition of humanity cannot be explained by mere reference to ancestral sin. Concupiscence would have resulted from man's natural constitution, even if we were to suppose the race normal and unfallen at the start; and though we believe by faith that concupiscence is, historically speaking, a liability of sin, we could never establish by reason that such is the case. The modern pedagogue, whoever he be, should therefore be progressive enough to acquire a clear conception of original sin as a state of privation, not one of depravity, before confining it to the rubbish heap of outgrown notions with some, or of exaggerating its import with others. It is better to make actions consistent with the moral and the Christian ideal than to make thought harmonious. And to make actions thus correspond to the moral ideal, none of your categorical imperatives will suffice. Only clear and definite belief in the Christian doctrine of "the sinfulness of sin" will prove an adequate basis for genuine Christian conduct.

The acceptance of the doctrine of original sin is no invita-

tion to become morbid, or to brood over the lost and unattainable; to lose the "sense" of sin is no return to healthy conditions of thought, unless indeed mental health bears no relation to upright conduct. Our moral ideal can not be stifled by any trick of metaphysics which would substitute the harmony of thought for the harmony of action, or blot out the wide difference between what we are and what we ought to be. Sorrow for sin with a firm purpose of amendment is an appreciation of true spiritual health by contrast with the moral sickness from which we have escaped or recovered. We are asked to look back with sorrow only to look forward with renewed courage. The two tendencies strong at all times in Christian thought,—self-denial and self-expansion—may have been exaggerated during the course of history into polar opposites, but rightly understood they only serve to express the negative and positive side of character-building. We are forced to specialize in conduct no less than in knowledge. The pursuit of a high ideal means abandoning along the way much that appears a real loss only to him who treads the path of dalliance for pleasure's sake.

A great deal is said of progress, but little of its definition. To-day the morality of commerce has become confounded with universal morality, and even the word "honor" has an air of the counting-room about it. The business-group of ideas is dominant, the self-made man fills the public eye, cheap standards of success have arisen in consequence of material prosperity, and a corresponding shrinkage in spiritual values has taken place. The idea of progress has come to mean little else than novelty and comfort. The result is that we are forming our standards on the shifting needs of the present, and forgetting the lessons which only the past can teach by giving us true perspective. Excessive craving for what is new, like excessive admiration for what is old, does not reflect the sound judgment of mankind which is registered in the slowly-reasoned out experience of the race. The ant, says Bacon, collects without constructing; the spider spins his web out of his present inner store; but the bee pursues a middle course, transforming by a power of its own the material gathered from many fields. The parable is obvious. Progress is transfor-

mation, not destruction, or isolation. And need it be said that the progress of man must now as ever consist in extracting spiritual value even from the most material of his pursuits so as to transform all in the crucible of the spirit, so as to remain the master, and not become the servant of his surroundings?

The two ideals of man—Christian and rational—are to a large extent sympathetic, as these pages have shown. The dignity of man as the image of God by nature and as the likeness of God by grace is good Catholic doctrine, else Michel de Bay would not have come to grief. We would do well in our preaching and writing to keep the two portraits of humanity distinct, and yet to show that one is but the completion of the other, not its opposite. We have no doctrine of depravity to hinder us from accepting what is good in any environment, past, present or future. The parable of the man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, fell among robbers who stripped him of his goods, inflicted wounds upon him, and left him half-dead, furnishes no stereotyped picture of man's positive condition after the fall. Stript as he was of the bounties according to the old axiom, he was not wounded in his natural powers. It is only the larger life, therefore, upon which Christianity insists, the life which is through faith, hope, and charity a created replica of the intellectual and moral life of God. The possibilities of man by nature and the greater possibilities of man by grace need to be emphasized to-day no less than the heinousness of sin which is spiritual death to the sinner. *Oportet hæc facere et illa non omittere.* The "psychological climate" has again changed, and our ideas ought to be clothed in a language suited to the spirit of the Church and the temper of the times.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

A LIVING WAGE: PRESUMPTIONS AND AUTHORITIES.

THE PRESENT METHOD OF FIXING WAGES.

The doctrine that every laborer has a moral right to a living wage is obviously in direct conflict with existing business practice and theory. In the great majority of wage-contracts, a decent livelihood for the worker is not among the aims that are consciously and earnestly sought by *both* parties. Sometimes it is not explicitly thought of by either of them. The amount of remuneration, as well as the hours and other conditions of employment, are fixed by the method of bargaining, according to which both employer and employee try to obtain the best terms possible. The latter strives to get as much as he can; the former, to pay no more than he must. Both will derive some advantage from the bargain, but more for one will mean less for the other. The greater share of gain will be reaped by the stronger bargainer. When through a combination of laborers, or employers, or both, collective is substituted for individual action, the end, the procedure, and the determining factors are essentially the same; the decisive element is not moral, but psychological and economic, namely, the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties.

There are, indeed, many cases in which bargaining power has no place, and many others in which it is not the final determinant. The remuneration of a large proportion of government employees is fixed by law, and in some of the older trades and services bargaining is limited by custom.¹ Again there are to be found employers who will not force wages below what they regard as a fair level, just as there are laborers who will not exact compensation that they believe to be unjust. On the whole, however, the labor contracts affected by these forces of law, custom and moral convictions, are exceptional.²

¹ Nicholson, J. S., "Principles of Political Economy," I, p. 325, New York, 1893.

² Instances where the employer, believing in the "economy of high wages," willingly pays more than the bargaining power of the laborer could command, do not constitute exceptions to general rule, since even here the former tries to get his work done as cheaply as possible.

So much for the prevailing practice; what of the underlying ethical theory? Are the laborers who try to get all that they can and the employers who pay no more than they must, utterly indifferent to the questions of right and wrong involved in the wage-contract? Or, has business become so widely separated from ethics that, although desirous of being fair to each other, the parties to the labor contract do not advert in any way to its ethical aspects? Or, do they explicitly maintain that, despite frequent and grave differences in the bargaining power of the parties, the transaction is essentially just? All three of these attitudes are undoubtedly represented among both employers and employed. In fixing wages, as in other actions, there are men who will not hesitate to gain their ends by conscious dishonesty or extortion. Others ignore the moral side of the wage-contract merely because it does not attract their attention; they are conscious only of a business transaction. The greater number, however, of those who strive to make the best possible bargain, regardless of any formal ethical standard of wages, seem to think that the contract is fair, inasmuch as it is free and made under the rule of competition. The assumption that a free contract is necessarily a fair contract, will be examined later; our present concern is with the doctrine which makes competition a measure of justice. To a very large extent, this notion, as well as the attitude of those who quietly ignore the moral aspects of the rate of wages, is the result of practical deductions from the teaching of the earlier English political economists. "Indeed we may say that political economy has importantly modified ethical conceptions; so that the price which competition tends at any time to fix as the market price of any kind of services, has been taken to represent the universal or social and therefore mortally valid estimate of the 'real worth' of such services."³

Now if political economy warrants this popular conclusion it creates at once a presumption of some value in favor of the justness of wages that are determined by the method of unlimited bargaining. The method is apparently sanctioned by the authority of science. To what extent is this true? It will

³Sidgwick, H., "The Principles of Political Economy," p. 504, New York, 1887.

conduce to clearness if a distinction is made between political economy as a system of supposedly rigid laws, and the practical precepts that have been laid down for the guidance of industry by a certain school of economists.

ECONOMIC LAW AND THE RATE OF WAGES.

Throughout the first three quarters of the Nineteenth Century political economy was committed to the theory that the rate of wages was determined by forces beyond the immediate control of either laborer or capitalist.⁴ Wages, it was said, are paid out of the fund of capital that has been saved from the product of the past. The amount of this wage-fund at any time was regarded as absolutely predetermined, and consequently not variable by agreement between the parties to the wage-contract. If any section of the laborers of a country succeeded in raising their wages some other section or sections would necessarily have their remuneration lowered. The general rate of wages was therefore fixed by an economic law that was as little subject to the wills and efforts of men as the law of gravitation. It was consequently no more immoral than the action of the tides.

Although the wage-fund theory is no longer held, either by economists or by intelligent men generally, an equally irrational belief in the power of economic laws to prevent any lasting modification in the rates of wages by human action, seems to retain a considerable body of adherents. It is cherished for the most part by those who have a personal interest in keeping wages low, and whose mental horizon is circumscribed by limitations of experience, education, intellect and will. To them the most convincing reply that can be made to the demand that the wage-contract be moralized seems to be the assertion that the rate of wages is fixed by economic law. Is the assumption valid, and if so does the inference really follow?

According to Marshall, an economic law "is a statement that a certain course of action may be expected under certain

⁴See chapter on "the Verdict of the Economists" in "Industrial Democracy," by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, London, 1897.

conditions from the members of an industrial group.”⁵ Hence a particular economic law merely declares that, given certain external social conditions, men may be expected to perform such and such economic actions. It does not say that they will act thus in all conditions, nor does it specify how frequently the assumed conditions will be present in actual life. For example, the law which causes the workers in the Southern cotton mills to be so poorly paid would not continue to operate there in changed conditions, and the existing conditions differ from those that obtain in the mills of Massachusetts. In the words of Marshall, “economic laws are applicable to a very narrow range of circumstances, which happen to exist together at one particular place and time, but quickly pass away.” They are consequently quite different from the laws of mathematics, which are absolute and universal. The sum of the angles of a triangle will equal two right angles always and everywhere; but the law that an increase in the supply of labor lowers wages, will not produce the same effect among organized as among unorganized workingmen.

The question whether the rate of wages is fixed by economic law, is chiefly a question of language. The affirmation is in a sense true, but it is not a very important or a very illuminating truth. At any rate, the inference drawn from it, that wages cannot be modified by human effort, is utterly invalid, and indicates a complete misunderstanding of the character of economic laws. For the laws are operative only in certain conditions, are descriptions of what is likely to happen in certain conditions, and are consequently dependent upon conditions. But the conditions themselves, especially in the field of distribution, are in a large measure under the control of men. Thus, it is an economic law that in a competitive regime wages are regulated by the interaction of supply and demand, but these factors are partly determined by the wills of the buyers and sellers of labor. Supply will be restricted by a combination of laborers; demand by a com-

⁵ “Principles of Economics,” Book I, Ch. VII, London, 1890. Cf. Ritchie, D. G., “Darwin and Hegel,” Ch. V, London, 1893; Keynes, J. N., “The Scope and the Method of Political Economy,” Ch. VII, New York, 1897; The Duke of Argyll, “The Reign of Law,” Chs. II and VII, New York, 1868.

bination of employers. Some of the dogmatic assertions made concerning the inflexibility of economic laws imply the notion that the latter are like the edicts of a despot; whereas the simple fact is that they are to a considerable extent moulded by the human beings whom they effect. A strong labor union might meet the objection of the employer, that efforts to get more pay must prove futile, since wages are fixed by economic law, with the declaration: "Yes, but we will help to make the law."

The scope of economic laws is further restricted by the fact that they describe, not what men *must* do, but what they may be expected to do. Herein they differ from the laws of physical nature, which admit of no exception in the conditions to which they apply. The laws of economics are not concerned with purely physical forces, which operate uniformly, blindly and necessarily, but with human actions, and these are free. Hence even where all the external conditions are suitable a particular economic law may not work out its normal and expected effect. For example, the condition of supply and demand in a labor market may call for a reduction in wages, yet a generous employer may refrain from taking advantage of favorable conditions, may do otherwise than he is expected to do, and allow wages to remain at the present level. In a word, economic laws describe uniform *tendencies* rather than uniform modes of human action.

Indeed, the custom of speaking of economic laws and producing, or tending to produce, certain effects is confusing and ought to be avoided.⁶ Subjectively, they are merely statements of uniformity; objectively, they are relations of uniformity. The element of compulsion or causality behind this uniformity is contained in certain physical, social and psychological forces. All of these can, to a greater or less extent, be counteracted by forces within the control of man. In any concrete situation it is the comparative strength of the two sets of forces that decides the kind of economic action that will be produced. Whether any class of underpaid laborers must continue to receive the meagre wages that the system of unlim-

⁶ Cf. Bonar, James, "Philosophy and Political Economy," pp. 194-196, London, 1893.

ited bargaining now assigns to them, depends upon whether the economic forces that produce this result can be overcome by forces working in the opposite direction. The question has no real relation to the abstract bogey that is sometimes appealed to in the name of economic law.

THE PRACTICAL TEACHING OF THE ECONOMISTS.

There is nothing consequently in the nature of economic laws to render existing rates of wages necessary, or the unrestricted use of bargaining power morally legitimate. Let us now see what warrant there is for the statement that economic writers have regarded a contract made under competitive conditions as just, and what value is to be attached to their pronouncements in this matter. In general, their views of ethical aspects of economic facts ought to have special weight because of their superior knowledge of the facts, and their superior facilities for applying ethical principles. The authority attaching to their opinions on the morality of unlimited free contract can be overcome only through an examination of the processes by which they reached their conclusions.

The assertion is sometimes made that economists have laid down no ethical doctrines of any kind, that their province is merely that of positive fact and their work that of analysis, observation and induction. The best reply to this statement is an appeal to the facts of history. "While affecting the reserved and serious air of students, political economists have at all times been found brawling in the market place."⁷ This is especially true of the "classical" or "orthodox" school of economists, who held undisputed sway in England during the first half of the Nineteenth Century. With the great majority of these, says Edward Cannan, "practical aims were paramount and the advancement of science secondary."⁸ As a rule they were men of strong moral convictions, and, of course, advocated no practical policy that in their view would be at variance with the right. On the contrary, they taught more or less explicitly that the measures that they favored—notably, unlimited freedom of competition and contract—would natu-

⁷ Toynbee, A., "Industrial Revolution," p. 25, New York, 1890.

⁸ "Production and Distribution," p. 384, London, 1894; cf. Hobson, J. A., "John Ruskin, Social Reformer," p. 99, London, 1898.

rally and automatically bring about a regime of social justice. Professor Sidgwick, who cannot be accused of unfriendliness toward the traditional political economy, tells us that "the teaching of political economists has generally pointed to the conclusion that a free exchange, without fraud or coercion, is always a fair exchange."⁹ The logic of their teaching, therefore, has been that wages freely bargained for would be just wages. What were the reasons that lead them to hold and promulgate this theory?

The political economy of Adam Smith was based partly on a priori assumptions and partly on induction.¹⁰ The a priori principles that he assumed as valid and that did most to give his system its distinctive character were, (a) the philosophical doctrine of an order, or law, of nature in favor of individual freedom, and (b) the theological doctrine of an all-wise Being who will "maintain at all times the greatest possible amount of happiness."¹¹ The idea of a law of nature came to him principally from the Physiocrats and the political doctrinaires who flourished immediately before the French Revolution; the ideal to which it pointed, individual freedom, was the dominant aspiration of his age. The order of nature meant that system of relations between man and man which had obtained or would obtain in a state of nature. The *law* of nature, consequently, required that political institutions and restraints be reduced to a minimum. This being accomplished, the equality of men, which also was a part of the order of nature, would secure for them the greatest measure of well-being.¹² Unlimited individual freedom was the practical ideal of those "nature philos-

⁹ Article on "Political Economy and Ethics" in "Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Economy," New York, 1891.

¹⁰ See Ingram, J. K., "History of Political Economy," pp. 89-93, New York, 1894; Cohn, G., "History of Political Economy," chapter on Adam Smith, Philadelphia, 1894; Cliffe-Leslie, T. E., "Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy," chapter on Adam Smith, London, 1888; Toynbee, op. cit., pp. 11-26; Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 19, 20; Bonar, op. cit., chapter on Adam Smith; Ely, R. T., "The Evolution of Industrial Society," chapter on "Industrial Liberty," New York, 1903.

¹¹ "Theory of the Moral Sentiments," Part VI, Sec. II, Ch. iii, 1759.

¹² W. S. Lilly's interesting volume, "A Century of Revolution," London, 1889, contains a thorough, though severe, criticism of the Revolutionary assumptions of liberty and equality.

ophers" who exercised so profound an influence upon Adam Smith. It was, indeed, the ideal of the age. Personal and political liberty was preached and longed for in England, France and America, as the one adequate remedy for the social ills then existing. Adam Smith sought to have it applied to industry. Every page of his writings, says Toynbee, "is illumined by one passion, the passion for freedom." The supreme need of the hour, to his mind, was the removal of those petty public and quasi-public restrictions that hindered in the industrial world freedom of movement and freedom of contract. Abolish these and the laborers would of themselves be able to realize their natural economic equality and their longed-for economic prosperity. "All systems either of preference or restraint," he declared in a passage that has become famous, "being thus completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord."¹³

It is surprising that Adam Smith, whose work abounds with proofs of his ability to observe facts accurately, could enunciate a principle so contrary to the fundamental facts of human nature and human conduct. Then, as now, it must have seemed clear that the legal power to enter into contracts is not sufficient to obtain for men the conditions of well-being. Freedom from physical and political coercion does not of itself render men truly free and equal in bargaining. The explanation seems to be found in Smith's second a priori principle, which, as so frequently happens with preconceived theories, prevented him from seeing conditions as they actually were. This was the assumption of the all-pervading beneficence of the Author of Nature. Though man is by nature essentially selfish and aims only at his private gain, he is led by an "invisible hand" to promote the welfare of all. His most selfish acts redound, at least in the long run, to the common good. Hence both individual and social prosperity and justice are best secured and conserved by allowing each to seek his own interests in his own way, by setting up the system of complete liberty, which is founded on the constitution of nature and the benevolent designs of nature's God.

¹³ "Wealth of Nations," Book IV, Ch. IX, final paragraph, New York, 1895.

These two assumptions of the supreme value of individual liberty, and the sufficiency of enlightened self-interest, were adopted in substance by all the great economists of England down to the middle of the Nineteenth Century. Most of them, indeed, cared little or nothing for—probably knew little of—the philosophical and theological prepossessions that underlay these theories in the mind of Adam Smith, but they had no hesitation in advocating as the correct principles of industrial action, abstention from combination and regulation, unlimited competition, and the fullest individual liberty.¹⁴ They did not, however, preach competition and freedom of contract as invariable laws, to be disregarded only under the greatest peril; that fault was committed by the popular expounders of political economy, chiefly journalists and politicians.¹⁵ They never asserted that wages fixed by bargaining in competitive conditions would in every case be just. Indeed, their primary aim was not with distribution at all. Professor Sidgwick says that Adam Smith and his followers sought before all else the improvement of production.¹⁶ The question with them was how to make the national product as great as possible at a minimum of cost. And the answer seemed to them to lie in the one word, competition. That the existing inequalities were far from being ideal, they were well aware; but they thought that the injury resulting to production from any interference with competition would more than offset the improvement in distribution.¹⁷ They made an unquestioning act of faith in the beneficent and levelling influence of competition. "Unrestricted freedom of action and contract would tend to reduce the actually inevitable inequality of economic opportunities to the lowest attainable minimum."¹⁸ With inequality of opportunity at a minimum, the prices of things, including the price of labor, would correspond as closely to the requirements of justice as could be expected in a world inhabited by human beings.

¹⁴ Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, p. 399; Keynes, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-74. John Rae seems to be almost alone in opposing this view of the mind of the classical school of economists: "Contemporary Socialism," pp. 345-374, New York, 1896.

¹⁵ Cliffe-Leslie, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 24, 396.

¹⁷ Sidgwick, *op. cit.*, p. 22, 400.

¹⁸ *Idem*, p. 506.

Now, this theory of the equalizing force of unfettered competition and unlimited freedom of contract, together with a very inadequate observation of the facts of industrial life, formed the basis of whatever claims the older economists had to be regarded as judges of the morality of wages fixed by the method of unlimited bargaining. That their theory was false and their study of facts one-sided, was abundantly proved by the industrial experience of the land in which the theory was most widely preached and most thoroughly tested.¹⁹ The rise of the factory system in England and the introduction of the policy of *laissez-faire* were, indeed, followed by a remarkable increase in the production of wealth; but inequalities of opportunity were not reduced to a minimum; the remuneration of labor did not tend to conform to a measure of substantial justice. Nearly the whole of the increase in wealth went to the newly-made capitalists, while the wages received by the laborers were barely sufficient to keep them alive.²⁰ The levelling influence of competition was confined to the ranks of the workmen, and its tendency was invariably downward. Starvation wages compelled husbands and fathers to send their wives and children into the mills, with the result that their own pay was still further reduced through this unnatural competition between husband and wife, between father and child. To such an extent did women and girls supersede men in the manufacturing industry that the latter frequently were obliged to remain at home to attend to the duties of the household. Children from the workhouses were impressed into the factories under a system of apprenticeship that rendered their existence "literally and without exaggeration that of slaves." In a word, "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty" advocated by Adam Smith and his successors, brought, instead of a regime of justice, a period of horror that is known in economic history as the period of English Wage-Slavery.²¹

¹⁹ On the incomplete inductions of the classical economists, see: Marshall, op. cit., Book I, Ch. IV, par. 6; Hobson, "The Social Problem," pp. 28-30, New York, 1901; Ruskin, "Unto This Last," Essay I, New York, 1885.

²⁰ Gibbins, H. de B., "Industry in England," p. 381, New York, 1898.

²¹ For a general description of this period, see: Gibbins, op. cit., pp. 381-406; "Alfred," "History of the Factory Movement," passim, London, 1857; Cooke-Taylor, R. W., "The Modern Factory System," passim, London, 1894; Engels, F., "Condition of the Working Classes in England," passim, New York, 1887; Carlyle, T., "Past and Present," Books I and III, 1841.

That the beliefs and hopes of the classical economists concerning the ethical efficacy of competition were utterly mistaken, is well understood by the economists of to-day. The latter realize very clearly that in some lines of production, at any rate, the natural and normal result of the competitive system is to have "our work done by a large number of low-grade laborers, instead of by a comparatively small number of high-grade laborers."²² Whole classes of laborers, for example, those employed in sweat shops, are "underpaid, underfed and undersupplied with everything which contributes to civilized life." Contemporary economists feel and acknowledge that conditions such as these are at variance with the requirements of justice. They are consequently desirous that competition should be modified in various ways; by custom, philanthropy, labor organizations and moderate legislative action. Beyond this the majority of them seem unwilling to go. In so far as they touch the ethical aspect of the matter at all, they seem to hold that the system of bargaining for wages satisfies the demand of justice as fully as is at present practicable. The question of replacing the practice of unlimited bargaining with a definitely moral standard of wages is discussed not so much from the standpoint of ethics as from that of feasibility. This is especially true of their attitude, in so far as they have any, toward the standard of a Living Wage. Their contention seems to be that even if this standard could be established in practice, for example, by legislation, it would be productive of more social harm than good. Professor Smart rejects the Living Wage, and defends the present method of bargaining on the ground that no more satisfactory plan is workable outside of socialism.²³ The existing freedom of contract secures for all "a certain rough kind of justice." President Hadley likewise declares against the Living Wage as impracticable, and ac-

²² Hadley, A. T., "Economics," sec. 361, New York, 1898; cf. Lavasseur, E., "The American Workman," p. 449, Baltimore, 1900; translated from the French by T. B. Adams; and especially, Walker, F. A., "The Wages Question," chapter on the "Degradation of Labor," New York, 1876.

²³ "Studies in Economics," chapter on a "Living Wage," New York, 1895; and "The Distribution of Income," Ch. XXVIII, New York, 1899.

cepts the sliding scale as the fairest method of determining wages that has yet been proposed.²⁴

The position of the two writers just named probably reflects the general views of all present-day economists except those who profess to give more than usual attention to the moral aspects of industry. These naturally lay greater stress on the immorality of unlimited bargaining, and pay less attention to the difficulties in the way of a better method.²⁵

THE ATTITUDE OF NINETEENTH CENTURY LEGISLATION TOWARD UNLIMITED BARGAINING.

Since the beginning of the Nineteenth Century the laws of England have allowed the fullest freedom of contract in the determination of the wages to be paid for all except government work. England is mentioned particularly because the history of her legislative attitude toward the wage-contract during the last century is typical of the greater part of Europe and of the whole of North America, and because she was the first to adopt the policy of non-regulation. The causes of the changed attitude of the law are very much the same as those which induced the economists to advocate unlimited competition and freedom of contract. The Industrial Revolution had rendered the old regulations of industry inadequate and harmful, and the dominant political ideal of the day was wider liberty for the individual. Thus the champions of non-interference with the industrial activity of the British subject were able to enforce their theoretical arguments by pointing to the disastrous results of the opposite policy. Prominent among these champions were the economists, whose influence upon English legislation during the first half of the nineteenth century has not been equalled in any other time or country. Ricardo alone, we are told by Toynbee, revolutionized the economic thought of the British Parliament during his brief stay in that body. Again, the middle classes, who were rapidly

²⁴ "Economics," secs. 404-406; cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, P., "Traité Théorique et Pratique d'Economie Politique," II, pp. 484, et sq., Paris, 1896.

²⁵ Cf. Ely, "Outlines of Economics," p. 206, New York, 1896; Hobson, "The Social Problem," Chs. II, VII.

gaining in wealth and political power, urged the *laissez-faire* policy because they felt that "with freedom they were more than a match for all competitors." The effect of these combined forces was to restrict state regulation of industrial life to the narrowest proportions known to history.

The causes of the regime of non-interference in America are included among those just described. The influence of the economists was not as great as in England; but the cult of individual freedom, and the self-confidence and self-assertion of the middle classes, were for a long period the dominant forces in shaping, both positively and negatively, the course of legislation regarding industry.

Obviously the attitude of the civil law toward the wage-contract, or toward any other human action or institution, is not per se a criterion of the morally good. The ordinances of legislatures are not always in accord with the principles of right and justice. The fact that the laws of a country allow the citizens by means of free contract to depress wages to the starvation level, or enhance them beyond the limits of extortion, does not make the transaction just; but, since the legislatures should, and generally speaking do, endeavor to promote just dealings in the most important social relations, there arises a presumption in favor of any institution that the law sanctions and protects.

In the present case the presumption vanishes as soon as we examine the causes of the legislation. As above described, these causes may be reduced to three: the insufficiency of the old restrictions; the fancied sufficiency of individual freedom; and the selfishness of the middle classes. The first afforded a good reason for such new legislation as would be appropriate to the new conditions of industry, but not for the anarchical policy of non-interference; the second was a hypothesis that has been utterly discredited by the subsequent history of industrial development—individual freedom has not brought either economic equality or economic justice; while the third should have been checked, instead of fostered, by legislation.

The presumptions in favor of the existing method of fixing wages and against the principle of living wage, which are

drawn from the teachings of political economy and the attitude of the law, disappear, therefore, when we realize the reasons upon which this teaching and this attitude were based. Economic laws are not inexorable, are not independent of the wills of the men whose actions they describe, do not compel wages to be adjusted by an unlimited use of the economic strength of the bargainers, and do not render existing rates of wages just. The practical recommendations of the economists and the ordinances of the legislators, can be traced to false principles, false reasoning, incomplete analysis of facts, and the selfishness of the dominant industrial class. Consequently the doctrine of a living wage cannot be refuted or put in peril by any mere appeal to economic or legal authority. We shall now review briefly the chief authorities, contemporary and historical, that are against the method of unrestricted bargaining and in favor of a professedly ethical standard.

LEGISLATION PREVIOUS TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

The policy of indifference which nearly all governments pursue with reference to the wage-contract to-day has not always prevailed. From the year 1349 to the year 1563 the remuneration of the unskilled laborers of England, both in town and country, was regulated by law—by the various “Statutes of Laborers” that were re-enacted or amended by nearly every monarch that reigned during those two centuries. In the last named year was passed the famous “Statute of Elizabeth,” which applied not only to the unskilled workers, but “to the greater part of the industry of the period.”²⁶ It continued on the statute books down to 1813, when at the bidding of capitalists and political economists, but against the protests of the laboring class, it was “peremptorily repealed.” A great economic historian has contended that from first to last these laws regulating wages were designed to, and actually did, benefit the employer at the expense of the working-man. The first of them was, indeed, framed for the express purpose of reducing the unusually high wages which prevailed

²⁶ Webb, “History of Trade Unionism,” p. 42, New York, 1902.

in consequence of the Black Death of 1348. In general, the legal rate of wages was for a long time a maximum which both master and man were forbidden to exceed, and the "Statute of Elizabeth" was almost invariably administered unfavorably to the laborer. According to the provisions of this act, wages were fixed by the justices of the peace, who were in most cases employers or men friendly to the employing class. This policy, together with the disastrous effects of the debasement of the currency and the confiscation of the gild lands by Henry VIII, and the progressive separation of the workers from their little plots of land and from their rights over the common, had no doubt gone very far toward making "low wages and famine wages traditional."²⁷ And yet we find that again and again during the eighteenth century the workingmen appealed to the justices and to the House of Commons to enforce and re-establish the legal regulation of wages.²⁸ However this may be, the question that concerns us now is not whether the laws fixing wages were favorable to the laborers, but whether the English people did not for centuries believe that wages determined by free contract were not necessarily just. That they believed in an objective standard of justice, a standard independent of the terms of the wage-agreement, is evident from their continued efforts to regulate the remuneration of labor by law.²⁹

The policy of legal regulation was carried out not only by means of the formal enactments just described, but also through the rules and customs of the gilds. During a considerable part of the Middle Ages the rates of wages determined by the gilds had virtually all the force of public laws. There was, moreover, an indirect regulation through the legal or quasi-legal regulation of the price of goods. Now, if a gild was able to fix wages so effectively that no one ever thought of

²⁷ Thorold Rogers, "The Economic Interpretation of History," p. 43, New York, 1889.

²⁸ Webb, "History of Trade Unionism," pp. 42-54.

²⁹ A detailed account of the various "Statutes of Laborers" enacted by the English Parliament will be found in the work of Thorold Rogers already cited, Ch. II. See also articles, "Government Regulation of Industry," "Laissez-Faire," and "Statute of Laborers," in Palgrave's "Dictionary."

departing from them, it performed the essential functions of a civil legislator; and if the central authority, or the municipality, or the gild, or even custom, determined the price of goods it virtually determined the price of labor.³⁰ And this legal supervision of the rewards of labor, direct or indirect, explicit or virtual, seems to have prevailed not only in England but throughout Western and Southwestern Europe, during the whole of the later Middle Ages. The accepted principle of mediæval society, say Sidney and Beatrice Webb, was that some kind of social organization was necessary in order to protect the standard of life of the workers, and to prevent their degradation.³¹ The sense of solidarity, mutual dependence and mutual responsibility among the members of a community, the conviction that the industrial world should be ordered by law, rather than left to individual caprice and selfishness, were far more prominent in the thought of that period than they are to-day.³² Hence, "every sort of economic transaction in which individual self-interest seemed to lead to injustice . . ." was regulated "by the general principle that a just or reasonable price should be paid."³³

THE TEACHING OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL WRITERS.

This attitude of the public and of legislators was the result of Christian conceptions of fair dealing, and of the widespread influence of the Christian Church. Christianity succeeded in the Middle Ages in "moralizing industrial and commercial conceptions and institutions," and it impressed men "with a keen sense of personal responsibility in the employment of secular power of every kind."³⁴ It was the uniform teaching of the Fathers of the Church and of the mediæval theologians that every human being had an imperishable right to a livelihood

³⁰ Cf. Brants, V., "Théories Economiques aux XIIe et XIVe Siècles," pp. 201 sq., Paris, 1895.

³¹ "History of Trade Unionism," p. 19.

³² Cf. Gierke, O., "Political Theories of the Middle Age," pp. 7, sq., Cambridge, 1900; translated by F. W. Maitland.

³³ Ashley, W. J., "English Economic History," I, p. 181, New York, 1894.

³⁴ Cunningham, W., "Western Civilization," II, pp. 104, 105, Cambridge, 1900.

from the common bounty of nature. This they regarded as a natural right, independent of and superior to all human laws, conventions and institutions. According to this doctrine, therefore, the laborer was endowed with an absolute right to at least sufficient remuneration to maintain his life. Moreover, the principle that the laborer should receive *just* wages was virtually contained in the canonist doctrine of just price. The theologians and canonists held that every commodity had a certain fair valuation, or just price, which was independent of the arbitrary and fortuitous valuation resulting from the higgling of the market.³⁵ The just price in any market being

³⁵ The somewhat puzzling doctrine of "just price" is not always understood by either its critics or its defenders. The former sometimes assert that it was based on an incorrect analysis of the phenomena that give rise to commercial values, individual and social. This is a complete misconception; for the doctrine in question was not an attempt to explain the actual, but to describe the ideal. Comparisons instituted between it and modern theories of value are, therefore, entirely irrelevant. A theory of value is a scientific explanation of the ultimate causes of the values that prevail or tend to prevail in a regime of free contract. Now, the medieval writers concerned themselves very little with this question: first, because values and prices were in their time fixed for the most part by law or custom; and, second, because their main purpose was to lay down rules for knowing the price at which a thing *ought* to sell, not to tell the price at which it would sell. Even if they had held, as some modern writers have asserted, that the just price of a commodity was something strictly intrinsic—a belief that cannot be correctly attributed to any of them—their teaching would not conflict with economic theories of value. (Cf. Cunningham, "Western Civilization," II, pp. 78-80.) The doctrine of just price may sometimes have been associated with incorrect views of industrial life, but all competent authorities agree that it was a fairly sound attempt to define the equities of medieval exchanges, and that it was tolerably successful in practice.

On the other hand, over-zealous apologists of the doctrine have tried to show that the "*communis aestimatio*," which was held to be the proximate criterion of just price, is essentially the same as that complex of social forces that fixes present market values, and that some modern writers have called the "*social estimate*." The resemblance is only of name. The common estimate of which the canonists spoke was a *conscious social judgment* that fixed prices beforehand, and was expressed chiefly in custom, while the social estimate of to-day is in reality an *unconscious resultant* of the higgling of the market, and finds expression in market price.

For a complete exposition of the doctrine of just price, with abundant citations and references, see: "*L'Idée du juste prix*," by Henri Garnier, Paris, 1900; and "*Allgemeine Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie*," by Julius Costa-Rosetti, S. J., Ch. XV, Freiburg, 1888; Brants in the work cited above, Ch. V and p. 193; Ashley in "*Economic History*," I, p. 134, sq.; and Cunningham in "*Growth of English Industry and Commerce*," I, pp. 232, sq., New York, 1890, are also quite satisfactory.

determined by the appraisement of the general public, it was said to be measured by the "*communis æstimatio*." To ascertain the just price of any article, account had to be taken of its general utility, scarcity and cost of production. The last element, which in the Middle Ages was mostly represented by labor expenditure, was regarded as the most important. When, therefore, the mediæval theologians and canonists taught that a just price should be paid for every commodity, and that its chief determinant was labor-cost, they virtually insisted that the laborer should be paid just wages.³⁶

To the searcher for explicit and precise rules for determining what is a fair remuneration for labor, the mediæval writers are, indeed, disappointing. St. Thomas Aquinas says that, as justice demands that a fair price be paid for a material commodity so it demands that a fair price should be given for human labor.³⁷ Other writers likewise content themselves with the general declaration that wages should be in accordance with justice. Their failure to be more specific seems to be explained by the industrial conditions of the time. During the greater part of the Middle Ages there was, properly speaking, no such thing as a wage system; for there was no class of laborers either in town or country, depending solely on employers to whom they sold their labor.³⁸ The master craftsmen in the towns and the men who tilled the soil on their own account, received just wages if they were paid a just price for their products. Even after the rise of a distinct laboring class, that is, men who could never hope to become master craftsmen, or men who spent the greater part of their time in the service of the lords of the domain, the question of just wages was not of supreme importance. In town industries the journeymen were quite commonly fed and lodged by their employers;³⁹ the relations between masters and journeymen were akin to those existing between father and sons;⁴⁰ and between the average

³⁶ Cf. Brants, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-116.

³⁷ "*Summa Theologica*," 2a 2ae, q. 114, a. 1, Rome, 1894.

³⁸ Gibbins, *op. cit.*, p. 150; Ashley, *op. cit.*, II, p. 101; Levasseur, "*Histoire des classes ouvrières avant 1789*," I, p. 598, Paris, 1900.

³⁹ Levasseur, *idem*, I, p. 455; Brants, *op. cit.*, p. 123; Martin Saint-Leon, "*Histoire des corporations des métiers*," p. 155, Paris, 1897.

⁴⁰ Ashley, *op. cit.*, II, p. 103.

earnings of the two classes there was not a great difference.⁴¹ Agricultural laborers usually had possession of a piece of ground, to the cultivation of which they devoted their leisure time, and from which they obtained a part of their sustenance.⁴² These conditions were not, indeed, universal, nor did they always secure for the laborer a reasonable living, but they explain sufficiently the failure of mediæval writers to treat specifically the question of just wages.

Later on, when the wage-earning class assumed greater proportions, we find the ethics of their remuneration explicitly discussed by theological writers. Molina, De Lugo, and Bonacina, writing about the beginning of the seventeenth century, declare that in general that wage is just which is customary for a given service in a given place.⁴³ The two first mentioned say that a wage insufficient for the subsistence of some laborers will nevertheless be fair when there are many who *willingly* sell their services for that amount. We are told that numerous workers do accept this lower wage, either because they have other sources of income, or because they can live more cheaply than fellow members of their own class. From the context it would seem that both Molina and De Lugo assume that a laborer has a right to a living from his toil, and that their chief concern in the passages cited is with cases in which the circumstances are exceptional.⁴⁴ At any rate they do not discuss the question of a living wage adequately and in all its relations. The only general standard of just remuneration that they lay down is custom. Whether the customary wages of those days complied with the requirements of a living wage as then understood is not easily determined. However, since wages remained stable during long periods of time, and since the direct influence of religious and moral teaching on economic laws was very considerable—much greater than at present—it may well be that the essentials of reasonable wages were fairly well realized.

⁴¹ Levasseur, *idem*, I, p. 313; Brants, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁴² Gibbins, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁴³ Molina, "De Contractibus," disp. 506, nos. 2, 3, 4, Venice, 1611; De Lugo, "De Jure et Justitia," disp. 29, no. 62, Lyons, 1670; Bonacina, "De Contractibus," disp. 3, q. 7, Venice, 1754.

⁴⁴ Cf. A. Vermeersch, S. J., "Quæstiones de Justitia," pp. 572, 573, Bruges, 1901; Pottier, A., "De Jure et Justitia," pp. 234-241, Liege, 1900.

From the time of the writers just mentioned down to the year 1891, the theological and canonist doctrine on the ethics of wages seems to have undergone no important development. The old phrases about customary wages and just wages are constantly recurring. A curious instance of this unprogressiveness is found in the pages of the canonist, Reiffenstuel, who wrote during the first half of the nineteenth century. He maintained that it was wrong for an employer to pay a laborer less than was usual in similar circumstances, but that when the usual wage was paid all obligations of justice were satisfied, even though it did not suffice for a livelihood.⁴⁵ According to this interpretation, the "customary wages" of the mediæval theologians and canonists become "current wages," and the "common estimate" of just wages becomes the wages that men actually pay in the strife of competitive bargaining. What was in the minds of the Schoolmen a conscious moral judgment is thus converted into an unconscious resultant of men's efforts to buy cheap and sell dear. The author's principle would justify starvation wages if these were common to a whole class.

In the year 1891 the late Pope Leo XIII formulated the doctrine of a minimum Living Wage in his celebrated encyclical, "*Rerum Novarum*," better known by the title, "On the Condition of Labor." Its most important passages relative to the present matter are the following:

"We now approach a subject of very great importance, and one on which if extremes are to be avoided right ideas are absolutely necessary. Wages, we are told, are fixed by free consent, and therefore the employer, when he pays what was agreed upon, has done his part and is not called upon for anything further. The only way, it is said, in which injustice could happen would be if the master refused to pay the whole of the wages, or the workman would not complete the work undertaken; when this happens the State should intervene to see that each obtains his own, but not under any other circumstances.

"This mode of reasoning is by no means convincing to a fair-minded man, for there are important considerations which it leaves out of view altogether. To labor is to exert one's self for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the purpose of life, and most of all

⁴⁵ "*Jus Canonicum*," lib. III, Decretal., tit. XVIII, nos. 108-114, Rome, 1831.

for self preservation. 'In the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread.' Therefore a man's labor has two notes or characters. First of all, it is *personal*; for the exertion of individual power belongs to the individual who puts it forth, employing his power for the personal profit for which it was given. Secondly, man's labor is *necessary*; for without the results of labor a man cannot live; and self-conservation is a law of nature which it is wrong to disobey. Now if we were to consider labor merely in so far as it is personal, doubtless it would be within the workman's right to accept any rate of wages whatever; for in the same way as he is free to work or not, so he is free to accept a small remuneration or none at all. But this is a mere abstract supposition; the labor of the workman is not only his personal attribute, but is necessary; and this makes all the difference. The preservation of life is the bounden duty of each and all, and to fail therein is a crime. It follows that each one has a right to procure what is required in order to live; and the poor can procure it in no other way than by work and wages.

"Let it be granted, then, that as a rule workmen and employer should make agreements, and in particular should freely agree, as to wages; nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more ancient and more imperious than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in *reasonable and frugal comfort*. If through necessity, or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or contractor will give him no better, he is the victim of fraud and injustice."

Pope Leo XIII was not, indeed, the first Catholic authority to proclaim this principle of a Living Wage. It had already been more or less explicitly laid down and defended by Kettler in Germany, Vogelsang in Australia, de Pascal in France, Potier in Belgium, and Manning in England.⁴⁶ It was the principle of social justice that was clearest and most definite in the consciousness of those numerous groups of Catholic thinkers and agitators who during the preceding quarter of a century had been seeking a remedy for the industrial ills of modern Europe. It was at least a partial application to existing economic conditions and institutions of the traditional theological and canonist doctrine of a just price. Indeed, the activity of

⁴⁶ Cf. Nitti, F., "Catholic Socialism," *passim*, New York, 1895; translated from the Italian by Mary Mackintosh.

this Catholic social movement, more perhaps than all other influences together, led the late Pontiff to issue the encyclical, "On the Condition of Labor." In a conversation with the Swiss social reformer, Gaspard Decurtins, Pope Leo referred to the father of the movement, Archbishop Kettler, as his "great forerunner." Nevertheless, it was his encyclical that made the Living Wage doctrine an explicit principle of Catholic ethics throughout the whole civilized world.

The subject of the authoritative Protestant teaching on the ethics of wages cannot be adequately treated here. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, a large number of able Protestant divines, such as Kingsley and Maurice in England, Stocker and Todt in Germany, and Gide in France, did, and some of them are still doing, valuable work by opposing the oppression of labor under the guise of free contract, and by insisting that to pay the laborer as little as one possibly can is to violate Christian justice.⁴⁷ There seems, however, to be no systematic body of Protestant doctrine on the ethics of wages that is traditional, uniform, and recognized generally as authoritative. Hodge's "Systematic Theology," the principal work on Protestant theology written in English, devotes a few pages to such questions of commercial morality as deception, adulteration, and extortion, but contains no word on the moral aspects of the wage contract.

CONTEMPORARY OPINION REGARDING AN ETHICAL STANDARD OF WAGES.

The ethical theory underlying the method of unlimited bargaining, namely, that contracts made without force or fraud are necessarily fair, is, despite the prevailing practice, condemned by the majority of disinterested men. This is most clearly seen in the general conviction that the excessive prices exacted and the enormous profits obtained by some of the great trusts, are not merely opposed to the public welfare, but positively unjust and dishonest.⁴⁸ Yet the contracts by which this result is brought about are all free. Speaking of the exorbitant profits made by a prominent corporation in the manu-

⁴⁷ Nitti, *idem*, pp. 85-99.

⁴⁸ Cf. Sidgwick, "Methods of Ethics," p. 288, New York, 1901.

facture of steel rails (twelve dollars per ton, which he maintained was ten and one-half dollars in excess of a fair profit), a capitalist and ex-Senator of the United States not long ago declared: "If this is not robbery I would like to find some stronger word to characterize it." With this view practically the whole of the American people would agree. Nevertheless, the purchasers of steel rails are neither deceived nor coerced; the transaction is free. Again the money shark who trades on the distress or ignorance of the poor by charging exorbitant rates of interest, gives his victims the benefit of a free contract; yet he is restrained by the civil law and condemned by the public conscience. Similarly with bargains where the subject matter is human services. A drowning man calls to another for help. The latter replies: "I will save you if you pay me a million dollars." The distressed millionaire prefers life on this hard condition to death without it, and quickly closes the contract. The contract was free, was a source of some gain for both parties, but who would affirm that it was just? And the employer who takes advantage of the need of his fellow-man and hires him at starvation wages, has merely made a free bargain. The laborer agrees to the harsh conditions because they mean for him the preservation of life; they represent an advantage as compared with the alternative of starvation. Still, with the exception of the employer and those who look at the matter from their own point of view, the entire community would insist that somehow the transaction was wrong. In the words of Dr. Cunningham, "we feel that it is unfair for the economically strong to wring all that he can out of the economically weak."⁴⁹ Hence, in a dispute between an employer and his poorly paid laborers, public sympathy is invariably on the side of the latter. Indeed, it may be said with confidence that the common sense and unbiased convictions of the community not only repudiate the theory that free contracts in general are just, but maintain that when the laborer is compelled to accept less than a certain decent minimum of remuneration he is in truth defrauded.

Belief in the Living Wage principle has always been more or less firm in the consciousness of the laborer himself, but only

⁴⁹ "Western Civilization," II, p. 80.

recently has it taken the form of an explicit demand.⁵⁰ In England the right to a reasonable minimum of pay has become one of the fundamental assumptions of trade unionism. "It is a vital principle," says one of the trade union leaders, "that a man by his labor should live, and notwithstanding all the teachings of political economists and all the doctrines taught by way of supply and demand, a greater doctrine overrides all these, the doctrine of humanity."⁵¹

The labor unions of America do not often use the phrase, "a living wage," nor explicitly outline the concept that it represents, but they express the same idea in their "union scale." This is the rate of wages that the union demands for its members in any particular industry. It is in reality the minimum that the unionists regard as compatible with right living. They reject, therefore, the standard of unlimited bargaining, inasmuch as they establish a minimum; and they substitute the standard of a living wage, inasmuch as they look upon this minimum as the lowest rate for which a man *ought* to work. It might be objected that the union scale is not intended to be an ethical standard, but merely represents what the unionists think they are strong enough to obtain. It is true that they try to get as high a wage as possible, but this is a matter of practical policy arising out of actual conditions. Behind it is always the conviction that there is involved a question of morals. They believe that they ought to have at least sufficient remuneration to afford them a decent livelihood. Many of them, indeed, hold that they have a right to more than this minimum; but this is merely an additional proof that the idea of an ethical standard is present to their consciousness.⁵²

Nor is the principle of the minimum wage entirely unknown to existing legal codes. The Compulsory Arbitration Act of New Zealand decrees that minors shall not be employed in factories for less than a certain sum per week, and that all

⁵⁰ Webb, "Industrial Democracy," pp. 582, sq.

⁵¹ Idem, loc. cit.

⁵² Cf. the address, "A Living Wage," delivered by President Gompers before the Nineteenth Century Club, and printed in the *American Federationist* for April, 1898; also the testimony of Presidents Gompers and Schaffer before the U. S. Industrial Commission; Vol. VII, pp. 397, 614 of the Report of the Commission.

laborers on public contracts shall receive at least the rates of wages that "are considered usual and fair in the locality." A law containing the latter provision was not long ago enacted in the State of New York. In Victoria, Australia, legal boards have been created with authority to establish a minimum wage, for the express purpose of preventing the remuneration of any class of workers from being reduced below the cost of living. And the New Zealand Court of Arbitration is empowered to fix a minimum wage that will apply, not only to the parties interested in any particular dispute, but to all who are "connected with or engaged in the industry to which the award applies within the industrial district to which the award relates."

This brief discussion of the authorities for and against the practice of unlimited bargaining is not, of course, an adequate historical review of the subject. It has, however, a certain value, inasmuch as it gives some notion of the different attitudes which men have taken toward the ethical side of the wage-contract. For if there is any field of study in which principles stand out in clearer light when they are seen as others see them, it is the field of ethics, and especially of applied ethics. Every new view-point that is taken, and every new opinion, no matter how fantastic, that is considered, contributes something to our understanding of the nature and bearing of ethical truths.

Our conclusions from the present study are: First, that men have always regarded the fixing of wages as in some degree an ethical action; and, secondly, that the preponderance of human opinion is decidedly against the method of unlimited bargaining. The belief that the amount of remuneration given the laborer is entirely devoid of moral aspects, in other words, "that there is no such thing as fair wages," has never been held by any considerable section of any community. Either explicitly or implicitly men have always been virtually unanimous in the conviction that the standard for determining wages should be a moral standard. Even the method of unlimited bargaining, which is on its face non-ethical, was advocated by economists and legislators chiefly because they believed that its results would be morally good. They expected it to bring

about the greatest attainable measure of social justice. Indeed, so long as men remain ethical beings, they cannot ignore the moral aspects of any practical policy that they recommend.⁵³ Finally, although the method of bargaining is the prevailing one, it is less than a century in existence, and was established through the mistaken efforts of economists and legislators. Previous to that period, it was frowned upon by the political, religious and moral forces of society. It is condemned to-day, not merely by the laborers, but by the moral sense of the greater and saner part of the community.

JOHN A. RYAN.

⁵³ Cf. Professor Foxwell's Introduction to Menger's "Right to the Whole Produce of Labor," p. xi, London, 1899; translated from the German by M. E. Tanner.

HISTORY AND INSPIRATION.

II. THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.

A. GENERAL REMARKS.

§ 1. *Origin and limitation of the authority of the Fathers.*

I. The New Testament writings were addressed to Christians and not to infidels. Neither the Gospels nor the Epistles were written with the view that pagans should learn the Christian faith by reading them. We mistake the character of the Gospels completely if we consider them as, or even compare them to scientific and complete treatises on Christian doctrine. The letters of the Apostles were written to communities of people who had already received the faith. It was the purpose of the Apostles to instruct those Christians more fully regarding some particular question or local circumstance, and to confirm them in the faith which had previously been preached to them. Writing his letters to the "Saints" in Corinth, Ephesus or Philippi, St. Paul intended to induce the faithful of those cities to regulate their lives in accordance with their faith. His letters become unintelligible and even absurd, if he is supposed to have addressed people who knew nothing of Christianity. He takes it for granted that the readers are already acquainted with the bulk of Christian doctrine.

Regarding the truth of this body of Christian doctrine, which had been preached to them, there could be no doubt whatever. St. Paul himself wrote to the Galatians: "Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach a gospel to you besides (opposed to) that which we have preached to you, let him be anathema" (Gal. I, 8). Therefore, Christianity or Christian doctrine being a living whole, and every part of it being in vital connection with every other part, it stands to reason that the faithful to whom the New Testament writings were first committed, carefully avoided taking from them any meaning, which would be found to clash with the *body of Christian doctrine* already known. The letters received from the

Apostles had to be interpreted in such a way as not to be at variance with the unity of the whole.

This shows the soundness of our Catholic teaching according to which Christian interpreters have to take as a guide the *analogy of faith*. Even if the doctrine in question is not explicitly expressed in the creed of the Church, it must agree with the spirit of the whole.

II. Christ did not teach men by writing books. He founded a Church. If there is one thing clear in the life of the Master of the Apostles, it is that He did not found His Church upon dead writings but upon living teaching. The Church of Christ is a living organism. St. Paul likes to call the Church "the body of Christ." "The faithful," he says, "are but one body in Christ" (Rom. XII, 5). "He (Christ) is the head of the body, the Church" (Col. I, 18).

"The kingdom of heaven is like a grain of mustard seed, which is the least indeed of all the seeds; but when it is grown up, it is greater than all herbs, and becometh a tree so that the birds of the air come and dwell in the branches thereof" (Matt. XIII, 32). In later centuries this tree produced branches, whose development or evolution was not known to those who saw its first appearance: but, although growing, Christianity always remained *the same tree*. Whatever grew beside or around this tree, was not the tree of Christ.

The vital fluid of the celestial mustard tree is, in the first place, divine grace, ascending and feeding all the branches through the Sacraments. Secondly, the divine doctrine, taught by the Apostles or their successors and held by the faithful. This organism can never change. It is of the very life of the tree. No one therefore can ever alter the divine constitution of the Church.

In the New Testament and in the history of the first Christian centuries there is nothing more evident than that the transmission of Christian doctrine was not left to the occasional speeches of men or women, enthused with a kind of inspiration; but that Christ founded a Church to whose divine constitution belongs an institution of official teachers. "All power is given to me in heaven and earth. Going therefore teach ye all nations" (Matt. XXVIII, 19). "He that heareth

you, heareth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth me” (Luke X, 16).

The Apostles taught mankind what Christ and the Holy Ghost revealed to them. Their successors do not receive additional revelations. They must keep and guard the revelation once received. They teach, explain and apply the doctrine of the Twelve. But they, as well as the Apostles themselves, are *jure divino* the official teachers of the living Church of Christ.

In this Church the ordinary way of teaching is oral preaching. Through this oral preaching of the Church, taught by the Pope and Bishops and held by the faithful, we know that—in setting forth the Christian revelation—the Apostles never taught any error in matters of faith; that, if occasionally they committed their teaching to writing, these writings were inspired. Through the Church we know the divine character of those Gospels and Epistles which out of so many apocrypha of the first two centuries, are acknowledged by the faithful to be the Word of God. The New Testament is the canon of the Church.

The successors of the Apostles, who in the entire course of their teaching never enjoyed additional revelation, were evidently not inspired when they wrote things which they knew belonged to the doctrine revealed by Christ. But nevertheless their writings are the official documents of authorized witnesses and regular teachers of the doctrine living in the Church assisted by the Holy Ghost.

Christ is with His Church “all days even to the consummation of the world” (Matt. XXVIII, 20). Before Christ died, He promised that the Father would give us “another Paraclete” who is to abide with us “for ever” (John XIV, 16). This other Paraclete takes the place of Christ himself: “But I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you that I go: for if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you” (John XVI, 7). “When he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will teach you all truth. . . . He shall glorify me; because he shall receive of mine and show it to you” (John XVI, 13 ff.). He is “the Spirit of Truth, whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not nor knoweth him; but you shall know him; because he shall abide with you, and shall be in you” (John XIV, 17).

Such being the nature of Christ's divine institution, the faithful easily realize "how they ought to behave themselves in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of truth" (I Tim. III, 15). They know that the official distribution of divine grace was entrusted to the anointed representatives of Christ, administering the sacraments. As regards the doctrines of the Church, the faithful know that they must "hear" the official teachers, with whom that "other Paraclete" now abides.

The Apostles died. But the divine institution of official ministers and teachers will last as long as the Church itself; it is the divine organism of the mystical body of Christ.

Because in their writings the Apostles were inspired, we are perfectly sure of every sacred writer that he has not written a single sentence, which is at variance with the body of Christian doctrines, preached to the Church. But the writings of their successors, not being inspired, must be judged in quite a different way. Taking inspiration in a broader sense, in later days saintly men may indeed have "prophesied" in some of their writings; they may perhaps, personally, even have received some special revelation: but the *Church* did not receive additional revelation: her official teachers were not inspired. We are only sure that the Holy Ghost abides with her in guarding the "*depositum fidei*" preached by the Apostles. We only know that on account of this "*assistentia Spiritus Sancti*," she never will err in matters of faith or morals. Therefore the writings of the successors of the Apostles, considered separately, have no divine authority on account of the personal knowledge of their authors. We need a *proof* that what they teach is the *teaching of the Church*. The authority of the later official teachers is founded, not upon their studies and learning, but upon their being the witnesses of the teaching of the infallible Church. This condition however being fulfilled, it is of course not less impossible that there should be a disagreement between the *sacred writings* and the teaching of the living *Church* at the present day, than there was in the first or second century.

This *unity* of the doctrine, which alone has the right to bear the name of Christian, shows the truth of our Catholic dogma

that no interpretation of Holy Scripture can be lawful or accurate, which is opposed to the unanimous doctrine of the Church.

“Quoniam vero,” says the Council of the Vatican (Sess. III, Cap. 2), “quæ S. Tridentina Synodus de interpretatione divinæ Scripturæ ad coercenda petulantia ingenia decrevit, a quibusdam hominibus prave exponuntur, Nos, idem decretum renovantes, hanc illius mentem esse declaramus, ut in *rebus fidei et morum, ad ædificationem doctrinæ Christianæ pertinentium*, is pro vero sensu Sacræ Scripturæ habendus sit, quem tenuit ac tenet Sancta Mater *Ecclesia*, cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione Scripturarum, atque ideo nemini licere contra hunc sensum . . . ipsam Scripturam Sacram interpretare.”

But does not history teach an “*evolution*” of Christian doctrine? Is the teaching of the Church at the present day identical with its teaching in the first centuries? If there is a change, how can the interpretation of Holy Scripture in ancient times restrict the freedom of modern Catholic scholars?

There is no Catholic who does not see the great *historical differences* between the Church in the days of the Apostles and the Church of modern times. Although its divine constitution remained unchanged, its form and shape had to be accommodated to the different needs of time, place and peoples. As regards the “*depositum fidei*,” Catholics do not lose sight of the great difference between the standpoints, from which in the course of so many centuries Christians considered and examined the doctrines revealed to them. Christianity, as we said, is no dead writing or building, but living teaching. In the teaching of the first centuries there was a vast residuum of unappropriated truth. We have no reason to admit that St. Peter knew clearly every dogma held by the Catholic Church after the Council of Trent. There was and is in the Christian revelation an unfathomable depth of meaning, out of which new disclosures may and do from time to time break forth. Therefore history teaches us *different degrees of knowledge*. But all degrees are animated by the knowledge of the articulate *unity* of the teaching of the

Church: it is only as a living whole that Christians of all centuries conceive their faith. No doctrine can retain its place in the Christian creed which is not a branch of the tree of Christ.

But how do we know whether this condition is fulfilled in regard to doctrines, which are believed nowadays? We need only look: for we are confronted with a fact. The infallible Church herself *is* the tree: her doctrines are the branches. There are no branches but those that grow upon this tree. The answer therefore is not left to the believing instinct of the individual, to which here Protestants might have recourse. We Catholics know; we see.

Catholics would give a dreadful weapon into the hands of the historians, if they admitted that in order to know whether modern teachings are Christian or not, the only question is whether the Church of the first centuries knew and believed them. Trying to find out the condition of early Christianity, Anglicans would entirely misunderstand the nature of the Church, if they discarded all that does not belong to the history of her teaching at that time, all that is not found to have been existing from the very beginning. The "*semper et ubique*" of the theologians must not be interpreted in this way. Seeing an enormous oak tree we realize perfectly that the tree has grown out of the acorn. Those, however, who planted the acorn, were sure that whatever might grow from it, would be an oak tree, but they could not see the height it afterwards attained, nor the boughs and branches which would crown it. Historically boughs and branches did not exist. Nevertheless, in a certain way, even the highest branches were there. Every living thing of the higher orders arises from a single minute cell, which even under the highest powers of the microscope is hardly distinguishable from the cells which are the origin of other living beings: yet this microscopic cell develops inevitably into a complete living thing, with all the organs and peculiarities of its own, not of another species. Thus, all into which it afterwards develops, must have been "*in potentia*" in the germinal cell.

This comparison between the natural evolution of living things and the development of the Church will be admitted by

Catholic theologians, if, instead of the natural law, and its inevitability, we place the "assistentia Spiritus Sancti," which makes us sure that whatever grows from what Christ has planted is: the mustard tree.

Christian revelation did not increase. It is the tree of knowledge which was and still is growing. Since, however, Christian revelation does not exist in the dead copies of Holy Scripture or of the Canons of some Councils,¹ but in the living teaching of the Church, it is often difficult to draw the line between revelation and its knowledge. In the living Church the body of known Christian truths is growing: a doctrine may belong to the Christian revelation although its explicit knowledge was not found in the teaching of the Church at the death of St. John.

In the first century, at the death of the Apostles, the Kingdom of Heaven was not merely a seed! In this way revelation is not to be compared to a single cell. It was a tree and all its later limbs, however young, had already grown. These limbs carried branches covered with buds of other branches. The great difference between historians and theologians seems to consist in this: that for the theologians, who study the principles, branch and bud are one; while historians compare the tree in its maturity to the mere sapling.

Nevertheless, the planters of the acorn, who did not go back to the spot where it was planted, until a gigantic oak tree was raising its crown, may not be able to tell us how boughs and branches have grown: history, following as far as possible the development of institutions, nearly always gives us a relatively full account of the growth of the different branches. From the top of each bough historical research slowly descends to the older branch, thus tracing each doctrine to its bud in the early Church. The knowledge of the bud, however, was not knowledge of the branch, except for Him, whose Providence is the law of this divine "evolution."

Thus then, between the doctrine of the living Church in the first and in the twentieth century there is no real difference,

¹ This, evidently, does not mean that there can be errors either in Holy Scripture or in the final definitions given by Ecumenical Councils.

which could suggest the possibility of real opposition or contradiction. There is, in fact, merely the difference of a *less and more perfect knowledge*. Christians of all centuries are children of the same Church. There is but one mustard tree.

III. The Fathers are the official representatives of the Church. They are the authorized witnesses of her teaching. Therefore wherever we can prove that the Fathers unanimously hold or teach a doctrine as belonging to our Christian faith, there we are absolutely sure to have the doctrine of *the Church*. No interpretation of the Sacred text can ever be admitted which runs counter to the unanimous consent of the Fathers.

What once belonged to Christian faith, belongs to it always. Of the growing mustard tree no branch, yea, no leaf will ever wither. We may have to cut down parasitical growth or leave its removal to the slow but sure hand of time: no real branch of the tree of Christ can ever be cast into the fire. Older branches have a color different from that of the younger offshoots: their bark and their whole formation bear vestiges of the influence of the atmosphere in which they grew: but trunk, boughs and branches are *one tree*. What was a part of the Christian faith in the days of St. Jerome, is part of it to-day.

We are often told that upon many scriptural topics modern science throws a new light; that we know a great many things which in olden times were not even suspected, and which nevertheless are of great importance in interpreting Holy Scripture. In the days of the Fathers, it is asserted, mankind had no idea of a scientific study of ancient literature and Semitic history.

All this is very true. Our knowledge of the Bible is much larger than it was in former times. *As scholars*, the Fathers, or at least many of them, were less learned than e. g. St. Thomas and other mediæval scholastics. Regarding biblical history, their scientific knowledge cannot be compared to the amount of information definitely established by modern criticism. About astronomy, physics or chemistry, the opinions held by the Fathers have no higher authority than the arguments they adduce. In all these things the Fathers were sometimes very much mistaken. But we do not consider them here

as scholars or merely as men of learning. *As Fathers* they are the authorized and official witnesses of the teaching of *the Church*. Christ did not open a school of critical studies. He built neither laboratory nor observatory. His Apostles taught mankind the *Christian revelation*. This revelation is the living teaching of the infallible Church. In matters of faith and morals the Church can never err, not on account of the learning of its members, but because the Holy Ghost abides with her. Thus the authority of the Fathers is not founded on their scholarship. Even the unanimous consent of the Fathers has no higher authority than that of other pious and learned men, except inasmuch as it is *a proof of the teaching of the Church*.

Thus then, a Christian is never justified in departing from the teaching of the Fathers in matters of faith, by appealing to the results of scientific progress in modern times. That the Fathers had a most imperfect knowledge of natural sciences and ancient historiography, is generally recognized; but this has no bearing at all upon our Catholic doctrine concerning the inerrancy of the Church, whose witnesses and official teachers the Fathers are when they speak *as Fathers of the Church*.

IV. In the Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus," Pope Leo applies those principles to the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures. "Sanctorum Patrum, quibus 'post Apostolos, *sancta ecclesia* plantatoribus, rigatoribus, ædificatoribus, pastoribus, nutritoribus crevit' (s. Aug.), *summa auctoritas est, quotiescumque testimonium aliquod biblicum ut ad fidei pertinet morumve doctrinam, uno eodemque modo explicant omnes: nam ex ipsa eorum consensione ita ab Apostolis secundum Catholicam fidem traditum esse nitide eminet.*"

Thus then, where the Fathers unanimously hold that a doctrine belongs to the Christian faith, there can be no doubt that we have in fact the testimony of the Church herself.

"In hisce rebus," continues the Pope, the authority of the Fathers stands very high, even if we consider them separately. The reason is evident. The Fathers were learned and saintly men, who left us many precious works and who, as a rule, are the most trustworthy witnesses of the teaching of the Church.

Seldom or never, however, can the testimony of a single Father, or of a few of them, be a sufficient proof that the doctrine in question is really taught by the Church herself. Practically there must be a moral unanimity. And even this unanimity is not always a sufficient proof.

What we ought to know, is, whether such a unanimous interpretation is not the result or natural consequence of the general condition of philosophical, historical or natural science in the days of the Fathers. In such a case, even the unanimous interpretation of a sacred text would not be unanimous testimony that this interpretation was founded upon the teaching of the Apostles, held by the living Church. It would merely mean that this was a commentary accepted by all the scholars of that time.

“Quocirca studiose dignoscendum in illorum interpretationibus, quænam reapse tradant tamquam pertinentia ad fidem aut cum ea maxime copulata” (Encyclical).

As far as history is concerned, it is a fact that Catholic scholars nowadays generally reject the patristic commentary on several Old Testament narratives, although the Fathers are unanimous in their interpretation. For instance, in regard to the creation of the world in six days, the deluge, or the chronology of Genesis, there is not a Catholic of any learning who still holds the opinions patronized by the Fathers. But they never gave those interpretations *“tamquam pertinentia ad fidem.”* They never taught that they were part of the living teaching of the Church, that is to say, of the Christian revelation preached by the Apostles.

Whether they speak as witnesses of the Church or as scholars of their day, is a question that is not always easily solved. Catholics ought never to forget the notable example of the great Bellarmin, who misunderstood the meaning of the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers to the extent of appealing to their testimony, against Galileo, in matters of physical science. But once we are perfectly sure that the Fathers unanimously teach or hold that a doctrine, or the interpretation of a text, belongs to our Christian faith, there can remain no doubt whatever that such a doctrine or interpretation is really a part of the teaching of the infallible Church. The Fathers themselves are the Church.

To reject such a unanimous teaching or interpretation of the Fathers, is equal to a denial of the inerrancy of the Church in matters of faith and morals. Here we touch the vital point of Catholicism. Every compromise would involve the Church herself.

There are few biblical texts the positive interpretation of which is unanimously taught by the Fathers to be a matter of faith. On the other hand there are many texts and passages, in interpreting which Catholics must be cautious not to run counter to a doctrine which belongs to our Christian faith according to the common consent of the Fathers; no matter whether this doctrine is contained in the Bible or not.

This analysis of Catholic principles shows the soundness of the common opinion of our theologians. Brucker and Lagrange, Vigouroux and Prat, Nisius and Schanz, Pesch and von Hummelauer, Catholic scholars in general now agree that we are not bound to accept the common interpretation of the Fathers in *scientific questions* or in those which are *merely historical*. There can be no other reason why the Councils of Trent and the Vatican and the Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus" always insist on "*res fidei et morum*," when speaking of the authority of the Fathers. "We therefore hope," says Chr. Pesch, "that the Encyclical of Leo XIII will put an end to the objections and anxiety of some exegetes, who cling to obsolete and antiquated interpretations on the plea that they are traditional."¹

This common opinion of modern theologians naturally suggests the question whether it is not a necessary conclusion even from a merely theological point of view, that neither natural sciences nor history of this kind are *taught* in Holy Scripture? If the Bible were to be considered as *teaching* those things, they should belong to the "*depositum fidei*," of which the Fathers are the guardians and witnesses.²

¹ Theol. Fragen, dritte Folge, p. 45, Freiburg, 1902.

² Cornely, *Introductio* I, p. 582, calls out attention to another point. "Profecto Deus," he says, "si libris sacris chronologiam et historiam nos docere voluisset, providentia speciali invigilasset, ut annorum numeri, personarum, gentium, terrarum nomina aliaque id genus, quae in historia alicujus momenti sunt, incorrupta conservarentur. At quanta in illis praecipue rebus editionum nostrarum biblicarum sit incertitudo . . . nemo ignorat."

V. The Fathers are never more unanimous than in teaching that the inerrancy of Holy Scripture is one of the fundamental principles of our Christian faith. With them this question is beyond discussion. It is simply "impious" to admit the possibility of an error on the part of an inspired writer. This dogma is at the bottom of the whole patristic literature. It is an *axiom* from which the Fathers start in their commentaries. If now and then we find them setting forth this principle, it is either because they wish to reject the interpretation of a text on account of its opposition to this axiom, or because they are arguing against an infidel. That the inerrancy of Holy Writ is a dogma of our faith, was considered to be self-evident, and so self-evident as to exclude even the suggestion that any proof was needed. In the Councils of Trent and of the Vatican, and in the Encyclical "Providentissimus Deus," we only hear the echo of this unanimous teaching.

Of course, in the works of the Fathers there are passages where they acknowledge, and even insist, that the historical sense of a biblical text or narrative cannot be true. We shall quote various passages of this kind. But in all these places the Fathers presume it to be self-evident that, when they reject the historical sense, they suppose that the inspired author did not wish to be understood in such a sense. According to them the author of those biblical texts did not intend to write strict history. Their common solution is: *littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat*. Instead of proving that the Fathers admit exceptions, these spiritual interpretations of the sacred text offer a very strong argument to the contrary. *Because* there can be no error in the Bible, the Fathers in these places have recourse to a spiritual sense. The more strange sometimes their interpretations are the stronger is our argument. It is therefore absolutely false, as some contend, that the Fathers admit the inerrancy of the Bible only in a general way. Evidently the principle is a general one. But this general principle teaches that there is *not a single* error: the impossibility of a single error is the real essence of the principle. Nowhere does any Father of the Church admit a real error on the part of an inspired writer, affirmed by him in the Scriptures.

In their minds this would imply an error on the part of *God himself*. God is the author of Holy Scripture; the human writers are his "pens."

The inerrancy of the Bible is therefore an unshakable principle of our faith.

Another question is, whether the Fathers were never mistaken in *applying* this principle, e. g., to the historical sense of biblical passages which, as scholars of their time, they misunderstood. This application of the principle cannot be considered as the teaching of the Church as long as it is not so regarded by the Fathers. Thus, in studying patrology, we should distinguish very carefully between the unanimous acknowledgment of the principle of inerrancy itself and its application to special cases.

Moreover, correctly to understand the judgment of the Fathers concerning the Bible, and their general way of speaking of it, we must first have a clear idea of the character of biblical study at that time.

§ 2. *Aim and Method of the Fathers.*

I. The aim and method of the Fathers in their biblical studies are nowhere more distinctly described than in the words of St. Augustine, found in his celebrated work *De Doctrina Christiana*, Lib. ii, cap. ix, n. 14:

"In all these books those who fear God and are of a meek and pious disposition, *seek the will of God*. And in pursuing this research, the *first rule* to be observed is, as I said, to know these books, if not yet with the understanding, still to read them so as to commit them to memory, or at least so as not to remain wholly ignorant of them. *Next*, those matters that are *plainly* laid down in them, *whether rules of life or rules of faith*, are to be searched into more carefully and more diligently; and the more of these a man discovers, the more capacious does his understanding become. For among those things that are *plainly* laid down in Scripture are to be found *all matters that concern faith and the manner of life*—hope, to wit, and love, of which I have spoken in the previous book. *After this*, when we have made ourselves to a certain extent familiar with the language of Scripture, we may proceed to open up and to investigate the *obscure passages*, and in doing

so draw examples from the plainer expressions to throw light upon the more obscure, and use the evidence of passages about which there is no doubt, to remove all hesitation regarding doubtful passages.”

The *aim* of the Fathers in studying Holy Scripture was to acquire knowledge of the biblical teaching on “faith and morals.” Their *method* is truly scientific, but philosophical and *theological*. The possibility that any inspired author had erred was beyond discussion, and therefore, contradiction being *per se* excluded, the scientific character of this method, by which they explain the obscure or doubtful passages according to those more clear, is self-evident. In a theological study of the religious teachings of the Bible no one can find fault with this method.

It need not be demonstrated that at this time the whole purpose of biblical study was the knowledge of *religious doctrines* contained in the Sacred Scriptures. We confine ourselves to a single illustration of the text we quoted: “Whoever thinks”—St. Augustine says—“that he understands the Holy Scriptures, or any part of them, but puts such an interpretation upon them as does not tend to build up this twofold *love of God and our neighbour*, does not yet understand them. If, on the other hand, a man draws a meaning from them that may be used for the building up of love, even though he does not take the precise meaning which the author, whom he reads, intended to express in that place, his error¹ is not pernicious, and he is wholly clear from the charge of deception.” “Whoever takes another meaning out of Scripture than the writer intended, goes astray, but nevertheless, as I was going to say, if his mistaken interpretation tends to build up love, which is the end of the commandment, he goes astray in much the same way as a man who by mistake quits the high road, but through the fields still reaches *the same place to which the road leads*. He is to be corrected, however, lest if he get into the habit of going astray (in his interpretations) he may at times take cross roads (with regard to moral life), or even go in the wrong direction altogether.”²

¹ St. Augustine himself does not follow his Jewish theory of inspiration. Cf. p. 58.

² Lib. I, cap. xxxvi, n. 40, 41.

These passages show that the religious doctrine of Holy Writ, especially regarding Christian life or morals, was the aim of biblical study. To reach this aim it was only necessary that the Fathers should *understand* the inspired sentences in their immediate context. The readers of Holy Scripture at that time, and during the middle ages, had to answer the question that was put by Philip, the Apostle, to the eunuch on the way that leads from Jerusalem unto Gaza: "*Thinkest thou that thou understandest what thou readest?*" As regards the moral teaching of Scripture, this was in fact the only question that demanded a solution. Why? Because *the intention* of the sacred writers to assert the religious doctrine contained in the Bible, is fully evident.

II. Nowadays the aim of many biblical scholars is entirely different. Historians as well as theologians have made the Bible the object of their researches. Before they can apply the theological method of the Fathers to the interpretation of the sacred writings, modern Scripture scholars must solve a number of other questions.

Apologists are confronted with a multitude of biblical students who deny the inspired character of Holy Writ. The faithful put questions with regard to the value of historical traditions, concerning the authenticity and integrity of the inspired books. Our Catholic magazines are filled with articles discussing the relation between the divine and human element in Scripture. We study many things in the Bible to which the Fathers never paid any attention, because they are new questions suggested by a new science. Living in a time of literary and historical studies, modern scripturists examine the literary character and the history of the sacred books. The critical method, which is the vital organism of historical science, was discovered in recent times.¹

Modern scholars realize the immense distance between the scientific value of sources and that of oral traditions. They know different types of either narrative, pragmatic or genetic history, characteristic of different centuries and races. They are, e. g., perfectly conscious that the historiography of ancient Semitic peoples is a type of literature entirely distinct from

¹ This does not mean that the critical method has reached its full perfection.

our own critical and genetic historiography. The realization of these literary facts was, in a certain way, the discovery of the historical method. The Fathers, however, and the mediæval theologians made no distinction between the various kinds of historical literature. They perhaps attached more credence to Tacitus than to Livy, to Dionysius the Areopagite than to Berosus; but all historical works and narratives were simply "history." Neither did they make a distinction between the narratives found in the divine library we call the Bible, and which contains the whole literature of the ancient Hebrew people. Parables excepted, all biblical narratives were "history."

Evidently this was *not the result of the notion they had of inspiration*. On account of this notion they at times *denied* the historical character of a narrative and explained it in a spiritual sense. The fact that they did not distinguish the various kinds of historical literature in the Bible, was the natural consequence of the more general phenomenon, that they did not examine history, either profane or sacred, according to the historical method. Their purpose was to study religion, not history. They looked upon history from the standpoint of their time, no matter whether it was found in Polybius or in the Bible.

No Father could suspect that on a later day "ignorant traducers" would blame *the Church* on account of his relative backwardness in historical research. It is true that the Fathers believed, for instance, that most unlikely story of the Seventy men in seventy cells, writing the Greek version of the Old Testament; several of them admitted in a general way that equally improbable fable in the 14th chapter of the 4th Book of Esdras; and although we are convinced that in mentioning many stories of this kind, their intention was more to relate than to affirm them, it still remains a fact that in these ancient times, even the most learned had not that critical instinct, which at present makes every one more cautious when he reads an ancient tale. But all this belongs to the history of mankind. The history of the Church teaches us how the preaching of the Gospel was like the rising of the sun in the dark night

of polytheism, and how Christianity has become identified with true and moral civilization.

Still less could the Fathers know or suspect that at a future time even Catholic scholars would seem to consider history as the only science, that has a right to make use of the narratives read in ancient sources or living in oral tradition. They could not imagine that some day it would seem unlawful to pay more attention to idealistic pictures and poetical legends, full of religious truths, than to a realistic photograph of the past. In these olden times people thought that there were higher truths than historical ones, and that the date of a battle was of less importance than lessons of eternal life. Although at that time mankind was not yet trained in critical studies, people were simple enough to think that they themselves might read the ancient sources they have copied for us, and use them in such a manner as suited the condition of their time. Just as their narratives were illustrated with pictures, so these great children used the historical narratives themselves as illustrations of what they wrote in their theological works; which even after so many centuries would still make an ignorant man believe that, in the theological world, "skyscrapers" are not the newest but the oldest style of building.

No one, therefore, can blame *the Church* for this lack of historical science and critical instinct in the theological works of the Fathers. Instead of historical science we find in their works something of a much higher character, which is wanting in most of modern writings.

III. Making no distinction between the various types of historical literature in the Bible, the Fathers evidently viewed Holy Scripture in quite a different light from modern scholars. This will explain facts which otherwise might seem somewhat strange.

For a Catholic it is a matter of course that there can never be a contradiction in the *affirmations* of inspired writers: for God himself is the author of the whole Bible. But it is by no means impossible that there should be a contradiction between the historical forms of several parables, between the historical data of several *midrashim*, or between oral traditions and written sources, whose strictly historical character the author of a

religious book does not intend to guarantee by using them for his religious purpose. If the author of Judith did not intend to write a historical work, but merely a midrash, we have no right to accuse him of error, though we may find several contradictions between the historical form of his book and true history. Since there is no false affirmation on the part of the author, these contradictions are only *material* errors; and in point of fact material errors are no errors at all. *Material* and *formal* are philosophical terms to distinguish between *apparent* and *real* errors. Therefore the errors excluded *a priori* from Holy Scripture are *formal* errors.

This distinction between formal and material errors may be called useless as far as the *religious* doctrines of Holy Scripture are concerned. Here book and author are one: the sacred authors *evidently intend to affirm* those religious doctrines and to deliver their own teaching. *All* biblical books are *religious* books. "No history," says Prat, "is more impersonal than biblical history." But there is no religious *teaching* more personal than that of the Bible: the inspired author demands from every reader a full adhesion to all he affirms. Since thus the whole Bible teaches religious doctrines, every religious error in the Bible would be a formal error. Narratives, however, can belong to a class of literature *that does not exclude historical inaccuracies*, and nevertheless be *used* as an instrument for this *religious* teaching. Therefore, as regards the historical data of Holy Writ, we have to make a distinction between formal and *material* errors.

Now since the Fathers did not study biblical history, but looked to the religious doctrine in Scripture, even in the historical books; since they did not distinguish between strict history and other types of historical literature: it follows naturally from their aim and their method, that in their works we find no explicit distinction between formal and material errors. Moreover this terminology was unknown at that time. In other words, they do not call our special attention to a distinction between *contradictions* in the *affirmations* of the inspired writers and contradictions in the *historical forms* of their religious teaching. Another important yet natural consequence was, that the Fathers tried, as a rule, to maintain the historical

accuracy of all the biblical narratives, without examining first whether the inspired author wished to be understood in a strictly historical sense.

These facts are but different views of the same phenomenon: the Fathers were not critics but theologians, they did not study the history of the sacred books but their religious teaching.

In history the method of the Fathers would lead us to the falsest conclusions. As a rule, the most recent narratives are the clearest, although they may be baseless oral traditions; while often ancient sources, written in the spirit of a different age, and transmitted perhaps in loose and stray fragments, are interpreted rightly only with difficulty. Ancient compilations sometimes are like palimpsests, in which after a careful examination some dark spot is seen to conceal the key to significant questions. The critical analysis of these compilations is the most interesting task of modern criticism, because in many works of relatively recent origin, it discovers ancient sources of the highest historical value. In his precious booklet "*Principes de Critique Historique*," the learned Bollandist, Father De Smedt, justly points out that in a certain kind of historical literature critical research makes us attach much more importance "aux détails qu'à la substance des faits" (p. 196).

Thus then, in studying biblical *history* scholars follow a method quite different from, and in many cases opposed to the method used by the Fathers in their study of biblical *theology*.

IV. It is almost useless to say that in the interpretation of Holy Scripture great caution and prudence are required. On this point all agree. The question is what must we understand by caution. We find the best answer in the Fathers and Scholastics.

It is a matter of fact, to which von Hummelauer calls attention, that the great majority of the Fathers were willing to abandon the truth of the strictly historical sense, when this historical sense offered great difficulties, which seemed to be irrefutable. On account of such difficulties they concluded that the biblical authors did not intend to write history. The Alex-

andrian school sought a solution in assuming a merely allegorical sense. A few of them even went so far as to reject the historical sense of innumerable passages and texts. Some of the Antiochian Fathers went to the opposite extreme. Still they were obliged to interpret parts of biblical passages in a merely typical sense. What is said, e. g., of David or Solomon in the literal or historical sense, they explain as being true only of Christ; in these parts, say they, the author did not intend to speak of David or Solomon. The Antiochians themselves therefore admit that in Scripture we find things, concerning David and Solomon, which modern scholars would call historical "material errors." In the works of the Fathers, who stand between these two extremes, we read several passages, where they explicitly state that in some texts or narratives the sacred writers have no intention of affirming their historical character. How these Fathers explain such biblical topics will be seen in the continuation of this study. Here we merely call attention to the fact that the Fathers did not adhere to the truth of the historical sense, when "*eum vel ratio tenere prohibeat vel necessitas cogat dimittere*" (Encyclical).

There can be no doubt as to the meaning in the Encyclical of the word "ratio." This is seen very clearly in the passage of St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, c. 7, 13, to which Pope Leo refers; and perhaps plainer still in the numerous examples, to be quoted later, where the Fathers abandon the historical sense. In their eyes interpretations ought to be *reasonable*.

When we are confronted with difficulties, caution becomes most seasonable. Here Fathers and Scholastics are equally "prudent" and for a very good reason.

"It is very detrimental," says St. Thomas, "either to assert or to deny as belonging to the faith things that do not belong to the faith" (*Opusculum* X, *init.*). "If I hear a Christian," St. Augustine writes, referring to scientific questions, "ignorant of such things, and mistaking one thing for another, I look on him with pity: nor does it harm him if he is ignorant of the nature and condition of created things, since he does not believe things unworthy of thee, O Lord, creator of all things: but it does harm *if he thinks that they belong to*

the doctrines of faith and dares to affirm persistently those things of which he is ignorant" (Conf. V, Cap. V). "It often happens"—says St. Augustine in another place—"that an unbeliever through observation and investigation knows with certainty things concerning the earth, the movements, magnitude and distance of the stars, the chronology, the nature of animals, and such like matter. Now it is a shameful and pernicious thing and much to be avoided, that an unbeliever should hear a Christian speaking of such matters *as taught in Sacred Scripture*, where in fact the Christian is so much mistaken that unbelievers, on hearing him and seeing the extravagance of his blunders, can hardly refrain from laughter. The trouble is not so much that the man is laughed at for his own mistakes, as that our sacred writers are believed to have taught such things by those outside the Church. For when they find a Christian thus going astray in a matter in which they are thoroughly acquainted, how will they trust our sacred books about the resurrection of the dead and the hope of eternal life and the kingdom of heaven, believing that the Scriptures teach error about such things which they themselves know better. . . . It is not easy to tell how much trouble and sorrow such rash and presumptuous men inflict upon their *prudent* brethren" (De Genesi ad Litt., I, 39).

Sometimes the maintenance of the strictly historical character of a biblical text offers great difficulties, while there is at least the possibility of explaining the text in another way; but as long as the *absolute* impossibility of its historical character is not proven in such a way that they themselves—who are not critics—realize perfectly the strength of the argument: some Catholics consider themselves the most "prudent" of all, when nevertheless they cling to the strictly historical truth so that they seem to weigh Catholicism with the historical character of such a biblical text or passage. The Fathers, as we see, did not belong to that class of "prudent" Catholics. Many things, seemingly of a modern type, are very old; but many other things, that appear to be old, are in reality quite modern: the modern prudence of some Catholics is a very old imprudence.

"In such matters two things are to be observed" according to St. Thomas. "First that the *truth* of Scripture be invio-

lably maintained; secondly, since Scripture *can be variously interpreted*, we should not cling to any exposition so stubbornly that, if what we supposed to be teaching the Scripture should afterwards prove to be false, we should still continue to assert it, *lest thereby Scripture should be ridiculed by unbelievers*" (I, q. 68, art. 1).¹ St. Augustine says that in such cases there is danger "lest we should be found contending not so much for the doctrine of Sacred Scripture as for our own, endeavoring to make our doctrine that of Scripture" (De Genesi ad Litt., I, 39).

We hope the readers will answer the question, how some modern "prudent" Catholics would judge of the liberty taken by a Scripturist, who for no other reasons than those of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, would explain the first chapters of Genesis so as to conclude to an instantaneous creation, and a production of all animal and plant life, even of the body of man, by a natural evolution from primordial matter.¹ We only state as a matter of fact, that at the present day "Scripture is ridiculed by unbelievers." Whether this is on account of the reason to which St. Thomas refers, is another question, that is best left unanswered. But one thing is clear: if there should be a clash between true historical science and a theological school, the responsibility for the dishonor and for the far-reaching consequences of such a condition of affairs, would fall upon this theological school. Another thing is sufficiently clear, to wit, that some theologians would soon understand biblical history better, if they would first study the history of Catholic learning during the past hundred years. They would discover that as regards strict history, theologians had to abandon one after another their formerly common interpretations of the most famous narratives of the Old Testament. They would readily realize how dangerous it is to cut off the line of retreat, by defending some interpretations "*tamquam pertinentia ad fidem.*" What is styled prudence, is not seldom a very great

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, Dist. XII, q. 1, a. 2. "*Sic ergo circa mundi principium aliquid est, quod ad substantiam fidei pertinet, mundum incepisse creatum, et hoc omnes sancti concorditer dicunt. Quo autem modo et ordine factus sit, non pertinet ad fidem nisi per accidens, in quantum in Scriptura traditur, cujus veritatem diversa expositione sancti salvantes diversa tradiderunt.*"

¹ Cf. *Critiek. en Traditie*, p. 115.

imprudence. Some Catholic scholars of the present day tremble when they see Catholic laymen going to Universities and studying either natural sciences or history in its original sources, after they had first learnt from some saintly priest—what he himself was taught—that our Catholic faith is incompatible with every theory, according to which the sacred authors used documents and sources that are not strictly historical and scientific. From the moment they discover a single fact in geology, ethnology, philology or ancient history, that is opposed to what they have been taught to be a matter of faith, they are adrift. The conclusions they arrive at, are seen in the case of some who should have been the glory of the Catholic Church, but . . . lost their faith. For, the greatest danger does not threaten those who are satisfied with merely attending the lectures of a professor, but those who pursue their studies with heart and soul, and *live* in the modern intellectual world.

Prudence therefore does not consist in maintaining the strictly historical character of a text as a matter of faith, when, on one hand, there are great difficulties against such interpretation of the text, and on the other hand there are able scholars who defend a different interpretation. Cautious interpreters of biblical history will not abandon the truth of “the literal sense” without convincing reasons. Here there is also a danger. On this point the Encyclical *Prov. Deus* is very explicit. But the greatest and most dreadful danger is on the other side, against which we are warned by the Fathers and ancient Scholastics. Catholic scholars ought to be more “prudent” than, in our opinion, Father Delattre was in writing his *Autour de la Question Biblique*.

§ 3. *Points of Agreement and Disagreement between the Fathers and modern Catholic critics.*

On questions of religious *principle*, Catholic critics declare that they perfectly agree with the Fathers. All emphatically maintain that in the whole Bible there can be *no error* attributable to the sacred author. In those places where they do not follow the scientific or historical sense of a biblical passage, the Fathers and Catholic critics alike sustain that the inspired

author *does not intend* to affirm the truth of such a sense, but wishes to be understood differently. Regarding *facts*, the Fathers and modern critics agree that the Bible contains narratives which appear to be historical, but which, if examined closely, are seen to belong to another class of literature.

The great question is, whether the *discrepancies* between ancient and modern Catholic commentaries imply disloyalty to the unchangeable Christian principle. Is it true that we are able to maintain the ancient Christian doctrine regarding the inerrancy of the Scriptures? Is it true that the existing discrepancies do not touch this Christian *principle*? The elucidation of this point is the aim of the next pages.

I. The Fathers were not scientists nor historians. The knowledge of positive facts has much increased in modern times. Therefore modern scholars of Scripture meet with *difficulties* which the Fathers did not and could not realize.

II. The *solution* of historical difficulties is often different. The appeal of the Fathers to a spiritual sense of the texts in question, could evidently offer no solution, unless they rejected the literal or historical sense. Since Catholics agree that each text has at least also a literal sense, scholars must look for another solution of the facts, whose presence in the Bible is acknowledged by the Fathers. Moreover it is absolutely impossible to give a spiritual interpretation to those passages, that at present offer the greatest difficulties.

III. The Fathers followed the *theological method* in their study of Scripture. According to the *critical method* modern Scripturists *first* examine what kind of literature has been chosen by the sacred author. After the solution of this preliminary question, they study the religious teaching of the historical books and apply the theological method.

A narrative does not lose *per se* its moral value, when it is not historical. On the part of an inspired author, no argument is needed to prove the truth of his religious teaching. The most perfect kind of parables are those that are altogether fictitious. The story of the prodigal son with all its significant details, would not teach those deep religious truths, which touch the heart of every Christian, if we did not know that, instead of being merely the history of a miserable man, whose

double we meet so often, it was entirely invented by our Saviour. As a rule, free narratives of pious authors and even the poetical legends of a faithful, fervent people, teach religious truths more abundantly, than do merely scientific records of historical events. We understand the moral conclusion drawn by the author of Genesis II, 24 just as well, if Cardinal Cajetan is right in interpreting the narrative of the formation of the first woman as a parable, when we have to consider this narrative as strictly historical.

This we ought to keep in mind when we assert that the critics and the Fathers view history in a different light.

In theology, written and oral tradition have the same value. As far as faith and morals are concerned, Catholics must admit all traditions which among the faithful were transmitted orally from generation to generation "as belonging to Christian revelation." The writings of Holy Scripture have no higher authority than the oral teaching of the living Church, assisted by the Holy Ghost.

Living in this theological world, at a time when the critical spirit was not yet developed, the Fathers easily lost sight of the immense distance *in history* between oral traditions and sources, of different kinds, when occasionally they reached the ground where at the present day criticism rules supreme. From their theological standpoint they had a very different view, e. g., of the book of Genesis and its historical value than von Hummelauer, Lagrange and other modern Catholic critics have, who contend that the author of Genesis made use of several popular traditions, and who by no means subordinate the historical value of the more obscure ancient sources to the authority of the clearer passages or books that are of more recent origin.

The Fathers understood perfectly the literal sense of the narratives of Genesis, often misunderstood by later interpreters. As described in Genesis, the world was created in six days of one week; the waters of the flood covered the whole earth; the narrative of the tower of Babel is an explanation or interpretation of the fact that all mankind does not speak the same language. The biblical authors must indeed have written in a very obscure style if they were misunderstood by their

contemporaries and by all the readers of more than twenty centuries. It is much easier to explain how lawyers, and even theologians, misinterpret documents when the obvious sense of the self-same documents causes them trouble.¹

But the Fathers were mistaken in interpreting the narratives of Genesis without first examining *the type of literature* to which they belonged. This remained to be examined by later critics.

Theologians are accustomed to a kind of literature in which every sentence is positively affirmed in its obvious literal sense by the writer. Critics, on the other hand, are dealing with several types of literature that are of an entirely different character. Therefore when questioned about the *truth* of a narrative that is not strictly historical, theologians are inclined to give a different answer from the critics. If asked about passages taken from *midrashim*—without the Bible, the type of historical literature most common among the Jews—probably theologians will say they are not true. But if we ask them about the story of some parable—a kind of literature with which they are perfectly acquainted—and wish to know whether we must hold that story to be true, the theologians will look at us and, shrugging their shoulders, they will most likely answer that it is “of course” a parable! This remark, made by von Hummelauer, is a good illustration of the great distance between the two standpoints. If theologians study Hebrew historiography, if they condescend to climb the hill of modern criticism, they will perhaps discover several kinds of literature, in regard to which an “of course” would be perfectly *ad rem*.²

When Lagrange published his “*La Methode Historique*,” a learned Scripturist—who in history does not attach much importance to what he styles a theory of “*kleine trekken*”—wrote in a Dutch magazine, that he did not see a real difference between the historical method, patronized by Lagrange, and

¹ The articles of Professor Happel in the *Biblische Zeitschrift*, 1904 and 1905 (*Der Turmbau zu Babel*), did not convince us that Gen. XI, 1-9, was entirely misunderstood by all previous readers.

² In his legitimate self-defence a Catholic critic sometimes comes to close quarters with “theologians.” But it stands to reason that he does not wish to be understood addressing himself to Catholic theologians at large. Our best theologians are not by any means opposed to sound and moderate criticism.

that method which had always been followed by Catholic scholars. He might view the matter in a different light if he paid more regard to the difference in results.

IV. We proved in the first chapter of this study that we must distinguish two sorts of affirmation in every book: those of the author himself, as an individual distinguished from his contemporaries and addressing himself to his readers—and those of his age, whose common opinions, mentioned in the book, are the author's starting point. The author does not know that these common opinions, which form the background of his book, are untrue. But evidently St. Jude, e. g., did not intend to inform his readers about the origin of the book of Enoch when, as representative of his age, he called its author "Enoch the seventh after Adam." Therefore St. Jude, as author, does not affirm an error either explicitly or implicitly. We consider this question as settled.³

The Fathers express themselves differently. But we saw that St. Jerome's "law of history" is in fact the same thing as our distinction between the writer *as author* and the writer *as representative of his time*. We shall see that St. Jerome does not by any means stand alone among the Fathers. We cannot expect that they apply the distinction to all those texts to which it is applied by modern scholars, who are critics, and thus examine biblical *history* according to a critical method. But the Fathers admit the principle.

V. Another distinction of extremely great importance, to which we would here call the attention of our readers, is that which regards *exclusively* the *inspired* books.

The biblical authors also use such opinions they held as ordinary men, which were *not* the common opinions of *their age*. With regard to things *mentioned* in the Bible, the man himself who wrote the book, may be personally mistaken, without affirming any error *as inspired author*. A short analysis will make us see the soundness of this apparently "new" distinction.

Being inspired, that is to say, his mind being superna-

³ All critics agree that in every book we find "Ueberreste" of the past, which the authors *unconsciously* transmit to us. Provided that they be rightly interpreted, these "Ueberreste" have the highest historical value.

turally illumined and his will supernaturally elevated, in a certain way the author was a different person from what he was before he became inspired. This distinction is not merely logical. An inspired author is a God-man. His teachings and affirmations are divine as much as they are human. His selection of materials, his use of the collected sources, in a word, his inspired writings are by no means the work of that ordinary man, who a short time previously perhaps wrote a letter to his friend. That ordinary man is not the author of a single inspired line. At one time in his life he became the instrument of the Spirit of God, who elevated the human faculties of the ordinary man by divine inspiration. In this supernaturally elevated state the ordinary man *became* the God-man, who was the *author* of an inspired book.

In such an inspired author the ordinary man, however, was by no means annihilated and did not disappear. An inspired author was not completely deified. God did not reveal to him all things. A want of knowledge in an inspired writer does not therefore interfere with his inspired character as author. We must distinguish two classes of things: first, those which God would teach mankind and which the God-man affirmed in his book; here every error is excluded; secondly, those things which God did not intend to reveal or make known, and concerning which the God-man did not intend to inform his readers. Regarding all things of this second class the inspired writer remained the ordinary man with all his doubts and his insufficiency of knowledge.

Since the inspired authors copy sources and use the knowledge of other people, why should they not use the knowledge they themselves had as ordinary men? The ordinary man remained perfectly alive, and the inspired author knew him much better than he knew other people. We know positively that the God-man did use the knowledge of that ordinary man, when this man was the representative of his age. But whether or not the representative of his age, what difference could this make to the God-man in writing his book? Could he not use the opinions of that ordinary man, without affirming them or having the intention to affirm them *as author*? This is the question, and its solution does not seem very difficult.

As a matter of fact we find texts in the Bible where, without doubt, there is a difference between the reality and what we read. This fact is so evident that no one can deny it. We understand that some philosophers can construct the best syllogisms with closed eyes, but they must use their senses in matters of fact. Let us give an example. In the New Testament we read that a text, quoted by the author, is taken from such or such an Old Testament book, when in fact it is not so taken but belonging to another book. To show that an event which happened in the days of Christ, was already foretold by the prophets, St. Matthew, e. g., quotes a text of *Zacharias*, which he says is a text of *Jeremias* (XXVII, 9). St. Mark, I, 2, refers to *Isaias* a text of the book of *Malachias*. How must we explain such *facts*?

To make our explanation better understood let us suppose at first that the author was not inspired.

Most likely, we would say, the author did not attach any importance to the question whether the event had been foretold by *Jeremias* or *Isaias* or *Malachias*. Most probably his intention was merely to show that such an event had been foretold by a Prophet of God in the Old Testament. Still the author thinks and believes that *Jeremias* or *Isaias* was this prophet. And therefore although he does not lie, he is mistaken. He errs.

In an inspired book, however, the case is entirely different. We may suppose that St. Matthew knew some texts of the prophets by heart, and that he considered this text quoted in his Gospel as belonging to the book of *Jeremias*. This Matthew now becomes the instrument of God to write a Gospel. God inspires him. From this moment St. Matthew becomes a God-man. What this God-man affirms and teaches must necessarily be true.

Now, we admit that St. Matthew had the same intention as inspired author which the uninspired writer must be supposed to have had when he wrote such a text. This intention was, to show the readers how the event in the days of Christ had already been foretold in a prophecy of the Old Testament.

But how can this God-man say that *Jeremias* was that prophet, if he did not intend to affirm it? At first sight this

may look strange, but we hope that the reader will agree with us in pronouncing the explanation very simple, when he has read a few more pages.

The text itself proves that God did not reveal to the ordinary man, perfectly alive in St. Matthew, the real origin of the quoted text. Therefore as inspired author St. Matthew affirms that the event was foretold by *a prophet* of the Old Testament, and that *according to him as ordinary man* Jeremias was that prophet.

What the God-man intends to affirm and to tell his readers is absolutely true. Moreover the form in which the author gives expression to his affirmation is perfectly clear. This form, however, bears the stamp of the imperfect knowledge of the ordinary man, who always remained even in the inspired author. Since the Incarnate Word of God was "found in fashion as a man," sin only excepted, why should we wonder at seeing His written Word bearing many vestiges of human imperfections, errors only excepted? The language itself of the New Testament is not classic Greek, but the ordinary language of the people, which was called by the learned "the language of sailors" and which first merited a place in human literature by being used to express the Word of God.

In one of his most interesting letters to Pammachius (LVII), St. Jerome quotes among others the texts of St. Matthew and St. Mark, to which we referred. Addressing himself to those scholars who, like scrupulous men, close their eyes to the facts that confront them, and find fault with others who attempt to explain those facts, St. Jerome writes: "On what grounds then has Mark in the very beginning of his Gospel set the words, 'As is written in the prophet Isaïas, behold I send my messenger,' when, as we said, it is not written in Isaïas at all, but in Malachias, the last of the twelve prophets? Let ignorant presumption solve this nice question, and I will ask pardon for being in the wrong" (P. L., XXII, p. 575).

Though St. Jerome acknowledges the fact, he does not abandon the Christian doctrine of the inerrancy of the Bible. A few pages before, treating of St. Matthew's text, he says: "They may accuse the Apostle of falsifying his version, and

still worse, that he is mistaken (*erret*) in the name, putting down Jeremias when it should be Zacharias. But far be it from us to speak in this manner of the follower of Christ, whose intention was to teach religious doctrines rather than to look for words and syllables" (P. L., XXII, p. 572).

St. Jerome generally appeals to this principle when he finds that he must acknowledge facts which he feels himself unable to explain: "*Littera occidit, spiritus autem vivificat.*" The difficulty of explaining a fact, was to him no reason to deny it. To suppose the error of a copyist, was a subterfuge, which he knew was excluded by the number of parallel cases and by the unlikeliness of such a hypothesis in these places. Therefore he acknowledges the facts, yea appeals to them against the worshippers of "the letter," but he gives a solution which he himself knew perfectly well did not sufficiently explain the difficulty. Thomas a Kempis might have said: "Our curiosity is often a hindrance to us in reading the Scriptures, when we wish to understand and discuss where we ought to pass on in simplicity" (Imit. I, cap. 5). Listening to the divine teaching of the inspired God-men and to the sacred music of the psalmists and prophets, the medieval mystics were certainly right in not worrying about such insignificant things, when their souls were lifted up to much higher spheres. However, apologists are not permitted to follow this method of meditation, because these apparently insignificant things touch upon one of the most vital questions of Christianity—the inerrancy of the inspired authors.

We have already partly convinced the readers that, as inspired authors, neither St. Matthew nor St. Mark affirm any error. But why did we say that the author would have affirmed the error *if he had not been inspired*, since there can be no error without the *intention* to affirm?

This question hits the nail on the head. But the answer is very simple.

Most likely our readers will agree with us that, at the time when he wrote, the author merely had the intention of making his contemporaries see, how this event had been foretold in a prophecy of the Old Testament. Actually, therefore, he most probably did not have the intention of pointing out that this

prophecy belonged not to Isaias, not to Amos or to Osee, but to no other prophet than Jeremias. On this account we must admit that on this moment he did not commit an "*error actualis*." Still it is evident that the author was mistaken. Why?

To hold an opinion means to affirm it. The intention to affirm it, ought not to be repeated every moment—*actualiter*. As long as the opinion perseveres, the intention to affirm it perseveres—*virtualiter*. The man, therefore, who wrote such a text was evidently mistaken at the moment when he wrote it. The author *is* the man who formerly *actualiter* affirmed. In a profane book the distinction between author and man is merely logical.

The inspired character of the Gospel does not change the intention of Matthew. The ordinary man persevered in his opinion that the text, which he knew by heart, was taken from Jeremias. And thus, when he wrote his Gospel, the man Matthew was mistaken. But the ordinary man, who is the subject of this opinion, is not the God-man, who is the inspired author of the Gospel. The inspired author has neither the *intentio actualis* nor the *intentio virtualis* to affirm more than that the event was foretold by a prophet. *Actualiter*, we said, the author had no other intention, even in the hypothesis that he were not inspired. And the *intentio virtualis* of the ordinary man does not touch the inspired God-man.

Reading these pages superficially, some might think that this distinction between the affirmations of the inspired author and many opinions still held by him as an ordinary man, can be applied to nearly all biblical texts and passages, offering a difficulty against the inerrancy of Holy Writ. By no means. Why not?

All depends upon the intention of the author. And the *intention* of an author must be judged according to the same law whether a book is inspired or not. Authors affirm what their books affirm.

This does not mean that everything that is said in a book belongs to the teaching of that book. Neither does this law exclude poetry, parables, *midrashim*, or other kinds of literature that have not a strictly historical character. Ancient

history cannot be placed upon the same level as modern historical writings; and especially ancient religious history, in which that ancient history merely becomes an instrument of religious teachings. The character of many ancient compilations would be entirely misunderstood, if every detail of their sources were considered as being affirmed by the compilers or authors of these books. When the compilers found two different versions of the same event, they often copied both of them. At times such books intend to give the sources without determining the historical reality that is hidden beneath. This, being recognized by all critics, should be taken into consideration, when interpreters establish what in fact is affirmed not only *in*, but also *by* a book. Although an ancient book may contain things that are not strictly historical, we are not justified in imputing error to the book and to its author, unless we know that the author intended to write history. His book does not teach an error if it belongs to that class of literature in which history—taken as it was at that time known and admitted—is merely the starting point of religious teaching. Unless we have positive arguments that the book will only give e. g. two contradictory versions, it stands to reason that, some narratives of the book not being historical, the man who wrote it, was mistaken in his historical information. Perhaps we must admit that the writer did not study scientifically the history of ancient times. But since the book belongs to a class of literature which only intends, either to teach religious truths, or to awaken religious feelings, and since freely written ancient history, and even some popular legends, are just as suitable for this purpose as scientific history, the book itself and the author, *formaliter as author*, cannot be said to affirm those historical details, which may be most significant of its religious teaching. The religious book shows, nevertheless, that in those historical details the writer is mistaken, because the man who holds these opinions is the writer himself. But if such a religious book is written by an inspired author, the God-man does not affirm any more than the book itself. The God-man affirms neither the historical mistakes of the ordinary man, who is still alive in the inspired author, nor those of other people, whose sources and traditions form

the background of the inspired book, which may be e. g. a *midrash*.

Now then, to discover the intention of the author is not more difficult in an inspired book than in a profane one. The whole difficulty is in determining the kind of literature of a book or passage.

As a rule this difficulty can be easily solved. Moreover there is no difficulty whatsoever with regard to matters of moral doctrine. All biblical books are religious books, teaching religious doctrines. Therefore of every sacred book the inspired author evidently intends to affirm the religious teaching. The distinction between a God-man and an ordinary man is here useless. We merely have to examine what religious doctrine is affirmed by the man that writes. For, in regard to all things belonging to this class, this man himself has become the God-man and speaks or writes *formaliter* as an inspired author.

Regarding history, however, we should first be sure that we have no epic narrative, no *midrash*, no idealized or symbolical description of either the past or the future, but ancient Semitic history. Knowing this, we have to point out that in its form this history is much freer than modern historical works. Besides, we must never lose sight of the fact that even this kind of history is merely the instrument of religious teaching. Whether it was the "direct" intention of the biblical authors to relate the historical reality itself or the sources and traditions of their times, is a question to be examined later. But once we admit that a book or a passage belongs to that class of literature, whose purpose it is to relate historical events, it is merely a matter of course that not only the religious but also the historical truth of what is told, is taught by such a book. We have only to interpret, according to the common rules of hermeneutics, what the author intended to say when he wrote the book. That this intention concerns the moment when he writes, is true for every book. But for inspired books this circumstance is of importance, because with regard to the God-man who writes, there can be no question of a persevering *virtualis intentio*, originating in a former actual intention or affirmation of the ordinary man. We need

not repeat that in the inspired writer himself the ordinary man did not disappear and that therefore his intention to affirm his own opinion, expressed in the inspired book, persevered *virtualiter*; but this intention is not the intention of the God-man, who is *the author* of the inspired book.

Now these cases, where the author of a strictly historical book has not, at the time he writes, the intention literally to affirm all that he writes, are *exceptions*, which have to be proved by the context and can regard only small details. If e. g. Matthew or Mark had written an inspired book, whose purpose it was to indicate the books of the Old Testament from which the quotations of the New Testament are taken, they would evidently have been mistaken *also as inspired writers*. Unless we show at least the likeliness of another intention, which thus has to be indicated, we never have a right to contend that the author, at the time he writes, has not the intention of affirming everything he actually writes.

Again an example will be the best illustration. If the book of Judith is no midrash, but history, we must leave to others the explanation of the fact that the author speaks of Nabuchodonosor as the king of the Assyrians, reigning at Nineveh. Of this Nabuchodonosor the author speaks about twenty times; but even if he spoke of him but once, what intention could he have, at the time of writing, but to say that this king bore indeed the name of Nabuchodonosor? If this book is to be considered as historical, it (and therefore also the author) affirms that Nabuchodonosor reigned in Nineveh and was king of the Assyrians. Some scripturists contend that in all these places the name of Nabuchodonosor is a corruption of the original text. Whatever may be the scientific value of this hypothesis, which by no means solves all the difficulties urged against the historical character of this king of the book of Judith, those scripturists themselves evidently agree that, if the book is no midrash, the name of Nabuchodonosor cannot be explained without admitting an error on the part of the inspired writer.

We hope that this analysis sufficiently shows the solidity of the grounds upon which our distinction is founded. It is clear that, if we close the Bible and start from an analysis of the

divine authorship of Holy Scripture, we would not arrive at these conclusions.¹ We must, in fact, *start* from the knowledge that all the biblical books were written "*spiritu sancto inspirante*." Since the true nature of divine inspiration does not depend upon the opinion of a philosopher about what he judges to be proper to divine authorship, but depends upon God Himself, who inspired the sacred books: we must examine the divine books themselves, and explain the character of biblical inspiration according to facts. However, we Catholics know that our explanation of those facts cannot be true, if it does not agree with the teaching of the Church, that every canonical book is of divine authorship, which excludes every error.

A confirmation of the soundness of our distinction is found, we would say, nearly everywhere in Holy Scripture.² Christ Himself expressed the most human feelings. The truly human feelings expressed by the Psalmist and other inspired writers are not always on the same moral level as those of Christ. The sacred authors frequently express doubts. They explicitly state that they are not sure about some things which they mention. But who was it who did not know? Who had these doubts? Evidently the man himself who wrote the book. But these doubts and this lack of knowledge merely surrounded or encircled those things that were the object of the inspired book, and of which the God-man informed the faithful. They all touch upon that other class of things of which God did not intend to inform the readers of His book and concerning which the ordinary man, still living in the inspired author and retaining his own opinions, had merely a human knowledge. Doubts and errors are equally impossible in the intellectual act of the inspired author, as God-man. But the inspired author knew perfectly well the doubts of his inseparable companion, the ordinary man, who lived in him. They were the *object* of his

¹ This is one of the reasons why in the following lines we maintain the thesis which we defended some years ago in *De Katoliek* and which was attacked by van Kasteren, Studien, LXXXVIII, p. 58 f., and Chr. Pesch, Theol. Zeitfragen, Dritte Folge, p. 81. In our opinion Father Lagrange was right in pointing out the real danger to which the theory of Card. Franzelin exposes Catholic scholars.

² Cf. Dr. Schmid, De inspirationis celiorum vi et ratione, p. 329. "Alia quaestio est, quid tunc Paulus *privatim* opinatus est. Ista quaestio, ut apparet, nos non tangit."

inspired knowledge. This evidently does not mean that they must be the object of the sentences of his book. Those doubts are expressed in whole sentences, and even in entire passages. Sentences and passages are written by an inspired author, and therefore are inspired. The only thing that is not inspired is the doubt itself, which is the object of his inspired writing, not grammatically, but logically.

Did the Fathers never make use of this distinction between the inspired author and the ordinary man?

They did not elaborate the theory. But they not only apply it; at times they explicitly state that an inspired author speaks "*ut homo*." In the context this "*homo*" is our ordinary man.³

VI. Thus far the differences noticed between Fathers and modern Catholic scholars are but so many illustrations of the fact, generally admitted, that the Fathers were not critics, but theologians. They did not study history. They did not follow the critical method of a more recent historical science in their exegesis of the Bible. But even as theologians there is a great difference between the Fathers and modern scripturists in this regard, that the Fathers are much more *free* in their interpretation of the sacred writings. If compared to their works, modern theological studies of Catholic writers are rather of the scrupulous character.

Everybody knows that explanations of the spiritual sense of Holy Scripture are as scarce in the works of modern Catholic theologians as they are numerous in the commentaries and homilies of the Fathers. Why? Catholics realized that even the Fathers underwent the influence of the ancient Jewish methods. Introducing, practically, as much freedom in the

³ Father *Lacome* is right where he says: "La critique, après tout, n'est en l'espèce que l'application au texte biblique de la raison sincère et éclairée, avide de vérité. Et, Dieu merci, il y a eu avant notre siècle, il y a eu en grand nombre dans les générations des Pères de l'Eglise des esprits consciencieux et avisés, des génies passionnés pour le vrai, qui ont fait de la critique avant la lettre. Plus on fouillera l'immense bibliothèque, plus on trouvera les unes après les autres, la liste presque complète des opinions émises par la critique." *Questions de principe*, p. 149, Paris, 1904. This evidently does not clash with what we said about the general lack of critical instinct in earlier times. Cf., e. g., *Grisar*, *Münchener Kath. Gelehrten Congres*, 1901, pp. 131-146.

management of biblical history (*haggadoth*) as slavery in the interpretation of the Law (*halachoth*), these Jewish hermeneutic methods were carved out for the scribes, who tried to find out all kinds of secret meanings in the words of Holy Writ. The Fathers never followed the Jews in their slavery to the letter of the Law. But no one will deny that they often exaggerated the secret or spiritual sense of the inspired writings. They left too much room to the imagination and the inventive genius of each individual interpreter. Their commentaries were too free.

Have we fallen into the opposite extreme? Is it possible that Catholics have been influenced by the ideas of Protestantism, worshipping the dead letter of the Bible?

Luther and Calvin rejected the divine authority of the Church. To their partisans the Bible alone was left. As soon as Protestantism abandoned the "letter" of Holy Writ, it was bound to dissolve Christianity into a countless number of sects. Protestantism was on the horns of a dreadful dilemma from the moment it separated from the Church. It had to replace the authority of the living Church by scrupulously keeping to the unchangeable "letter" of the Bible, or Christianity would soon run aground, if Protestants followed the freedom of interpretation taken by Catholics in the days of the Fathers and their mediæval disciples. The leaders of earlier Protestantism realized this perfectly. And orthodox Protestants feel this keenly nowadays. Amongst Catholics conditions were quite different. The norm and standard of Christian faith was the teaching of the Church. However free, the interpretation of the inspired writings had to agree with her teaching. No doubt ingenious and inventive commentators sometimes read their own ideas into the Bible. The Fathers especially applied this method in their homilies. When expressed in the inspired word of Holy Writ, their preaching of Christian doctrines seemed to receive more unction. For those "accommodations" the New Testament itself had afforded an example. Within the Catholic Church there was no harm in such freedom in interpreting the Scriptures, since the interpretation itself was controlled by the living teaching and divine authority of the Spouse of the Holy Ghost. But within the realm of

Protestantism, "to release the letter" of Holy Scripture meant preparing the way for the ruin of Christianity.

From its very beginning Protestantism was considered by Catholics as heresy. Catholics and Protestants were antagonists. But the great battle was fought about the ancient Christian doctrine of the divine authority of the Church. And this antagonism between Catholicism and Protestantism does not by any means exclude the possibility, that Catholics may have been influenced by the ideas of their opponents with regard to the character of the Bible, whose divine authority was acknowledged by Catholics and Protestants alike. Catholics, of course, had to avoid even the appearance of esteeming the Bible less than Protestants did. In later days Catholics and orthodox Protestants were alarmed by the complete ruin of Christian faith among those Protestants who did not keep to the "letter." Would it seem strange, if some Catholics had not realized that even due freedom is destructive of Protestantism, but is not dangerous to the Church? As a matter of fact, in the later works of Catholic theologians we look in vain for that ancient freedom in interpreting Holy Scripture, which was common among the Fathers.

The critical study of biblical history teaches us that we must once more take up our old Catholic tradition, provided that we avoid in the interpretation of the Word of God that exaggeration of the secret and spiritual sense, which spoiled the work of some of the greatest of our ancient scholars. According to the old Catholic tradition of the Fathers, the fundamental law of ancient *Christian* interpretation is the teaching of St. Paul: "*The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth*" (II Cor. III, 6). We Catholics are not slaves to the letter. Rome is not "that Jerusalem which is in bondage with her children," but, "that Jerusalem which is free" (Gal. IV, 25-26).

Still in another regard, but in a quite different way, Catholics seem to have become influenced by the appearance of Protestantism.

Why are great biblical scholars extremely rare among the new generation of Catholic apologists, who have grown out of the struggle with Protestantism? Our readers will agree with us that the biblical science of more recent Catholic theologians

is frequently second-hand. The Fathers were not critics. But they knew the Bible. They not merely illustrated metaphysical or ecclesiastical teachings by quoting biblical texts; their theology was based upon a steady reading and constant study of Holy Writ. They knew the facts. They knew and realized the difficulties against the historical character of some passages much better than the majority of our modern theologians seem to do. We shall see that not infrequently a Father of the Church felt obliged to abandon the "letter," and did not hesitate to deny the intention of the sacred author to affirm the historical sense. Nowadays many Catholic theologians do not feel that same freedom of the individual. Later Catholic scholars seem to have been influenced by their struggle against the exaggerated "individualism" of Protestantism, which rejected the authority of the Church.¹ There seems to be among some Catholics a strained and quite unnatural fear of the *individual*, who might go his own way in scientific questions of theology, and who examines by himself, without any scruples, the divine Scriptures.

In the middle ages the level of biblical knowledge and original commentaries was falling rather than rising. The time of the "*Catenæ*" had come. But although Scripture studies did not flourish, other branches of theological science were blooming. The banner of kings of science was flying out from the mighty towers and castles, crowning the steep hills of mediæval metaphysics. The Scholastics respected the rights of the individual.

In the eyes of men like St. Thomas science was a country to be explored. However far preceding scholars might have

¹ The possibility of falling into the opposite extreme, is particularly evident in those countries, where copies of the Bible became extremely rare among the Catholic people. In some Catechisms the question, whether the faithful are allowed to read the Bible, is answered in such a way that many Protestants believe, we Catholics see so great a danger to Christianity in the reading of the Word of God Himself, as to prefer that our people completely ignore the Scriptures! Of course, the Church merely requires that the faithful should not use other editions of Holy Scripture than those which she herself approved, and in which the rather obscure biblical texts are explained to the common people by some footnotes. But we must acknowledge a great discrepancy between some modern Catholic theologians and the Fathers of the Church, in their attitude towards the reading of the Bible by the faithful.

penetrated into its fields and forests, there ever remained infinitely more still to be discovered. But these scientific explorations were, of course, the work of individuals. In modern armies the strength and courage of a single man may count for naught: science hands her palms to giants advancing alone. The ships of our Arctic explorers do not carry a large crew. When Stanley and Livingstone penetrated into the wilds of Africa, they were not accompanied by a large crowd of geographers. They were alone. No one denies that humility is one of the characteristics of truly learned men; no Catholic denies that the most learned man, when confronted with the higher authority of the Church, has to bow his head; no one denies that in things of so great importance and of so far reaching consequences as the interpretation of the Scriptures, prudence and cautiousness are imperiously required. But, nevertheless, in the realm of science the individual is king. Never will a single scientific argument be possible when the individual must appeal to others; never will science introduce general suffrage into its own realm. Her laws and decisions are not carried by sweeping majorities. "There is nothing new under the sun"; even St. Thomas himself was strongly opposed by his contemporaries. But the Catholic Church will ever consider as one of her noblest glories, the exploits of her mediæval explorers, who quite alone ascended as high as possible the Mt. Everest of metaphysical science.

Nowadays some Catholic scholars seem to consider theology a barn wherein are kept the crops already gathered. They do not seem to realize that the territory of science has an everlasting springtime; although people are not always plowing the same lands. Science is not corn drying in a granary, but living in the furrows of the fields from which, according to the book of Genesis, mankind eats its bread in the sweat of its face. In the history of Catholic science we find a barn of precious crops. But these belong to history. They feed our people, and are the seed of future crops. It is not in the barn that theological science is living and working. How, then, must we explain the fact, that some Catholics seem not to like the fresh air of the fields, where—since there are no other fields—the corn is growing among weeds? In our opinion, the principal

reason is, because in the fields of science every one has to plow his own little piece of land, and works alone. And wherever some modern Catholics see an individual alone in the fields of theology, they look upon him with distrust. An object of great alarm to them are those "individuals" especially, who attempt to place in the barn the new crop from the little lands which border on the fields of historical science. They may swear that their crop is of the same seed as that which is kept in the barn; they may declare that they are Catholic to the backbone; they may invite, and even beseech their fellow Catholic to examine the new crop: but they are distrusted: *they are alone.*

It stands to reason that we do not wish to be understood as addressing ourselves to Catholics at large. But we cannot help believing that this picture represents the true state of affairs in some of those little Catholic worlds, which their inhabitants easily identify with the one, saving Catholic Church. Whether in the past this spirit, reigning within some circles, encouraged the personal initiative among our scholars, and was profitable to the progress of theological science; whether after the days of St. Thomas, many carloads of new sacks, that is to say, of new theological crops, were placed in the barn: are questions which we must leave to the theologians themselves. But with regard to Scripture studies, we do not hesitate to affirm that we Catholics ought to study more than we did the works of the ancient Fathers. Many of us would entirely change our views if we knew the Fathers better. When our contemporaries become interested in a question touching upon theology, we cannot put aside the impression that among some Catholic scholars, the reaction against Protestantism has extended the boundaries of authority so far that they never feel sufficiently sure, whether they are in the realm of *science*, where the individual is king. We do not by any means deny that some modern critics fall into the opposite extreme, by going their own way even where they are on the grounds of eternal Catholic principles. But in our opinion the most striking discrepancy between a great number of our modern true blue Catholic theologians and the Fathers, consists in a kind of sickly apprehension of that freedom and "individual-

ism," which in matters of science is a question of to be or not to be. In Catholic Scripture studies the killing of personal initiative would become especially dangerous if, some time, the tendency of those theologians should prevail, who underwent the influence of the Protestant worshipping of the "letter."

St. Jerome, the patron of Catholic scripturists, was such a characteristic and self-conscious "individual" as is rarely seen in history. This will be shown in the second part of this chapter.

Regarding the authority of *the Church* all true Catholic scholars are little children. "He that walketh sincerely, walketh boldly" (Prov. X, 19) and "perfect love casteth out fear" (I John IV, 18). But whoever loves his Mother, the Catholic Church, will never forget the words of Our Lord: "Unless you become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. XVIII, 3).

HENRY A. POELS.

P. S. We evidently do not imagine that every objection raised against the inerrancy of Holy Writ, can be resolved by an appeal to the distinctions we proposed. We merely dealt with two classes of the most serious difficulties. In the continuation of this study we will have to show, e. g., that the historical truth of writings, whose authors interpret and pass sentence over the past, ought not to be judged according to entirely the same standard of truth as mere narratives; that the Scriptures contain rhetorical elements, which cannot be interpreted like positive and philosophical affirmations, etc. But these other difficulties will be easily solved, once we agree on the soundness of the distinctions set forth in those two first articles.—Even if we were to admit the theory of P. Schanz regarding the connection between inspiration and apostleship, we would be obliged, nevertheless, to distinguish the teachings of the God-man from the opinions held by the ordinary man.

H. P.

RICHARD FITZRALPH OF ARMAGH AND THE FRANCISCANS (1349-1360). II.

Fitzralph seems to have been in great demand as a preacher. "Among his collected sermons (of which, either in full or in reports, the Bodleian MS. 144 contains no less than eighty-five), there are some which were delivered before the Pope on July 7, 1335, in November, 1338, in December, 1341, in September and December, 1342, and in December, 1344, dates which may possibly even point to a continuous residence at Avignon, taken in connection with the circumstance that his sermons preached in England begin in 1345."³³ This conclusion seems to be confirmed by a mandate of Clement VI in 1344 to the Bishop and Chapter of Lichfield to revoke certain statutes made by Bishop Walter touching the Deanery of Lichfield "whereby the present dean Richard, S.T.P., has been much harassed during his absence at the papal court."³⁴ It is strange, however, if Mr. Poole's conjecture be true, that this mandate was not given before 1344. There are other sermons extant which were delivered at Lichfield and London and other places in England, and at Drogheda, Dundalk, Trim and other churches in his native country. These, though preserved or reported in Latin, are generally stated to have been delivered in English. Four out of the "seven or eight" sermons preached at St. Paul's Cross, London (1356-7), on the question of evangelical poverty have been printed by Joannes Sudoris at the end of his edition of the "Summa in Quæstionibus Armenorum." Fitzralph frequently made the virtues of our Blessed Lady the subject of his discourse, for many of his sermons are entitled "De Laudibus sanctæ Deiparæ."

These sermons present a uniform plan. The subject is divided according to the scholastic method, and each member or section of the plan is proved and illustrated as if it were a complete whole. The result is a singular clearness which

³³ Poole, D N B., XIX, 195.

³⁴ Bliss, "Calendar," III, 117.

however is never hard or cold because pervaded by a certain warmth and unction.³⁵

Ever since the days of John Comyn, the first English archbishop of Dublin, there was unending conflict between Armagh and Dublin respecting the exercise of the primatial powers. Indeed, the contest was almost inevitable under the circumstances. Dublin, as the political capital and by far the most important city in the country, wished to be entirely free from the primatial powers of Armagh. Popes and kings favored now one side, now the other.

In 1349 the contention broke out more fiercely than ever between Fitzralph and Alexander de Bicknor, Archbishop of Dublin. In that year Archbishop Fitzralph obtained from Edward III a recognition of the right to have his cross borne before him in all parts of Ireland. This right he promptly and vigorously exercised in Dublin. But Edward soon revoked his letters, and wrote to the Cardinal of St. Anastasia to procure the disallowal of Fitzralph's claim of supremacy over the see of Dublin, and also to the Archbishop himself commanding his return to his diocese. But down to the end of 1350 at least we find Fitzralph's claims supported by riots which called for active measures on the part of the government.³⁶ Nor did he give up the exercise of what he conceived to be the right of his Church, for in 1352 we find the Archbishop of Dublin again receiving letters patent from Edward denying the primatial rights of Fitzralph in the Archdiocese of Dublin.

In the following year the controversy was taken to Rome. It would seem from subsequent events that no definite decision was given, as the contest went on until the reign of Queen Mary. Archbishop John Allen of Dublin, in 1529, states that he found a letter of Innocent VI in Rome which decided that the Archbishop of Armagh should be entitled Primate of All Ireland, and the Archbishop of Dublin Primate of Ireland. Whatever be its real value, this is the origin of the present titles of these bishops.³⁷

³⁵ *Irish Eccl. Record*, I, 525-6.

³⁶ Poole, D N B., XIX, 196.

³⁷ Wilkin's "Concilia," IV, p. 81 ff. *Irish Eccl. Record*, 1889, (III Series) X, p. 422 ff. Item, 1900, (IV Series) VIII, p. 193.

Fitzralph was a man who preëminently joined the speculative temper with the practical, and evinced great activity in the administration of his office. He acquired for his diocese the priory and house of St. Andrew in the Ardes from the Benedictines of St. Mary of Senley in Normandy.³⁸ He adopted means to increase the slender revenue of his see by appropriating four churches to his "mensa," and exchanged certain church properties for others more advantageous to the see of Armagh.³⁹

Among other things he tells us in the "Defensorium Curatorum" that he had three or four of his priests studying at the University of Oxford.⁴⁰

He seems to have been diligent in visiting the different church provinces. We find him engaged on a visitation of the diocese of Meath in 1355 when Edward III called on him to return quickly to Dundalk to treat with Odo O'Neill, who was advancing on that town with a considerable Irish army.⁴¹ Indeed we meet with him in the guise of an ambassador of peace as far back as 1348 when he received from the king full powers to treat for peace between the English and the Irish.⁴² Trithemius tritely tells us that he was famous for his wit, a scholar in speech and of great activity in preaching to the people.⁴³ So that he seems to have justified the eulogy passed on him in the Bull which made him Archbishop: "In spiritualibus providus, in temporalibus circumspectus."

The event most generally connected with the name of Fitzralph is the controversy with the Mendicants. We have seen that he appeared at Avignon in 1349 as the official spokesman of the secular clergy, but there is little to show what attitude he maintained towards the Friars on his return to Ireland. The contest came to a crisis, however, in 1356, and occupied the remaining years of his life, as we have no evidence of his returning to his diocese after the citation to Avignon in 1357.

³⁸ *Irish Eccl. Record*, I, 526.

³⁹ Bliss, III, 398; also Theiner, 295.

⁴⁰ Brown, Appendix to "Fasciculus Rerum Expetendarum," p. 474.

⁴¹ Stuart-Coleman, "Memoirs of Armagh," Dublin, 1900, p. 108.

⁴² Pat. 29, Edw. III, cited in *Irish Eccl. Rec.*, I, 526.

⁴³ See Prince, "Worthies of Devon," p. 366.

Fitzralph died at Avignon, very probably on the sixteenth of November, 1360.⁴⁴ About ten years after his death his remains were brought back to his native town of Dundalk by Stephen de Valle, Bishop of Meath, and deposited in the Church of St. Nicholas, but some doubted whether the remains were his or another's.⁴⁵ The monument was still there in the beginning of the seventeenth century, as Usher wrote to Camden on October 30, 1606, that "it was not long ago by the unruly soldiers defaced."⁴⁶

His memory attracted many of the faithful to his tomb, and many miracles are said to have taken place there, whereat (relates the first continuator of Higden) it is said that the Friars are ill-pleased.⁴⁷ About his person there must have grown up a "cultus" of some antiquity and public importance, at least in Armagh and the neighborhood, for in the beginning of the fifteenth century Boniface IX appointed a commission consisting of Archbishop Colton of Armagh and Richard Yong, Abbot of Osney, and Bishop-elect of Bangor, to inquire into his claims for canonization.⁴⁸ The results of this investigation are not known; but this does not make it evident that the claims were set aside. His memory however seems to have been held, locally, in saintly veneration by many for a long time. A synod held at Drogheda on June 20, 1545, under George Dowdall, Primate of Armagh, ordered that the Feast of Saint Richard of Dundalk be celebrated on the morrow of the feast of Sts. John and Paul (June 27th).⁴⁹ Even as late as the seventeenth century, Fr. Paul Harris speaks of Fitzralph as "called by the inhabitants of the country St. Richard of Dundalk."⁵⁰ And Prince quotes an old couplet from this same writer which the people in Ireland by ancient tradition are said to have often chanted:

⁴⁴ Gilbert, "Chartularies," II, 393; Ware-Harris, I, 83. See Poole for discordant statements.

⁴⁵ Cf. Gilbert, l. c., and Ware-Harris, l. c.

⁴⁶ Camden, "Epist.," p. 86.

⁴⁷ Higden, "Polychronicon," VIII, 392; "Chronicon Angliæ," p. 48.

⁴⁸ Ware-Harris, l. c.

⁴⁹ Canon O'Hanlon, "Lives of the Irish Saints," I, 528, also forthcoming volume under November 16.

⁵⁰ "Admonition to the Fryars of Ireland," pp. 15, 34, cited by Poole, D N B.

“Many a mile have I gone,
And many did I walk,
But never saw a holier man
Than Richard of Dundalk.”⁵¹

II.

Before recounting the mass of accusation that was hurled against the Franciscans in the fourteenth century, it is only just that we should first view the movement as a whole, and at its best, and try to determine its place in history, its mission, its genius and its measure of success. Such a retrospect will give us a proper background, and will act as a balancing and controlling force, since accusations against religious orders are to a great extent made, consciously or unconsciously, in comparison with a sublime ideal, or a former high standard. Moreover we must take into account the drastic, uncompromising “*Satyra*” of the Middle Ages. When we meet with a manuscript headed with a picture of four devils hugging four Mendicants (one of each of the Orders) with evidences of undying affection, we must not immediately conclude that the Friars were really unpopular, or that they had fallen away completely from their first fervor. In dealing with such satire, and in reading detailed accusations, men are too apt to substitute the general for the particular, and to accuse a society as a whole of lapses which should be laid only at the door of the individual.

There are few periods in history whose features it is more difficult to grasp with accuracy than the age which gave birth to St. Francis. It was an age of transition, and had all the contradictory impulses of such an age. The people were becoming daily more conscious of their great latent powers, and their true social destiny. The feudal system, which had served so well and so ill, was passing away before the breath of the new democracy.

Many influences conduced to this awakening of the European mind. Principal among them were the growth of the Universities and the Crusades. The influence of the universities in moulding the thought and the character of the Middle

⁵¹ Prince, “*Worthies of Devon*,” p. 367.

Age is well nigh incalculable. " Their organization and their traditions, their studies and their exercises affected the progress and intellectual development of Europe more powerfully or (perhaps it should be said) more exclusively, than any schools in all likelihood will ever do again."⁵²

The powerful influence of the Crusades had greatly stimulated, almost created, commercial enterprise. All sorts of arts and inventions had been introduced from the East, and towns were constantly springing into existence. The great bulky form of the Third Estate was becoming visible in the light of the new dawn, and a powerful middle class was growing up on the ruins of the European nobility, impoverished by a century's conflict with Islam. But the Crusades were by no means an unmixed blessing. They had, it is true, thrown back the threatening advance of Islam and opened the road to commerce, but they indirectly effected a loosening of faith and morals by the introduction of Oriental habits and forms of thought, and that intellectual independence so strongly furthered by warfare and travel.

The new-born towns were most affected by these evils. Sanitary conditions were poor, and improvement could not keep pace with the growth of the population. Education and spiritual care were deficient, because the monasteries, hitherto the great centers of education, were mostly in the country, and the Church had not yet adjusted herself to the new conditions. Hence, the towns, more especially the suburbs, became nests of pestilence and vice. They became the rallying points of opposition to the feudal baron and the feudal bishop, and centers of all kinds of heterodox religious opinions.

The clergy had lost much of their prestige from the worldliness and contagious influence of that large army of men who donned the cassock, not for love of souls, but for love of preferment and of wealth. This was the cost at which the Church had to enter the political and social enterprises of early mediæval life in order to lift society out of the barbarous chaos in which she found it. And so the life of the thirteenth century presented many ugly and lamentable features. There was a

⁵² Rashdall, " Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages," I, p. 5.

spirit of deep uncharitableness abroad. Princes and nobles did not seem to think that the poor and the lowly were of the same blood and of the same value in the sight of God as themselves. Society was continually immersed in a series of unmeaning wars—civil wars, border wars, wars between city and city, baron and baron, complicated with dissensions, plots, massacres and plunders. There was only one power on earth that could and did restrain this mad medley of sometimes petty, sometimes daring ambitions; and that was the Papacy. It was a final court of appeal, and a just and righteous one, against the overbearing and injustice of autocratic rulers. And no one, probably, who ever occupied the chair of Peter more clearly grasped or more firmly executed this high mission than the man who ruled the Christian Church in the first years of the thirteenth century—Innocent III. But great social reforms are seldom inaugurated by those in authority. Authority is in its nature conservative, and can not rightly initiate radical changes. These must come, in their beginnings at least, from an inner movement of society itself. Hence at this time there was need of some great solvent to influence from within that seething mediæval world which Pope Innocent ruled so firmly from without. The elements of such a reform were already at work and needed but the hand of a chosen son of God to add the quickening touch of unity and zeal.

The people of that day were preëminently a people who would be swept on by the spirit of a great reform. We have spoken of their faults; let us now say a word about their virtues. These were as high and striking as their vices. Above all things they had faith—a simple, manly, unfaltering faith. They constituted a Europe that was budding into manhood, with all the enthusiasm and daring of youth, and all the ambition and grasp of intellect of maturer years.

They aspired to ideals, almost too noble for a world like this, and all but realized them. Witness their adding to the spiritual authority of the papacy the powers of an earthly kingdom, ruling all other earthly kingdoms, asserting the superiority of might to right, and putting before mankind “a conception of the sanctity and dignity of government far nobler

than anything civilization had yet known.”⁵³ Even in their architecture the essential note was aspiration. Their Gothic cathedrals have been truly called sermons in stone, raising upward the thoughts of man along their lofty spires and bringing them into living touch with the Common Father in heaven. It was an age of poetry and of chivalry—the age of jongleur and minstrel and troubadour. We also note that the elements of a sounder criticism were waxing into strength; and there was a deeper yearning for freedom among the people. Behind the worldly glitter of the age there was everywhere evidence of a deep and abiding spiritual growth. We can trace its steady progress through the twelfth century, intensified in such mutually uncongenial spirits as St. Bernard and the Calabrian seer, Joachim of Flora.

The essential characteristic of the new mysticism lay in a deeper personal love of Christ. When the Church passed over from Rome to the barbarians, the intimate, personal love of the early Christians, rooted in long-lingering memories of the God-Man, merged into a more awesome feeling befitting the uncultivated mind of the barbarian. They built magnificent basilicas and stepped back to worship at a distance the Saviour whom the early Christians would press close to their hearts. A certain tendency to arid formalism was the almost inevitable result of such a temper and such circumstances. But the world was returning to a closer union with Christ. The attachments of the mediæval man were intensely personal; and once he clearly grasped the idea of the personal relation of Christ with man, it took but a moment to kneel in humility and love at the feet of his Master and Friend.

Yet these noble ideals and impulses were only as streams of limpid water flowing gently but steadily through marshes of political coarseness, moral corruption and intellectual folly. What was needed was a man in whom they would swell into a noble river, cleansing the grossness from its path, hoisting the soul of the age upon its bosom and bearing it onward to regions of deeper truth and higher morality. This is what happened at the dawn of the thirteenth century, and St. Francis

⁵³ Wakeman, “History of the Church of England,” p. 138, 3d ed., 1897.

of Assisi was the chosen one employed by God to accomplish the noble task.⁵⁴

When we look for the reasons of the instantaneous success of the Franciscan movement, we must bear in mind that it combined in itself the two great forces that were stirring the minds of the day—the growing mystic spirit, that brought out at once the flower of Christian thought and emphasized by feudal habit more and more the personal note in religion, and the new democratic spirit that radiated principally from the towns and the universities.

“In St. Francis,” says Harnack, “medieval piety obtained its clearest and most forcible expression. In him it uttered itself most simply, and, therefore, most powerfully and most impressively because its chord—humility, love, obedience—was here struck with the greatest purity.”⁵⁵ St. Francis was also a child of the new democracy. Italy, if I might speak of the Italy of that day as a single entity, was the first to rebel against the yoke of feudalism. Almost every town and city in the land was trying with nervous energy to work out its political destiny in its own way. In the struggle of the different communes for individuality and freedom there arises a bewildering confusion of constitutional forms. But whatever distinctness and diversity of form these various constitutions assumed, they supplied St. Francis with a general type on which to model his society—a type more suited to the times than the feudal form of government of the older orders. In the new orders superiors were to be elected only for a certain period; they were to assume no titles that spelled authority too plainly, but were called simply ministers or guardians.

In their relations to the world and their mode of acting on it the Friars also differed essentially from the monks of old. The Benedictine settling down in a primitive and chaotic society which had to be brought under obedience to law, represented “the political and social concept of Christian life.”⁵⁶ His task was therefore to bring stability and permanency into

⁵⁴ See the Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII on the occasion of the seventh centenary of St. Francis, *Leonis XIII Acta*, Vol. III, p. 142 ff.

⁵⁵ “History of Dogma,” Vol. VI, p. 85, Eng. trans.

⁵⁶ Cuthbert, “The Friars and How They Came to England,” p. 29.

the lawless nature of the barbarian. He represented law and order, and consequently acted on the world mainly through the collective force of his organized society. The influence of the Friars, on the other hand, was more individual and personal. They went forth into the world two by two and tramped over the highways and byways of Europe, their convent being little more than a place of meeting, where they could compare notes and prepare for a fresh start. The monk turned his back on the world. "He made his way into the labyrinthine forest, and he cleared just so much of space as his dwelling required, suffering the high solemn trees and the deep pathless thicket to close him in." In time, perhaps, "he rose from his knees and found himself a city." But this was the encroachment of the world on his ideal. The Friar, on the other hand, from the very first plunged into the stress and misery of the towns, becoming all things to all men, that he might gain their souls to Christ.

There is no more interesting character in history than the early Friar. He had an individualism all his own. He had a profound contempt for the good things of this world, and an utter disregard of artificial conventionality. It was his delight to be scoffed at and humiliated for Christ's sake. He was as light-hearted, as generous and as simple as a child. His love of nature is proverbial; and he seems to have put a premium on human joy. But we must not thence conclude that he did not grasp the idea of the Great Atonement and the grim reality of the Gospel of Pain. St. Francis' dream of perfect joy was to be turned out into the cold night, and to bear it patiently for Christ's sake.⁵⁷ Indeed, his whole life was one long martyrdom for Christ. But he saw more in the tragedy of Calvary than sorrow. He saw that it was a reconciliation of the world with God, and on that account the world assumed a new and brighter meaning for him.⁵⁸

Socially the great distinguishing badge of the Friars was their profession of absolute poverty. They could possess

⁵⁷ "The Little Flowers of St. Francis," Chap. VIII.

⁵⁸ See article by Fr. Cuthbert on "St. Francis of Assisi and the Religious Revival in the Thirteenth Century," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1900, Vol. XXV, p. 657 ff.

nothing, either individually or in common. Christ was poor; therefore they must be poor—the poorest of the poor. For their ideal was to follow Christ in everything.

There were other movements in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which clamored for a return to the simplicity and poverty of the early Church—Waldenses, Cathari, Albigenses, and the like.⁵⁹ Apart from their heretical tenets, they were not unjustified, though ill-directed, protests against the wealth and worldliness of the clergy of the day. But they failed. And they failed principally because of their wrongful attitude toward these abuses and toward the Church which had to tolerate them. They were professional reformers, and because the Church would not listen to their wild schemes, they regarded her too as sinful, and turned their backs upon her. With the Friars it was different. “They embraced poverty because Christ was poor . . . They did not set themselves in the first place to reform society. If they became afterwards great social reformers, that was as a consequence of their vocation, not as a conscious motive.”⁶⁰

The actual life of the Friars in the early days of the movement has been happily described by M. Sabatier in his “Life of St. Francis”:

“The first brothers lived as did the poor people among whom they so willingly moved; Portiuncula was their favorite church, but it would be a mistake to suppose that they sojourned there for any long periods. It was their place of meeting, nothing more. When they set forth, they simply knew when they should meet again in the neighborhood of the modest chapel. Their life was that of the Umbrian beggars of the present day, going here and there as fancy dictated, sleeping in hay-lofts, in leper hospitals, or under the porch of some church. So little had they any fixed domicile that Egidio, having decided to join them, was at a considerable trouble to learn where to find Francis, and accidentally meeting him in the neighborhood of Rivo-Torto, he saw in the fact a providential leading.

“They went up and down the country, joyfully sowing their seed. It was the beginning of summer, the time when everybody in Umbria

⁵⁹ For a comparison of the Franciscans and the Waldensian movements see article by St. Beissel, entitled “Die Culturgeschichtliche Bedeutung des hl. Franz von Assisi,” *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, Vol. 33.

⁶⁰ Cuthbert, “The Friars and How They Came to England,” p. 23.

is out of doors mowing or turning the grass. The customs of the country have changed but little. Walking in the end of May in the fields about Florence, Perugia, or Rieti, one still sees, at nightfall, the bagpipers entering the fields as the mowers seat themselves upon the hay-cocks for their evening meal; they play a few pieces, and when the train of hay-makers returns to the village, followed by the harvest-laden carts, it is they who lead the procession, rending the air with their sharpest strains.

"The joyous Penitents who loved to call themselves *Joculatores Domini*, God's *jongleurs*, no doubt often did the same. They did even better, for not willing to be a charge to anyone, they passed a part of the day in aiding the peasants in their field-work. The inhabitants of these districts are for the most part kindly and sedate; the Friars soon gained their confidence, by relating to them first their history and then their hopes. They worked and ate together; field-hands and friars often slept in the same barn, and when with the morrow's dawn the friars went on their way, the hearts of those they had left behind had been touched.


"They were not yet converted, but they knew that not far away, over toward Assisi, were living men who had renounced all worldly goods, and who, consumed with zeal, were going up and down preaching penance and peace."⁶¹

We have dwelt at length on the first ideal phase of the Franciscan movement, because it is then that we can best see its true spirit. But the little family that gathered around St. Francis had soon to face the storm and stress of the world. Its members rapidly increased in numbers, and some kind of definite rule became necessary. The first rule was approved by Pope Innocent III in the year 1210.⁶² This rule has not come down to us, but it was a kind of rough sketch of regulations which afterwards took exact shape in the Rule of 1223, known as the Second Rule.⁶³ Further on in this study we shall get a glimpse of the order's struggle with the world and with the parochial clergy, and of the long contest waged within the order itself. The rent between the two parties within the order—the Observants and the Conventuals as they afterwards became generally known—was already definitely marked, and

⁶¹ Sabatier, "Life of St. Francis of Assisi," p. 77 ff.

⁶² Sabatier, op. cit., 128 (note).

⁶³ See Fr. Paschal Robinson, "The Rule of St. Francis of Assisi," p. 73.



has left its unmistakable echoes and traces in the primitive Franciscan literature. One party, a minority, adhered with tenacity to their first simple ideal, especially the rule of absolute uncompromising poverty. The other party were more inclined to adapt themselves to circumstances and temper the strictness of the original rule.

It would be interesting to trace the ebb and flow of this great conflict between the divine ideal of St. Francis and fallen human nature, as it rose and fell from generation to generation until the final separation of the parties in the sixteenth century. But it is not our intention here to do more more than point out the main lines on which it was waged. The great point of contention was the interpretation of the rule of poverty. On this the "spirituales," or observants would have no such thing as compromise. The more moderate party, however, which was also the more numerous, gladly obtained permission from the Holy See to store up goods for temporal use, and to build churches and convents. They adhered to the letter of the rule by allowing the right of ownership to remain with the givers.⁶⁴ But in 1245 they obtained a Bull from Pope Innocent IV which allowed the ownership of all their property to be vested in the Roman Church.⁶⁵ This development was, of course, natural; and the plaint of some modern Protestant writers is out of place, when they accuse the Church of dragging down the order from its original high ideal. The Church had the responsibility of Christendom on her hands, and could not let an army of roving and exalted mystics endanger society with disruption nor see, it may be, a noble movement die away in a few sputtering jets of individual enthusiasm. They had, of necessity, to become part of the existing ecclesiastical framework, with organization, assurance of control, and some kind of settled existence.

The Friars also departed far from their original path in another direction—they entered the universities. St. Francis wished his disciples to be the apostles of humility and love, but he could see little of these qualities in the dry and arrogant intellectual jugglery that was not uncommon in the schools of

⁶⁴ Bull of Gregory IX, 1230; see "*Bullarium Romanum*," Vol. III, p. 449 ff.

⁶⁵ "*Bullarium Romanum*," Vol. III, p. 519 ff.

the early thirteenth century, all aglow with the consuming passion of dialectic or mental fencing. Despite his fears the Friars did enter the universities and, it would seem, for the universities' good. In the first flush of the movement it was, indeed, possible for the Friars to accomplish their mission without the aid of much theological learning; but there came a time when the order consisted mainly of men of normal spiritual temper; for such men something more than their natural earnestness was needed, if their preaching was to be regularly effective.

We have spoken of the departures from the original ideal in so far as they were a development, and not a deterioration. Of the latter we shall speak hereafter. Deterioration, of course, there was constantly; for the Friars were only human. But there was as constant an attempt to reform.

The Church did not allow the conflicting parties within the order to separate until the year 1517, when Pope Leo X divided the order into two bodies. He decreed that the strict party should be known by the name of Observantines, and the moderate party by that of Conventuals, all other designations being abolished. Finally, in the year 1525, the more strict Capuchin reform was begun by Friar Matthew de' Bassi, and was constituted into a distinct congregation in 1619 by Pope Paul V. Hence, we have to-day three distinct bodies of Friars Minor or Franciscans—the Observantines, the Conventuals and the Capuchins.

Before speaking of the effect of the Franciscan movement on western civilization, we shall say a few words on their work in England and in Ireland, because these countries are affected more closely than others by the attacks of Fitzralph. Four clerics and five lay brothers, with Brother Agnellus at their head, crossed the Channel in 1224.⁶⁶ As elsewhere their steps were first directed to the wretched denizens of the outskirts of the towns. "Near the shambles in Newgate, and close upon the city gate of that name, on a spot appropriately called Stinking Lane, arose the chief house of the order in Eng-

⁶⁶ Thomas de Eccleston, *De Adventu F. F. Minorum in Angliam*, Ch. 1. Trans. by Fr. Cuthbert in his "Friars and How They Came to England."

land.”⁶⁷ Their rapid success and popularity are attested by the fact that thirty-two years after their arrival “there were in the English Province forty-nine houses, and the number of brethren dwelling therein was one thousand two hundred and forty-two.”⁶⁸ They seemed to have been truer to their first principles, and more successful, in England than elsewhere, at least in the thirteenth century; and Brewer pays them a high tribute when he says “that poverty, rigid poverty to the last, continues to be the rule rather than the exception with the Minorite Friars is clear from the inventories of their houses taken at the Dissolution by the Royal Commission.”⁶⁹ They very early made their way to the universities, and in time the genius of men like Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and William Occam gave the English Franciscans the honor of being the most learned body in Europe.⁷⁰

The Friars settled in Ireland about ten years after their arrival in England. Their efficiency was naturally much impaired by the antagonism between the native Irish and the English. Most of the monasteries founded before the time of Fitzralph were in the eastern part of the country, namely, that part which was most under English influence.⁷¹ Taking in conjunction with this the fact that the Anglo-Irish excluded the Irish as much as possible from the religious communities situated within the limits of the English power in Ireland,⁷² we are inclined to think that the native Irish Friars had a minor place in the mind of Fitzralph. Hence, we shall not dwell on their history but shall pass on to a review of the benefits conferred on western civilization by the Franciscan movement in general.

⁶⁷ Brewer, “*Monumenta Franciscana*,” Vol. I, p. XVIII (introd.).

⁶⁸ “*Eccleston*,” Chap. II, in fine.

⁶⁹ “*Monumenta Franciscana*,” p. xx, note (introd.), Vol. I.

⁷⁰ Jessop, “The Coming of the Friars,” *Nineteenth Century*, July, 1883, Vol. XIV, p. 97.

Dom Gasquet, “English Scholarship in the Thirteenth Century,” *Dublin Review*, 4. S., July-Oct., 1898.

⁷¹ Meehan, “Rise and Fall of the Irish Franciscan Monasteries,” Dublin, 6th edition, *passim*.

⁷² Dr. Kelly, article on “Statute of Kilkenny,” *Dublin Review*, March, 1844, XVI, p. 181.

This influence was so complex and so far-reaching, that it is impossible to trace it with any degree of fulness. They were the popular preachers of their day. Being constantly on the move, seeing and hearing everything, they had a fund of anecdote and illustration to lend zest and pungency to their preaching.⁷³ Hence their words went right to the hearts of the common people, and in the Third Order they had a powerful means of preserving in the life of the home the sense of deep and sincere piety which they had awakened.

The popular preaching of the Friars also played an important part in the development of the European vernaculars. They prepared the way for Dante and Chaucer. Nor was their influence less profound in raising the tone of the content of literature. This indeed was inevitable from the awakened spirit of purer love for God, and man, and nature. Jacopone di Tode in no small sense anticipated Dante, and both owed much to the Poverello of Assisi himself.

Even in history the first marked instance of the personal note, in contrast with the dry, reserved and impersonal chronicles of the past, is found in the inimitable Salimbene of Parma. In the art of painting we need but mention the names of the Tertiaries Cimabue and Giotto, of the latter of whom it has been said that "he created the special glory of Middle Age Italy—its *schools* of great painters."⁷⁴ He was the first to make a clear-cut departure from the dry conventional Byzantine style, to put life and feeling into the art of painting, and to provide for the popularization and permanency of his work.

In architecture also there was a far-reaching revival in the thirteenth century. Old ecclesiastical buildings were restored and new ones built; the characteristic inspiration of the Gothic rose on the wings of higher and grander conceptions under the impulse of the religious enthusiasm enkindled by St. Francis. In the regions of pure theology and philosophy it is to be noted that the great system of Catholic thought which the thirteenth century produced to counteract the dangers of Averroistic Aristotelianism was begun by the Franciscan Alex-

⁷³ Cf. Lucy T. Smith, "English Popular Preaching in the Fourteenth Century," *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, January, 1892, Vol. VII, p. 25.

⁷⁴ Canon Little, "St. Francis of Assisi," p. 294.

ander of Hales, though it owes its systematization to the Dominicans. But if to the name of St. Thomas must be ascribed the first place in the ranks of the great scholastics, that of Roger Bacon is supreme in another field. He was, we may almost say, the first, and for a long time the greatest, student in the field of natural science. Indeed, the early attention which the Friars gave to sickness and disease, and even to a wider circle of physical studies, gave the first popular impulse to a systematic study of medical science and natural philosophy.⁷⁵

Perhaps the most lasting influence of the Franciscan movement on civilization was in the way of social reform. In many ways it elevated the social condition of woman; and by the religious consecration and ennobling of poverty, by the romantic idealization of its history, its functions and its spirit, made the life of the poor more respected. Misery and distress of every kind received greater practical and religious sympathy from the example of the tender devotion shown by the Friars to the wretched, neglected and oftentimes leprous outcasts of the mediæval towns. Their lives and their teachings stirred all Christendom in its somewhat sluggish depths, and loosened spiritual forces that were alive, indeed, but had become dormant for awhile.

Nor was this the only line along which the cause of the weak was advanced. In the Third Order we find the following articles laid down:

1. The brethren must carry no offensive weapons, except in the defense of the Church and the faith of Jesus Christ, or in defence of their country, or with the permission of the Superiors (Ch. VII).

2. The brethren must abstain from solemn oaths, unless they are constrained by necessity and keep within the limit of the cases excepted by the Holy See (Ch. XII).

3. Each brother will give a farthing of current money to the treasurer, who will collect this money and distribute it suitably, according to the advice of the ministers, to the brethren and sisters who are destitute (Ch. XIII).⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Brewer, "*Mon. Franc.*," Vol. I, p. xliii (introd.).

⁷⁶ Cf. Le Monnier, "*Hist. of St. Francis*," Chap. XIII, p. 288.

In a few years by this masterstroke of genius, this universal religious association of laymen, the power of feudalism was severely maimed, if not broken, in Italy. The peasant world of Tertiaries refused to follow the feudal lords any longer to their petty wars. They refused to take any more oaths of fealty. They are organized now, like the guilds, the nobles, the ecclesiastics. They have a strong reserve fund at hand for contingencies. The astonished nobles make a desperate effort to stifle this new movement. But the Holy See refused to issue any judicial injunctions against the Tertiaries and they won, and ended forever any future growth of the old feudal militarism.

We have mentioned here but a few of the many ways in which the Franciscan movement influenced society in the thirteenth century. When all is told it will be found that it was one of the most powerful formative influences of the time, nay, by far the most significant. But the movement is so vast and its sweep so far-reaching, that it would be impossible in the space at our disposal to attempt any adequate appreciation of its achievements. It was necessary, however, to have some estimate of the purpose and spirit and success of the movement, in order to be able to weigh justly the phenomena of its deterioration as set forth in the writ of accusation furnished by Fitzralph.

III.

"The brethren must possess nothing, neither house nor land, nor anything whatsoever, so that, as pilgrims and strangers in this world, they may go with confidence to ask alms."⁷⁷ Such is the profession of poverty laid by St. Francis on his disciples. They must possess nothing either individually or in common. Those to whom the Lord has given the grace of working must work faithfully and devoutly;⁷⁸ but if they are not paid the price of their labor, let them have recourse to the table of the Lord, asking alms from door to door.⁷⁹ But

⁷⁷ Rule, Chap. VI. See Le Monnier, "Hist. of St. Francis of Assisi," Ch. XV.

⁷⁸ Rule, Ch. V.

⁷⁹ "Testament of St. Francis, apud Le Monnier," Ch. XXIII, p. 489.

they are commanded strictly "not to receive money or cash in any way, either themselves, or through another."⁸⁰

It would be too much to expect a multitude of men to abide by the letter of an ideal so high, and a renouncement of all worldly goods so complete. Hence, the growth of a conflict within the Order was inevitable, once the movement had become popular. The first rumbling of this conflict was heard as far back as 1220 when St. Francis was in the Orient, and the affairs of the Order at home were in the hands of Brothers Matteo of Narni and Gregory of Naples who were inclined to alleviate the vow of poverty.⁸¹ The Rule of 1223 was drawn up to curb this tendency, and marks the rapid evolution of the Order. The majority of the Brothers were then settling down to a more stable and normal state of life, and were being swept gradually into the current of contemporary scholasticism.

Under the generalship of Elias the antagonism between the strict and moderate spirits was very bitter. Elias was the incarnation of the spirit of relaxation. While he was yet general in 1230 Pope Gregory IX allowed the appointment of a nuntius through whom the brethren might receive money or alms. By this Bull it was also ordained, that the ownership of property received by the Friars should remain with the givers.⁸²

The opposition of the Spirituals, or strict party, to these relaxing tendencies waxed loud and strong, and through the influence of St. Anthony of Padua, they forced the deposition of Elias in this same year. But the sympathy of the Church seems to have been still with the Conventuals, or Moderate party. In 1245 Pope Innocent IV issued a Bull in which the function of the nuntius was extended to looking after the comforts (*commoda*) of the Friars as well as their necessities, and the ownership of property was vested in the Holy See.⁸³

After the election of John of Parma to the generalate (1247-57) the Joachimite ideas which in one form or another had been floating for nearly half a century in the mind of Southern Europe took definite shape among a party of the

⁸⁰ Rule, Ch. IV.

⁸¹ Cf. Sabatier, "Life of St. Francis," Ch. XIII, p. 235.

⁸² "Bullarium Romanum," Vol. III, p. 449 ff.

⁸³ "Bull. Rom.," III, p. 519.

Spirituals. They believed themselves to be the new order of monks announced by Joachim of Flora.⁸⁴ Their views in their extremest form were embodied in a book known as the "Liber Introductorius Ad Evangelium Eternum" of Gerardus de Borgo San Donnino which appeared in 1254. It was decried by the Magistri of Paris, who were at this time in conflict with the Mendicants, and condemned by Pope Alexander IV in 1255.⁸⁵ Though the great body of the Order was not in sympathy with the radical ideas of Gerardus, its good name and orthodoxy were compromised. The Friars retaliated by obtaining the condemnation of the work entitled "De Periculis Novissimorum Temporum" of William of St. Amour, which was a vehement attack on the principles of evangelical poverty.⁸⁶

The condemnation of the Introductorius did not long dampen the ardor of the Spirituals. To reconcile their demands with actual conditions Nicholas III issued the decree "Exiit qui seminat" on August 14, 1279, in which theoretically he advocated the strict doctrine, though practically he stood by the views of the mitigated observance.⁸⁷ He said that Christ had confirmed the way of evangelical poverty by His own example, and that the Apostles had followed it—words which afterwards were the subject of protracted controversy.

The controversy about this time centered around the names of John Peter Olivi⁸⁸ and Ubertino da Casale;⁸⁹ the great question was whether the brethren were bound to the "usus pauper rerum."

Some held that, as the renouncement of ownership was absolute, so the use of things should be rigidly sparing. The writings of Olivi were condemned by the Order, but Clement V put the matter into the hands of a commission which acted up to the time of the Council of Vienna. Ubertino forwarded to the commission a complete defense of his friend Olivi.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Gebhart, "L'Italie Mystique," p. 71 ff., p. 200 ff.

⁸⁵ Denifle, *Archiv fuer Lit. u. Kirch. Geschichte*, Vol. I, p. 49 ff.

⁸⁶ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," Vol. I, p. 382 ff.

⁸⁷ Hefele, "Conciliengeschichte," Vol. VI., p. 548.

⁸⁸ Cf. Father Ehrle, *Archiv fuer Lit. u. Kirch. Gesch.*, Vol. III, p. 409 ff.

⁸⁹ Huck, "Ubertin Von Casale," Freiburg im Br., 1903.

⁹⁰ Ehrle, *Archiv*, Vol. II, p. 353 ff.

The result of the deliberations at Avignon, and in the Council of Vienna were published by Clement V in the Decretal "*Exivi de paradiso.*"⁹¹ This was, of course, a compromise, though under the circumstances it decidedly favored the stricter view. But the great desire of the Spirituals—final separation from the Order—remained unsatisfied.

In 1321 a dispute arose between the Inquisitor, John of Belna, and the Minorite Berengarius, which changed the whole aspect of the Franciscan controversy. Belna stamped as heretical the statement that Christ and the Apostles, following the way of perfection, possessed nothing individually or in common. Berengarius, on the other hand, defended it as orthodox, and indeed defined by the Decretal "*Exiit qui seminat.*" The controversy was soon brought before the Holy See. While the decision of the Pontiff was still pending a general chapter of the Order, held under Michael of Cesena at Perugia in 1322, declared their adhesion to the Decretal "*Exiit*" of Nicholas III and their belief that Christ and the Apostles possessed nothing by right of dominion whether individually or in common.

On December 8, 1322, John XXII issued the Decretal "*Ad Conditorem*" in which he declared that the Decretal "*Exiit*" which allowed only the "*usus facti*" to the Minorites (dominion being vested in the Roman Church) is not understood of those things which are consumed by use. Hence the dominion of these things is restored to the Friars. This Decretal did not touch the question of the poverty of Christ. But in November, 1323, Pope John issued the Bull "*Cum inter nonnullos*" in which he declared the proposition that Christ and His Apostles possessed nothing individually or in common to be erroneous and heretical. These Bulls were ardently opposed, and the controversy took an unfavorable turn for the Order by the fact that Louis of Bavaria availed himself of it in his struggle with the Holy See. John XXII replied to his adversaries in another Bull "*Quia quorundam*" in 1324, in which he vindicated and confirmed his former constitutions. This was soon followed by a complete schism of many of the Friars,

⁹¹ Clementin, V, tit. XI, c. I.

but the Order in general remained faithful to the Holy See.⁹² A summary of the errors of the Fraticelli may be found in a Bull of John XXII published in 1318 and beginning with the words "Gloriosam Ecclesiam."⁹³

As we go on through the years we find many echoes of the controversy and many traces of the old Joachimite ideas. The questions at issue were still being agitated warmly in 1349 when Fitzralph, on the occasion of a visit to Avignon, was commissioned by the English clergy to lay before the Pope certain complaints against the Friars. This memorial was presented on July 5, 1350.⁹⁴ But some time previous to its presentation Fitzralph and two other Doctors were appointed by the Pope to make enquiry concerning the questions of property, dominion, possession and the right of use, which had long been agitated among the Mendicants. They came to no definite conclusions, and Fitzralph was urged by some of the cardinals to undertake an independent treatise on the subject.⁹⁵ This treatise "De Pauperie Salvatoris" was completed in seven books not earlier than 1353.⁹⁶ The text of the first four books and the table of contents of the last three have been published by Reginald Lane Poole as an appendix to Wycliffe's "De Dominio Divino."⁹⁷

The work is composed in the form of a dialogue. The dedication recounts the circumstances in which it was written, and the first chapter states the problem of which he seeks a solution. Men have attached different meanings to the words "dominion," "property," "possession," "right of using," "use" and the "voluntary renouncement" of the things of this world for God's sake. Hence arose the difference in the rules of the various religious orders. It is therefore desirable to examine thoroughly the true meaning of these words.

⁹² Heimbucher, "Die Orden und Kongregationen der Katholischen Kirche," Vol. I, p. 298 ff. For a reconciling of the Decretals of John XXII and Nich. III, cf. Natalis Alexander, "Hist Eccl.," Vol. VIII, p. 410 ff.

⁹³ "Bull. Rom.," Vol. IV, p. 261 ff. For the difference between the early Spirituals and the Fraticelli cf. Ehrle, *Archiv*, Vols. III and IV.

⁹⁴ Cf. list of writings *infre*, p. 84.

⁹⁵ These facts are told by Fitzralph himself in the dedication of the "De Pauperie Salvatoris."

⁹⁶ It was dedicated to Pope Innocent VI who was elected in December, 1352.

⁹⁷ "De Dominio Divino Libri Tres," London, 1890. Cf. pp. 257-476. Also *Introd.*, p. xxxiv ff.

The first book treats of dominion, possession and use as found in God and the Angels. The second book treats of original human dominion, namely, that which man had before the fall of Adam. It is in this book that he develops the celebrated doctrine that dominion is founded in grace. In the third book he considers the relation in which original dominion stood to possession and use, and the objects on which it can operate. In the fourth book he treats of property and civil dominion.⁹⁸ In the succeeding books Fitzralph treats of the questions which more immediately concern the Mendicant controversy. Unfortunately these three books have not been published by Mr. Poole as they were not in line with his purpose of showing how Wycliffe was indebted to Fitzralph for his views on dominion. To attempt a reconstruction of his views from the headings of the chapters, which alone are published, would be more than hazardous without a knowledge of his definitions and distinctions; hence we shall be content with merely pointing out the general scope of these books, viz., the fifth, sixth and seventh of the treatise.

The fifth treats "*de principiis ditantibus Deum, angelos bonos et malos, et homines bonos et malos.*" This book is divided into twenty-three chapters.⁹⁹ The sixth book treats "*de gradibus paupertatis,*" and is divided into thirty-seven chapters. It is here that he treats specially of the poverty of Christ and the evangelical poverty of the Friars. The seventh book "*Contrarietates famosas et alias magis occultas inter constitutiones dominorum Summorum Pontificum Nicholai III et Johannis XXII, ac ipsius libellum 'Quoniam vir reprobus,' super paupertatis Christi et Apostolorum ipsius materia, quæ paupertas regulæ ordinis fratrum minorum ascribitur et eisdem, certis traditis documentis, absolvit.*" This book is divided into eighteen chapters.

This work was very likely finished before Fitzralph left Ireland for the last time in 1356.¹⁰⁰ In this year he went to London on some business connected with his diocese, and found

⁹⁸ We could not obtain this work in time to be able to give a complete exposition of his views, as originally intended.

⁹⁹ Table of contents apud Poole, "*De dominio Divino,*" p. 264 ff.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Poole, "*De Dominio Divino,*" p. xxxvii (Introd.).

there an ardent dispute "super mendacitate et mendicatione Christi Domini Salvatoris Nostri." Being asked several times to preach to the people, he delivered seven or eight sermons in the vernacular, and expressed in public his famous nine conclusions. This he did, however, with the protestation that he did not intend to affirm rashly anything prejudicial to the doctrine of the Church, and that he did not advise the total abolition of the Mendicant Orders, but only a return to the purity of their original institution. Moreover in everything he laid himself under the correction of the Pope.

On account of these nine conclusions and what he said in the London Sermons, the Friars, "licet frivole," appealed to the Holy See.¹⁰¹

Ware says that the guardian of the Franciscans at Armagh, and others both of that order and of the Dominicans, had him cited to Avignon.¹⁰²

The king forbade him, April 1, 1357, to quit the country without special leave,¹⁰³ but this prohibition must have been withdrawn, since he defended his position before the papal court on the eighth of November of that year in the sermon entitled "Defensorium Curatorum."¹⁰⁴ In this he again put forth his nine conclusions and defended them seriatim. It may be well to add that he urged these conclusions merely as probable. The first seven conclusions pertain to our present matter. It will be noticed from their contents that a new phrase of the Franciscan controversy is being emphasized, namely, that relating to mendicancy and mendicity.

The first conclusion was: "Quod Dominus Jesus Christus in sua conversatione humana semper pauper erat, non quia propter se paupertatem dilexit aut voluit."

The difference between his adversaries and himself, he relates, is not about the fact that Christ was poor, but about the added modification: non quia propter se, etc.

We shall point out briefly his principal arguments for up-

¹⁰¹ "Defensorium Curatorum," ad init., Brown, Appendix, p. 466.

¹⁰² Ware-Harris, Vol. I, p. 82.

¹⁰³ Rymer, "Fœdera," III, pt. I, 352, ed. 1825, cited by Poole; "Dict. of Nat. Biog.," XIX, 196.

¹⁰⁴ Edited by Brown, "App. ad Fascic.," pp. 466-486.

holding this conclusion. (1) To be poor is to be miserable; but nobody loves misery for its own sake. (2) His next argument is drawn from the doctrine of Aristotle: *Nihil est propter se diligibile, nisi quod sublato omni commodo sequente gratuite captaretur.* (3) No effect of sin is lovable propter se. But there would be no poverty if our first parents had not sinned. (4) No privation of good is per se lovable. It seems puerile, he adds, to insist on this, since no one except through deficiency in philosophy or logic would argue the opposite.

The second conclusion was: "*Quod Dominus Noster Jesus Christus nunquam spontanee mendicavit.*"

Such a practise is against God's commandment: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house . . . nor anything that is his (Exod. XX, 17). In Deuteronomy XV, 4, it is said "there shall be no poor nor beggar among you." Again, "*Christus esset hypocrita, apparens mendicus non existens.*" Again, if Christ, the Supreme Pontiff, taught voluntary begging by His example, the Church knowingly erred when she laid down that no one should be promoted to sacred orders without a sufficient title. Again, if Christ begged voluntarily He would have given scandal to the clerical order, since according to the canonical sanctions a begging bishop or cleric brings opprobrium on that order. Again, if Christ begged voluntarily, voluntary begging pertained to the perfection of life. Then why did Christ ordain in the Old Law that priests, in whom there ought to be the greatest perfection of life, should have possessions and tithes? Moreover, the Spouse of Christ would also have erred in admitting the endowment of churches, if mendicity pertains to the perfection of the Gospel. Again, if mendicity pertains to the perfection of Christian life, as the Friars claim, it is wonderful that neither our Lord nor the Holy Spirit (in the Scriptures) has ever instructed us on this. Indeed, Christ commanded the contrary to His disciples when he sent them out to preach the Gospel, viz., that they should get food and drink as the wages of their labor (Luke X, 7); and Christ probably earned His own bread as a carpenter.

We have given here but a few of the reasons put forth to show that Christ did not beg voluntarily.

The third conclusion was: "*Quod Christus nunquam docuit*

spontanee mendicare." The Acts speak of the things which Christ "began to *do* and to teach" (I, 1). If Christ taught others to beg and did not do so Himself, He would have rendered His doctrine liable to suspicion. All the reasons given above apply here too.

The fourth conclusion was: *Quod Dominus Noster Jesus Christus docuit non debere hominem spontanee mendicare.* "If any man will not work, neither let him eat" (II Thess. III, 10). He also refers to the "*De Opere Monachorum*" of St. Augustine, who attempts to show that labor ought to be preferred to the "*otium contemplationis*," and to the Rule and Testament of St. Francis, who enjoined work on the brethren. Hence, it is wonderful with what effrontery the Friars dare to exercise voluntary begging, or prefer begging to work, contrary to the wishes of their founder. It is to be wondered the more because "*man is born to labor*" (Job V, 7), and begging is contrary to the law of our first institution, in which, had it been preserved, there would never have been any begging. Moreover, Christ performed a miracle rather than beg the didrachma for Himself and Peter (Matth. XVII, 26). From these it can be judged with probability that Christ taught men not to beg voluntarily.

The fifth conclusion was: "*Quod nullius potest prudenter et sancte spontaneam mendicitatem super se assumere perpetuo observandam.*" This conclusion naturally follows from the preceding. Christ, the Apostles, Scripture and the Church dissuade us from begging. Moreover, a person acting thus places himself in the way of temptation according to the words of Solomon: "Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessities of life: lest perhaps being filled, I should be tempted to deny, and say: who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal, and foreswear the name of my God" (Prov. XXX, 8-9); and the words of Ecclesiasticus "Through poverty many have sinned" (XXVII, 1).

The sixth conclusion was: *Quod non est de regula fratrum minorum mendicitatem spontanee servare.*

We found especially noteworthy the fifth chapter of the Rule, and the words of St. Francis in his last will: "I labored with my hands, and I will labor, and I wish firmly that my brethren should work at some honest labor."

The seventh conclusion was: "Quod bulla Domini Alexandri Papæ quarti, quæ magistrorum libellum condemnat, nullam præmissarum conclusionum impugnat." John XXII in the Constitution "Quia Quorundam" says expressly that Pope Nicholas III revoked that Bull and all the letters of Alexander IV in so far as they related to the articles which his own declaration contains. It is evident, moreover, that the strict poverty enjoined by Pope Nicholas III is understood by the Friars to mean mendicity. Even in the Bull itself of Pope Alexander Fitzralph can remember nothing that would militate against his conclusions.

In this brief sketch we have in no wise been able to do justice to the very subtle, if not always sound, reasoning of Fitzralph in the matter of the poverty and mendicancy of the Friars. But even the mere statement of the celebrated nine conclusions (the last two of which we shall consider in the next chapter) subserves the purpose of the historian because it condenses in a few simple sentences the thought and feelings of the parish clergy of the fourteenth century in regard to their rivals in the vineyard of Christ.

St. Francis told his brethren, in his last will, to ask for alms when the price of their labor was not paid them. But many among the Franciscans—how many it is difficult to tell—had very exaggerated notions of the place of mendicancy and mendicity among the virtues. They praised mendicity whether it meant the asking of the price of their labor or not. It is not surprising that a man of Fitzralph's active temperament should grow indignant over a practice like this. But in his role of a special pleader he did not tell us just how prevalent this mere begging was.

More than five centuries have passed away since Fitzralph scored the current exaggerated notions of the Friars in the matter of poverty and mendicancy, but there is yet wanting, as far as we know, a really disinterested and well-balanced treatment of the true place of these practices in the Christian economy. The theologians of the Mendicant Orders, it is true, have treated the matter more or less at length. But they mostly lack that fine sense of equilibrium which takes into account the actual and changing conditions of human society. Secular writers, as a rule, leave the radical points at issue severely alone.

One thing seems certain, that the phenomenon of mendicity as it confronted Fitzralph will never appear in history again. The theoretical grounds on which his position rested did not seem to be very clear even to himself. Yet, even with due account for his prejudices, he must have vaguely felt that his face was turned in the direction pointed out by the finger of social progress. In the spirit of his age, he tried to solve peremptorily with an array of syllogisms a practical problem which was working itself out gradually by the force of actual conditions. This was his weak point, but it was an inevitable weakness, since it is given to few to be right in their conclusions and their arguments.

IV.

Soon after the rise of the Mendicant Orders there came about between them and the diocesan clergy a conflict which raged almost continually for three hundred years. The active nature of the Friars' mission and the privileges they enjoyed made this antagonism almost inevitable.

As to the condition of the parish clergy, it must be admitted that the tone of education among them was low; the ruinous system of Provisions, Patronage, Chantryes and the like had helped to bring about a further lowering of their efficiency. Still the "povre Person of a toun" of Chaucer's Prologue must have had many a prototype in these days. Hemmed in as they were by the monasteries and non-resident, sometimes foreign beneficiaries on the one side, and by the rising Mendicants on the other, they would be more than human if they did not fight for more control in their parishes. The Friars especially were a thorn in their side. For both pride and pocket were touched when their churches were emptied by these more popular rivals.

We have noticed the noble work which the children of St. Francis performed in the thirteenth century; but in the days of their deterioration even good and earnest men might plausibly argue that they had outlived their usefulness, and had become a disorganizing force in the Church.

The conflict between the two parties related to confession, preaching, sepulture, tithes and a host of minor matters. The

privilege of hearing confessions without the permission of the parish priest was, however, the great matter of contention. Before the twelfth century there were few exceptions to the general discipline of the Church that the faithful should confess their sins to the parish priest and him alone.¹⁰⁵ But the contrary custom was evidently creeping in at this time, probably due to the preaching of the Crusades. The famous canon "Omnis utriusque sexus" of the fourth Lateran Council was directed against the abuses connected with this departure from the old discipline. With the advent of the Mendicants an endless dispute arose in regard to the interpretation of this canon. The diocesan clergy maintained that the words "proprius sacerdos" should be taken strictly, whilst the Friars, on the other hand, would have them extended to all those whom the ecclesiastical authorities would approve.¹⁰⁶

The cause of the Friars, as a rule, prevailed before the Holy See; nevertheless, the controversy went on without any cessation. In 1281, Martin IV tried to conciliate the opposing parties by a constitution which permitted the Minorites to hear confessions without permission of the parish priest, but which at the same time required the faithful to confess to their own parish priest once a year according to the decree "Omnis utriusque sexus."¹⁰⁷ But this constitution only shifted the ground of the conflict. The parish priests maintained that the faithful should confess to themselves *the same sins* which they had already confessed to the Friars, whilst the latter denied this obligation. The French clergy sought a decision from Rome, but Pope Nicholas IV left the matter undecided, and it is still in suspense says Evrard in 1292.¹⁰⁸ Popes Boniface VIII, Benedict XI, Clement V and John XXII tried to pour oil on the troubled waters, with what small measure of success we shall see more in detail in the course of this narrative.

The controversy was especially bitter in England about the middle of the fourteenth century,¹⁰⁹ and all the lines of accusa-

¹⁰⁵ Migne, "Theol. Cursus Completus," XX, p. 425 ff.

¹⁰⁶ M. de Launoy, "Dissertation sur le sens du canon 'Omnis utriusque sexus,'" apud Migne, op. cit., p. 430.

¹⁰⁷ Hefele, "Concilien-geschichte," Vol. VI, p. 242.

¹⁰⁸ Apud Migne, l. c.

¹⁰⁹ Wadding, *Annales Minorum*, Vol. VIII, p. 126.

tion against the Friars meet in the powerful plea of Fitzralph. We have already related the proceedings that lead to his citation to Avignon. He protests in the beginning of his "Defensorium" that he does not advise the abolition of the Mendicant Orders, but only that they be reduced to the purity of their original institution; and in everything he lays himself under the correction of the Holy See. His position in regard to the privileges of the Friars is laid down in the last two of the famous nine conclusions. These two conclusions read thus:

"Octava conclusio et prima de privilegiorum materia erat ista, quod pro confessione parochianorum alicujus ecclesiæ facienda cum exclusione loci alterius eligibilior est parochialis ecclesia, quam Fratrum oratorium sive ipsorum ecclesia.

"Nona conclusio erat ex secunda in ista materia quod ad confessionem parochianorum cujusvis ecclesiæ uni personæ singulariter faciendam eligibilior est persona ordinarii quam fratris persona."¹¹⁰

The proofs of these two theses occupy the greater part of the Defensorium. He proceeds in the usual scholastic method. The arguments for each thesis are arranged under three general headings, showing that the parish church and the parish priest are *safer* for the spiritual welfare of the penitent, *more useful*, and cause *less inconvenience* than the churches and persons of the Friars. To prove each of these sub-theses he brings forth an appalling array of arguments, drawn from every imaginable source, and expressed with rare vigor and power of speech.

We shall not follow him in his subtleties and syllogisms, but shall take up briefly under their proper headings his reasons for demanding the abolition of the privileges of the Friars.

I. *From the Institution of the Priesthood.*—The parochial churches and the parochial clergy are the ones chosen and prescribed by God for the faithful, and all other churches and pastors are forbidden.¹¹¹ Hence the parish churches should be preferred to those of the Friars, and the parish priests to the persons of the Friars, since the latter are merely permitted by concession of the Supreme Pontiff.

¹¹⁰ Brown, "Append. ad Fasciculus Rerum Expet. et Fug," pp. 466, 467.

¹¹¹ Deut. XII, Levit. IV.

II. *Confessions*.—He argues from the very state of Mendicancy that the Friars should not be allowed to hear confessions. Solomon said "Give me neither beggary, nor riches: give me only the necessities of life."¹¹² There is too much temptation connected with the former states. Now a penitent might reasonably argue thus: why should this Mendicant hear my confession and at the same time desist from acquiring the necessities of life, if he did not expect help from me? Hence he cannot be as independent and equitable a judge in the tribunal of penance as the parish priest who has his fixed salary.

Moreover, from his ideas on Mendicancy the Friar is inclined to impose almsgiving for every kind of sin; whereas each disease requires its proper remedy. Thus when the apostle failed to cast out the devil our Lord said "this kind is not cast out but by prayer and fasting."¹¹³ In this imposition of almsgiving there is also a temptation for the Friars to consult their own interests. That they are influenced by these subtle temptations is confirmed by the fact that after obtaining the privilege of hearing confessions the Friars everywhere build stately edifices, but never before that. You never hear of their imposing these alms for the support of the parish church, or for the repair of bridges or highways. Hence, it may be judged with a good show of reason that their anxiety to hear confessions is dictated to a great extent by their own self-interest.¹¹⁴

This tendency to build was strenuously resisted by the stricter party among the Friars. Some great Franciscan Houses, however, arose, such as those at London and York, which might vie with the Benedictine Monasteries.¹¹⁵ But Mr. Brewer points out that generally their buildings, even to the last, retained their primitive squat, low and meagre proportions, and that rigid poverty was the rule rather than the exception.¹¹⁶

As to the repair of highways and bridges it seems likely that each village took care of its own, and that the owners of the

¹¹² Proverbs XXX, 8.

¹¹³ Matth. XVI.

¹¹⁴ Brown, App., p. 469.

¹¹⁵ Gasquet, "Henry VIII and the English Monasteries," Vol. 11, p. 238 ff., 6th edition.

¹¹⁶ "Monum. Franc.," Vol. I, *Introd.*, pp. xviii, xx note.

scattered properties likewise attended to the means of communication between their estates. But Thorold Rogers admits that the evidence "as to local taxation for roads up to the sixteenth century is entirely negative."¹¹⁷ Road-making and bridge-building were also included among meritorious acts of charity, and Mr. Cutts states that the calendar of chantries, etc., contains a number of endowments which were given or bequeathed for these purposes.¹¹⁸ Fitzralph's words would seem to argue a wide range of charity in this regard, which had fallen off through the encroachments of the Friars.

The Friars are accused of violating the decree "Religiosi" of Pope Clement V which forbids all Religious, under pain of excommunication, to absolve from sentences pronounced through provincial statutes or synodal statutes of any kind.¹¹⁹ The Irish primate thinks that in his own diocese of Armagh there are two thousand excommunicated annually through the sentences against murderers, public robbers, incendiaries and the like, of whom scarcely forty in the year come to him or his penitentiaries. But he adds, "*recipiunt sacramenta omnes tales ut ceteri, et absolvuntur et absoluti dicuntur, nec per alios quam per Fratres, non dubium, cum nulli alii absolvant, absoluti creduntur.*"¹²⁰

He brings up the contention in regard to the decree "*Omnis utriusque sexus*" in the following proposition: *quisque parochianus confessus Fratribus, ordinariis neglectis juxta potestatem quam habent, post confessionem hujusmodi remanet in peccato mortali et a nullo peccato mortali absolvitur.*¹²¹ The reason of this is that a penitent who neglects to go to his parish priest for a whole year violates the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council, and hence is in mortal sin. Evidently as long as he remains in this state his confessions to the Friars will be fruitless. He does not deny the power of the Friars to absolve nor of the Popes to grant them this power, but at the same time he maintains that the precept of the Lateran Council still binds.

Confession to the Friars is a matter of free choice; confes-

¹¹⁷ "The Economic Interpretation of History," p. 483, 1889.

¹¹⁸ "Parish Priests and their People in the Middle Ages in England," p. 527.

¹¹⁹ Clementin V, tit. VII, Ch. I.

¹²⁰ Brown, App., p. 468.

¹²¹ Brown, App., p. 470.

sion to the parish priest once a year is a matter of precept. But the former does not dispense with the latter. Hence the Primate escapes the condemnation of John de Polliaco,¹²² and at the same time upholds the old contention against the Friars. He cites the decree of Martin IV, mentioned above (p. 52), and also the decree "Inter Cunctas" of Benedict IX,¹²³ which bids the Friars to exhort their penitents to confess the same sins at least once a year to their own priests. He does not add, however, that this is enjoined by Pope Benedict not because it is necessary, but because it is useful.

The relations of the canon "Omnis Utriusque" with such decrees of the Popes were a matter of continual dispute between the Friars and the parish clergy in the fourteenth century; and more than fifty years after Fitzralph's death we find the University of Oxford asking for a clearing up of the ambiguity in the matter.¹²⁴

Another evil which he lays at the door of this privilege is the levity which it occasioned in the Friars, and the scandal arising therefrom: "Procurantur (contra regulam S. Francisci) ut audire possint concilia secretissima mulierum, reginarum et aliarum omnium indistincte, etiam capite inclinato ad caput multum obedienter,¹²⁵ non insequentes vestigia Sancti Job qui dicit: pepigi foedus cum oculis ne cogitarem de virgine: ita ut per tale consortium jam cum pulcherrimis dominabus philosophantur in cameris: unde per orbem scandala, quæ nolo exprimere, de fratribus sunt exorta patenter (ut multum videntur) per abusum hujus privilegii."¹²⁶

III. *Sepulture*.—(1) In regard to sepulture Fitzralph accuses the Friars of violating the decree "Animarum" of Boniface VIII,¹²⁷ by which the penalty of interdict is decreed against the churches and cemeteries of all religious who induce others by vow, oath or compact¹²⁸ to choose graves in their churchyards or change the location when already chosen else-

¹²² "Decree Vas Electionis, Extrav. Cm.," Bk. V, Tit. II, Ch. II.

¹²³ "Extrav. Com.," Lib. V, Tit. VII, Ch. I.

¹²⁴ Wilkin's "Concilia," III, p. 364; "Articuli concernentes reform. Eccl.," No. 32.

¹²⁵ Goldast has "irreverenter."

¹²⁶ Brown, App., p. 479.

¹²⁷ "Lib. Sextus," Bk. III, Tit. XII, Ch. I.

¹²⁸ De Ferraris, "Bibliotheca ad v. Sepulturam," Vol. VII, p. 158.

where.¹²⁹ That this decree was not universally observed is evident from the fact that later Clement V decreed a further penalty of excommunication against those who should violate it.¹³⁰ He accuses them of violating the decree "Dudum" of Clement V, which requires the Friars to give the parish clergy a fourth not only of all funeral perquisites, but of all offerings of every kind.¹³¹

This fourth, adds the Primate, is often never paid: "quam quartam de multis legatis, donatis, atque oblatiis Fratres non solvunt curatis sed infinitis caautis adhibitis, ut curati asserunt, ipsi Fratres sibi appropriant, diversis quæsitis coloribus, quod inter eos et Fratres quasi ubique in populis Christianis sunt lites, contentiones et jurgia infinita ita quod in locis quamplurimis a verbis pervenitur ad verbera et in mentibus caritas procul abjicitur."¹³²

IV. *Tithes and Preaching*.—In the matter of tithes Fitzralph accuses the Friars of incurring the excommunication inflicted by Clement V for appropriating the tithes or acquiring them under artful pretexts.¹³³ He says that by the reception of legacies and donations from which they never gave any tithes, they averted the due revenues of the Church.¹³⁴ Furthermore, he accuses them of violating the decree "Cupientes" of Clement V by which all religious are excommunicated, who in their sermon or otherwise withdraw their hearers from the payment of the tithes due to the Church.¹³⁵ For, he says, they affirm in public "quod nec de eleemosynis panis et vini, cerevisiæ aut aliarum rerum hujusmodi modicarum teneantur donantes in decimando lucra mercationis ipsorum aliquid decimare. Ego vero e contrario affirmavi quod de parvis sicut de magnis donariis tenentur inter lucra sua mentionem facere."¹³⁶ The Friars are also charged with neglecting to instruct their penitents on the duty of paying the tithes, as this decree of Pope Clement requires.

¹²⁹ Brown, App., p. 467.

¹³⁰ Clement, Lib. V, Tit. VIII, Ch. III.

¹³¹ Clement, Lib. III, Tit. VII, Ch. II.

¹³² Brown, App., p. 472.

¹³³ Clement, Lib. III, Tit. VIII, Ch. I.

¹³⁴ Brown, App., p. 468.

¹³⁵ Clement, Lib. V, Tit. VIII, Ch. III.

¹³⁶ Brown, App., p. 469.

The parish priests were indeed put between two fires by the Minorites in the matter of tithes. The more radical of the Spirituals, who laid special stress on the doctrine of evangelical poverty, preached against *all* endowments and tithes as contrary to the spirit of the Gospel; whilst the Conventuals, on the other hand, indirectly lessened the revenues of the parish church by the endowments and legacies which they themselves received.

V. Inducing Young Boys to Join the Order.—One of the most serious of Fitzralph's accusations against the Friars was the charge of undue pressure in inducing young boys to join the order. Because they cannot deceive grown men, he relates, they allure these boys by deceit and trifling presents to join the order, and then deny them the liberty of leaving. They cannot even speak with their own parents without being under the custody and consequent fear of the Friars. He cites the story of an Englishman who lately told him that his son, a boy under thirteen years of age, was thus kidnapped at Oxford, and that he could not speak to him unless under the custody of the Friars.

The result of all this was an appalling falling off in the number of students. In the English schools the lay people took away their children altogether, as they would rather see their sons farmers than thus lost to them forever. Thus in Oxford there were formerly, even in his own time, thirty thousand students, who have now dwindled down to less than six thousand owing principally to this practice of the Friars.¹³⁷ It is scarcely necessary to remark that these figures are either misprinted or greatly exaggerated.¹³⁸

But however exaggerated the statements of Fitzralph may be, it is evident that the Friars had fallen into the mistake of too great proselyting zeal, and that anxiety to increase their numbers had become a kind of mania.

There is a story told in the Register of Bishop Stafford, in the year 1411, of the detaining of a young boy against his own and his parents' wishes, which is even more offensive than that

¹³⁷ Brown, App., p. 473.

¹³⁸ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," Vol. II, pt. II, p. 581 ff.

told above by Fitzralph.¹³⁹ Richard de Bury grows indignant over the same practice. "You draw boys into your religion with hooks of apples, as the people commonly report, whom having professed, you do not instruct in doctrines by compulsion and fear as their age requires, but maintain them to go upon beggarly excursions, and suffer them to consume the time in which they might learn, in catching at the favors of their friends, to the offence of their parents, the danger of the boys, and the detriment of the Order."¹⁴⁰

No doubt a certain amount of proselyting is a practical necessity for religious orders, but the abuse of the practice is rather repugnant. However in considering the abuses mentioned here we should remember the havoc played by the terrible contemporary scourge of the Black Death. William of Worcester records in the Register of the Franciscans at Bodwin that in the General Chapter held at Lyons in 1351 it was computed that the Order had lost 13,883 members in Europe through this ravaging disease.¹⁴¹ Fitzralph died at Avignon without effecting any reform in this matter, but the University of Oxford took things into its own hands by passing a statute against the admission into the Mendicant colleges of boys under eighteen years of age.¹⁴² The Friars triumphed over the University, however, in the Parliament of 1366,¹⁴³ and we find the charge brought forward again by the University in 1414 in its "*articuli concernentes reformationem Ecclesiæ*."¹⁴⁴

VI. *Monopoly of Books*.—Fitzralph states also that the Friars buy up all the books on the market so that poor students find it impossible to obtain any. He had three or four students in Oxford himself, one of whom had to return home because he could not get a copy of the Bible or other suitable theological works and he speaks as if he expected the others home at any time.¹⁴⁵ Richard de Bury commends the zeal of the early

¹³⁹ Cf. Capes, "The English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," p. 319.

¹⁴⁰ "Philobiblion," p. 52. New York, 1899.

¹⁴¹ Gasquet, "Henry VIII and the English Monasteries," Vol. I, p. 3.

¹⁴² Quoted at length by Little, "Grey Friars at Oxford," p. 80.

¹⁴³ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," Vol. II, pt. II, p. 385.

¹⁴⁴ Wilkin's "Concilia," Vol. III, p. 364.

¹⁴⁵ Brown, App., p. 474.

Friars in collecting books, and acknowledges his own indebtedness to them.¹⁴⁶ But elsewhere he grows wrathful over their withdrawal "from the study and paternal care of books by a threefold superfluous care, namely, of their bellies, clothing, and houses."¹⁴⁷ Before the time of Fitzralph the Friars had certainly an advantage over their secular rivals in the matter of books,¹⁴⁸ but the statement of the Primate that in every convent there was a grand noble library must have been true no longer in the sixteenth century; for John Leland states that in the Franciscan houses there were cobwebs in the library, and moths and book-worms, but little more.¹⁴⁹ The flagging of library enthusiasm and the stress of circumstances had no doubt done their work.

VII. *Undue Vexation of Litigants*.—The Friars are also accused of undue vexation of priests and others who have law-suits with them.

When they have two conservatories they cite their opponents before the more distant one, that thus they might desist from pressing the case in order to avoid the consequent inconvenience. The Primate states that this has often happened in the Province of Armagh—*uti aliqui in ista curia præsentes affirmant, et est super hoc fama communis*.¹⁵⁰ This accusation recalls a passage in the decree "Religiosi" of Clement V; *Districte inhibemus ne . . . personas ecclesiasticas, præsertim coram iudicibus delegatis a nobis, suam contra eos justitiam prosequentes vexare indebite ac ad loca plura et præsertim multum remota convenire præsumant*.¹⁵¹

VIII. *They Are Brazen Beggars*.—This is the next accusation brought forth by Fitzralph, and his graphic description of their mode of begging is well worth reading. "Jam enim istis temporibus non potuit magnus aut mediocris in clero et populo vix cibum assumere, nisi tales non vocati affuerint mendicantes; non more pauperum petentes ad portas vel ostia humiliter,

¹⁴⁶ "Philobiblion," p. 71 ff.

¹⁴⁷ "Philobiblion," p. 49.

¹⁴⁸ Rashdall, "Universities of Europe," Vol. I, p. 497.

¹⁴⁹ Cited by Capes, "English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries," p. 319.

¹⁵⁰ Brown, App., p. 472.

¹⁵¹ Clement, Lib. V, Tit., III, Ch. I.

ut St. Franciscus in testamento præcepit et docuit, mendicando; sed curias sive domos sine verecundia penetrantes et inibi hospitantes nullatenus invitati edunt et bibunt quæ apud eos reperiunt; secum nihilominus aut grana aut similia aut panes aut carnes seu caseos (etiãsi in domo non fuerint nisi duo) secum extorquendo reportant; nec quisquam poterit eis denegare nisi verecundiam naturalem abjiciat."¹⁵² Chaucer tells the same story in a less earnest vein when he says of the Frere:

"He was the beste beggere in his hous . . .
For thogh a widwe hadde, noght a sho,
So pleasaunt was his 'In principio,'
Yet wolde he have a farthing, er he wente."¹⁵³

There is no doubt that the mendicancy of the Friars had often enough degenerated into mere shameless begging to call forth the indignation of men like Fitzralph and the satire of men like Chaucer. The professional tramp of to-day, to whom work is the "summum malum," would be sure to have donned the grey habit in the fourteenth century as the easiest way of making a living. But we are far from attributing this ugly feature to the general body of the order.

IX. *They Are Wonderful Gad-Abouts.*—This is a feature which we find continually cropping up in the popular descriptions of the Friar, though it is not always meant in a reproachful sense. One of the best of this type is Salimbene of Parma,¹⁵⁴ whose chronicle throws so much white light on the social life of the middle of the thirteenth century. Of course, there was a great body of men in the order whom this description would ill fit, but the popular character of the mission of Friars Minor made the type sufficiently marked to elicit special attention. As they were continually travelling from place to place, they always had the latest gossip at their fingers' ends, and might be said to have filled, in a way, the role of the newspaper of to-day.

X. *Miscellaneous Reasons for Preferring the Parish Priest to the Friar.*—In going to confession to the parish priest and in

¹⁵² Brown, App., p. 474.

¹⁵³ "Prologue to the Canterbury Tales."

¹⁵⁴ "Sons of Francis," p. 252 ff., London, 1902.

the parish church you have the merit not only of going to confession, but also of going to confession to the person and in the place appointed by God and the common law of the Church. Moreover, there are more parishioners than Friars, hence you shall (or should) get the benefit of more prayers by going to the parish church. The parish priests are bound by more ties to the people and hence are more devoted to their interests than the roving Friars who are here to-day and away to-morrow.¹⁵⁵ Access is more easily had to the parish priest than to the strange Friar, especially in nocturnal sick-calls when access cannot be had to the latter. It is well that the confessor should know the previous life of his penitents that he may be able to advise them more advantageously. There is more shame (and hence more merit) in confessing one's sins to the parish priest than to a stranger. In the case of a man and wife it is much better that the same confessor should hear both, just as it is better to have one physician for two diseased members of the same body than to have one for each. Another result of these privileges is that the parish priests no longer know the faces of their own flocks.¹⁵⁶ The abuses of the privileges of the Friars bring contempt upon the parish priests and lack of devotion and shame among the faithful.

XI. *These Privileges Are Harmful to the Friars Themselves.*—They engender avarice; for the Friars obtain only those privileges to which temporal advantages are annexed, namely those relating to confession, sepulture and the like. They engender pride. Preaching and hearing confessions are offices of honor and dignity; whereas the Friars pretend to make a special practice of humility. These privileges are an occasion to the Friars of injuries and uncharitableness toward the parish priests.¹⁵⁷

He accuses the Franciscans especially of departing from the spirit of their rule. They hold on till death to these privileges, though the order was instituted by St. Francis without them.¹⁵⁸ And no one doubts that observance becomes easier

¹⁵⁵ Brown, App., p. 468.

¹⁵⁶ Brown, App., p. 472.

¹⁵⁷ Brown, App., p. 474.

¹⁵⁸ Brown, App., p. 475 ff.

and more lax, and merit less, when they have the privilege of preaching, hearing confessions, burying the dead, and appropriating to themselves three fourths of all the perquisites. Hence by procuring these privileges they are looking back after putting their hand to the plough.¹⁵⁹ They have also relaxed the rule in the manner of receiving candidates for the order. This power was accorded only to the provincial ministers.¹⁶⁰ But now any Friar may receive a person into the order.¹⁶¹ Moreover, they violate the clause which requires that the ministers examine the candidates carefully on the faith and the sacraments of the Church,¹⁶² because scarcely any one comes to them but youngsters who know very little in which to be examined. "Et nihilominus vix reperitur fratrum locus notabilis, quin sit ibi puerorum infra decennium conventus unus aut saltem dimidius."¹⁶³ St. Francis bids them in his will to show reverence to the priests; but they do not carry out his wishes.¹⁶⁴

The Rule enjoins "that the Brethren must never preach in the bishoprick of any bishop if he opposes it."¹⁶⁵ But this clause also has been set aside. Moreover, St. Francis forbids the Brethren "to demand any letter of the Roman Curia, either for a church or for any other place, nor under pretext of preaching,"¹⁶⁶ whereas in the grant of the privileges themselves we find the words "Vestris precibus inclinati."¹⁶⁷ Indeed, they violate their rule by receiving Holy Orders at all. According to the Rule they must be truly *Mendici*, and hence have no title for ordination.

The Primate thus proceeds at special length against the Friars Minor "quia ipsi in Londiniis inchoarunt negotium, occasionem aliis ordinibus ministrantes. Et quia ipsi præ ceteris de perfectione evangelica disputantes eam spontaneæ mendacitati ascribunt."¹⁶⁸ It appears truly wonderful to him that

¹⁵⁹ Rule, Ch. II.

¹⁶⁰ Rule, Ch. II, in princ.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Bull of Pope Innocent IV, 1245, "Bull. Rom.," III, p. 520.

¹⁶² Rule, l. c.

¹⁶³ Brown, App., p. 476.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. "Will of St. Francis" apud Le Monnier, p. 488 ff.

¹⁶⁵ Rule, Ch. IX.

¹⁶⁶ Le Monnier, p. 490.

¹⁶⁷ E. g., in Bull of Pope Innocent IV, 1249, we find the words: *vestris supplicationibus inclinati*, "Bull. Rom.," III, p. 542.

¹⁶⁸ Brown, App., p. 478.

St. Francis should have instituted a better road to human perfection than the omnipotent, all-good, and all wise God Himself established in the primeval institution of man. For it is evident that our first parents did not follow the practice of mendicancy when they were placed in the garden of Eden.

V.

Such is in brief Fitzralph's impeachment of the Friars. In treating of the more serious of the charges we have already made such comment as we thought necessary to give them their proper historical background and to help us in appraising the attitude of the Primate. But it may be well to illustrate in a more general way the temper and bearing of the contemporaries or quasi-contemporaries of the great Irish prelate in so far as they voice the discontent elicited by the encroachments of the Friars. It is hardly necessary to speak of the Universities. They grew mainly out of the desire for higher education for the secular clergy, and naturally became the rallying points of the subsequent struggle with the mendicants.¹⁶⁹

This struggle is also reflected in the legislation of the Church. In 1300 Pope Boniface VIII testified to the grave discord existing between the parochial clergy and the Friars, and decreed measures of conciliation in his famous Bull "*Super Cathedram*," which confirmed the privileges of the Friars, but required permission from the local prelates for the hearing of confessions, and ordered a fourth of all offerings to be given to the parochial clergy.¹⁷⁰

Benedict XI a few years later declared that this Bull only caused greater discord than ever, and consequently revoked it. He decreed among other things that the permission of the local prelates was not necessary for those hearing confessions.¹⁷¹ But Clement V, a few years after, republished the Bull "*Super Cathedram*" because the legislation of Benedict XI had only further increased the discord.

We hear murmuring voices among the clergy of Italy in 1259, at the council of Ravenna, when some of them complain

¹⁶⁹ Rashdall, "*Universities of Europe*," I, 369 ff.; II, 378 et passim.

¹⁷⁰ Clement, Lib. III, Tit. VII, Ch. II.

¹⁷¹ "*Extrav. Com.*," Lib. V, Tit. VII, Ch. I.

that they cannot raise the subsidy demanded by the Pope for the war against the Tartars, because of the encroachments of the Friars. The Friars do not preach in favor of the tithes; they hear confessions which should be made to the priests; they bury the parishioners; and they usurp the office of preaching. It must be added, however, that the Bishop of Parma stood up and defended the religious, giving high praise to their good work.¹⁷²

Turning to Germany we find the Fathers of the Provincial Synod of Salzburg in 1274 taking away all privileges granted by themselves or their predecessors in regard to confessions, indulgences and the like. The reason is that these privileges had disturbed the discipline of the Church.¹⁷³ A subsequent synod of Salzburg asked the Pope in 1300 for a fuller explanation of the Bull "*Super cathedram*," since the Mendicants did not want to observe it.¹⁷⁴

In the preparation for the council of Lyons held in the year 1274, Bishop Bruno of Olmütz advised a withdrawal of these privileges. He complained that the Friars were getting all pastoral duties into their hands except those that were disagreeable, and were monopolizing the legacies of the faithful and the drawing up of wills. He also accused them of disparaging the priests and of claiming unwarranted power of indulgences.¹⁷⁵ In 1282 the Archbishop of Rouen and the Bishop of Amiens tried to devise means of grappling with the privileges of the Mendicants, and mentioned an assembly of Prelates at Paris which suspended these privileges on account of their unwarranted extension.¹⁷⁶ A few years later (1287), we find the Provincial Council of Rheims ordering a collection to defray the expenses of prosecuting a suit at Rome against the Mendicants who unduly extended the privileges granted to them by Martin IV.¹⁷⁷

When we cross the channel to England we find the same note of rancor and opposition. No doubt the Friars came in

¹⁷² Mansi, XXIII, col. 993-4.

¹⁷³ Mansi, XXIV, col. 138.

¹⁷⁴ Hefele, "*Conciliengeschichte*," Vol. VI, p. 375.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 130.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

¹⁷⁷ Mansi, Vol. XXIV, Col. 847-8.

for their share in the trenchant philippic of the Synod of Exeter in 1287 against the quæstors and pardoners.¹⁷⁸ In a letter of 1297 Archbishop Winchelsey voices the complaints of a provincial council held in London shortly before in which the Mendicants are accused of presuming to interpret the decrees of the Pope in doubtful matters, of absolving from reserved censures without permission and of unduly extending their powers in the confessional; from which it follows that the prelates cannot recognize the faces of their people, who are estranged from them by lack of intercourse and by contempt, and thus escape the salutary discipline of the Church.¹⁷⁹ There is a local flavor in the mandate of Boniface VIII in 1303 to the Bishop of Bath and Wells to protect the rectors and curates of parish churches in the city and diocese of Exeter against the claims of the Friars to preach, hear confessions, and bury the dead without their permission.¹⁸⁰

Even after the time of Fitzralph the old rancor was kept up. In 1366 Archbishop Langham (of Canterbury) states that grave complaints had reached him to the effect that certain of the Friars Minor and Dominicans preached publicly in their sermons that they have a right (*de jure communi*) to preach in the parish churches without asking or obtaining permission, and to hear the confessions of all comers and absolve them even in cases specially reserved to himself, thereby causing grave scandal among the faithful. He accordingly forbids them to exercise these functions unless they can show a privilege from the Holy See or letters patent from the Bishop.¹⁸¹ In 1414 the University of Oxford in its "*Articuli concernentes reformationem Ecclesiæ*" resumes most of the old charges against the Friars.¹⁸² In Fitzralph's native country we find evidence of the same complaints. Thus, many of the accusations brought against the Friars by Fitzralph had been already put forth by the provincial synod of Dublin in 1348.¹⁸³

If we turn to the chroniclers of these times we shall find, for example, Matthew Paris bewailing the loss of authority of

¹⁷⁸ Wilkins, "*Concilia*," Vol. II, p. 154.

¹⁷⁹ Wilkins, "*Concilia*," Vol. II, p. 228.

¹⁸⁰ Bliss, "*Calendar*," I, p. 608.

¹⁸¹ Wilkins, "*Concilia*," III, p. 64.

¹⁸² Wilkins, "*Concilia*," III, p. 364 ff.

¹⁸³ Wilkins, "*Concilia*," II, p. 746 ff.

the ordinary preachers and the audacity assumed by many of the people because they were no longer obliged to confess their sins to their own priests, but could flee under the sheltering wings of the passing Friars.¹⁸⁴ And the author of the *Chronicon Angliæ* utters a mournful "proh dolor!" at the thought of Fitzralph's failure in the attempt to abolish the privileges of the Friars.¹⁸⁵

The pictures of the Friar given in the popular literature of the time are scarcely more encouraging. Indeed we should not expect it. For the satirists give us for the most part but the shady side of clerical life.

Chaucer's Frere is an active, pleasant flatterer who sings well, lisps affectively and can play a tune on the rote. He is loved by the tavern-keepers, sellers of victuals, free-holders and "worthy women of the town." But he avoids the lepers and the poor, and associates with those only from whom there is something to gain.

"Ful swetely herde he confessioun,
And pleasaunt was his absolucion;
He was an esy man to yeve penaunce
Ther as he wiste to hav a good pitaunce;
For unto a povre odre for to yive
Is signe that a man is wel y-shrive.
For if he yaf, he dorste make avaunt,
He wiste that a man was repentaunt.
For many a man so hard is of his herte,
He may nat wepe al-thogh him sore smerte.
Therefore, in stede of weping and preyeres
Men moot yeve silver to the povre freres."¹⁸⁶

For other samples of this literature the reader may consult the *Somnour's Tale of Chaucer*, *Piers Ploughman's Vision*,¹⁸⁷ and indeed the secular literature of the time in general.

We have here brought into relief a number of protests covering nearly all Europe in point of territory, and extending

¹⁸⁴ Paris, "English History," Vol. III, p. 149, tr. by J. A. Giles, London, 1852-54.

¹⁸⁵ "Chronicon Angliæ ad an. 1358," p. 38.

¹⁸⁶ Chaucer, "Prologue to the Canterbury Tales."

¹⁸⁷ "The Vision and Creed of Pier's Ploughman," ed. Thos. Wright, 2 vols., London, 1887 (2d ed.).

over the century before and the half century after the death of Fitzralph. Only thus can we get a true idea of the universality and persistency of the controversy, and the true inwardness of the radical position taken by the Irish Primate.

There is evidence of extremely forced relations between the Mendicants and the local clergy. When the Church gave the Friars full sway in Europe, she evidently saw an urgent need for their labor. When the vineyards of the parish clergy were entered by others it was because they themselves had neglected to till them. But the state of affairs thus brought about was certainly abnormal, and the tendency to hark back to the ordinary discipline of the Church became more intensified as time wore on and the Friars themselves had gone the road of deterioration. It is in the light of these considerations that we must weigh the motives of Fitzralph and judge his character. There is no need of examining the intrinsic merits of each item in the controversy. No doubt there is much to be said on both sides.

The attack of the Irish prelate produced many responses on the part of the Friars. The best known is that of the English Franciscan, Roger of Conway, and is entitled "*Defensio Mendicantium*."¹⁸⁸ It would be interesting to enter into a detailed statement of his defense, but our primary purpose is not with the controversy but with Fitzralph. We shall point out, however, some reserves that must be made in dealing with the charges generally made against the Friars of this period.

1. We must remember the general slackening of the bonds of society brought about by the ravages of the Black Death. When the fell disease swept over Europe the Friars died by thousands at their posts of duty, but the plague reacted sadly on the personnel of the Order.

2. These accusations are penned for the most part by unfriendly hands; and the Friars left little written material behind them, like the great Benedictine annals, to justify their daily conduct.

3. The ideal of St. Francis was so high and unearthly, and the Friar moved so openly before the eyes of the world, that it

¹⁸⁸ Printed with Fitzralph's "*Defensorium*" at Lyons, 1496, and in Goldast's "*Monarchia*."

was an easy matter for the satirist to find some weakness on which to dilate.

4. However much the parish priests resented the encroachments of the Friar, and however much the people hit off his frailties with their rude jests, it is certain that he was popular with the masses of the people even on the eve of the dissolution of the monasteries.¹⁸⁹

VI.

We may now return to the outcome of Fitzralph's plea at Avignon. "A notarial instrument of the case, of which there is a copy in the Bodleian MS. 158, f. 174, contains the information that Fitzralph's case was entrusted by the Pope to four cardinals for examination, November 14, and gives the particulars on which this should proceed. But unfortunately we have no record of the conclusion arrived at."¹⁹⁰

We can find no proof for the statement of Irish Church historians,¹⁹¹ that Fitzralph was expressly condemned or silenced except the unsupported word of Wadding.¹⁹² It is true, however, that Pope Innocent VI sent a letter to the English bishops on October 1, 1358, forbidding any innovation to be made, or any molestation of the Friars in their functions whilst the suit of Fitzralph was pending before the Holy See.¹⁹³ It is also indisputed that the Friars were confirmed in their privileges.¹⁹⁴ But it is generally agreed that Fitzralph died in peace at Avignon before any formal pronouncement on his "conclusions" was given by the Holy See.

It has been stated in a previous chapter that the dispute between Fitzralph and the Friars was more of English than of Irish import. It is significant in this connection that during his stay at Avignon Fitzralph got financial support from the clergy of Lincoln diocese, of which he had formerly been chan-

¹⁸⁹ Gasquet, "Henry VIII and the English Monasteries," *passim*.

¹⁹⁰ Poole, "Dict. of Nat. Biog., XIX, 196. See also the papal letter of 1358 mentioned below.

¹⁹¹ E. g., Brennan, "Ecc. History of Ireland," p. 337, Dublin, 1864; Malone, "Church History of Ireland," II, 34, 35, 3d ed.

¹⁹² *Annales Minorum*, VIII, 129.

¹⁹³ "Bullarium Ordinis Prædicatorum," Tom. II, p. 250; Wadding, l. c., p. 128.

¹⁹⁴ Walsingham, "Hist. Anglic.," I, 285.

cellor;¹⁹⁵ and Wycliffe countenances a rumor that the English bishops in general contributed towards his expenses.¹⁹⁶

The *Chronicon Angliæ*, under the year 1358, stating that a great controversy had arisen between Fitzralph and the English clergy on the one hand, and the four Mendicant orders on the other, bewails the fact that, through the default of the promises of the English clergy and the abundant resources of the Friars, the latter obtained a confirmation and even an extension of their privileges whilst the suit was still pending.¹⁹⁷ According to Harris it is stated in a fragment of Henry of Knighton that the Archbishop had a subsidy from his clergy to maintain his suit at Avignon, and that the Abbot of St. Alban's was his proctor there.¹⁹⁸

But the question was more than a matter of local importance. Fitzralph made no restrictions in his plea for the abolition of the privileges of the Orders. His failure in this attempt did not, however, remove the controversy. Many afterwards took up even a more radical attitude than his. Thus in 1409 we find Pope Alexander V restating the discipline of the Bull "*Super Cathedram*," and condemning again the errors of John de Poliacco, which some maintained to be true notwithstanding the condemnation of John XXII (who, they say, was a heretic at the time), as well as some new errors of the same tenor.¹⁹⁹

In the course of time the parochial clergy gradually gained their point, and the relations between the two parties took on their present more agreeable aspect. Thus in the sixteenth century we find various councils going back to the legislation of the fourth council of the Lateran, such as the council of Milan in 1565,²⁰⁰ and the council of Rheims in 1583.²⁰¹

Fitzralph was advocating a course which, sooner or later, to a less or greater extent, had to be taken. Like a volunteer

¹⁹⁵ Reg. Gynewell, apud Tanner, "*Bibliotheca Britt.*," p. 284, note C.

¹⁹⁶ "*Fascic. Zizan*," p. 284; *Triologus* IV, 36, p. 375, ed. G. V. Lechler cited by Poole, "*Dict. of Nat. Biog.*," XIX, p. 197.

¹⁹⁷ "*Chronicon Angliæ*," p. 38.

¹⁹⁸ Ware-Harris, I, p. 83.

¹⁹⁹ Wadding, Vol. IX, p. 508.

²⁰⁰ Mansi, XXXIV A, col. 21.

²⁰¹ Mansi, XXXIV A, col. 691, confirmed by Gregory XIII; Mansi, l. c., 715.

army the Friars had been called into the field for a special emergency. They had done their work, and done it well. In the mind of Fitzralph the time had come for their disbandment. Having lost their primitive zeal, he considered them a disorganizing element in the work of ministering to the spiritual needs of the faithful, neither doing that work properly themselves nor allowing the parish priests, the ordinary shepherds, to do it. He saw that the existing relations between the diocesan clergy and the Friars bred only scandal and dissension. The former were the pastors designated by the canon law of the Church. Rightly or wrongly he also thought that they were the ones best fitted for feeding the flock.

Two hundred years afterwards, when the old discipline was being reinstated, his plea would have caused little comment. His attitude was dictated by no petty personal dislike to the Friars. It was no mere domestic quarrel, as some writers would maintain.²⁰² His earnestness and ability in presenting the claims of the parochial clergy had made him the spokesman in a cause of universal interest.

In his theoretical views even Wadding admits that he sinned rather "*intellectus exuberantia quam voluntatis perversitate.*"²⁰³ His nine conclusions were urged merely as probable propositions, and in everything he laid himself under the correction of the Holy See.²⁰⁴

He was a man of wonderful activity, of powerful and subtle reasoning and of rare oratorical powers; exuberant perhaps in his fancies, and in the heat of argument prone to exaggeration, but a man of elevated motives, imbued with a spirit of filial obedience to the Church and sincerely devoted to her general interests.

JOHN J. GREANEY.

PITTSBURG, PA.

PRINCIPAL WRITINGS OF RICHARD FITZRALPH.

A. PRINTED.

Defensorium Curatorum. Printed by John Trechsel, Lyons, 1496; also in Edward Brown's "*Fasciculus Rerum Expetendarum et Fugendarum*," II, 466-486;

²⁰² "*Irish Eccl. Record*," I, 528.

²⁰³ "*Ann. Min.*," VIII, p. 129.

²⁰⁴ "*Defensorium Curatorum*, ad init."

London, 1690; in Melchior Goldast's "Monarchia S. Romani Imperii," II, 1392 ff. Frankfurt, 1614. It is also printed elsewhere.

De Pauperie Salvatoris. The first four books of this treatise with the chapter-heads of the remaining three, are published by Reginald Lane Poole in his edition of Wycliffe's "De Dominio Divino," pp. 257-476. London, 1890.

Summa In Quæstionibus Armenorum. Edited by John Sudoris together with four of the sermons preached at St. Paul's Cross, London, 1356-57, and printed by Jean Petit at Paris in 1511.

B. IN MANUSCRIPT.

Sermons: The Bodleian Ms. 144 contains no less than eighty-eight of his sermons in full or in reports. There are also several minor collections, e. g., *Sermones de Tempore et de Sanctis*. New College, Oxford, XC 2. *De Laudibus Sanctæ Deiparæ Trin.* Coll., Dublin and elsewhere.

Propositio ex Parte Prælatorum et Omnium Curatorum Totius Ecclesiæ coram Papa in Pleno Consistorio . . . adversus Ordines Mendicantes. Presented July 5, 1350. Bodl. MS. 144, f. 251 b. He wrote many other minor tracts against the mendicants, among them a reply to Roger Conway. Cfr. Tanner, *Bibliotheca*.

Propositio ex Parte Illustris Principis Domini Regis Edwardi III in Consistorio pro Gratia Jubileæ Ejusdem Domini Regis Populo Obtinenda. Bodl. MS. 144, f. 246 b.

Minor Tracts against the Armenians.

Richard Radulphi Armachani Opus in P. Lombardi Sententias in Quæstiones XXIX Distributum. Oriel College (Oxford) XV.

Lectura Sententiarum, lib. IV, *ibid.*; *Quæstiones Sententiarum*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *Lectura Theologiæ*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *De Statu Universalis Ecclesiæ*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *De Peccato Ignorantiæ*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *De Vafritiis Judæorum*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *Epistolæ ad Diversos*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *Dialogi Varii*, lib. I, *ibid.*; *Contra Validos Mendicantes*, lib. I, *ibid.*

Dialogus de Rebus ad Sacram Scripturam Pertinentibus MS. in *Biblioth. Lincoln. Oxon. Austr.* 75.

Vita Sancti Mancheni Abbatis. For fuller particulars see Tanner's *Bibliotheca Brittanico-Hibernica*, p. 284 ff.; Poole, "Dict. of Mat. Biog.," Vol. XIX at word Fitzralph. *Irish Eccles. Record*, Series I; Vol. I, p. 530 ff. Ware-Harris, Vol. II (*Writers of Ireland*), pp. 84-85. *Notes and Queries*, No. 110; Series II, Vol. V, pp. 110-111, 159.

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1. The autobiography, if it may properly be called such, of Saint Theresa, had been several times translated into French before Fr. Marcel Bouix published (1852) his translation. Since then it has held a foremost place among French classics of piety, and deservedly so. The flowing style, the personal note of enthusiasm that rings in the French phrase, and the harmonious dignity of the diction, made this translation a favorite "livre d'édification." It is said that the house of Lecoffre alone has sold more than thirty thousand copies of it. A confrère has revised and enlarged the Bouix translation, improved some defects, restored here and there the concision, picturesqueness, and laconic force of the original, and retranslated some paragraphs from the critical edition of La Fuente (Madrid, 1861-1862) and the photographic fac-simile (Madrid, 1873) of the autograph life kept in the Escorial. The valuable historical notes and excursus of Fr. Bouix are reprinted, and Fr. Peyré has added four "Relations" or confidential letters of the saint to her confessors; they complete and illustrate the original "Vida." that is really not an autobiography, since it stops at 1565, but a description of her spiritual condition, experiences, and "états d'oraison" within a given period, i. e., up to her fiftieth year. It is well known that the best historians of Spanish literature like Capmany (1848) and Ticknor (1867), look on the writings of St. Theresa as models of pure Castilian. Her "Letters" in particular, are declared to be written in a style incomparable for simplicity, naturalness and lively wit. They were also translated into French by Fr. Bouix, as well as the "Book of Founda-

tions," and her other writings. The life and letters of the saint were translated into English by Fr. Coleridge (London, 1881, 1896, 3 vols.).

2. Saint Gertrude of Helpede (Helfta) near Eisleben, is one of the most charming figures of the thirteenth century; it is a pity that Montalembert did not make of her life a companion-piece to his exquisite Saint Elizabeth. Her "Revelations" have always been a beloved manual of the mystical life, and may be said to have received a solemn ecclesiastical approval by her canonization in 1677. The pious and learned Blossius is said to have read them through once a month. Of the five books in which they are now extant (e. g., *Revelationes Gertrudianæ ac Mechtildianæ*, Solesmes edition, Paris, 1875) the first and fifth are biographical additions by other hands; the second book, properly entitled "*Legatus divinæ pietatis*," is her own composition; the third and fourth were dictated by her to one of her companions. They are all now extant only in Latin, but it seems probable that the three books of the "Revelations" proper were originally composed in German. In the two volumes before us an anonymous Benedictine has translated these "Revelations" into French, and thus made them accessible to many readers, to whom the Latin is an unknown tongue, or to whom the peculiarities of mediæval Latin are insuperable. The translator has added a very useful preface in which he describes the character of these intimate communings of a chosen soul with Jesus Christ, and the temper of reverence in which they should be read. Is he right in continuing to assert that she was an abbess? Dr. Kaulen maintains in the last edition of the "*Kirchenlexikon*" that she never held a position of authority in any of the monasteries in which she lived.

3. The mystical writings of the German Dominican, Blessed Heinrich Suso, include his famous "*Exemplar*," some sermons, and a number of letters. The "*Exemplar*" is divided into four books, the first of which contains an account of his life, the second is entitled "*The Book of Eternal Wisdom*," the third "*The Book of Eternal Truth*" and the fourth "*The Little Book of Letters*." Originally each book was independently composed and circulated, though their collection into a whole is the work of Suso himself. He is one of the most delicate emotional souls that German mysticism ever produced. His "*minnereiches Herz*," or heart overflowing with spiritual joy, was the source at once of an irrepressible apostolic zeal and of noble outpourings of love and adoration expressed in a highly imaginative and picturesque South-German dialect that has no superior for warmth and richness and tenderness. Fr. Baumgartner says that he wrote the most beautiful German prose of the

fourteenth century and that he turned with ease and accuracy the most difficult scholastic terms. He is free from those errors of the Beghards and the Brothers of the Free Spirit that even Meister Eckhart did not wholly avoid. In the "Book of Eternal Wisdom" fourteenth and fifteenth century Germany recognized a work of devotion that contained the essence of all the holiest and most intimate contemplation that devout German souls had risen to since the days of Saint Gertrude. His "Life" is not so much an autobiography as a description of the manner in which a true servant of God must dispose his internal and external life, if he would be pleasing to his Creator. During the nineteenth century his writings have been a beloved theme of the literary historians of mediæval Germany, and generally of writers on the history of mystical theology. Görres, Diepenbrock, Greith and Denifle among Catholics, Preger and Schmidt among Protestants, have studied them profoundly and illustrated them with much learning and theological acumen. In Eckhart, Johann Tauler and Heinrich Suso they have recognized the three purest and loveliest flowers of German mediæval mysticism. The "Exemplar" of Suso was excellently edited by Father Denifle (Munich, 1876). Together with the other writings of this holy man it was translated into French by Cartier (1856) from the Italian of del Nente (1663). Father Thiriot has now executed a new translation of all the works of Suso, thereby rendering them accessible to many who cannot read or appreciate the richly emotional language of this loving Suabian "Minnesinger of Eternal Wisdom," his lady and his joy, for whom he underwent atrocious sufferings and whose arms (IHS) he had stamped with a heated iron on his breast. In the preface of this book the French translator narrates critically the life of Suso, describes the origin of his works and the history of the manuscripts, appreciates their intrinsic worth and their great local influence, as well as their close kinship with the doctrine of Saint Thomas, and their practical helpful tendency.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

La Vierge Marie dans L'Histoire de L'Orient Chrétien, par l'abbé Joseph Lemann. 2d edition. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 640.

We opened this work expecting to find a documented exposition of the "cultus" of the Blessed Virgin in the Christian Orient, especially in the earliest period of liturgical development. That thesis is an admirable one and has never been done with anything

like the thoroughness that Liell and Lehner, and we might add Fr. Livius, have shown in treating the ecclesiastical history of the Blessed Virgin in the West. This volume contains a series of warm and fervorous oratorical disquisitions on the Blessed Virgin at various "tournants" of Oriental ecclesiastical history. It is also dominated strongly by an historical mysticism that seems likely soon to lose its only *raison d'être*, given the momentous changes that are supervening in the farther Orient, and the reaction that they will probably call forth, in conjunction with the grave internal modifications of the ecclesiastical conditions of France. The work is a tribute to the Blessed Virgin on the occasion of the semi-centenary of the Immaculate Conception.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Histoire de la Charité. Par Léon Lallemand. T. I, pp. x + 191. Paris: 1902; T. II. Paris: 1903. 8°, pp. 195.

In the first of these two very interesting volumes the author passes in review the legislation and practice of the principal nations of antiquity in relation to the various classes of society dependent on others, whether as slaves, or as composing the great mass of the weak and indigent. Beginning with the Hebrew people the author examines the enactments of the Mosaic law bearing on the condition of widows and orphans, slaves and strangers dwelling within the territory allotted to the children of Israel, and indicates as far as possible how far these enactments were observed and enforced. In the second and succeeding chapters he makes a similar inquiry with regard to the Egyptians, the Assyrians and Babylonians, the Greeks, the Romans to the reign of Constantine, the Gauls and the Germans. In a concluding chapter the author sums up the results of his investigations. These are not of a nature to support the theory of the constant moral progress of the human race; but on the contrary they very clearly show that in the pre-Christian ages the condition of all the weaker ranks of society grew steadily worse, while at the same time the ruling powers became more and more indifferent to the grievances of those whose unrequited labors maintained them in boundless luxury.

In the second volume we look upon a far different spectacle. From the moment that the doctrines of Christianity began to be propagated in every province of the Roman Empire, the condition of the poor and the weak, of widows and orphans, of the slave and the despised outcasts of society began to improve. Converts to the new religion from the ranks of the wealthy were made to understand that

the legion of slaves who ministered to their wants were creatures of God, equal, possibly superior according to the degree of virtue attained, in His sight with themselves. They were taught to believe that the wretched crowd of the blind, the lame and the indigent who piteously begged an alms from them when they appeared in public followed by a crowd of only less needy sycophantic clients, belonged to the class on which Christ during His earthly life had conferred His greatest benefits; and furthermore that His Apostles themselves were men who had followed one of the humblest and most ill-requited of avocations. So great was the influence of these doctrines even on the pagan world that one of the bitterest enemies of Christianity, the Emperor Julian, during his brief term of power saw that his efforts to prolong the existence of paganism would be vain unless he could prevail on his indifferent followers to observe the principles of Christianity in relation to society. His attempt to destroy the Church with some of her own weapons was, however, futile. Those who applauded his exertions in the cause of the gods were not led to do so in the interests of humanity at large but of their own selfishness. So well was this recognized that the moment Julian passed away the Empire returned again to the guidance of a line of Christian Emperors who controlled its destinies until the vigorous invaders from the North at last succeeded in settling on its ruins. It was during this long period of invasion that the charitable institutions of the Church obtained their first great development in the West. Wave after wave of invasion swept for centuries over Western Europe. The unfortunate people had scarcely time to recover from the disasters caused by one warlike horde when another was upon them. The only institution capable of coping with the invaders was the Church. The barbarians themselves entertained for her the greatest respect, and so she was able to alleviate in a great degree the general distress. Her hospitals, homes for the aged, orphan asylums, and similar charitable institutions were open to all. The great estates of the Church, especially of the Roman Church, were the patrimony of the poor from which they derived sustenance at a time when without these resources nothing but starvation or slavery remained.

These volumes will prove of great service, especially to priests, and to those of the laity who wish to obtain information in a clear and succinct form relative to the charitable institutions of the Church up to the reign of Charlemagne. Three other volumes, covering the period from Charlemagne to the present day, are to follow.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

The Middle Ages: Sketches and Fragments. By Thomas J. Shahan.
New York: Benziger, 1904. 8°, pp. 432.

In turning over the pages of this truly charming collection of essays, there come involuntarily to one's lips the words of A Kempis: "If thy heart were right, then every creature would be to thee as a mirror of life. . . . If thou wert good and pure within then wouldst thou see all things without hindrance and understand them aright." Truly, the author of this book has such a "pure mind and a simple intention," and so he not only knows books but he also understands aright the people they tell about; is able to live in the past and sympathize with the hopes and passions of once vigorous civilizations. Hence, although a mere collection of essays, this book will go farther toward dispelling the myth of anti-mediævalism than any formal history. The author's sympathy enables him to so understand the times he writes of that he can seize the salient points in their history—the characteristics of their mental and moral makeup—and present them to his readers unobscured by that unnecessary multitudinous detail in which the average mediæval writer revels. Of course all the many sides of that marvellously varied life of the Middle Ages could not be handled in a production of this character. The close student, moreover, will notice that the author's attention is directed more to the early and later Middle Ages than to those wonderful twelfth and thirteenth centuries which are the Middle Ages par excellence. In any case, the reader will find here a remarkably skilful presentation of all the principal elements that make up life from Gregory the Great to Leo X.

Now that we have a similar collection of essays on the "Beginnings of Christianity" by the same author, it is to be hoped that the series will be continued to our own times. There is no satisfactory study at hand of the Reformation period along such lines. Dr. Shahan is certainly capable of writing such a one, all the more as the materials for it are now so accessible. Archbishop Spalding's *Essays* on the same period are now rather out of date, and moreover, are marred by a bitter controversial spirit characteristic of his time. Catholics now need and eagerly await a new presentation of that subject, learned yet popular, Catholic yet sweetened by that sympathetic charity of mind and grace of expression so prominent in the volume under discussion.

In the meantime may the "Middle Ages" be read widely by at least Catholics! Somehow or other American Catholics seem to prefer a Protestant like Hallam to a writer of their own creed. In a sense they are justified by the general amateurishness of American Catholic

scholarships, at least in things mediæval. That reproach is now removed in part. This book is in real learning away beyond Hallam, and fully equal in style to the best put forth by that able writer, while for a true appreciation of mediæval life Hallam is distinctly inferior.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

La divinité de Jésus-Christ. Conférences préchées à Saint-Jacques du-Haut-Pas. Par D. Viellard-Lacharme. Lecoffre: Paris, 1904. 8°, pp. 287.

We have here in book-form the conferences given by the author in Paris last winter. They are eight in number, and deal effectively with the attacks recently made by critics on the Divinity of Christ.

Attention is first called to the pre-eminence of Christ in history and to the moral elevation of the race due to this pre-eminence. On friends and foes alike the attractive personality of Christ exerted an uplifting influence. He opened out the perspective of the Infinite, taught the dignity and worth of the human individual, and initiated a moral progress of which He himself is the visible ideal. Intellectually, morally and religiously Christ's work is a renewal and purification of humanity. Thought and action alike drew inspiration from the Perfect Life once lived on earth.

How explain this universal attractiveness of Christ's personality? As the inheritance of beliefs which our fathers held before us and transmitted ready-made? Hardly, for this theory of atavism would have made faith in Christ's personality impossible at the outset, and is belied by the facts of the first conversions no less than by those of the Oxford movement in our own times. However much the perpetuation of belief may be influenced by the three forces of heredity, environment, and education, there comes a time in most men's lives when the acceptance of the faith of the fathers is no longer perfunctory, but the free, vital, moral and personal work of the individual upon due examination. Christianity is an appeal to all the faculties of man, not merely to the intellect. Man whole and entire is concerned in its acceptance. It is only by divorcing these complex interests that the critic succeeds in weakening the force of the appeal, as if it were an affair of pure logic and in no wise presupposed good will, a moral element.

Nor can the fact of Christ's universal attractiveness be explained on the theory of His sovereign and exceptional genius. The impression which genius makes is not lasting. It soon becomes an affair of memory, whereas Christ's influence is one of life, of actuality, now as

heretofore undiminished. The critic cannot suppress Christ's divinity by exalting his humanity. The theory of an exalted humanity is a makeshift wholly inadequate to the burden of explanation which the critic places upon it.

Every naturalistic theory breaks down of its own weight. The Catholic solution that Christ is divine forces itself upon the mind in consequence. The author, to bring out the proof of Christ's divinity, studies in detail the title "Son of God" in its progressive manifestation by Christ from the day in the temple when He said He must be about His Father's business to the day when He solemnly affirmed His divine Sonship to the High Priest. Is this title "Son of God" to be understood in a proper or only in a moral sense?

The moral theory cannot account for the facts either of Christ's personal affirmations or of the Apostle's understanding of them. A meaning much more profound attaches to Christ's personal declarations concerning Himself, and is demanded by the absolute uniqueness of His Person.

Recognition of the historical fact that these statements were made leads to the question of their value. Christ's doctrinal and moral teaching so utterly surpasses in sublimity, purity, and simplicity of expression the teaching of the ancients, and his sinless, self-contained, and unfanatical life is raised so high above all the characters of history, that it is impossible to admit either self-deception, or a willingness to deceive in this "ideal type of Moral Beauty." His works are additional attestation of the value of His words, and the Church is ever a living witness to the same.

Belief in Christ's divinity is neither the product of an excited imagination on the part of the Apostles, nor an after-thought due to St. Paul's speculative genius, and the importation of Greek philosophy into the simple faith of the Synoptists. It is impossible that ignorant men, as were the Apostles, could have invented, much less carried through successfully, a movement based on so great a mystery as that of God made man; all the more so as the Jewish spirit was jealously monotheistic, and contemporary belief could not by one man, even a St. Paul, be lifted permanently out of its traditionally appointed grooves. The primitive Church was not of such a character as to receive passively a metaphysical view like this unless it expressed the content of the actual faith it already had in mind and heart.

Of this living faith the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, the struggle against the early heresies, the rites of worship, the professions of faith made by the martyrs and sealed with their blood, are a cloud of witnesses. It was not philosophy or theory that produced faith in

Christ's divinity, but it was the living faith of the Christian community that created a philosophy and theology to give rational and systematic expression to what it already believed.

This work gives a good insight into the general trend of current criticism and meets the critic on his own ground. Of course, in these conferences one will not find, and should not expect, the minutiae of specialized studies. The view taken is large, clear, and cogent. It enables the reader to appreciate the total drift of Faith and to contrast this with the partialities of Criticism.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Catholic Ideals in Social Life. By Fr. Cuthbert, O.S.F. Benziger, 1904, 8°, pp. 250. \$1.25.

It is generally recognized that a complex process of readjustment is going on in society, between state and society, between them and religion, particularly the Catholic Church, and between traditional views of persons, of duties, and newer broader conceptions of life and its relations. When we hold tenaciously to the old, as many do, or holding to old phrases, coerce these into new meanings as some do we find real hindrance to objective appreciation of facts and tendencies. When we scout the old, break with it and yield to the fascination of new attitudes, we find equal difficulty. The author of this volume has happily avoided extremes and has given us a work full of real human sympathy, loyal faith and fine discernment. In treating such border question as State, Church, Liberty, Woman, The Priest and Social Reform, The Spiritual Apostolate of the Working man, he speaks with the frankness of clear insight as well as with its reserve. The aim of the book is to direct Catholic thought and action toward the demands made by modern conditions, "to give expression to the Catholic mind touching some of the most urgent questions of the hour in regard to social life and conduct." However, the author tells us more about the Catholic mind as it should be than as it is. He calls attention rightly to the "over-systematizing and overformulating" within the Church which have tended to stamp out individuality; to the present duty of the Church "to reconstruct her social and political life"; to the fact that "Christianity is tolerant of defective social systems whilst absolutely uncompromising within the more intimate sphere of personal life"; to the farce seen when a man endows "a hospital whilst at the same time he systematically sweats his workmen and starves the workman's children"; to the fact that not infrequently "the immediate duty springing from our Christian fellowship lies not in the direction of the Church, but in that of the ballot

box." The book is filled with the most attractive common sense views of life and faith and social duty. If one bring human sympathy and some Christian zeal to the reading of it, one will not fail to profit greatly.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

Het Boek der Rechters. Door D. A. Sloet, 's Hertogenbosch, 1904.
Het Eerste en Tweede Boek der Koningen. Door Dr. A. Janssen,
 's Hertogenbosch, 1904. 8°, pp. 202, 285.

Among the Catholic commentaries on the Book of Judges we do not know of any superior in merit to the recent work of Father Sloet. The author follows in the footsteps of Father Lagrange, to whom, of course, he owes a great deal. The commentary on the Books of Samuel also, by Dr. A. Janssen, bears testimony to the great learning of its author. Let us hope that these two commentaries may soon be translated into a language in which they shall find a large circle of readers.

The future historian of biblical studies in Holland will be able to make an interesting comparison between the Introduction to Genesis by Dessens and the Preface to the Book of Judges by Sloet: rapid movement is no longer an exclusive characteristic of the New World.

HENRY POELS.

Summa Theologia Moralis, Scholarum usui accommodavit H. Nolden. Vol. I, de Principiis, Theologiæ Moralis; Vol. II, de Præceptis; Vol. II, de Sacramentis. Cœniponte: Fel. Rauch, 1904.

A new edition of Father Nolden's *Summa Theologia Moralis* has lately come from the press. The fact that this is the fourth edition of the volumes "De Principiis and de Præceptis" and the fifth of "De Sacramentis" attests the popularity of the work. The general division into which the author has thrown his *Summa* is a logical one and will help to make it more serviceable for practical use. Father Nolden's style is clear and simple, and his latin in marked contrast to Fr. Lehmkuhl's can be read with ease.

But while a useful compendium Fr. Nolden's work can hardly lay claim to be a true *summa* of moral theology. For like so many manuals of our day it is lacking in just those elements which are necessary in anything like a full and adequate work on this science. Like them it gives comparatively scant treatment to the fundamental principles of morality while enlarging upon rules and methods of application. Thus the author's first volume "De Principiis" is by far the smallest one, while it should be, we venture to say, if not larger than the others at least as large. For in it are the tracts "De

Ultimo Fine, de Actibus Humanis, de Conscientia, de Virtutibus," tracts which set forth the fundamental principles of the Christian life. A more extended discussion of the matter that would come within the range of this volume—of the "virtues," of the passions and of habits, we judge to be absolutely necessary even in works that ambition to be only of the general scope of Fr. Noldin. Then again the treatise on sin, we think, has taken on too much the restricted character of casuistry. This may be sufficient for the confessional; but more than this is required if moral theology is to hold its right place among the moral sciences.¹ It is because of the absence in the late works on morals of its speculative side of the failure to present what may be called its essential and dogmatic phase that moral theology has come to be reckoned as being but a mass of jejune rules and prohibitions uninformed with the vitalizing principles of a true and high science. Such was not the moral theology of St. Thomas and Suarez, as seen in the *De Legibus* of the one and the *Secunda Secundæ* of the other. It were well for the character and repute of this branch of theology if the ideals presented by these works were kept more in mind.

JOHN WEBSTER MELODY.

The Life of St. Teresa of Jesus written by herself and translated from the Spanish by David Lewis. Third edition, enlarged; with additional notes and an introduction by Rev. Fr. Benedict Zimmerman, O.C.D. London: Thomas Baker, 1904. Pp. xliii-489. Price 8/ net.

The autobiography of the foundress of the reformed Carmelites is too well known to need comment or recommendation, except with regard to the care exercised by the translator, the editor, and the publisher; and, in the case of the volume before us, at this moment, we are happily able to speak in the highest terms of the way in which all three of these have done their work. We have in the present book a piece of spiritual literature, of enduring value both to the hagiologist and to the pious reader, rendered into irreproachable English and printed in a manner to delight the most fastidious. It is questionable if in any language, there exists a more generally acceptable version of the Saint's life. As originally edited by David Lewis, this publication attained the high standard of all the work done by the distinguished translator of the writings of St. John of the Cross. In the present edition, except for the regrettable omission of the

¹ See "Moral Theology at the End of the Nineteenth Century," by Very Rev. Thos. Bouquillon in CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY BULLETIN, April, 1899.

first editor's marginal notes, we have a reproduction of the first, with an addition of no mean value in the shape of a long preface from the pen of Father Zimmerman.

St. Teresa's account of her own spiritual life is not what one would call light reading; her pages really require considerable careful study in order that their lessons may be brought home to the mind. They are not of an order to attract the frivolous or the shallow; and they do introduce one to some of the deepest problems of mystical theology. But the people who can learn from these confessions are no small number. Recent times have witnessed something like a general spread of interest in the phenomena of the spiritual geniuses who are called "saints" in the Church; few such geniuses have been the subject of more careful attention than the great Spanish mystic whose life we are at present considering. It is a pleasant thing therefore, to find that the book, which is of all books the most reliable and illuminating for the manifesting of her characteristics, has been placed within reach of the English reader in a form so satisfactory that few critics will discover defects worth mentioning.

JOSEPH MCSORLEY.

Life and Life-work of Mother Theodore Guérin, Foundress of the Sisters of Providence at St.-Mary-of-the-Woods, Vigo County, Indiana. By a member of the same Congregation. New York, Cincinnati, Chicago: Benziger Brothers, 1904. Pp. 500.

Cardinal Gibbons, in his introduction to the Life of Mother Guérin, reminds the reader of the debt of gratitude which the Catholics of America owe to the Religious women who have played so large a part in the pioneer work of building up the Church in this new world of ours. Prominent among those who possess such a claim on us is the subject of the present biography. In the early days of the diocese of Vincennes, this valiant woman, strong, prudent, practical, energetic, a leader, an educator of no ordinary merit, and a nun given over heart and soul to the cause of religion, proved herself to be a providential instrument for the carrying on of God's work in a place and under circumstances which would have rendered many a willing laborer helpless. The volume which tells the story of her characteristics, her trials, and her successes will be of interest and profit to many souls more or less familiar with duties and obstacles of the same sort as those by which this remarkable woman achieved her mission.

JOSEPH MCSORLEY.

L'Abbé Eusèbe Renaudot, *Essai sur sa vie, et sur son oeuvre liturgique*, par Antoine Villien. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 288.

It is not usually known to what an extent the best modern studies on the history of the liturgy are based on the toilsome labors of seventeenth century writers. The liturgies of the East, in particular, were first thoroughly examined, read in the original, and then translated and published by Renaudot in his famous *Collection of the Oriental Liturgies* (Paris, 1715-1716, 2 vols.). As is well known, his translation of the sacramental rituals of the Orientals was published by Denzinger (1863-1864). We owe him also, in very great measure, the "Perpetuité de la Foi" originally planned and partly executed by Arnould, but completed and defended by Renaudot, to so great an extent that it usually goes by his name. This work was compiled in defence of the Oriental belief in the Real Presence and the Transubstantiation, as was his edition of the Eucharist-homilies of Gennadius, Nectarius, Meletius, and other ancient Greek patriarchs (1709). His narrative of the Jacobite patriarchs of Alexandria (1713) is yet a valuable source for the history of Monophysitism, as may be seen by the use made of it by Dr. Neale in his *History of the Church of Alexandria*. Renaudot also edited some mediæval Moslem travels in India and China (1718), and wrote a critical refutation of a multitude of false statements in the *Dictionnaire* of Bayle (1697). His name is forever a shining one in the historiography of Oriental liturgy. Tireless, critical, deeply reverent of the past, he had a large share of ecclesiastical credit and influence. His grandfather and father were the creators of modern French journalism and belonged to the distinguished coterie of men who held with Port-Royal and the Jansenists. Renaudot was a strong Gallican and an anti-Jesuit in the stirring period that centres about the year 1700, and that was so productive of feelings and passions whose final outcome was the French Revolution. As owner of the *Gazette de France*, he was also a politician and had a rôle of importance after the arrival of James II in France and the establishment of his court at St. Germain. This story of his life emphasizes the scholarly labors of French ecclesiastics in the reign of Louis XIV in defence of the ancient faith; Renaudot was in touch with most of these savants, whom the work of the Abbé Villien brings before us in numbers, and with much vividness of presentation. All theologians will welcome the pages (171-267) on the condition of liturgical studies before Renaudot and the advance accomplished by him, as well as the description of his principal theories and ideas concerning the growth, content and spirit of the oldest liturgies.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

La Sainte Vierge, par. René-Marie de la Broise (Les Saints). Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 247.

Saint Paulin de Nole, Evêque de Nole (353-431), par André Baudrillart. Ibid., 1905. 8°, pp. 190.

St. Léon IX (1002-1054), par l'abbé Eugène Martin. Ibid., 1904. 8°, pp. 208.

Les Seize Carmélites de Compiègne, par Victor Pierre. Ibid., 1905. 8°, pp. 188.

Le Bienheureux Curé D'Ars (1786-1859), par Joseph Vianey. Ibid., 1905. 8°, pp. 200.

The hagiographical collection of "Les Saints" has swollen to stately proportions. The volumes before us are all in keeping with the principles and traditions established at the beginning—sufficiency and conciseness of historical information, brevity of narrative, sobriety and timeliness of bibliographical reference, spirit of reverence and critical fair-mindedness, Fr. de la Broise writes of the Blessed Virgin, and draws his material from the approved sources of the New Testament, and from ancient ecclesiastical tradition, also from the consensus of theologians and the intimate spiritual experience of the Saints. His volume is worthy of a careful meditative perusal. Fr. Baudrillart unfolds a chapter of fourth-century ecclesiastical life in a remote town of Central Italy. Paulinus of Nola, a Gallo-Roman grandee of the first order, is exhibited to our view in a very pleasing and instructive manner. Nobleman, convert, ascetic, gentleman, writer, art-critic, bishop and saint—there is scarcely a phase of the contemporary Christianity which his life and writings and relations do not illustrate. He fits in well between Jerome and Ambrose, Damasus and Augustine; we could ill-afford to lose the side-lights that his correspondence and his poems throw upon the inner life of the new religion in the first century of its triumphal progress through the Mediterranean world. The Abbé Martin, well known for his scholarly works on the local ecclesiastical history of Alsace, keeps up the reputation of Alsatian Catholics for historiographical services, by a very good but strongly condensed life of the great Alsatian noble and bishop, Bruno of Toul, who became pope under the name of Leo IX, and is venerated as a saint. Leo IX is a product of the Cluny politico-ecclesiastical spirit and a near forerunner of the indomitable men who in the next hundred years were to wage a war of life or death for ecclesiastical liberty and the distinction of the temporal and spiritual powers. The touching narrative of the sixteen holy Carmelite nuns who died for the Catholic

faith in the French Revolution, at Compiègne (July 17, 1794), will be new to many readers, at least in the minute details that are here set forth by M. Victor Pierre. Finally, the well-known history of the Curé d'Ars, who is almost of yesterday, is told with sympathy and admiration by his near relative M. Joseph Vianey, a circumstance that, in this case, adds a peculiar value to the life of a holy priest who was distinctly of the people, and whose days were passed in the humble but heavenly service of mankind as a rural parish priest. His beatification (Jan. 8, 1905) by the first parish priest who has risen to the papal throne in many a long day is an event so close to the memory of all as to call for no special comment. Every community, college and academy, not to speak of cultured Catholic families, should subscribe to the entire collection of "Les Saints"; they are a new gallery of portraits of the saints that complete Butler, while they do not pretend to relegate to obscurity that calm and judicious historian of the chosen souls of Catholicism.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Les Sources de L'Histoire de France, des Origines aux Guerres d'Italie, V. Les Valois, Louis XI et Charles VIII (1461-1494). Paris: Picard, 1905. 8°, pp. clxxxvii + 192.

We have always noticed with extreme satisfaction the appearance of the "fascicules" of "The Sources of French History" begun and executed in its first part by M. Auguste Molinier, professor in the Ecole des Chartes. The present (fifth) fascicule brings to completion the first part or section of this epoch-making work. In 5,651 numbers or paragraphs this distinguished master of historical teaching has described scientifically as many historical writings dealing with the history of French territory from the earliest times to the year 1494. As we have more than once explained the great usefulness of this bibliographical manual, it does not seem necessary to do more than indicate its completion. At the same time, it is to be regretted that the author should have passed away while the last pages of his work were going through the press; he did not live to reap the reward of praise and congratulation that he well deserved. Every student of history will appreciate the admirable general introduction (I-CLXXXVII) in which the author describes with the authority of a master the characteristics of mediæval historiography. France need no longer envy Germany her Wattenbach and her Lorenz.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

The Gospel Applied To Our Times. A Sermon for every Sunday in the year. By Rev. D. S. Phelan. St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder, 1904. 8°, pp. 473.

Without flattery this is a volume of excellent sermons. The doctrine is timely, well-chosen, correct and sufficient. The diction is pithy and vivid, marked also by a certain fresh candor and boldness that are here in their place. The tone that pervades the collection is one of moral earnestness and responsibility. The sermons are all short, "preachable" within the space of thirty minutes, and deal with subjects of every-day and primary importance. There is very little useless repetition, and almost no useless ornament. Father Phelan himself gives the key-note of his preaching when he calls his book an application to our daily lives of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. He speaks at all times like one who has a message to deliver in the name of another, and that other is the Saviour of Mankind.

The introductory remarks of Father Phelan are conceived in his characteristic vein of honest and fearless bluntness. When he says that his long experience as a writer of editorials in a prominent Catholic newspaper has made him strong in the qualities of "consecutive thought and orderly arrangement," he is uttering no boast. All the world knows that the editor of the "Western Watchman" is master of many literary gifts, among which none are more regularly in evidence than his plain directness of utterance and his logical habit of mind. The thoughts, counsel and speech of such a man are of course at all times valuable. Woe to the cause that neglects the varied wisdom of experience and the distribution of gifts that the Holy Spirit has made! We might object to the statement that "only parish priests know the secret of preaching effectively." On reflection, these words must suffer exceptions and modifications that will at once commend themselves to the author, and are no doubt implicitly accepted by him. Nor do we think that the old sermon-books are yet utterly out of touch with the great modern lines of thought and action. This is scarcely the place to enter more deeply on these considerations. Would that we had a noble "History of Preaching" written from a Catholic point of view, in which all such questions would be discussed, calmly and philosophically, with the pages of our long history open to the writer, and all the gifts of the historical investigator assured to him in their plenitude! In the meantime every priest should possess a copy of Father Phelan's sermons, and not only every priest, but every Catholic institution, and even every Catholic family. They represent Jesus Christ, and as

such have an apostolic mission, to which corresponds the duty of reading and meditating the truths they set forth.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

The Christian Gentlewoman and the Social Apostolate. By Katherine E. Conway. Boston: Thomas J. Flynn and Co., 1904. 16°, pp. 98.

For this timely little book, we are all, both men and women, the debtors of Miss Conway. Unconsciously, but also to a great extent, the woman of the United States has been losing some of the lovely traits that once characterized her. An unintelligent mania of imitation, and an irreligious materialistic atmosphere, are largely responsible for the loss of qualities and the decay of sentiments that once placed woman on a peculiarly high and sacrosanct level, idealized her in a sense at once true and Christian, and counterbalanced her political and juridical inferiority by a chivalrous homage and defence that only Christianity could suggest and sustain. The four chapters of this work are entitled: *The Christian Woman and the Social Apostolate, Being Broad-Minded, The Novel-Habit, The Uses of Prosperity.* Those who know with what fulness of literary experience, gentle but pointed wit, good taste and moderation, Miss Conway approaches her subject, will not be astonished to learn that they are all largely in evidence on every page of this admirable little book. There is scarcely a public relationship of woman that is not touched on, from a point of view at once Christian, Catholic, and supremely sensible. Every woman should make this book a "livre de chevet," and not only this one, but the entire "Family Sitting-Room Series." The others are entitled: *A Lady and Her Letters, Making Friends and Keeping Them, Questions of Honor and the Christian Life, Bettering Ourselves.* They are at once tasty in form and cheap in price. Why should not such lovely and useful works be scattered through the land as prizes on the occasion of academic graduation exercises in parochial schools and convents? They might well replace inferior and colorless material for which much money is spent to little avail.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Studies in Biblical Law. By Harold M. Wiener. London: David Nutt, 1904. Pp. ix + 128.

These studies contain some good remarks, e. g., that parts of the Mosaic legislation are not "jural" laws, but exhortations to the people. M. Wiener is profoundly attached to the faith of his fathers

and never uses the name of Jehovah. He hates the critics and speaks very "frankly" of them. In his opinion critics should be lawyers. Many critics are in fact perfectly acquainted with the fundamental principles and history of ancient legislation; but M. Wiener seems to forget that lawyers when dealing with Old Testament topics, should also be critics.

H. POELS.

Questions De Principes concernant l'Exégèse Catholique contemporaine. Par le R. P. P. B. Lacome, O.P. Paris: Bureaux de la Revue Thomiste, 1904, Pp. 207.

This book is one of those which should be read by every one who teaches either dogmatic theology or biblical exegesis. He will find *multa* and *multum*.

In the opinion of Father Lacome a modern theologian must be a philosopher and a critic at the same time. His philosophical principles are those of St. Thomas. There are none better. But in this work the principles of the Angelic Doctor are reduced to a living science: the author's theology has grown in the new atmosphere of the modern world.

Father Lacome is strongly opposed to some quasi-historical theories, which are founded on false philosophical systems. As a whole we perfectly agree with him. In questions of fact, however, one might be justified in thinking that his description of the present conditions of affairs is too dark, especially if applied to the Catholic world at large. The author himself can hardly expect that all Catholic scholars will approve of his panegyric on the genius of the Latin races. Among Anglo-Saxons and Germans Father Lacome discovers "dans le vieux fond de la race" something which is an obstacle to "le génie catholique." Our answer is a prayer for France and a smile for the author.

However, every reader of the book will agree that it is the work of a scholar. It does not belong to that class of theological writings which critics pass by without notice, because their authors did not keep abreast of modern science.

The book has no index. We do not know whether such is a consequence of the writer's antipathy to German scholarship or not; but even French readers would like to find him in this regard a little more German.

The first chapter treats of Theology and Exegesis. Here Kant is contrasted with Aristotle. As regards the distinction between history and theology, our attention is called to the impossibility of

"le doute méthodique," and we are shown why exegetes need the "theological spirit."

In the second chapter the author examines: "The object of history. The causes. The historical fact." His readers will be especially interested in his remarks on "the literary character of the discourses of Jesus in the Gospel of St. John" (pp. 72 ff.), "the divinity of Christ in the Synoptics" (87 ff.) and "the historical method" (31 ff.).

After this he shows us that *theories* are merely instruments for the discovery of truth. He warns us against identifying them with real science.

The fourth chapter, in which he treats of "Tradition," is the most interesting of all. "La tradition est appelée à nous fournir deux choses: les éléments matériels qui manquent à la constitution des théories, l'esprit dans lequel doit se faire leur choix, leur assemblage, leur emploi" (139). The author shows the absolute impossibility of writing a scientific history without frequently using the "tradition" (150-169). We believe that the written documents conceal more "life" than Father Lacome seems to admit; but this whole chapter deserves to be carefully studied.

Finally, in his last chapter, on "The future of Biblical Exegesis in the Catholic Church," the learned Dominican points out the course which, in his opinion, Catholic exegetes ought to follow in the future. He shows the weak spots in the methods of our opponents, but no one is more convinced than he that we have to make our own of what we find in their works: "une méthode historique" and several "résultats acquis par cette méthode" (p. 204).

The author hits the nail on the head when says: "On ne saura jamais ce que perd l'Eglise par la diminution de son autorité intellectuelle. C'est à cette autorité qu'elle a dû dans le passé ses succès. L'Eglise du Christ a renoncé dès le début à toutes les puissances de ce monde, sauf à la puissance de l'esprit" (p. 202). The author appeals to the Fathers and medieval Scholastics. "Depuis, au contraire, elle a reculé et perdu du terrain, à mesure que baissait son autorité doctrinale." "En ces siècles de fièvre intellectuelle, d'idolâtrie de la science, elle seule régit, et celui-la gouverne le monde qui commande au nom de la science (ibid.)."

We cordially recommend this book not only to those who are interested in biblical studies, but also to those Catholics who do not seem to realize the need of a Catholic University in America.

H. POELS.

REV. WILLIAM C. CURRIE.

Rev. William C. Currie of St. Patrick's Church, Philadelphia, Pa., died December 20, 1904. He was a student of the University during the scholastic year 1890-91. From this time until his last illness Father Currie was engaged in parochial work and in this field of labor well fulfilled the promise of his student days. His life was marked by a manifest love for his priestly duties and a generosity of spirit that reckoned no sacrifice too great in their behalf. His simplicity of soul and genial, sanguine temperament bore him up uncomplaining under the "burden of the day and the heats." At his death few ranked higher in the respect and esteem of his brother priests and to be revered as he was revered by those who lived and worked with him is the sure proof of true worth. The memory of this life of one of the first of those who have gone out from her halls, the University will always keep sacred, and for his unflagging interest in her affairs she will ever be grateful. May he rest in peace.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Award from the Carnegie Institute.—Dr. Albert F. Zahm has received from the Carnegie Institute an award of one thousand dollars for the current year to continue his experimental researches in aerodynamics.

Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul.—The patronal feast of the Faculty of Theology was celebrated on January 25. The High Mass was sung by the Very Rev. T. J. Shahan, D.D., and the sermon was preached by the Very Rev. C. P. Grannan, D.D.

Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas.—The patronal feast of the Faculty of Philosophy was celebrated on Tuesday, March 7. The High Mass was sung by his Excellency Most Rev. Diomedeo Falconio, Apostolic Delegate to the United States. The sermon was preached by Very Rev. E. A. Pace, D.D., of the Faculty of Philosophy.

Annual Retreat for Students.—The annual retreat for the students was given March 8–12 by the Very Rev. D. J. Kennedy, O.P., S.T.M., Prior of St. Joseph's House of Studies, Somerset, Ohio.

Finances of the University.—The Financial Committee of the University have invested since October, 1904, the sum of \$100,000.

During the month of January a bequest of the late Mr. Patrick Carroll, Albany, N. Y., amounting to \$480.67 was received by the University.

The second annual collection for the University promises to be even more successful than the first. The returns from forty-five dioceses up to February 20 amounts to \$80,000, an increase of \$18,000 over the sums received from the same dioceses last year.

A movement has been inaugurated by the Knights of Columbus at the suggestion of his Eminence Cardinal Gibbons to raise additional funds for the University.

The Exhibit of Catholic Philanthropical Work at the St. Louis Exposition has been acquired by the University.

Annual Meeting of the Alumni Association.—The eleventh annual meeting of the Alumni Association of the Catholic University of America was held at the Bellevue-Stratford hotel in Philadelphia on

February 23, 1905, the President, Rev. Wm. J. Higgins, being in the chair. In a few gracious words the President welcomed the members of the association to Philadelphia in the name of the alumni of that city.

The minutes of the previous meeting were read and adopted. The treasurer's report showed a balance on hand of \$134.35. The historian, Rev. Father Duffy, gave an interesting account of the literary work that had already been done by a number of the alumni and told of the distinction achieved by several of the members in various spheres of activity. He regretfully recorded the deaths of Rev. Thos. C. McGolrick and John T. Stinson of the Archdiocese of Boston, honored members of this association, who had passed away during the previous year.

Dr. Kerby made a report from which it appeared that \$1,200 had been paid over to the Rector of the University for the Bouquillon Library. It was voted that Dr. Kerby be instructed to issue a circular letter to the alumni calling attention again to the Bouquillon Library Fund, and requesting subscriptions. It was further voted that such a letter be issued every six months until the three years' time originally agreed upon for the receiving of subscriptions shall have expired.

The committee appointed last year to draw up a new constitution made its report through Rev. Dr. Maguire. After the report of the committee was accepted and the committee itself discharged a detailed discussion of the proposed constitution followed. With some few amendments the constitution submitted by the committee was accepted, and the secretary was instructed to have the instrument, as amended, printed and sent to every member of the association.

Rev. Dr. Kerby announced to the meeting the determination of the trustees to open an undergraduate department at the University the beginning of the next scholastic year. He bespoke the lively interest of the association for the new department and the support that must follow such interest. Rev. Father Duffy introduced resolutions expressive of sympathy for the University in its late financial straits, from which happily it was emerging, and of loyalty to and approval of its prospective departure in inaugurating a department for undergraduate students. On motion of Father McSorley the secretary was instructed to request the faculties of the University to forward such information and advice to the members of the Alumni Association as would enable the latter to coöperate the more effectively with the University in making the proposed undergraduate department a success.

It was decided that the next meeting of the Association should be held in Albany, N. Y.

The following were elected officers for the ensuing year: President, Rev. E. A. O'Connor; First Vice-President, Rev. J. T. Driscoll; Second Vice-President, Rev. J. J. Lynch; Secretary-Treasurer, Rev. J. W. Melody, D.D.; Historian, Rev. F. O. Duffy. Executive Committee, Revs. J. W. McDermott, P. H. McClean, Messrs. F. Guilfoile, Wm. Kennedy, F. Garvan. Membership Committee, Revs. McSorley, Wiest, Martin, Kerby, Fitzgerald and O'Neill.

After a vote of thanks had been voted to the alumni of Philadelphia for their cordial hospitality shown on the occasion of the eleventh annual reunion, the meeting, on motion, adjourned.

At the banquet which followed the business session of the Alumni his Excellency the Apostolic Delegate responded to the toast "Our Holy Father," the Right Rev. Rector to that of "The University," and Very Rev. P. J. Garvey, Rector of St. Charles Seminary, Overbrook, Pa., to that of "Our Philadelphia Hosts." His Grace Archbishop Keane of Dubuque, former Rector of the University, who was among the guests of honor, was the third speaker. His presence at the banquet was a source of the deepest gratification to the members of the Alumni Association, and his stirring and inspiring words brought back memories of the days when as head of the University he gave himself so unsparingly to the work of advancing the cause of Catholic higher education, not only within the University itself but throughout the country at large, where he pleaded for higher and nobler ideals of Catholic life and the means of attaining them through the enlargement and advancement of Catholic University education. In his address the Archbishop referred to the hopes entertained twenty years ago by the hierarchy and by his Holiness the late Pope Leo XIII of the good that would be accomplished by the foundation of a Catholic University in the United States, and to the degree in which these hopes have since been realized. An interesting reminiscence of a conversation about that time with Leo XIII relative to the character and government of the contemplated Catholic University was related by the Archbishop as follows:

"This evening recalls to my mind a conversation I had with Pope Leo XIII nearly nineteen years ago. He was then considering the question of the Catholic University of America. Ought it be established? If so what should be the manner of its conduct? He made up his mind that this country ought to have a University. He asked me what I thought of its government. I told him that some persons in this country thought it ought to be in charge of the Society of

Jesus. He brought his clenched hand vehemently down on the table at which we sat and exclaimed: 'jamais! I love the Society of Jesus—in its place; but a great institution of the Church's learning in your country must be organized like the Church itself—hierarchically.' ”

His Grace Archbishop Ryan made a brief address at the close of the banquet in which he called attention to the lesson every priest should learn from the humility of His Holiness Pope Pius X, and the reverent awe with which he accepted his exalted office.

DISCOVERY OF THE BASILICA OF SS. FELIX AND ADAUCTUS IN THE CEMETERY OF COMMODILLA.

The most important discovery made by the Commission of Sacred Archæology during the year 1904 was the cemeterial basilica of SS. Felix and Adauctus in the cemetery of Commodilla.¹ Like so many of the ancient Christian cemeteries of Rome the cemetery of Commodilla derives its name from a member of the community who donated the property under which it was excavated to the Church as a place of interment for her co-religionists. Professor Marucchi is of the opinion that this cemetery existed as early as the latter part of the first or the beginning of the second century; as to its foundress nothing is known except her name. The two martyrs in whose honor a cemeterial basilica was erected, Felix and Adauctus, suffered, according to their legendary acts, in the persecution of Diocletian; Merita, another martyr interred in this cemetery, according to the equally unreliable documents relative to her martyrdom, won her crown in the persecution of Valerian. The only reliable information from an ancient source that we possess relative to the former martyrs is that contained in the metrical inscription erected in their honor by Pope Damasus (366-384); and even this tells us nothing more than that a priest named Verus was commissioned by Pope Damasus to adorn the tomb of the martyrs Felix and Adauctus, who, with faith undefiled, had confessed Christ and attained a heavenly reward:

O scmel atque iterum vero de nomine Felix
Qui intemerata fide contempto principe mundi
Confessus Christum cœlest(ia re)gna petiti
O vera pretiosa fides co(gnose)ite fratres

Qua ad cœlum victor parit(er proper)avit Adauctus
Presbyter his Verus Da(maso rect)ore jubente
Composuit tumulum sanctorum limina adornans

The basilica of SS. Felix and Adauctus was erected as a memorial

¹ Cf. *Nuovo Bulletino*, 1904, p. 41 sqq.; 161 sqq.; and *Röm. Quart. Erst. Heft*, 1904, p. 40 sqq.

to these martyrs during the pontificate of Pope Siricius (384-398). It consists of a single chamber excavated in the tufa, irregular in form, and in dimensions twelve by four meters. The natural tufa wall was, however, here and there reënforced by walls of mason-work, which were elevated, like the walls of the basilica of St. Petronilla, above the level of the campagna and sustained the roof. These walls are covered with stucco on which are depicted a number of highly interesting paintings, most of which Wilpert assigns to the sixth century. Several of these representations are very well preserved, and as the number of cemeterial frescoes painted subsequently to the capture of Rome by Alaric (410) is not very great, those recently discovered are for this reason all the more precious.

The first fresco that came to light in this cemeterial basilica represents a subject of which this is the first example discovered in the catacombs: the conferring of the keys on St. Peter. In the center our Lord, clothed in purple, is seated on the globe; His garments consist of the tunica talaris ornamented with the broad clavus, and the pallium. In His left hand He holds the codex of the Gospels, studded with gems; in His right are two keys which He is in the act of handing to St. Peter. The Prince of the Apostles, at His side, reaches forward to receive with veiled hands the precious volume. Although somewhat injured the traditional type of St. Peter in Christian art is easily recognized in this representation of the Apostle. On the other side of our Lord is an excellent and well-preserved picture of St. Paul; his hands, like those of St. Peter, are enfolded in his pallium, and in them he holds a package of six volumes.

Four other saints are represented on both sides of these, the central figures, SS. Adauetus and Merita on the left, St. Felix and the Protomartyr St. Stephen on the right. The picture of St. Stephen is especially well-preserved, that of St. Felix is only slightly injured; but on the other side the representation of St. Adauetus is almost wholly destroyed, and only the upper portion of that of St. Merita remains. The heads of all the figures are encircled with the nimbus, and the name of each personage, with the exception of our Lord, preceded by a cross and the abbreviated title SCS., is inscribed beside him. The Saints in whose honor the basilica was erected, Felix and Adauetus, hold their crowns in their veiled hands; the crown of St. Felix, studded with gems, is excellently preserved. St. Stephen and St. Merita have their hands outstretched in prayer—Orantes—the former, as well as St. Felix, has the large tonsure. St. Merita is represented without a veil, which shows that she was a virgin.

The style of this fresco, Wilpert tells us, is "relatively good"; the colors employed by the artist are excellent, and the whole scene produces a highly agreeable impression on the spectator. Our Lord is of the youthful type familiar in the frescoes of the catacombs; the four Saints nearest to Him, all advancing eagerly in His direction, recall the attitude of the Magi offering their gifts to the infant Saviour, a favorite subject of the earlier Christian artists. The absence of the cross from the nimbus of Christ is a strong indication that the fresco belongs to the early part of the sixth century, and as the basilica was restored by Pope John I (523-526) it is highly probable that they date from his pontificate.

A second fresco of this basilica in an excellent state of preservation represents the blessed Virgin, with the Child Jesus, seated majestically on a splendid throne. Christ holds in His right hand a sealed roll; Mary is clad in purple, with red shoes, and her head is covered with her cloak (*palla*). A white band projects from under the cloak on her forehead and in her left hand she holds the usual *mappa*. St. Felix and St. Adauctus stand on the right and left of the throne; the former is aged, resembling somewhat the type of St. Peter, and wears a full beard; the latter is youthful in appearance. Both Saints have the large tonsure, which proves that Adauctus as well as Felix, in the early part of the sixth century, was regarded as having belonged to the ranks of the clergy. In front of St. Adauctus is a lady, robed in purple like the blessed Virgin; in her hands, covered with a cloth, she holds a partially unfolded volume. From an inscription beneath the fresco we learn that this lady was a matron named Turtura who was granted the rare privilege of being buried near the bodies of the martyrs, that she was widowed at the age of 24, that this painting was placed above her tomb by her only son to whom she had faithfully fulfilled the duties of both father and mother, and that she died at the age of sixty. The right hand of St. Adauctus rests on the shoulder of Turtura in the fresco, which signifies that she is being presented to Christ by the holy martyr.

In another part of the basilica there is a representation of St. Luke painted, as an inscription states, in the time of the Emperor Constantine Pogonatus (668-685). As was to be expected from its later date this painting is much inferior in style to the others described. In his right hand the Evangelist holds a roll—the symbol of his vocation; while a reminiscence of his former calling is seen hanging on his left arm—a physician's satchel containing four surgical implements, one of which is a lance.

MAURICE M. HASSETT.

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LEBINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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PRACTICAL RELIGION AND UNIVERSITY EDUCATION.

The most important question in the development of our national life is the improvement of religious and moral teaching, so that it shall keep pace with all the improvements in secular teaching. There is needed in all classes an awakening of the spiritual and emotional life, such as religion alone can bring. A multitude of Christians are truly diseased, dyspeptic Christians, and they need active training of their moral and religious sense; which training, in turn, can not be acquired by any haphazard way, not by chance or instinct, or by regular growth of inner consciousness. Unless we cherish and nourish the spiritual warmth and vigor that God has made natural to each heart, they will die out, whereas, if we cultivate them in our schools the church will become a great power in the nation, win the coöperation of multitudes, and obtain on all sides an abundance of sympathy. There is everywhere a great need of bringing to the feet of Jesus Christ not alone the children of our land, but the growing youth, young men and women. They should be firmly established in His service and love and made to conform to Him in character, life, and mutual service. Statistics prove abundantly that if the young are not made servants and imitators of Jesus, they will not turn to Him for light and comfort in their old age. We need a higher and more liberal education of our clergy and of all our teachers, a greater perfection of all systematic re-

ligious teaching. Thus shall we have a multitude of men and women who will inform all phases of human activity with a spirit at once new and old—new because it has grown faint and rare, and old because it is identical with the mission of Jesus Christ. Once it was the custom to teach in the schools the truths of religion and practical righteousness; when this was done we had great men of clear thought, lofty patriotism, and moral heroism. If we cannot teach religion formally in the public schools, as is done in England and Germany, we can at least insist on the indirect teaching of it, in the home, to begin with. It is impossible to overestimate the responsibilities of parents for the religious teaching of their children. The home is a little college, where the father and mother are the faculty, their children the pupils, the words of father and mother the text-books, their pleasure or displeasure reward and punishment, their approval the seal of success. In the family should be the little altar of God, and family prayers should be said regularly but with devotion and loving faith, so that the children may imbibe a sweet and cheerful piety and know God's service to be one of gladsome cheer and great practical utility. All private schools, at least from the primary school or kindergarten to the greatest of our universities, should be informed with a spirit of Christian morality and religion. The ideas that are turning in the head of the youth of to-day will be deeds fashioned by the man of to-morrow. Mighty and manifold are the possibilities of a general national religious education. Could we have it, Christianity would be the common law of the land and the highest science of the race. The truest examples of morality and religion should be given by the teachers themselves, for obvious reasons, and notably by those who hold the highest places and stand for the most advanced knowledge. If these men had a profound and an intense Christian faith our nation would advance immeasurably on all the lines of morality and religion. Jesus Christ would be again an object of ardent love and loving imitation. It is wrong to imagine that religion is something external, like a material thing, to be taken or put away at will, and that man is naturally non-religious. No! man is naturally religious, as he is naturally gifted with five senses, or with an

intellect and a heart. The religious quality of the child's mind being natural calls therefore for a training, a formation, precisely as his power of walking or talking. All observation has shown that the child is freely and joyously religious, as he is freely and joyously playful.¹ Religion is a universal response to universal experience. And this is true of adolescence—of the youth of sixteen to twenty and of the maiden of the same age. What else is the source of their yearnings and their longings half-confessed and half-concealed, of their hero-worship, their miscellaneous romanticism, their strong admirations, their irresistible curiosities,—nay, of their sublime errors and follies? It is God who is appealing to them through the three great channels of all human spiritual development—the true, the good and the beautiful. They are

¹“The point of view of the-child-that-is and the point of view of the-man-that-he-should-become are reconciled through the insight that the later self is pre-formed in the earlier. It is possible to make education ethical because the child's nature is ethical; social because it is social. The ethical authority to which the child is taught to bow is already within the child himself. It is the same with religious education; it is the same with specifically Christian education. God has made us in his own image and likeness; he has formed us for himself, and there is a sense in which, as one of the Fathers said, the soul is naturally Christian.

“At this point religious thought transfigures the whole idea of education. The chief factor in the process is no longer the text-book; it is no longer the teacher; it is God who preforms the child for himself, plants within him the religious impulse, and grants to parents and teachers the privilege of co-operating to bring the child to a divine destiny. The time is not far behind us when men failed to connect the thought of childhood or the thought of education with the thought of God. They put education and religion in sharp antithesis, making one a human process, the other divine. Even to-day there is distrust of religious education lest it shall leave conversion and religious experience out of the account. But in reality infancy, childhood, and adolescence are themselves a divinely appointed school of personal religion, a school in which the divine Spirit is prime mover and chief factor. Religion does not flow from the teacher to the child; it is not given or communicated, or impressed, merely from without; it is a vital impulse, and its source is the source of all light and life. In the normal unfolding of a child's soul we behold the work of the Logos who gives himself to every man coming into the world. When the Logos comes to a child, he comes to his own, and it is in the profoundest sense natural that the child should increasingly receive him as the powers of the personality enlarge.

“The thought of God works a further transformation in our thought of education. For God's will compasses all the ends, his presence suffuses all the means, and his power works in all the processes of it. Accordingly religious education is not a part of general education, it is general education. It is the whole of which our so-called secular education is only a part or a phase. Religious education alone takes account of the whole personality, of all its powers, all its duties, all its possibilities, and of the ultimate reality of the environment. The special hours, places, and material employed in religious training do not stand for any mere department; they represent the inner meaning of education and of life in their totality.”—Dr. George Albert Coe, in *Proceedings of Religious Educational Association*, Chicago, 1903, pp. 48-50.

all "seekers after God" if so be they may find Him; their very aberrations and collapses only confirm this truth. Not only is the child naturally religious, but nature itself speaks the language of religion, is herself a manifestation of the existence of one God, of His divine attributes, His power, goodness and mercy. Even human knowledge is a moral and religious force by its nature—the man who knows something is, usually speaking, a better and a higher being than the man who knows nothing. So it is that if all these truths were set to work in the minds of our children they would grow up Christians, and be so gladly and freely, and never know themselves for anything else in our society.

There should always be a sincere respect for the individuality of the Christian soul of youth. Every child is God's understudy, and as such demands all reverence and sympathy. In every child religion is a vital growing force, as real as any physical force—he will be either religious or irreligious. Every child comes from God and is destined to be returned to Him—he should therefore learn the dealings of God with all His other children, i. e., the history of the Old Testament and the New Testament, the life of Jesus Christ, and the lives of His great servants, usually called His saints. There are not two kinds of education, secular and religious, but there is one kind of education, which is religious or irreligious, and can easily become anti-religious. Nor ought we be content with educating in religion and morality the little children; the agony of the situation is by no means in the education of the little ones, but in the education of the young men and women in our colleges and universities. What is really needed is strong Christian character and personality in the teachers—not more abundance of hard facts, more academical information, more encyclopædias and museums and laboratories, but more spiritual power, more moral and religious courage that shall be contagious and help to deaden the earthly and sordid influences about us, not to stifle religious aspiration and all thought of God.

All future teachers of youth should be first profoundly trained in the principles of morality and religion—it is no

longer desirable to abandon the formation of a child or a youth to persons who know or care nothing about Christian morality or the Christian religion. They should at least know and believe and teach that there is one God, that all men are His children, and therefore brothers, that human life is the most valuable of earthly things, and that there exists a moral order with consequent human responsibility to the divine Maker and the model of that order. These truths, at least, should be taught to all our American youth, and by every possible agency, in all schools whatsoever, and it should be made clear how these fundamental Christian truths affect practically all forms of human life. All grades of children and youth, whatever their age and intelligence, should be made to know these truths and to appreciate them. Clergymen and teachers should everywhere disseminate them and make themselves by special training more and more capable of illustrating them. If Sunday does not furnish sufficient occasion, then let sufficient time be taken on week-days, but let all American children be taught the elements of Christian morality and religious belief.

Religious education is so important that it may be called "a great and gracious sacrament." But it must have for its ministers thoroughly trained and approved men, clergymen and teachers of spiritualized hearts and convinced minds. Once we have such a body of religiously trained and believing teachers we shall be able to mould in every sense that public opinion which is the real queen of our lives and our institutions. It is of the highest importance that the need of a religious and moral training for all teachers should be insisted on in all newspapers and magazines, by all prominent and authoritative persons, in the family circle on every occasion, in the societies of the young, by the high-school teachers and the university professors. Would that an army of such spiritual men and women were at hand to inform the consciences of the 22,000,000 of scholastic youth in the United States, of whom fully 13,000,000 are receiving in the schools no formal religious or moral training whatsoever, and none of whom are provided by the public authority with any such

training! It is necessary that we should come together in every state and territory of the Union and form one great influential association that shall inculcate fundamental principles, the necessity of a reform in moral training that shall cover all the departments of education from the lowest to the highest, and a union or blending of religion with morality and knowledge as all three being necessary for good government. Let us disseminate correct thinking on these general lines, and let us combine throughout the United States, so that henceforth these general ideas shall be made the common property of all good men and women, and operative through the following channels—universities and colleges, theological seminaries, churches and clergymen, Sunday schools, high schools and academies, primary and grammar schools, private schools, personal training of teachers, societies for young men and young women, the home circle, books, periodicals and libraries, the press in general, organized correspondence clubs, and religious art and music. Let us hold an annual meeting of all persons of good will, so that a great wave of feeling may be set in motion that shall surge through our American life and bear to victory these few great and shaping ideas, and thus save our state and our civilization from a general apostasy from Jesus Christ.

The foregoing declaration of general principles is such as might be signed by any Catholic and indeed voices our views with a certain fulness and accuracy. Yet not one word of it comes from a Catholic pen; it is all taken from the published report of the First Annual Convention of the Religious Education Association held at Chicago in February, 1903. Men and women from every walk of life crowded the vast Auditorium for several days, and, it is to be presumed, accepted and sympathized with the above views as presented by the ablest scholars and the most renowned educators from the various branches of Protestantism. I have read this report from cover to cover, and made from its prayers, speeches, papers and discussions the above mosaic of the general thought and purpose of the Association. While a Catholic

student cannot fail to be impressed with certain peculiarities stamped upon the Protestant mind by the lack of a central religious authority, and by an original misconception of the office and function of Sacred Scripture, he must also be profoundly touched at the sight of so great a love for Jesus Christ, so evidently sincere a desire to re-establish Him as the Lord and Master of our American life and society. The general impression made on my mind by the reading of the "Proceedings" of this convention was one of reverence and sympathy coupled with a sense of rejoicing that, from afar at least, American men and women were beginning to recognize openly and without shame those solid principles of our Catholic faith that have led us to make every sacrifice, to undergo much reproach and objugation, to bear with patience accusations and insinuations of apathy, disloyalty, lack of sympathy toward the ideals of our common American life. We are truly one with all our fellow-citizens in love of country and in willing readiness to uphold her honor, further her progress, and defend her rights. We hope that the spirit that dictated the thoughts and expressions I have quoted will operate more profoundly and extensively so that the day may not be far distant when we shall all be one in religious and moral convictions—one by no external compulsion but one by that intimate persuasion which held the Apostles to the person and mission of Jesus: "Lord to whom else shall we go, for Thou hast the words (i. e., the absolute certainty) of Eternal Life?"

In the application of these principles and sentiments to Catholic university education it is only natural that I should take some things for granted. Thus, for instance, it is admitted that the university is normally the fountain-head of all systematized education. In the splendid hierarchy of the teaching-office it is the university teacher who is rightly called on for the highest human wisdom, the university itself which is rightly looked on as the academical senate of the Church militant, with authority to examine, illustrate, defend and propagate her teachings and make them shine in the loveliest dress of ideas and language, with all the arts of convincing eloquence that the trained mind can master. In all the pul-

pits of the Catholic world we listen to-day to the theology of the Church as set forth by a great university teacher, St. Thomas Aquinas, and before we listened to these doctrines, the priests who teach us from their pulpits learned them at the feet of other men who in turn had spent their lives in their study and dissemination. The laws of the Catholic Church were drawn up by men who learned the nature and spirit and scope of legislation from a multitude of university teachers. No human influence has affected the Catholic Church so profoundly, has prepared so regularly the way before her feet as her great universities. Paris and Oxford still live in her and can show their work. Bologna and Padua, Cologne and Louvain, are still able to point with pride to their prominent share in the public history of Catholicism. One may search through all its annals in the last seven hundred years; he will find no page unilluminated by that regular hard-won scholarship that her loving sons took away from the universities that she opened for them. I take it also for granted that the choicest youth of every land and time is to be found in the universities. It was always so, and we have only to look about us to see that it is so to-day in our own land and our own time. Something like 130,000 young men frequent the great university schools from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Oh, mighty army of academic youth! In you reposes the future, with a quasi-divine, quasi-fatal certainty. In you we are building the walls of the city that our own eyes shall not see, whose gates our own feet shall not enter, but which we shall fashion and govern through you as through our missionaries and agents. In other words, I take it also for granted that the university youth is the true shaping force of every society. I know that the self-made man is not uncommon in the United States, that in the raw, irregular and unfinished conditions of our natural life this type was long almost the normal one, even as in the rude warfare of an untutored tribal world the most gigantic clansman is captain. But in the levelling-up and toning-down of the nineteenth century the inevitable general laws of human life have exhibited their iron logic in this as in all other things—it is everywhere the trained and cultivated mind that has the

better chance to make clear its ideas and impose its will. Even in the dominant philosophy of materialism, even in the state of the most ultra equalitarianism, this will come about. Mind is the queen of all life, and is never rightly powerful except when equipped and adorned with all the armor and insignia of her office.

If these assumptions be true, then we Catholics are in presence of a very grave situation, none other than the saving and the handing down of our religion as we have received it from our fathers, undiminished in content, untarnished in splendor and magnificence, unimpaired in vigor and adaptability to new needs and occasions, as fertile a mother of the arts and sciences, as open and potent a source of inspiration in all things great and desirable, as she ever was. We have faced with courage and to some extent solved the question of religious primary education and of similar secondary or college education. I say, to some extent solved, for we are far from content with what we have done, and are victims of that divine restlessness and ardor which are the true root of perfection in human affairs. Nevertheless, we have reached a stage of conviction, of fixed principles, of accepted situations, of working systems, and even of blessed fruitage. Would that we could say as much of our domestic situation as regards the university, and in particular the Catholic University at Washington, which alone represents the ideal and hope of the American Catholic episcopate and the Apostolic See, and therefore is especially in view by all American Catholics when this question comes up for discussion. The time will no doubt come when there will be several such institutions in our land. But we have first to show the world that we are capable of creating and sustaining one such; we have first to combine effectually among ourselves to equip it, fill it with students, and consolidate it; we have first to heal our minor differences from whatever source arisen, and demonstrate that our American Catholicism is of the same generous fibre as that of the past concerning which we are so justly proud. After all, it is not so much by the contemplation of the past phases of Catholic endeavor that we shall save

and perpetuate our holy religion, as by the measure in which we reproduce the glorious and useful institutions of the past, and adapt them to American life, i. e., to the chief promise of spiritual progress and success that is now visible in this world.

My contention is that a Catholic university is the most potent imaginable influence in the development of practical religion, practical Catholicism. What is meant by practical Catholicism, i. e., at the level on which we are for the moment standing? I mean the realization on a great scale of a life that shall be thoroughly permeated with the principles and ideals of the Catholic religion. I mean a generation of men and women in all ranks of society who shall hold in veneration the Holy Catholic Church, and make themselves her humble and joyous apostles, who shall hold dear all her teachings, shall comprehend as best they may her spirit and her nature, shall exhibit in all the relations of public and private life the genuine impress of the doctrine and discipline of Catholicism, even as a child exhibits the teaching of his parents, an apprentice the training of his master, a soldier the labors of his drill-master. Practical religion, practical Catholicism, is no amusement, no light worldly thing. If it be an honor, a glory and a blessing to belong to the true religion of Jesus Christ, it has also been ever looked on as a most grave responsibility, for it makes us at once debtors to all humanity, to all time, debtors to God Himself for so signal a calling and so holy a mission. We are or should be, every one of us, apostles and missionaries. If we feel this in no degree, then it is time to examine the basis of our faith and ask ourselves to what depths we have fallen through this dark and murky atmosphere of modern materialism and miscellaneous irreligion.

One of the greatest laws of life is the law of Imitation. No force moves us so strongly in our thoughts and our actions as that mysterious law which compels us to conform our lives to certain exemplars shown us, and that appeal or are made to appeal to us. The child imitates his parents, the pupil his teachers, the apprentice his master. It is a silent

but potent schooling that works on us in an atmosphere of admiration and veneration, until it has transformed our innermost being. The ideals of the young at least are seldom vague and hazy; they stand forth incorporated in flesh and blood, in the men and women of history or the men and women whom they see and know. So true is this that after nineteen centuries no better name has been found for the perfect Christian life than the Imitation of Christ, the following in His holy footsteps, the squaring of our thoughts and hopes with His teachings. Whom shall our young people imitate in the decades, nay in the centuries to come? Shall we trust to non-Catholic schools to create generations of thinkers and writers, of famous philosophers and poets and historians, of men renowned for mighty deeds of Catholic charity and generosity? Shall we look to professors and teachers who, to say the least, look on us as misguided and somewhat inferior people, for ennobling inspirations, living and moving speech, a sacred enthusiasm for our glorious and holy past—all the usual sources of high resolutions and daring enterprises? To propose such questions is to answer them. One cannot gather roses from thistles; even so one cannot hope to raise up amid totally un-Catholic surroundings a superior generation of Catholic laymen and laywomen, a generation of lay Catholics in whom there shall be found sufficient intelligent ardor, and sufficient piety to do on a higher social level the equivalent of what their fathers and mothers did amid many tribulations and obstacles that we now no longer encounter, at least in the measure and after the manner of former times. We must then create a source whence such men may naturally and regularly come, a centre where the representatives of the highest human learning shall be convinced and ardent Catholic men and where all academic surroundings, otherwise so influential, shall be interpenetrated with a Catholic spirit; where the traditions, the customs, the usual elements of academic pride and the proofs of academic merit and glory shall be suffused with Catholicism; where young men, and young women too shall grow up freely and joyously in the full exercise of Catholic manhood and Catholic womanhood, and where all doubts

of intellectual inferiority shall be crushed in the overwhelming evidence and consciousness of an unbroken grandeur of achievement. In other words we must organize the workings of the great life-law of Imitation; we must bring the broadly flowing current of this strong young blood within our lines, set a clear channel for it and proceed to stake out the metes and bounds along which it shall work for ever in the interest of our holy religion, not so much for the sake of the immediate present, as for the sake of the years that are coming and the generations that are advancing to fill them.

Another law of human life is known as the law of Prestige. What is Prestige? It is well defined as authority or importance based on past achievements, or gained from the appearance of power or ability; the moral influence of reputation, former character, or success. When all Europe was Catholic, this authority was a principal handmaid of religion. Whatever way men looked they saw the monuments of Catholicism—its glorious cathedrals and magnificent churches, its organized education from the crowded universities to the smallest village-school, its systematized charities and universal beneficence, its trade-guilds and crafts of artisans, its gems of painting and sculpture, its triumphs of architecture and music, its solutions or alleviations of misery and injustice and inequality. Then one could not find a poet or an artist, a thinker or an orator, who was not aflame with a glad admiration of the great deeds of Mother Church and did not feel himself in his own way her apostle.

Prestige is the tribute of humanity to superior worth or utility, real or fancied, as the case may be. But there is no missionary agency, no proselytism that works like it. Prestige is a kind of atmosphere, a tone, a spirit, common to all, and utterly irresistible, for its strength lies in the great human tendency to admiration. Now what shall we Catholics admire in the future? What works and what persons shall we gaze upon with fondness and mentally rejoice that they exist and are operative in all our society? I know some will say that we have the works and the men and the women of the Catholic past. And so far as the answer goes, it is correct.

And it would be sufficient if the law of Prestige had for its field of influence only the past. Then we might all stand on the hither side of the great ocean of time and feel secure that our ideals were right glorious and efficient ones. But we live very much in the present, and the very present that we breathe is itself slipping into the past while we speak of it. And all the great laws of human life are operative only in the present. The past is a book filled up from cover to cover, the future a book whose blank pages are sealed and closed to our human eyes. If we are to help our Catholic faith to profit by the deep human sense of admiration, to awaken in our American manhood a respect and then a love for Catholicism, we must do great deeds. We must in our turn contribute to the generous ideals that justly fascinate universal humanity. Our Catholic youth, as it grows up in the future, must feel that it is in some degree sheltered from certain temptations to irreligion and loss of Christian faith by the splendid temporal merits and undeniable human service of Catholicism. It must know that for every great and noble institution put up and supported by non-Catholics, similar if not greater ones have been created by Catholics. It must know that in the grand effort to improve and perfect our new American life Catholics are everywhere straining as hard as non-Catholics, and it must be able to point to the hard facts in buildings, endowments, teachers, and accomplishments. Wherever the Catholic youth of the future looks it ought to behold at least a measure of accomplishment along all the lines of American idealism. And let me say at once, that in spite of some crudity and rawness inherent in the youth of our national life, our American idealism is very grand and very noble, very capable of being elevated to a still higher degree, and needing only that the spiritual eye should be cleansed and the promises and benefits of a religious Christian spirit grasped with more firmness and more conviction.

Now I return to the fact that the greatest things are accomplished only through education. In this sign shalt thou conquer, might we say, with all due reverence—and to that other fact that to-day at least and in the future, it is the university

as such which everywhere in the United States stands or should stand for the highest Christian idealism along all lines of thinking and doing. Where can this great force of Prestige be better trained and harnessed to the cause of Catholicism than in our own university whence in due time shall come many generations of men illustrious in every walk of life. It is from such schools that in the last seven centuries have come the men of thought and men of action, men famous in all forms and channels of public service and private enterprise, men who have guided to success the noblest common enterprises and who have always risen above their narrow selves in loving devotion to the common weal. In the great Basilica of St. Paul at Rome you may see the portraits of two hundred and sixty popes in due order around the walls of that splendid edifice. Who can gaze upon so much character and success, so much self-identity and tenacity and not be deeply moved with veneration for the Catholic religion. In the great hall of the Ducal Palace at Venice you may yet see the long line of Doges who governed that wonderful city. And who has ever looked thereon without a sense of admiration for the boldness and persistency, the ingenuity and the foresight that made a great world-state out of a handful of reedy islets in a political back-water corner of Europe? We are carrying the future of American Catholicism in our thoughts and our resolutions. If they be small and limited, wretchedly local and parochial, remember that they will not therefore die. They will live, and live to plague the grandchildren of this generation at the sight of their ignoble and dwarf-like proportions. God helps those who help themselves. And if we would have a future generation of Catholics do the great things we hope for from now, then we must prepare the way, in so far as in us lies; we must begin at least by a cheap and easy act—the full and sane recognition of the necessity of a real university that shall be thoroughly Catholic in tone and accomplishment, in government, ideals, and we hope, one day, in services to both Church and State.

A third law of our human life is the law of Leadership. Nothing is done on this earth apart from leadership. The

savage who would add to his hunting grounds seeks out a man who has the forceful qualities for that rude task, and the capitalist who would organize any branch of trade or industry looks about long and earnestly to discern the man to whom he will entrust his money, his hopes, yea and sometimes the very heart of him, certain good and great ideals that he believes in and would see realized. And where has this law been more profoundly realized than by its divine Maker, Jesus Christ, who put into His Church a living soul of leadership and brought home its benefits to every Catholic heart and mind by a unique system of direction that has weathered every storm, political, religious and social. The world is governed by its leaders, and is right joyously governed by those who have led it up broad steepes of statesmanship, through bloody vicissitudes of war, over painful stretches of oppression, and through nights of humiliation and despair. Its philosophers and poets, its orators and legislators and its teachers are all eminent leaders who yet beckon men on from their urns, nay, for they never die, from the pedestals of fame on which a grateful humanity has placed them.

Would you have great leaders in the future, faithful to Catholic ideals, filled with accurate and extensive knowledge of the essence and the possibilities, the spirit and the adaptability of Catholicism? Then you must make ready the only system through which you can hope to receive them such as you desire them. Leaders you must have. But shall they be clear of vision, quick and alert in mind, devoted with a holy intensity to the manifold great interests of Catholicism? Or shall they be timid and half-hearted, conscious of their own ignorance and their incapacity to stand for the historic and religious fulness of Catholicism? Shall they have read our history through the spectacles of our enemies, our theology and philosophy through the books alone of men who detest them, our achievements of all kinds through the presentation and with the prejudiced comments of those who are naturally fearful of an honest approval of the glories and the services of Catholicism?

Perhaps you will say that it is the business of the bishops

and the priests of the Church to look after their own race, their own successors. But this is only half an answer. The natural and ordinary place of the clergy is the sanctuary. From the altar, the pulpit, and the confessional its influence radiates directly through all our Catholic society. Beyond that pale its influence is indirect and irregular, and depends more on character, personality, attainments, and circumstances, than on office and function. Of course, it needs for the exercise of that office an education in keeping with the society in which it lives and moves—the ecclesiastical training that would suffice for a simple agricultural people will not do for a great world-state, filled with vast cities, overflowing with energy and ardor, eager to surpass all former records of humanity in every field of endeavor. But there is a world outside the sanctuary, even in its broadest range of influence, the great world of ordinary social life, in which lay opinion and example, lay authority and influence, are supreme. Its priests and priestesses are the men of ability and the women of character who are looked up to by others, whose attainments are superior, whose minds are better equipped, whose speech is more accurate and pointed, whose high office or great wealth or varied distinction place them in the front rank of citizens. No city is so small or so insignificant as not to count some Catholics of that rank and condition. And in our great cities their number is growing with astonishing rapidity. Right here there is coming to the front another leadership that is, thank God, sympathetic to Catholicism, that yet borrows its ideals, its language, and its spirit from the great old Church in and through which this lay world has been reaching its present position. But we are after all a minority and our people mingle in all freedom with their non-Catholic fellow-citizens, and the general tendency is toward a levelling and an ignoring of the profound religious differences that exist among us. Unless we make an effort to provide for our Catholic laity the advantages of university education amid Catholic influences we run an appreciable risk, to say the least, of reaching very soon a point where we can behold the clergy on one side and then, across a broad gulf, the educated and progressive laity on the other.

Let me repeat that we cannot gather grapes from thorns nor roses from thistles. Much less can we expect a large percentage of cultivated, well-read, and devoted Catholic gentlemen and scholars in all walks of society, if we take no heed to the creation of the only great schools they can come from. I state historical truth when I say that the conditions of the Church in every national society of Europe are most profoundly conditioned by her relation to the universities of each land. The irreligion, hatred, and injustice that we behold in certain Catholic countries are the outcome of anti-Catholic university influences, influences that are almost irresistible by the mass of the plain people, since the formation of all popular leadership is in the hands of an atheistic state. On the other hand, look at the little state of Belgium and see how bravely the Catholic people of that state have forged ahead to the front rank in all industrial and commercial development. Were it not for their Catholic university at Louvain, the Catholic majority would be quickly conquered and severely oppressed by their opponents. It has rendered incalculable service of every kind to Church and State, and no one there regrets the two general collections that are taken up for it throughout Belgium every year and to which every good Belgian Catholic contributes with as much intelligent pride and satisfaction as he casts his ballot. If the political sufferings and wrongs of Ireland have not been remedied, if the drain on her population still goes on unchecked, if her industries are few, her commerce insignificant, her entire position anomalous, it is because this bright intellectual people have been deprived of a university that they could frequent with pleasure and affection, and on the other hand have been compelled to accept a university that stood for the opposite of all their inherited ideals, both civil and religious.

I take it, therefore, that we ought at least to reflect on this situation: shall we have a Catholic laity in the next generation capable of recognizing its duties to Holy Church, and also of fulfilling them with a fair measure of success? If we can compass this at the expense of some sacrifice, we shall

have served practically the cause of Catholicism; if we cannot compass it, or if we fail to recognize that the psychological moment has arrived, there are not a few who forecast the practical failure of the highest Catholic ideals. And a great and good man has said very lately that ideals which fail of realization in the United States are unlikely to be realized anywhere. Gradually there has been coming on throughout the civilized world a change from irresponsible monarchical government to a government of the people, i. e. to the ideal democracy that was so long an utopian dream, but has at last been broadly realized in this favored land and is moving hence to the peaceful conquest of the world. From a subject the average citizen has become sovereign, from an object of administration the source of civil authority, from an inferior an equal of the greatest, from a helpless entity in the state a being equipped with all the qualities of initiative, control, and executive.

It is notorious that the Catholic Church is always affected in its external relations and vicissitudes by the form of government, be it empire, kingdom, feudalism, despotism or democracy, the rule of one or a few, of many or of all. Never has the lay element been so signally serviceable to the Church as in the century that has just closed. The names of a multitude of practical Catholic laymen began to shine in the firmament according as secular interests and influences eliminated themselves from the counsels and the purposes of our Holy Church. Daniel O'Connell in Ireland and Joseph Görres in Germany open this *saculum mirabile* of apology and resistance. In France shine the names of Montalembert, Chesnelong, Léon Harmel, De Mun and De Broglie; in Germany the names of August Reichensperger and Peter Reichensperger, Mallinckrodt, Windthorst, Lieber and others. Not only political champions have come forth to defend her, but much of her intellectual glory has come from the devotion of Catholic laymen—Cæsare Cantù and Alessandro Manzoni in Italy, Ludwig Pastor in Germany, Menendez y Pelayo in Spain, are only types of a great number of laymen who have given to the cause of Catholicism all that they had and all that they were.

Quod isti et istæ cur non ego? What such men have done is at once a hint and an encouragement for the Catholics of the United States. Not that we apprehend for Catholicism anything but the largest freedom under the ægis of American liberty, nor that we forecast any such struggles as have filled the annals of Catholic Europe since the French Revolution. We shall have our own trials, our own grave emergencies, our own impelling duties, our own high soliciting ideals. Government itself is taking on a more complex character according as the state grows not only in bulk, but in the consciousness of social duty and responsibility. There is manifest a growing need of superior and sure scholarship in all its departments. Our internal political cares and burdens demand earnest thought and wise reflection, and that means well-trained men capable of handling the multitudinous interests of a world-state whose population will soon turn the figure of 100,000,000 of people, and whose responsibilities reach now from the rising to the setting sun. Imperial Rome was centered about one sea—the Mediterranean; we are seated with pride and majesty on two oceans, as though we were called of God to be the final and the largest interpretation of humanity. Indeed, it is impossible any longer for a man of heart to approach the contemplation of the *Majestas Americana* without a kindling of prophetic emotion, that religious troubling of the heart's lowest deeps, which occurs whenever we are in the presence of a divine decree. Our American Democracy is entering upon phases of social achievement that have hitherto in a manner been purely academical for us, but are now become realities. Society, here, as elsewhere, now as in the past and in the future, must prepare to protect itself from those great evils which are ignorance, corruption, rascality, apathy and self-seeking. With us that means for every citizen an increase of knowledge, a cleansing of his mind and an invigoration of his heart—above all, a solid re-indoctrination in the true original bed-rock principles of American life and politics, as written out in our great political documents and interpreted by our history. In addition to this the Catholic citizen deplores, in company with many others, the growing influences

of a materialism unrelieved too often by elevated achievements, and an agnosticism, an ignoring of the Master of heaven and earth, that is creeping insidiously into the minds of multitudes hitherto supposed immune. We are told by a university scholar and teacher of international repute that

“The authority of conscience is a dream; there is no moral tribunal higher than that of human opinion and law; death levels the good with the wicked, the sensualist with the pure of heart, the man who has been a blessing with the man who has been a curse to his kind.”

Now, it is very largely by their numbers and their assurance that the scoffers, the doubters, and the pessimists, affect mankind, and not by any novelty of argument or power of persuasion. Impiety and blasphemy and irreligion are like a fashion that grows by the vices it feeds on, not by the virtues it is incapable of arousing. It is a grave duty of our Catholic laity to lead a vigorous reaction against a false philosophy that is, by universal admission, growing daily more popular, according as the impact of riches and success is battering down the old strongholds of natural virtue and inherited Christian morality and discipline of life. But a successful propaganda demands leaders and prestige and names that the mass of men look up to as so many banners waving above the conflict. We cannot improvise an Orestes Brownson. Nor is one great name, one honorable leader enough—there must be many and they must come from within and come regularly, from the intellectual nurseries of the Church. In other words, the only certain and scientific hope of keeping our own hearts and the hearts of our descendants free from the bad corroding philosophy of life that grows daily more powerful in American society is a vigorous return to a profoundly Catholic philosophy of life, but on such high and noble lines, that its superiority must be recognized by all men of good will. Practical Catholicism for the individual indeed is based on the penitent heart and the humble will, but for the world at large it demands all the help that scholarship can lend it, all the support that comes from a great aristocracy of learning, from a solidly established system of teaching, writing, and preach-

ing that shall be inferior to nothing of the kind that is offered elsewhere. Over against the temple of Mammon we must set the temple of Religion, and over against the temple of a false, insufficient and mere worldly learning we must set the temple of a learning that freely and joyously recognizes God and His rights in His own world. From its broad platform each one may say with the Christian poet:

“I value Science—none can prize it more—
 It gives ten thousand motives to adore:
 Be it religious as it ought to be,
 The heart it humbles and it bows the knee:
 What time it lays the breast of Nature bare,
 Discerns God’s fingers working everywhere;
 In the vast sweep of all-embracing laws
 Finds Him the real and the only cause;

 Not as some claim, once acting, but now not,
 The glorious product of His hands forgot—
 Having wound up the grand automaton,
 Leaving it henceforth to itself to run.”

If we believe what has hitherto been said, and agree that we ought to accept the conclusion and make a suitable provision for a Catholic education that shall be at once of the highest academical order and frankly religious in the Catholic sense, we must be prepared to hear that we are religious idealists, ultra-spiritual, unpractical and unreal members of the state. But we may answer that up to date the only efficient and durable morality known to mankind is that based on profound religious convictions, and that the delicate web of modern agnostic morality is no more likely to bear the cruel strain of the life of to-day and to-morrow than the gentlemanly stoicism of Marcus Aurelius could heal the crowding ills of the Roman state.¹ Men may be, and mostly have been

¹ “Hitherto we have seen the ancient world only as it was described for us by the great or by hangers-on of the great. Now we can hear the voice of the common people. It is not so full or articulate as we could wish, but it suffices to put the whole story in a new and more instructive light. Read, for instance, the panegyrics of Gibbon and Renan upon the philosophic Marcus Aurelius, and then turn to Schiller’s account of the incapacity of the Emperor and the disasters of his reign.” Bigg, *The Church’s Task Under the Roman Empire*, Oxford, 1905, p. v.

controlled from without, and obliged to suffer the bit and rein. But if we would continue to be self-determining free agents in the development of our life, private and public, we must take our stand on specific Christian belief, not the vague religiosity of a poet or a philosopher or an artist, but the faith of the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the teachings of His Holy Church. At least that is the consistent position for a practical and intelligent Catholic. Once this is admitted, common sense, history and the analogy of life tell him that the higher we go in the work of education, the truer is this principle, and the more rigorous its consequences for the social and religious development of Christianity.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

It may not be out of place to recall here the admirable words in which Cardinal Newman laid bare the inner weakness of certain modern substitutes for Christian religion and morality:

"Observe, gentlemen, the heresy, as it may be called, of which I speak, is the substitution of a moral sense or taste for conscience in the true meaning of the word; now this error may be the foundation of a character of far more elasticity and grace than ever adorned the persons whom I have been describing. It is especially congenial to men of an imaginative and poetical cast of mind, who will readily accept the notion that virtue is nothing more than the graceful in conduct. Such persons, far from tolerating fear, as a principle, in their apprehension of religious and moral truth, will not be slow to call it simply gloom and superstition. Rather a philosopher's, a gentleman's religion, is of a liberal and generous character; it is based upon honour; vice is evil, because it is unworthy, despicable, and odious. This was the quarrel of the ancient heathen with Christianity, that, instead of simply fixing the mind on the fair and the pleasant, it intermingled other ideas with them of a sad and painful nature; that it spoke of tears before joy, a cross before a crown; that it laid the foundation of heroism in penance; that it made the soul tremble with the news of Purgatory and Hell; that it insisted on views and a worship of the Deity, which to their minds was nothing else than mean, servile, and cowardly. The notion of an All-perfect, Ever-present God, in whose sight we are less than atoms, and who, while He deigns to visit us, can punish as well as bless, was abhorrent to them; they made their own minds their sanctuary, their own ideas their oracle, and conscience in morals was but parallel to genius in art, and wisdom in philosophy.

"Of course, he is at liberty, on his principles, to pick and choose out of Christianity what he will; he discards the theological, the mysterious, the spiritual; he makes selection of the morally or esthetically beautiful. To him it matters not at all that he begins his teaching where he should end it; it matters not that, instead of planting the tree, he merely crops its flowers for his banquet; he only aims at the present life, his philosophy dies with him; if his flowers do but last to the end of his revel, he has nothing more to seek. When night comes, the withered leaves may be mingled with his own ashes; he and they will have done their work, he and they will be no more. Certainly, it costs little to make men virtuous on conditions such as these; it is like teaching them a language or an accomplishment, to write Latin or to play on an instrument,—the profession of an artist, not the commission of an Apostle." *Idea of a University*, Discourse VIII, cc. 5 and 9.

TRACES OF PENANCE IN NON-REVEALED RELIGIONS.

One of the striking characteristics of the Christian religion, as of its precursor, the religion of Israel, is its care to keep alive the consciousness of sin and to lay stress on the corresponding need of repentance. The virtue of penance holds a prominent place among the religious virtues inculcated by the Old and New Testaments. The Christian religion is preëminently the religion of reconciliation of sinful man with the offended Lord and Creator.

While the practice of penance is found in its perfection only in the Christian religion, traces of it are not absent from religions that have no just claim to be regarded as revealed. For penance is a spontaneous outgrowth of the religious instinct, and hence is a virtue natural to the heart of man.

This is a truth we are sometimes apt to lose sight of. In contrasting the moral and religious condition of Christian peoples with what we find among those who have not known the saving truths of the Gospel, we are often disposed to assume that the latter have always been so hopelessly inured to moral transgressions as to be ignorant of the very idea of sin, and hence of the need of repentance.

The flagrant vices tolerated by the religious systems of Greece and Rome in the days of the Empire lend a certain color to this view. But it is well to bear in mind, first of all, that the moral decadence of the Roman world in the time of Christ by no means represents the best that man could do without the light of the Mosaic or Christian law. In such religions as ancient Brahmanism and Zoroastrianism, we find recognized a lofty moral standard that compares not unfavorably with that of the Old Testament. In these religions, emphasis was laid on rightness of thought, desire, volition, as well as on rightness of word and action. The consciousness of sin seems to have been keen, and so, too, the spirit of penance.

But even where there is question of religions of a lower order, we should not be too hasty to infer that because morality is but imperfectly comprehended, the consciousness of sin must be entirely lacking. We should be careful to distinguish the Christian standard of morality from the varying and often grossly defective standards of pagan peoples. Much that is shocking to the moral sense of the Christian is done by peoples of inferior culture without the slightest consciousness of moral guilt. They even regard as virtue much that we hold to be crime. Yet they all have a standard, however crude, of right and wrong. And what their rudely developed conscience tells them to be wrong, they also generally conceive to be displeasing to one or more of the gods they hold in honor. Thus they have, with few exceptions, a notion at least elementary of sin, that is, of wrong-doing viewed as offensive to the deity or deities, and hence meriting divine punishment unless in some way atoned for. This consciousness of sin may exist in varying degrees of range and intensity, depending on the extent to which moral and religious duties are recognized, and on the character and amount of evil that their transgression is thought to involve. But even in a religion of low morality, there may still be a dim notion of sin. Where such notion exists, it is safe to conclude that the idea of penance is not altogether ignored.

Among peoples of low grades of civilization, recourse to penitential prayer seems rarely if ever to be had for the expiation of sin. Such outward expressions of contrition do not come natural to them. Nor do we find specific penitential rites of widespread use. The offering made in silence to the deity,—often nothing more than a gift—compensation, a sort of *wergild*,—would seem to do service in most cases. To die fighting bravely in battle is reputed among warlike tribes to have the same atoning efficacy that the Christian attributes to the martyr's death.

Now and then penitential practices have been discovered in religions of a low order. The widespread notion that sickness is often a divine punishment for sins of the past has led in several known instances to the popular practice of confessing

ones sins in serious sickness with a view to recovery. Father Dobrizhoffer tells in his interesting "History of the Abipones," a wild tribe formerly predominant in the southern parts of Brazil, that in a case of serious sickness, "at his first coming, the physician overwhelms the sick man with a hundred questions: 'Where were you yesterday?' says he. 'What roads did you tread? Did you overturn the jug and spill the drink prepared from the maize? What? Have you imprudently given the flesh of a tortoise, stag or boar to be devoured by dogs?' Should the sick man confess to having done any of these things, 'It is well,' replies the physician, 'we have discovered the cause of your disorder.'"¹

In this instance, it is the violation of purely religious customs and restrictions that form the subject-matter of confession. But other examples are known where ethical duties are included. Thus in former times in Tahiti, sickness was the occasion for the restoration of private property that the patient had stolen.² Bancroft records that among the Taculies of the Pacific Coast, it is customary in extreme sickness to send for the medicine-man and make a confession of sins. On the truth and accuracy of this confession depend the chances of recovery. Bancroft remarks that the crimes they generally confess are too revolting to be told in print. But this only goes to show that they are sadly deficient in moral sense, not that they are lacking in at least a dim conception of sin. Similar practices of confessing sins in time of sickness and calamity prevailed in Central America and Peru. "It is related by an old chronicler," says Bancroft, speaking of Guatemala, "that when a party of travellers met a jaguar or puma, each one immediately commended himself to the gods, and confessed in a loud voice the sins he had committed, imploring pardon. If the object of their terror still advanced upon them, they cried: "We have committed as many more sins, do not kill us!" and sat down, saying one to another, "One of us has done some grievous deed and him the wild beast will kill!"³

¹ Jevons, "Introduction to the History of Religion," New York, 1896, p. 111.

² Jevons, *ibid.*

³ H. Bancroft, "Works," Vol. III, pp. 143, 472, 486.

So, too, in ancient Peru, on the occasion of any local calamity, a rigorous inquiry was made into the conduct of the members of the community, and he whose sins were thought to be the cause, was compelled to make reparation.¹

The comparatively high civilizations of ancient Peru, Central America and Mexico possessed religious systems remarkable for their penitential element. A prayer has been preserved which the Incas of Peru used to say, when on the occasion of a certain feast, they bathed in the river to wash away their sins: "O thou River, receive the sins which I have this day confessed unto the Sun; carry them down to the sea and let them never more appear."

Only those whose consciences were purged of guilt had a right to partake of the sacred Sancu, a maize pudding sprinkled with the blood of sheep, and distributed to the people on plates of gold with the greatest reverence. As it was about to be distributed, the high priest said: "Take heed how you eat this Sancu; for he who eats it in sin, and with a double will and heart, is seen by our father the Sun, who will punish him with grievous troubles. But he who with a single heart partakes of it, to him the Sun and the Thunder will show favor, and will grant . . . all that he requires."

The ordinary means of relieving the conscience burdened with the sense of guilt was confession of sins to the temple-priests. In most places, sins were publicly confessed, except grave crimes meriting death, which were told to the priest in secret. Penances in keeping with the gravity of the sins confessed were imposed on the penitents. "The Yncas," relates Father Molina, "and the people of Cuzco always made their confessions in secret, and generally they confessed to those Indian sorcerers of Huaro who were employed for this office. In their confessions, they accused themselves of not having revered the sun, the moon, and the huacas (the sacred images), with not having celebrated the feasts of the Raymis, which are those in each month of the year, with all their hearts; with having committed fornication, against the law of the Ynca not to touch a strange woman or to seduce a virgin

¹ Payne, "New World," I, p. 443.

unless given by the Ynca, and not because fornication was a sin. For they did not understand this. They also accused themselves of any murder or theft, which we hold to be grave sins.’¹

In ancient Yucatan, confession of sins “was much resorted to, the more so as death and disease were thought to be direct punishments for sin committed. Married priests were the regular confessors, but these were not always applied to for spiritual aid; the wife would often confess to her husband, or a husband to his wife, or sometimes a public avowal was made.’²

In Nicaragua, confession was likewise a recognized institution.

“The confessor was chosen from among the most aged and respected citizens; a calabash suspended from the neck was his badge of office. He was required to be a man of blameless life, unmarried, and not connected with the temple. Those who wished to confess went to his house, and there standing with humility before him, unburdened their conscience. The confessor was forbidden to reveal any secret confided to him in his official capacity, under pain of punishment. The penance he imposed was generally some kind of labor to be performed for the benefit of the temple.’³

More striking still was the practice of confession for purposes of penance among the Aztecs of Mexico. It is not a little surprising to find in a religion reeking with the blood of human victims and encouraging almost every form of idolatrous nature-worship, a lofty conception of a supreme deity, prayers of great spiritual depth and beauty, and coupled with penitential austerities, a most solemn and impressive rite of auricular confession. Yet these were characteristics of the ancient Aztec religion, as we learn from the absolutely reliable account which the early Franciscan missionary, Father Bernard de Sahagun, has left on record in his *History of New*

¹ Rivero and Tschudi, “Peruvian Antiquities,” p. 180. Acosta, “Ind. Occid,” B. V, Ch. 25. C. R. Markham, “Narratives of the Rites and Laws of the Yncas,” London. Hakluyt Society, 1873, pp. 15, and 27.

² Bancroft, III, p. 472.

³ Bancroft, III, pp. 494-5.

Spain. It is to him that Bancroft is chiefly indebted for his description of the religious beliefs and rites of ancient Mexico.

The confessors were priests who acted in the name of the supreme deity, Tezcatlipoca. It was to him that the confession of sins was held to be made, the priests being his visible representatives. Woe to the misguided penitent who was led by a feeling of shame to keep some sin untold. His sacrilegious conduct put him beyond the pale of divine mercy. What made the rite peculiarly solemn was the fact that no penitent, however distinguished, could make use of it more than once. For this reason it was generally put off till late in life.

When a penitent made known to the priest that he wished to confess his sins, the divining book was consulted and a day selected favorable for the performance of the rite. At the appointed time, the penitent came bringing a new mat, copal incense, and wood for the sacred fire. The fire having been kindled, the priest seated himself on the mat before it, and having put the incense on the glowing embers, prayed thus to Tezcatlipoca :

“O Lord, thou that art the father and the mother of the gods and the most ancient god, know that here has come thy vassal and servant, weeping and with great sadness; he is aware that he has wandered from the way, that he has stumbled . . . that he is spotted with certain filthy sins and grave crimes worthy of death. Our Lord, very pitiful, since thou art the protector and the defender of all, accept the penitence, give ear to the anguish, of this thy servant and vassal.”

The confessor then turned to the penitent and warned him of the obligation before God of making a full confession of sins.

“It is certain that thou art now in his presence, although thou art not worthy to see him; neither will he speak to thee, for he is invisible and impalpable. See, then, to it how thou comest, and with what heart; fear not to publish thy secrets in his presence. . . . Tell all with sadness to our Lord God, who is the favorer of all, and whose arms are open and ready to embrace and set thee on his shoulders.”

The penitent then took oath to make a clean breast of his sins, touching the ground with his hand and throwing incense

on the fire. When his self-accusation was over, the priest prayed:

“O our most compassionate Lord, protector and favorer of all, thou hast now heard the confession of this poor sinner. . . . This rite is like very clear water, with which thou wastest away the faults of him that wholly confesses, even if he have incurred destruction and shortening of days; if indeed he hath told all the truth . . . he has received the pardon of them and of what they have incurred. This poor man is even as one who has slipped and fallen in thy presence, offending thee in divers ways, dirtied himself also and casting himself into a deep cavern and a bottomless well. He fell like a poor and lean man; and now he is grieved and discontented with all the past; his heart and body are pained and ill at ease; he is now filled with heaviness for having done what he did; he is now wholly determined never to offend thee again. . . . Since thou art full of pity, O Lord, see good to pardon and cleanse him; grant him the pardon and remission of his sins, a thing that descends from heaven, as water very clear and very pure to wash away sins, with which thou wastest away all the stain and impurity that sin causes in the soul.”

Then turning to the penitent, he admonished him in part as follows:

“O my brother, thou hast come into a place of much peril, a place of travail and fear. . . . These thy sins are not only snares, nets and wells, into which thou has fallen, but they are also wild beasts that kill and rend both body and soul. . . . When thou wast created and sent into this world, clean and good wast thou created and sent; thy father and thy mother Quetzalcoatl formed thee like a precious stone. . . . But of thy own will and volition, thou hast defiled and stained thyself, and rolled in filth and in the uncleanness of the sins and evil deeds that thou hast committed and now confessed. Now thou hast been born anew. . . . Now once more thou beginnest to shine anew like a very precious and clear stone. . . . Since this is so, see that thou live with much circumspection and very advisedly now and henceforward, all the time that thou mayest live in this world under the power and lordship of our Lord God, most element, beneficent, and munificent. Weep, be sad, walk humbly, with submission, with the head low and bowed down, praying to God. . . . Therefore I entreat thee to stand up and strengthen thyself, and henceforth to be no more as thou hast been in the past. Take to thyself a new heart

and a new manner of living . . . do not turn again to thine old sins. . . . It is moreover fit that thou shouldst do penance, working a year or more in the house of God; there thou shalt bleed thyself, and prick thy body with manguey thorns; and as a penance for the adulteries and other vilenesses that thou hast committed, thou shalt, twice every day, pass osier twigs through holes pierced in thy body, once through thy tongue, and once through thy ears. . . . Thou shalt give alms to the needy and the hungry, to those that have nothing to cover themselves with. . . . Care most of all for the sick; they are the image of God. There remains nothing more to be said to thee; go in peace, and entreat God to aid thee to fulfil what thou art obliged to do; for he gives favor to all."¹

The late Lafcadio Hearn in his recent work on Japan, cites from Sir Ernest Satow the following Shinto prayer, which the pious Hirata recommended to be said daily before the household god-shelf. It shows again that where the mind is held captive in polytheistic worship, the heart may still yearn for higher things.

"Reverently adoring the great god of the two palaces of Ise in the first place,—the eight hundred myriads of celestial gods,—the eight hundred myriads of terrestrial gods,—the fifteen hundred myriads of gods to whom are consecrated the great and small temples in all provinces, all islands . . . I pray with awe that they will deign to correct the unwilling faults which, heard and seen by them, I have committed; and that blessing and favoring me according to the powers which they severally wield, they will cause me to follow the divine example, and to perform good works in the way."²

The Egyptian religion likewise encouraged the spirit of penance. The worship of Isis seems to have been marked by penitential rites. Ovid alludes to penitents confessing their faults in public before the statue of Isis in Rome.³

In the ancient papyri which have come down to us, a number of hymns and prayers have been brought to light that sound like echoes of the inspired psalms, though in reality much more ancient. In these the penitential element finds worthy expression.

¹ Bancroft, III, 381-2, 220-6.

² "Japan, an Interpretation," pp. 168-1.

³ Ovid, "De Ponto," I, 1, 51.



Thus in the so-called Song of the Harper, which dates from the Eighteenth Dynasty, we find this admonition:

“Mind thee of the day, when thou too shalt start for the land,
To which one goeth to return not thence.
Good for thee then will have been (an honest life).
Therefore be just and hate transgressions;
For he who loveth justice (will be blessed).”¹

Again in the hymn to the supreme Sun-god Amen, dating from the Nineteenth Dynasty, we find the following supplication of a contrite worshipper:

“Come to me, O thou Sun;
.
Thou art he that giveth (help);
There is no help without thee
Except thou (givest it).
.
Let my desires be fulfilled.
.
Hear my vows, my humble supplications every day.
.
Reproach me not with my many sins.
I am a youth, weak of body.
I am a man without heart.”²

In the well-known Book of the Dead, which doubtless every pious Egyptian knew by heart, there is the interesting negative confession and repudiation of sin which the soul must make in the underworld, while its good and evil deeds were being set off against each other. The rubric states that it was to be recited when the deceased “cometh forth into the hall of double Maati, so that he may be separated from every sin which he hath done, and may behold the gods.”

“Homage to thee, O Great God,” cries out the soul, “I know thee and I know thy name and the names of the two and forty gods who exist with thee . . . who live as warders of sinners, and who feed upon their blood on the day when the lives of men are taken into account in the presence of the god Un-nefer.”

¹ Translation of Ludwig Stern, in “Egyptian Literature,” Colonial Press, New York, p. 349.

² Translation of C. W. Goodwin, in “Egyptian Literature,” pp. 344-5.

Then follows the long self-justification in which the soul declares itself guiltless of such and such sins, the enumeration of which is remarkably comprehensive. In the concluding Address to the Gods of the Underworld, the soul cries out:

"Oh, grant ye that I may come to you, for I have not committed faults, I have not sinned, I have not done evil. . . . I have given bread to the hungry man, and water to the thirsty man, and apparel to the naked man, and a boat to the (ship-wrecked) mariner."

In the supplementary prayer to the Four Apes we read:

"Hail ye Four Apes who sit in the bows of the boat of Ra . . . who live upon right and truth . . . who are without deceit and fraud, and to whom wickedness is an abomination, do ye away with my evil deeds, and put ye away my sin."¹

In the ancient religion of Babylonia, the penitential spirit also found striking expression. The Babylonian, like the Hebrew, viewed misfortunes both private and public as divine punishments for neglect and wrong-doing. In some way, known or unknown, the worshipper felt he had offended the deity. Hence every misfortune was the occasion of approaching the god or goddess thought to be offended, and of imploring the deity with contrite heart to turn away his or her wrath and restore the penitent to friendship. Apart from their polytheism, these penitential psalms of ancient Babylonia breathe a religious and ethical tone that reminds one forcibly of the noble hymns of Israel, which they antedate by more than a thousand years.

In some of these penitential prayers, the sinner is assisted by the priest who at certain intervals in the petition makes intercession for him. Thus in a psalm, only partly preserved, to a goddess, perhaps Ishtar, we read:

"I, thy servant, full of sighs, call upon thee;
The fervent prayer of him who has sinned do thou accept.
If thou lookest upon a man, that man lives.
O, all-powerful mistress of Mankind,
Merciful one, to whom it is good to turn, who hears sighs."

¹ E. A. W. Budge, "The Book of the Dead," in "Egyptian Literature," pp. 102, ff.

Then the priest, interceding for the penitent, takes up the chant:

"His god and goddess being angry with him, he calls on thee.
Turn towards him thy countenance, take hold of his hand."

The penitent then resumes:

"Besides thee, there is no guiding deity.
I implore thee to look upon me and hear my sighs.
Proclaim pacification, and may thy soul be appeased.
How long, O my mistress, till thy countenance be turned towards me?

Like doves I lament, I satiate myself with sighs."¹

In another hymn, the penitent not knowing which particular deity he has offended, prays as follows:

"An offence have I unwittingly committed against my god,
A sin against my goddess unwittingly been guilty of,
O lord, my sins are many, great are my transgressions,
O my goddess, my sins are great, great are my transgressions,
Known or unknown god, my sins are many, great are my transgressions."

Again he cries out:

"I seek for help, but no one takes my hand.
I weep, but no one approaches me.
I call aloud, but no one hears me.
Full of woe, I grovel in the dust without looking up.
To the known or unknown god do I speak with sighs.
To the known or unknown goddess do I speak with sighs."

Then comes the intercession of the priests:

"O lord, do not cast aside thy servant,
Overflowing with tears; take him by the hand."

Thereupon the penitent concludes with his plaintive appeal:

"The sin I have committed change to mercy;
The wrong I have done, may the wind carry off.
Tear asunder my many transgressions as a garment.
My god, my sins are seven times seven, forgive me my sins.

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Forgive me my sins, and I will humble myself before thee."²

¹ Jastrow, "The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria," Boston, 1898, p. 318.

² Jastrow, pp. 321, 322.

If we except the various mysteries, most of which were of oriental or Egyptian origin, we do not find marked traces of penance in the religions of Greece and Rome. The classical literature is lacking in penitential prayers and hymns. The little spirit of penance which they seem to have had found its satisfaction rather in offerings to the gods, and in lustrations.

When we turn to the religion which the Sanskrit-speaking invaders brought with them into India, we are impressed with the proof which these ancient warriors gave of their intense devotion to their gods, and of their sense of sin prompting them to penance. Among their gods were those who in a special way were guardians of the moral law. These were Varuna, the all-embracing heaven, maker and lord of all things; Mitra the sun-god, the omniscient friend of the good, the avenger of lying and deceit; and Agni, the fire-god, dwelling in the household hearths, the friend and benefactor of good men. The ancient *riks* or hymns abound in noble passages in which the worshipper, oppressed with the sense of guilt, lifts up his voice with sad yet confident appeal to one of these deities, and asks for pardon. It is chiefly to the god Varuna that these penitential prayers are directed. Such, for example are the following:

“If we to any dear and loved companion
Have evil done, to brother or to neighbor,
To our own countryman or to a stranger,
That sin do thou, O Varuna, forgive us.

“Forgive the wrongs committed by our fathers,
What we ourselves have sinned in mercy pardon;
My own misdeeds do thou, O God, take from me,
And for another’s sin let me not suffer.

“If ever we deceived like cheating players,
If consciously we erred, or all unconscious,
According to our sin do thou not punish;
Be thou the singer’s guardian in thy wisdom.

“We turn aside thy anger with our offerings,
O King, by our libations and devotion.
Do thou, who hast the power, wise king eternal,
Release us from the sins we have committed.”¹

¹ Kaegi, “The Rigveda,” translated by R. Arrowsmith. Boston, 1886, pp. 67-68.

The later development of the religion of the Vedas into the highly complicated system known as Brahmanism, was marked by an even greater insistence on the practice of penance. Confession of sins was frequently resorted to, especially before the performance of certain solemn sacrifices. Besides the astonishing variety of purificatory rites,—baths, sprinkling with water or stale, smearing with ashes or cowdung, sippings of water, and suppressions of breath,—fasts and other forms of self-mortification, some of them unto death, were prescribed as penances for sin. The eleventh book of the metrical treatise known as the “Laws of Manu” is practically a penitential, in which is laid down the proper manner of atoning for different kinds of sin. It is here that the following passage may be found, setting forth the nature and efficacy of penance:

“By confession, by repentance, by austerity, and by reciting (the Veda) a sinner is freed from guilt and, in case no other course is possible, by liberality.

“In proportion as a man has done wrong, himself confesses it, even so far is he freed from guilt as a snake from its slough.

“In proportion as his heart loathes his evil deed, even so far is his body freed from that guilt.

“He who has committed a sin and has repented, is freed from that sin, but he is purified only by (the resolution of) ceasing (to sin and thinking) ‘I will do so no more.’

“Having thus considered in his mind what results will arise from his deeds after death, let him always be good in thoughts, speech, and actions.

“He who, having either unintentionally or intentionally committed a reprehensible deed, desires to be freed from (the guilt of) it, must not commit it a second time.

“If his mind be uneasy with respect to any act, let him repeat the austerities (prescribed as a penance) for it until they fully satisfy (his conscience).”¹

In early Buddhism, the Brahman practice of confession was retained, not as a rite efficacious for the remission of sin, but rather as a valuable form of discipline. A monk, guilty of some offense, was expected to confess it to a brother monk

¹ “Laws of Manu,” XI, 228-234; in “Sacred Books of the East,” Vol. XXV, p. 477.

that very day, and to receive the fitting penance. Otherwise, his guilt became the greater by every day's delay. In addition to this private confession, there was a fortnightly ceremony, corresponding somewhat to the chapter in some religious orders, at which the presiding monk enumerated a stereotyped formula of offenses which it was the duty of every monk to avoid. First came the class of offenses that entailed expulsion from the order, then several others of less and less consequence. After mentioning the sins comprised in each class, the presiding monk put three times to the assembled monks this question: "Venerable sirs, are you pure in this matter?" If no one spoke, it was a sign that all were guiltless. If a monk confessed that he had committed some one of the offenses mentioned, a penance proportionate to the gravity of the transgression was laid upon him.

In the course of time, however, when the craving for some divine being to worship had transformed into gods the founder Gautama and the other fancied Buddhas of the past and future, giving rise to the so-called Mahayana sect, violations of the moral law came once more to be viewed as sins; and confession, now directed to the Buddhas, was held to be efficacious both for the removal of guilt and for securing a happy rebirth, provided it was accompanied by a sincere repentance and a purpose of amendment. Such, for example, is the confession to the Thirty-five Buddhas practised in Thibet. The penitent monk, having before him the images or pictures of the Thirty-five Buddhas, begins to pray:

"Honor to the Buddhas without stain, who all pursue the same path. Repentance of all sins.

"I adore the Tathagatas of the three periods . . . the very pure and perfect Buddhas. . . . I place before them and confess my sins."

Then follows a long formula of adoration of the different Buddhas, whose several names, piously pronounced, are thought to be efficacious for the remission of specific sins.¹

In Japanese Buddhism there exists a somewhat similar penitential acknowledgment of wrong-doing.²

¹ Cf. Schlagintweit, "Buddhism in Thibet," Ch. XI.

² "Si-do-in-dzou," translated by S. Kawamoura; in *Annales du Musée Guimet*, Paris, 1899, p. 20.

In none of the religions thus far considered do we find a keener sense of the evil of wrong-doing than in Zoroastrianism. This religion, venerable alike for its antiquity and for its lofty moral standard, inculcated the greatest horror for sin. Owing to its peculiar dualistic doctrine, a violation of the moral law, whether in thought or deed, was held to be more than an offense against the good creator Ormazd, meriting his indignation and punishment; it was also a blight on the good creation, and strengthened the kingdom of the evil spirit by furthering the production of noxious animals. This was especially true of the crime of abortion and of all forms of unchastity. The Vendidad teaches that the unchaste woman is to be avoided as pestilence, as a noxious wild beast. Her very look causes one-third of the good creation to wither.¹

It is but natural that in a religion that insisted so strongly on the evil of sin, penance should be a prominent characteristic. It is true, one may look in vain in the Avestan literature for penitential psalms like those that belonged to the religious poetry of the Vedas. But in the Vendidad and elsewhere we find abundant examples of penances for sins, and in the penitential teachings and practices of modern Zoroastrianism we may recognize the persistent forms of ancient tradition.

The Sad-Dar, a modern Persian treatise on religious subjects pertaining to the Zoroastrian religion, lays down that everyone who falls into sin must go before the priest and confess his guilt.

“It is continually necessary that the accomplishment of repentance be kept in mind. Every time that a sin leaps from control, it is necessary to act so that they go before the priests . . . and do penance. And in accordance with the sin should be the good work. . . . Sin is thereby extirpated like a tree that withers. . . . And that repentance is better which they accomplish before high-priests . . . and when they accomplish the retribution that the high-priest orders, every sin that exists departs from them. If there be no high-priest, it is necessary to go before some persons who are commissioned by high-priests, and if those also do not exist, it is necessary to go to a man who is a friend of the soul and accomplish the repentance. . . .

¹ “Vendidad,” XVIII, iv, 60-65.

Repentance is when they do penance for the sin they have committed, and do not commit that sin a second time; if they do commit it, that first sin comes back."¹

There exists among the Parsees of Gujerat a penitential form of devotion much in vogue, the antiquity of which is not easy to determine. It is the formula of confession and renunciation of sin known as the Patet. It is recited to ease the conscience when burdened with the sense of guilt. It is even said for the benefit of departed relatives. Every pious Parsee looks to its recital as the safe means of securing a happy death, and a life of heavenly bliss in the presence of Ormazd. As soon as a member of the family is seen to be in danger of death, two or more priests are summoned to the bedside, and in the presence of the assembled relatives, the Patet is devoutly recited. If the dying person is able, he too pronounces the words together with the officiating priests.

It opens with a prayer meant to direct the intention of the penitent, and also consisting of a short profession of faith. It runs in part as follows:

"I pronounce in *Vaj* the name of God. I fix my mind on goodness. I perform the Patet to repair my thoughts, to increase my merits; to close the gate of hell, to open the gate of heaven. I hope to go to the excellent world of the just. . . . For the sake of my soul, may every fault that I have committed and every act of neglect be rooted out of me. Henceforth I will be more active in doing good, and I will refrain from evil. . . . I declare myself a worshipper of Mazda, a disciple of Zoroaster, an enemy of the evil spirits, an observer of the law of the Lord."

Then follows the Patet proper, which for brevity's sake, is given here only in part.

"I praise and call in my thought, in my word, in my action, all good thoughts, all good words, all good actions. I repel far from my thought, my word, my action, every bad thought, every bad word, every bad action. . . . I hold fast to the truth, . . . I hold fast to the pure glory of the excellent Mazdean religion . . . and leave it not, neither for a more happy life, nor for a longer life, nor for power, nor for wealth. If I must give up my life for my soul's salvation,

¹ "Sad-Dar," translated by E. W. West; "Sacred Books of the East," Vol. XXIV, pp. 308-309.

I will give it up with joy. . . . Every thought which I ought to have had and did not have; every word which I ought to have said and did not say; every action which I ought to have done and did not perform; every order which I ought to have given and did not give; every thought which I ought not to have had, and did have; every word which I ought not to have said and did say; every act which I ought not to have committed and did commit . . . from all sins of this kind I turn away, I repent of them, I do penance for them."

Then follows a long and very complete enumeration of sins, arranged in several groups. They are expressed conditionally, and repudiated by the penitent in so far as he may be guilty of them. The first group, which may serve as an example of the rest, is as follows:

"From all the sins that I may have committed . . . against Ormazd the Creator, and . . . against men of every station; if I have struck any one, if I have caused him physical suffering, if I have injured him by word; if I have done wrong to the just, if I have done wrong to the high priests, Mobeds, Dasturs, Herbeds (note-names to designate various orders of priests); if I have refused to give to those to whom it was my duty to give; if I have refused hospitality to the stranger; . . . if I have withheld assistance from my neighbor; if I have not saved him from hunger, thirst, cold and heat; . . . if I have not dealt kindly and considerately with those under my charge; with the result that I have wronged and grieved both good men and the Creator Ormazd, in thought, word, or action, . . . from all sins of this kind I turn away, I repent of them, I do penance for them."

The Patet concludes with renewed expressions of repentance, with an appeal to Ormazd for mercy and pardon, and with the prayer that the penitent, being freed from his sins, may be deemed worthy of a place among the just in heaven.¹

To these traces of penance in different religions, others might perhaps be added. But examples enough have been given to show how widespread is the craving of the human heart for reconciliation with the offended deity. The moral standard recognized in many of these religions has left much to be desired. But it was the best the worshippers knew, and within the narrow range of their knowledge, they tried to make amends for what they felt to be misdeeds. Like many other

¹ Cf. J. Darmesteter, "*Le Zend-Avesta*," Paris, 1893, Vol. III, pp. 167, ff.

rites, these penitential practices go to show that there is much even in pagan religions that is admirable as expressive of religious devotion. It is only the narrow soul that sneers at everything belonging to pagan religions. Viewed in this light, the religions of the world are well deserving of our sympathetic study.

CHARLES FRANCIS AIKEN.

ATHEISM AND SOCIALISM.

The charge is persistently made against socialism that it is atheistic: emphatic denials from authentic socialist sources are so frequently heard that one is compelled to respect them and to admit that neither the charge nor the denial is of itself evident. Some lines along which study of the question may be undertaken, are here suggested.

The facts in the case are confusing. Many of the most aggressive socialist leaders and writers are atheists and they habitually identify their atheism with their socialism; yet there are Christians who find in socialism harmonious social expression of their religious principles. Robert Ingersoll, who was a powerful enemy of Christianity and religion, was equally an opponent of socialism. Louise Michel, who died recently in Paris, was an intense atheist and anarchist, while the *Agnostic Journal* (March 4, 1905) claims that anarchy and Christianity are united in the person of the Russian priest Father Gapon, who recently led the revolutionary forces. Karl Marx and Engels were materialists, atheists, socialists, yet many of their followers find it possible to accept socialism from them, unaccompanied by atheism. Socialism in Germany is well organized, radical and powerful, yet well informed men say that not one fourth of the 3,000,000 German socialists are atheists. It is said that when a Jew becomes a socialist, he becomes an atheist, yet the spread of atheism in that race appears much greater than the spread of socialism. Some socialist platforms declare religion to be a private matter and they are called atheistic: the modern states actually make religion a private matter and it is said that they favor religion. The card of admission to the Socialist Party in the United States, signed by all who join the party, has no reference whatever to religion though the Church is socialism's strongest enemy. Leo XIII. in his encyclical on Freemasonry states that the masons prepare the way for socialists, and in his encyclical "Exeunte jam Anno," 1888, he says: "Rationalism, materialism, and atheism have begotten social-

ism, communism and nihilism, fatal and pestilential evils which naturally and almost necessarily flow forth from such principles." Socialism is here represented as springing from atheism while many who oppose socialism do so because they believe that it leads to atheism rather than springs from it.

We find, too, an increasingly large number of economists, students of government, and of history and law who study socialism thoroughly, regardless of any necessary reference to religion or to the lack of it. Thousands of laborers and socialists discuss it and accept or reject it, purely on its economic and social merits and are conscious of no necessary bearing on their faith whatever it be. And others who are socialists see a necessary relation between religion and socialism. A Jewish socialist is quoted in the *New York Sun*, November 23, 1904, saying, "To become a socialist, a man must think, and when a man begins to think, God flies out." And yet a second socialist, represented as a Catholic is quoted in the *Social Democratic Herald* (September 17, 1904) as saying: "I was born and raised a Roman Catholic, and still worship God according to the rules of that Church and . . . I expect to die a Roman Catholic."

A severe indictment of socialism was recently published by two socialists who left the party and commenced a campaign against it. The charge that socialism is atheistic is very strongly supported in the work, but in fairness to those whom it attacks, we should not attribute any more authority to the work than a fair critical sense generally allows to one who abandons a religion or party and then attacks it.

The discovery of the real relations of atheism and socialism is of much importance, since it should guide us in our dealings with socialism. If atheism causes socialism, cause and not effect should be combatted. If socialism causes atheism, the former, not the latter, should claim the attention of social students. If there is no necessary relation between them, it is vain to conduct a campaign against atheism in the hope of suppressing socialism.

Much of the emphasis of Catholic opposition to socialism rests on the claim that it is atheistic. Yet there are evidences that that line of argument does not always convince. Most

Christians are not socialists. Some are socialists, not because of any perceived relation between the idea of socialism and the idea of God, but because of distinctively social and personal teaching and experience.

Atheism.—A number of words are in use as practically synonymous with atheism: Agnosticism, infidelity, scepticism, unbelief, materialism, free thought, secularism. For our purpose we may use the word atheist as indicating one who does not believe in God: hence primarily a negative attitude. This may extend from mere absence of conviction, lack of any attitude toward the idea of God, to a direct positive denial that there is a God. Three aspects of atheism may be enumerated. It may indicate a state of mind of an individual, who does not bother about God, yet at the same time, does not attempt to reconstruct his thinking without God. He may live in a theistic atmosphere, accept principles of conduct which Christianity teaches, accept his economics, science, and social institutions as he finds them. He may be as good or as bad as a believing neighbor; the only difference being that the idea of God has evaporated. There is no question of logic, consistency, sanctions; it is merely a fact of life. Most of us know and understand atheists of this type. Whatever bearing this may have on the theologian's question of theoretical atheists, we cannot deny the fact.

On the other hand we have the practical atheists: men who live as though there were no God, no responsibility, no future life; engaged in pleasure, business, learning or what you will, but revealing in thought, action, life, no trace of belief in God. Such we find among the ranks of so called believers in no small numbers. The extent to which this is true is dreadful to contemplate and the power of propaganda which this practical atheism possesses is in some respects irresistible. While the danger of materialistic or atheistic teaching is admittedly great as a force to undermine morals, it should be noted that the danger to one's thinking, from an atheistic life is greater. Many prefer to be called agnostics—a term which is gradually replacing atheist, as applied to those who assert merely that they do not know.

The two classes of men here referred to give us a distinct aspect of atheism which we must carefully note. The practical atheist is not an atheist unless he admits it. The modern state, modern systems of law, of education, may be termed in a way atheistic. Some philosophers have held principles whose logical conclusions led to the denial of the existence of God, yet they professedly believed in God. It is well to adopt the rule found in the "Dictionnaire de Theologie catholique" (word Atheisme): The term atheist should not be applied to the author of a doctrine whose conclusions do not directly and immediately destroy the notion of God although they would by logical deduction endanger it.

We find next, atheists who are systematic formal materialists: who reconstruct their philosophy in harmony with the denial of God's existence. They explain reality, without reference to God, assume a positive materialistic principle and teach and foster the system of thought which results. Some such may see a moral or social value in religion regardless of the truth or falsity of it. Whatever the logic of their position, they confine themselves to the speculative order and only indirectly come into contact with life and institutions.

Finally, we have atheism, rather materialism, as an all embracing philosophy of life, including intellectual, moral, social, industrial orders and institutions, excluding God and the supernatural on principle, aiming to reorganize civilization with God banished, religion silenced, and eternity ignored.

It is always well to learn how an individual takes his own atheism before classifying him. The practical atheist resents being called an atheist; the theoretical individual atheist or agnostic may be or may not be an active enemy of religion. A well-known public man once remarked with some humor that he had met but one atheist who did not believe in God.

The forces in modern life that are producing atheism are strong and complex. The three types indicated are not to be accounted for by one cause. Man's natural tendency to rebel against control is one factor, the circumstances of free speech, free press, free thought are others, as also the tremendous emphasis now placed on the material side of life.

One may say, in a sense, that industry is atheistic, politics is atheistic, education is atheistic, international relations are atheistic, science is atheistic, yet who would maintain that these are formally opposing religion? There is significance in the observations of Osler in his lecture on Science and Immortality. "Immortality and all that it may mean, is a dead issue in the great movements of the world. In the social and political forces, what account is taken by practical men of any eternal significance of life? Does it ever enter into the consideration of those controlling the destinies of their fellow creatures that this life is only a preparation for another? To raise the question is to raise a smile. I am not talking of our professions, but of the every day condition which only serves to emphasize the contrast between the precepts of the gospel and the practice of the street. Without a preadventure it may be said that a living faith in a future existence has not the slightest influence in the settlement of the grave social and national problems which confront the race to-day." "While accepting a belief in immortality and accepting the phases and forms of the prevailing religion, an immense majority live practically uninfluenced by it, except in so far as it ministers to a wholesale dissonance between the inner and the outer life and diffuses an atmosphere of general insincerity. A second group, larger, perhaps to-day than ever before in history put the supernatural altogether out of man's life and regard the hereafter as only one of the many inventions he has sought out for himself. A third group, ever small and select, lay hold with the anchor of faith upon eternal life as the controlling influence in this one." The upper classes tend to practical materialism or atheism because life means so much to them and the lower classes tend that way because life means so little for them. Ruskin cites a correspondent as saying ("Fors," 111, p. 116): "If you teach him (man) only to reason you may make him an atheist, a demagogue or any vile thing; but if you teach him to feel, his feelings can only find their proper and natural relief in devotion and religious resignation." Again, Paulsen says in his Introduction to Philosophy (p. 72): "If there is a connection between theoretical, and

what one calls practical materialism it is not realized in this that metaphysics determines life, but in this that life determines metaphysics. An empty and common life has a tendency above all to develop a nihilistic view of life; its features are low estimates of life and its destiny, misunderstanding and ridicule of the nobler sides of human nature, loss of reverence for moral and spiritual greatness, infidelity and scorn for all ideal endeavors. And such a nihilistic conception of life has of course a natural tendency toward a materialistic view of the world."

Socialism.—Socialism is always criticism and reform; complaint and aspiration. As a criticism, large numbers accept it; as a reform, many of these fear it. We find individuals in whom Socialism is a quiet, harmless, orderly state of mind. Socialization of capital they look upon as the single solution of our problems; private ownership of capital and the consequences of such ownership are regarded as the causes thereof. These men think their socialism unrelated to philosophy, to religion, to history or evolution. They see a condition, believe in a given remedy and think out no relations beyond the specific measure and social adjustments to it. There are certainly many socialists who answer this description, whose religion, philosophy, ethics are not affected in principle, though somewhat modified in application. Hadley says rightly in his "Economics," Chapter I: "A socialist in the proper definition of the word is a man who distrusts these conclusions of the individualist and who believes that the loss from the exercise of individual freedom in most of the debatable cases outweighs the gain." "One side believes that this good is best achieved by individual freedom in a particular line of action: the other side believes that the dangers and evils with which such freedom is attended, outweigh its advantages." "The difference between individualists and socialists is largely a matter of temperament. It comes from a difference in constitution which leads the individualist to calculate the large and remote consequences of any measure and ignore the immediate details while the socialist feels the immediate details so strongly that he distrusts the somewhat abstract lines of thought which the individualist is prone to follow."

We find a second stage of socialism when it philosophizes, constructs a system of ethics, politics, a quasi interpretation of history and a set of social principles which affect practically the whole social order. It may be the logical development of the first, but it does not go to extremes.

We find also a third stage of socialism which aims to be comprehensive, to construct a system of thought, philosophy and institutions which will explain all reality. In this form socialism has taken on materialism, atheism, hatred of religion and it does advocate most depraved and confused views of life.

The essential element of socialism, socialization of capital, is a distinct demand, easily accounted for and quite logically the result of given antecedents. The trend of solid judgment today identifies it but indirectly with religion and philosophy. Many have tried and are trying to control it in the name of materialism; others try to claim it for Christianity; others identify it with a theory of social evolution. As a matter of mere logic it may be made a necessary and integral part of a Christian or of a materialistic philosophy as one will. As a question of public policy, it may be presented without express relation to either. As a question of actual development, it tends to more and more sympathy with atheism and to less and less with Christianity. Even that is as much unconscious as conscious and hence frequently denied. When we charge a moderate though convinced socialist with atheism, his repudiation of atheism may be quite honest. He became a socialist because he was looking for reform, not religion.

In dealing with atheist or socialist we should endeavor to avoid confusing two points of view and claiming to know better than he, what he believes. Atheism and socialism are to their partisans what these take them to be. A written exposition of socialism is not socialism; it is a picture. Socialism is a living attitude to life. We should, therefore, permit atheist and socialist to tell us what atheism and socialism are to them, that is, what they think them to be, and in any discussion, the basis of argument should be the definition which atheist or socialist furnishes. He knows better than his opponent, what either or both systems are to him. We should

guard against confounding the whole social structure of a movement like atheism or socialism, with the individual aspect of it. Few atheists embrace the whole of atheism or materialism as historically developed: few socialists summarize in conscious acceptance all the successive stages of socialism. When we study the history of one or both, we construct a picture of the whole evolution of the system and frequently assume that the individual adherent today knows, accepts and teaches the whole.

If we place ourselves at the standpoint of atheism and attempt to account for the organized unrest, revolution, reform, uprisings, campaigns inaugurated by or in the name of socialism, we shall not succeed. If we place ourselves at the standpoint of socialism and attempt to account for the materialism and atheism of the world, we shall not succeed.

That one will account for the other in many localities, that the two are linked in mental sympathy frequently, no one can deny: that the atheist now and then finds an ally in the socialist, and vice versa is evident, but we are scarcely justified in assuming a permanent, necessary general logical relation between the two.

The idea of God is ultimate and comprehensive. Nothing in the whole sweep of creation can escape a real relation to God. We who believe in God, refer to Him all causality in the order of being, all sanction in the order of law, all authority in the order of social existence. All thought, all conduct, all philosophy is related directly or indirectly to God. I have heard a serious man say that the authority of God is involved in the police sign, "Keep off the grass." Thus, to believe in God, or to deny His existence implies a complete philosophy. While this is true, it should not be taken in too specific a sense. Belief in God does not necessarily lead to a fixed order of property, to a given form of government, or to a determined outline of social relations as it affects explanations, sanctions, and motives more than institutions.

In the social order, wealth or property is ultimate and comprehensive; the law of its distribution is far-reaching. Physical existence depends on food, shelter, clothing, culture, prog-

ress. Moral and spiritual development depend on security which property gives. The principles which at any given time theoretically govern the distribution of wealth arise out of definite ethical conceptions. Back of these are found ideas of human right, duties, destiny and relations—and back of these, a final attitude toward the idea of God. Thus we may say, that for those who believe in God, every fact and process in the distribution of property may be related to God, but they who reject the idea of God may account for their views of property by reference to another ultimate idea.

Belief in God entails many consequences in life. It fosters a spiritual view of existence, refers present standards to future existence, measures all values in this life in terms of relation to spiritual life beyond the grave. Lack of belief in God entails many consequences, practically the reverse of those just named, modified by the fact that we live in a civilization resting on a belief in God and Jesus Christ. Either the believer or the non-believer may be socialist or individualist without being conscious that faith and socialism influence each other to any great extent. But when the individual socialist, enters a socialist party or movement, new factors come into the situation and certainly affect him. He does not foresee all that socialism is, nor does he measure the countless influences that will affect him even more than the principles on which he consciously embraces socialism.

He lives in an atmosphere of criticism of the universal existing social order, his association is with like minded men who represent every degree of radical thought from materialism and atheism to the most conservative position imaginable. The gradual fusing of views into one great view and the preponderance of radical tendencies, of emotional standards and short-sighted estimates; the gradually assumed leadership by the most radical members of a party; the total absence of critical sense and intellectual restraint, all work imperceptibly but powerfully on the individual socialist and most certainly affect his whole view of life regardless of his will and his conscious attitudes. The believer may begin by seeking social justice for humanity: he is led to see that the

present industrial order is wrong. He criticizes religion for not condemning injustice. Criticism of administration of religion degenerates unconsciously into doubt as to the value of religion. The step to rejection of it and of belief in God is then not long. The atmosphere of the socialist movement appears from every point of view to be hostile to the sense of the supernatural and spiritual and to a large-hearted sympathetic faith in God. It is quite within the range of possibility, as shown in the Christian Socialist movement in England, that a band of spiritually minded men filled with religious zeal should endeavor to suppress the competitive struggle and to organize industry on a coöperative basis. But the early failure which visited the effort shows the impossibility of its aim as well.

As the socialist movement is now constituted, taking its historical circumstances into account, everything in it, tendency, atmosphere, leadership, association, sympathy and attitude does threaten the spirit, belief, standards and hopes of one who devoutly believes in God. There will be found individual socialists in no way connected with party or movement, who maintain that their faith remains unaffected: there may be found individuals in the movement, who through circumstances, seem to escape spiritual harm. But undeniably the danger is direct, constant and manysided: so much so that one must accept loyally and endorse unqualifiedly the appeal of Leo XIII to Catholics not to join the socialistic party or movement.¹

The peril is the greater because not easily seen. Few men who believe in God will look to socialism for atheism. They are in no way concerned with atheism. If they believe that they find what they want, they accept socialism and they maintain very earnestly that they are faithful Christians. If we in our antagonism assume the conscious presence of atheism where such socialists can not see it, we make on them the impression of being dishonest or uninformed and we lose influence with them. If we distinguish socialism as a state of mind from socialism as a movement and note the difference between the individual socialist and the party socialist, we may

¹ See also *American Catholic Quarterly*, April, 1905, "Catholicity and Socialism."

see the cause of the confusion regarding the relations of atheism and socialism both in the minds of those who honestly assume a necessary relation between the two and of those who deny such a relation.

The significance of certain facts is great to us and trifling to others: for instance, that so many leaders of socialism are atheists: that its most complete scientific form is professedly materialistic: that the drift throughout all types of socialism is toward if not to materialistic views; that many who have lost faith are active in the movement; that it tends so frequently to become—not a mere scheme of production and distribution—but a philosophy of life, or rather a philosophy of society without any conception of sin, grace, the supernatural or the spiritual destiny of man. The believing Christian who becomes a socialist will say to his opponent that these are personal matters; that he looks to socialism for economics and politics, not for faith or religion. He does not see and will not admit that socialism can mean to him anything more than he makes it mean. The evolution through which he may go, the fate of many who like him, sought life and found spiritual death in socialism, will not deter him for he sees no relation: the countless consequences of his step are hidden from him and they appear one by one until the work is done and then he ceases to care.

The points of view suggested in these pages may be of some service in helping to see the relations of atheism and socialism. But that service is secondary. If we commence systematic observation of socialists and socialism: if we but note the circumstances by which this individual or that one, was led into socialism; the progress of his mind in it; the change in point of view, the widening scope of criticism and the deepening determination of reform; the enlarging of comment and scorn, we will discover the power, dynamic character and trend of socialism and then speak with authority to those whom we would save from it. We should see socialism at work, undoing and transforming, much as we watch the bale of cotton converted into cloth. The bale does not predict the process nor does the figured textile proclaim it. The conservative Christian who enters the socialist movement and becomes

a radical atheist, does not at either terminal of the journey show us the process. No mere scientific formula, fixed theory of value or accumulation of capital explains it.

It is surely unwise for Catholics to read without discrimination socialistic literature and attend socialist meetings. This is done more or less freely but with no good results. If we might build up a worthy literature on social reform and develop a personal interest in the problems which confront society, after the manner of the Holy Father, we might draw thinking Catholics into a movement which would to some extent satisfy the legitimate demands for reform and save them from an atmosphere and companionship and agitation hostile to their faith.

The campaign of defense against socialism should be carefully thought out in advance and our energies should be directed with wisdom. How win back the Christian who is a Socialist? How prevent the honest man, whose sense of equity it outraged by our conditions, from becoming a socialist? How select what is true in criticism, fair in hope and reasonable in plan out of the mass of socialism and profit by it?

What is the value of argument, refutation, logic in meeting the socialist presentation? We shall scarcely accomplish much if we persist in describing, attacking and refuting the worst possible phases of socialism, since it propagates itself by the appeal of its best features, just as any other system does.

Possibly thoughtful consideration of these and similar problems will lead us to discover that we are making some mistakes in our methods. In the case of an epidemic, general warnings, principles of sanitation and official notices have their value, but effective work will consist in reaching the individual locality or home, and in pointing out definite causes of danger and definite methods of protection. Similarly the process of mental revolution which socialism implies may be arrested by learning the circumstances in the individual's life and thinking, and by preparing him against the assumptions and views out of which socialism springs. Socialism wins the individual because it knows how to appeal to him. We shall save the individual from the errors of socialism when we learn how to appeal to him with sympathy, fairness and insight.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

THE LATINITY OF ENNODIUS.

The Latinity of the Fathers, or "Church Latin" as we sometimes designate it, is seldom synonymous to our minds with the flowing periods of the Classic Latin writers. At the close of the Middle Ages the Humanists, consistent with their pedantic ideals of Classic Latinity, relegated the Fathers and "Church Latin" in general to the back-woods of Barbarism.¹ Still the Humanist of the fifteenth or sixteenth century had this redeeming quality: he was candid and outspoken. He proclaimed his doctrine "from the house-tops" and therefore provoked refutation. The modern Humanist, on the contrary, employs the crushing argument of silence. He says little and thinks less of Patristic Latinity.

Now even a cursory perusal of Patristic Latin will convince the thinking student that neither Cicero nor Cæsar nor Livy wrote the last well-balanced Latin period with its chosen diction, its smooth and easy flow, its artistic climax and delicate close. A Tertullian, a Cyprian, a Minutius Felix, a Jerome and even an Ennodius must be given a place in the great contest for that final period, whose musical cadence marks the confines between Classic and Scholastic Latinity. This fact has been generously appreciated of late years by certain scholars, particularly in Germany, and such production as the "*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum*"² and the "*Monumenta Germaniæ Historica*"³ attest the worth and interest of Patristic Latin.

A Latin author and a Father of the Church, on whom posterity has not lavished its epithets of praise and commendation,⁴ is Magnus Felix Ennodius. According to his

¹ Cf. E. Norden, "Die Antike Kunstprosa," Leipzig, 1898, II, p. 763 sq.

² Editum consilio et impensis Academiæ Litterarum Cæsareæ Vindobonensis.

³ Edidit Societas Aperiendis Fontibus Rerum Germanicarum Medii Ævi.

⁴ See "Saint Ennodius and the Papal Supremacy," by E. Maguire, in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, vol. 26, p. 317 sq. and p. 523 sq.—Cf. p. 330: "A few of his (Ennodius') hymns, especially the beautiful Ode on the Holy Virgin Euphemia, are referred to with scant eulogy; we are informed that his Apologia was approved by the Pope and the Roman Synod . . . and some of the unappreciative notices add that his style was labored and turgid."

own testimony he was born at Arles¹ France in the year 473.² He was a mere boy when his parents died. Left to the custody of his paternal aunt, he received a thorough education at Milan and fared well generally until her death. He was then sixteen years old.³ She left him almost penniless. Shortly reduced to the state of a beggar, he sought an honorable alliance with the young daughter (*parvula filiola*) of a very distinguished lady. His proposal was immediately accepted and his station in life at once elevated from the condition of want to that of affluence.⁴ Ennodius, however, seems to have made ill use of his wealth and to have lived some time in utter forgetfulness of his duties to the Bestower of "every best gift." In a moment of recollection he amended his⁵ ways, abandoned former follies and prepared himself for the ministry of the Church. His betrothed wife entered a convent of her own free choice.⁶ Ennodius was ordained deacon at the age of twenty-one, became Bishop of Pavia A. D. 511, was sent twice as Papal Envoy to Constantinople and died A. D. 521.⁷ The Church honors his memory on the seventeenth of July.⁸

That Ennodius was a diligent student of the Latin language is clear even from a cursory reading of his works, which teem with apt quotations from the classic Latin authors, and from his style which though turgid, and even lifeless, exhibits

¹ Cf. "Ennod, Epist.," VII, 8.

² Cf. Ennod., ed. Fr. Vogel, p. 11.

³ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 303-5.

⁴ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 303-18; *ex mendico in regem mutatus*.

⁵ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, pp. 300-304.

⁶ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, pp. 304-6.—The statement made by so many of Ennodius' biographers to the effect that he was actually married is not true. It is based on the false reading common to the inferior class of manuscripts that contain his writings. According to these manuscripts Ennodius was actually married and lived in wedlock for some time. The manuscript reading in question is: "*illa quae mecum matrimonii habuit parilitatem*"; but by far the best and most reliable manuscript has: "*illa quae mecum matrimonii habuit parilitate subiugari*." In this latter reading the words *habuit* . . . *subiugari* express simple futurity: "who was to be my bride." The word *habuit* in the present construction (*viz.*, with the *pres. infin. pass.*) is equivalent to the Greek *ἐμελλε*,—a striking characteristic of the Latin language at the time of Ennodius. Cf. Ennod. ed Vogel, p. 58, 29. The same construction occurs in the Athanasian Symbol: *ad cuius adventum omnes homines habent resurgere* . . . , which means *resurrecturi sunt*, as the following words clearly show: *et reddituri sunt*. Cf. Vogel, edit. Ennod., p. vi.—cf. Ph. Thielmann, "*Woelfflin's Archiv fuer Latein. Lexicogr.*," II, p. 194.

⁷ Cf. Vogel, edit. Ennod., p. xxviii.

⁸ Cf. "*Acta Sanctorum*," Jul. IV, p. 271 sq.

in the main a conscious effort after grammatical accuracy and rhetorical finish.¹

Over all and through all we find the glittering gold among the rough quartz.² Our author wrote both prose and verse.³ In the former particularly, he reveals his high esteem and keen appreciation for classic models. He passes judgment on the stylistic characteristics of individual authors; for instance, on Cicero, Vergil and Sallust⁴ and his judgment is always just. He exhorts his youthful disciples to read and re-read these masters assiduously.⁵ He frequently criticises the exuberant style of his young friends, indicates defects and suggests methods of improvement. He⁶ urges them to be more manly and less florid in their expressions. In a word Ennodius was thoroughly familiar with the works of Cicero, Sallust, Vergil, Horace, Lucan, Juvenal and nearly all the later writers of the Empire.⁷ He was a true Roman in sentiment and expression.⁸ He thought, spoke and wrote in Latin that was thoroughly Roman in every respect except simplicity. He lacks simplicity and stylistic clarity, though his diction is Roman and amazingly so for a writer of the sixth century. The artificial periodicity of his sentences, is due to a marked tendency of Latin writers, at the beginning of the sixth century to divorce the written from the spoken language, the literary from

¹ Cf. Vogel, "Woelfflin's Archiv fuer Latein. Lexicogr.," I., p. 268.

² Here are a few sentences that make for the truth of our assertion: Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 15, 24: *alias uberius, melius alias*; p. 96, 10: *ubique luctus, pavor ubique*; p. 118, 5: *aliud est enim ut lauderis dicere, aliud dicere ne carparis*; p. 221, 19: *una offendenda est hilaritate et lascivia placanda altera*; p. 125, 19: *mihi meo vivendum est more*; p. 66, 5: *quod licet non licet, quod non licet licet*.

³ The extant works of Ennodius are: 9 Books of Letters; 10 Miscellaneous Opuscles; 28 *Dictiones* or *Declamatory Recitationes* of a Sacred, Ethical, Scholastic and Controversial character; 1 Book of Poems and 1 Book of Epigrams. These works are edited by F. Vogel, "Monumenta German. Hist.," 7, and by W. Hartel, *Corpus Script. Ecclesiast.* VI.

⁴ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 24, 19: "Tulliani profunditas gurgitis, Crispi proprietates, Maronis elegantia."

⁵ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 20, 23: "labora ergo circa studia, lucem in conloquiis dilige, lectioni devotus insiste."

⁶ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 20, 35: "pulchra sunt quae scribis, sed ago amo plus fortia; redemita sunt floribus, sed poma plus diligo."

⁷ Cf. Vogel, edit. Ennod., pp. 332-333.

⁸ He refers in touching words to crumbling Rome; cf. Vogel, p. 210, 7 sq.: "illa ipsa mater civitatum Roma iuveniscit marcida senectutis membra rescando, date veniam, Lupercalis genii sacra rudimenta: plus est occasum repellere quam dedisse principia."—He speaks of Grace as a something which (p. 203, 16) "descendit a Superis."

the *sermo plebeius* or conversational speech.¹ Ennodius' contemporary Avitus offers us a basis for this conclusion in his strange, distorted collocation of individual words and whole sentences. The metaphor of the skiff, struggling against the current is an apt image of the situation in which Ennodius found himself, whenever he made conscious efforts to write classic Latin. He had to row against the tide of decadence,² and the undercurrents of fixed phraseology which threatened to upset his barque at every stroke of the oar. Hence the silent condemnation with which the centuries have branded the Latinity of Ennodius is not founded on true and logical principles. To judge and condemn his Latinity as a whole by its turgid or inflated characteristics is to draw a conclusion from partial premises.³ The very atmosphere Ennodius breathed forbade him to be simple, clear and buoyant in his style. In the matter of his diction, however, he was not so trammelled, he was freer to choose; and so if a correct estimate of his Latinity is sought, it will have to be based on the care or negligence manifested in his diction and in that alone.

Let us then examine briefly the diction of Ennodius in the light of Classic diction, and, for reasons of relief, contrast it with the diction of some other better known Father of the Church,—say St. Jerome, whose Latinity has been carefully studied and presented to the literary world in neat and scientific form by Henri Goelzer, *Latinité De Saint Jérôme*, Paris, 1884. In the main our results will be of a negative character. We shall see, for instance, how Ennodius avoided the shoals of the *sermo plebeius*, and maintained a middle course between the extreme conservatism of his classic exemplars and the unthoughtful liberties of verbal coinage indulged in by his predecessors and contemporaries in patristic Latinity.

A very prominent characteristic of post-classic prose is the poetic element.⁴ This element first discernible in Livy

¹ Cf. J. J. Ampère, "Histoire Littéraire," Paris, 1867, tom. 2, ch. VII, p. 198.

² Cf. Vogel, "Woelfflin's Archiv f. Lat. Lexicogr.," I, p. 267.

³ Thus Teuffel, "Geschichte Der Roemischen Litteratur," Leipzig, 1890, par. 479, 1 sq., severely exposes the turgid and inflated characteristics of Ennodius' style without ever a word in favor of his diction.—Simcox, "A History of Latin Literature," New York, 1883, Vol. II., pp. 459-460, has only words of reprobation for Ennodius' language.

⁴ Cf. Furneaux, "The Annals of Tacitus," Oxford, 1896, Vol. I, introd., p. 39.

distinguishes the severe *sermo urbanus* of the late Republic from the prose of the Empire. Poetic words or phrases and poetic imagery separate the rigid classic prose of Cicero and Cæsar from a considerable portion of Livy's prose and from all the prose of succeeding writers. We will therefore eliminate this poetic tendency so common to all the Latin writers after the Classic period and establish our conclusions about Ennodian diction according to the following two standards of Classic Latin diction: (A) careful avoidance of the *Sermo Plebeius*,¹ the free and easy medium of conversation: (B) extreme conservatism in regard to the formation of new words within the language itself and a conscious aversion to the introduction of foreign words. Did Ennodius shun the *sermo plebeius* in his literary compositions? Did he hesitate to introduce a new or a late word into his writings? We shall endeavor to show that the answer to these two questions is decidedly affirmative. The *sermo plebeius* or familiar language of daily conversation has a predilection for diminutive nouns and adjectives,² for frequentative and denominative verbs.³ The numerical abuse is so great that these diminutive and frequentative forms come to lose their original force and the delicate shades of meaning which they invariably express in the Classic authors. The writings of St. Jerome afford ample confirmation for this statement. He used more than one seventh of all the known diminutives in the Latin language down to his time.⁴ In fact he coined no less than fifty diminutive nouns⁵ and nine diminutive adjectives.⁶ Again we find a surprisingly large number of frequentative verbs in the writings of St. Jerome. He seems to have coined five.⁷ This rather inconsiderate use of the *sermo plebeius* works adversely to the author's good intentions and as a consequence the majority of St. Jerome's diminutive and frequentative forms have lost their original force and shade of mean-

¹ Cf. F. T. Cooper, "Word Formation in the Roman *Sermo Plebeius*," New York, 1895, introd., p. xvii sq.

² Cf. Cooper, "Word Formation in the Roman *Sermo Plebeius*," p. 164 sqq.

³ Cf. Cooper, op. cit., p. 210 sq. and p. 225 sq.

⁴ Cf. C. Paucker, "De Latinitate B. Hieronymi," Berlin, 1880, p. 57.

⁵ Cf. H. Goelzer, "Latinité De Saint Jérôme," pp. 14, 15.

⁶ Cf. H. Goelzer, op. cit., p. 15.

⁷ Cf. H. Goelzer, op. cit., p. 14.

ing.¹ Ennodius, on the contrary, employs frequentatives and diminutives thoughtfully and sparingly; and the few that he does employ exhibit a remarkable departure from the *sermo plebeius* of the sixth century. They retain as a whole the force and meaning which they were primitively destined to convey.² He has in all only seventeen diminutive nouns that were introduced into the Latin language in the course of its decadence and no diminutive adjectives that show a departure from Classic prose. One of the diminutive nouns (*casellula*, "a very little cottage") is most likely Ennodius' own coinage. Ennodius is also extremely careful and chary in the use of frequentative formations. Not more than four frequentative verbs which recede from classic usage appear in his writings. Indeed the diction of Ennodius is too pure and classic to allow of any undue intrusion of the *sermo plebeius* or intimate and careless language of social communication.

A more interesting question is that of new formations,—words that appear for the first time in the works of Ennodius and seem to have been coined by him to meet some pressing literary exigency. We may remark at the outset that this creation of new words is not only justifiable, if done with discretion and precision, but absolutely necessary at times.³ Cicero did not hesitate to make new formations hitherto unknown in the Latin language.⁴ He was careful, however, to mould his new words according to the received analogies governing such formation. His coinages were always correct and apropos. St. Jerome on the other hand was too profuse in his new formations. He seems to have coined no less than

¹ Cf. H. Goelzer, op. cit., pp. 128, 129 and p. 176.

² Thus *Infantulus* (p. 114, 33) is "a very young child"; *casellula* (p. 318, 6) "a very small cottage" or hut; *civitatula* (p. 100, 15) "a little town or village"; *facultatula* (p. 73, 28) "modest resources," etc.

Hieronymus, in Gal. I, ad I, 11 sq., has a few interesting remarks in justification of his new formations: "Si hi, qui desertos sæculi legere consueverunt, cœperint nobis de novitate et vilitate sermonis illudere, mittamus eos ad Ciceronis libros qui de questionibus philosophiæ prænotantur; et videant, quanta ibi necessitate compulsus sit tanta verborum portenta proferre, quæ numquam latini hominis auris audivit, et hoc, cum de Græco, quæ lingua vicina est, transferre in nostram. Quid patiuntur illi, qui de Hebræis difficultatibus proprietates exprimere conantur?"—cf. Max Bonnett, "Le Latin de Grégoire de Tours," Paris, 1890, p. 443.

⁴ Cf. *redamare* (Cic. *Lael.*, 14, parag. 49). The word was coined by Cicero to translate the Greek.

three hundred and seventy words.¹ In a way, Cassiodorus rightly styled him "*latinæ linguæ dilatator eximius*."² There is absolutely no excuse for his exorbitant coinage of diminutives; nor can we excuse such new words as *defensator*³ for the classical *defensor*; nor yet *civitacula*⁴ for *civitatula*, *illuvio*⁵ for *illuvies*, *comessor*⁶ for *comestor*, and *obumbraculum*⁷ for *obumbratio*. The unpardonable reaches its climax in the formation of such words as *apostatrix*, *capabilis*, *fusitrix*, *antepassio*, *propassio*, *prolimen*, *promurale*, *tuguriunculum* and *trinomius*.⁸ In all these instances Jerome ignores the fundamental laws of word-derivation in the Latin language.

Turning now to Ennodius whose diction especially we have in mind, we detect at a glance the conservatism of the true Roman and the correctness of the skilled rhetorician. His new formations are few and these few are in the main necessary. They have furthermore the sanction of accurate derivation. There are two linguistic abnormalities in this list, but neither can be traced with desirable certainty to the literary work-shop of Ennodius. They are *cautelitas*⁹ and *plectura*.¹⁰ The first is abnormal in as far as it is an abstract word derived from another abstract word: *cautela*, *cautelitas*. The second word *plectura* in conformity with the recognized rules of derivation should be *plexura* (from the supine *plexum*). We have already hinted at the doubtful Ennodian origin of the two words. Our reasons for this opinion are the following. *Cautelitas* occurs in a jocose letter which Ennodius addresses to his friend and physician, *Helpidius*, a man of "*Attic Erudition*," but dilatory in his correspondence.¹¹ From the tone of the whole letter two alternatives are inevitable: either Ennodius playfully coined the word in good-natured irony, "*an forte circa me illam tuam cautelitatem æstimas esse servan-*

¹ Cf. H. Goelzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 14, 15.

² Cf. Cassiod., "*Divin. Lect.*," p. 21.

³ Cf. H. Goelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴ Cf. H. Goelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁵ Cf. H. Goelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁶ Cf. H. Goelzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 46 and 54.

⁷ Cf. Hier, *adv. Jovin.*, I, 39.

⁸ Cf. H. Goelzer, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁹ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 275, II.

¹⁰ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 2, 6.

¹¹ Cf. Ennod. *Epist.*, 8, 8, ed. Vogel, p. 275.

dam,"¹ for elsewhere he always uses *cautela*,² or Ennodius' friend employed the word in some previous letter, as the two pronominal adjectives *illam tuam* suggest. A similar use of these pronouns is found in Cicero (*Epist. ad Att.*, 1, 10): "*Cum essem in Tusculano (erit tibi pro illo tuo 'Cum essem in Ceramicus')*". *Plectura* is a formation on the analogy of *nectura*³ and *flectura*.⁴ Elsewhere *plectura* is found only as a false reading for *pletura* in the family of manuscripts of Paulinus Nolanus, *Carmen* 24.48.⁵ In Jerome we find *frixura*⁶ for *frictura*,—just the reverse of *plectura* for *plexura*. I am inclined to believe, however, that *plectura* is not a deliberate coinage of Ennodius. I should look upon it as a current word of that period, which has not survived except in the writings of Ennodius. My reasons for believing that Ennodius is not guilty of this incorrect formation are two fold: (A) Ennodius' carefulness in coining the words that can be attributed to him with any degree of certainty,⁷ (B) his using *flexura*, the correct form (*Carm.*, 1, 4, 105), not *flectura*, though the latter may have had currency in his time, as it is employed by *Acro* and *Hor.* *Carm.*, 1.25.10.

Another word first found in Ennodius is *infamium*⁸ for *infamia*. It rests on the analogy of *ignominium*⁹ for *ignominia*. *Infamium*, like *plectura*, appears to have been a current word in the time of Ennodius, since it is used so freely in the *Concilia Toletana*.¹⁰ Still another curious anomaly is *commeatio*. It is, however, a correct formation from the verb *commeo*. Ennodius employs it twice with a freedom and unconsciousness that betoken its current use.¹¹ Furthermore the word occurs in¹² *Cassiodorus*. *Præloquium* for *præfatio* does not appear in the extant writings of Ennodius'

¹ Cf. Ennod. *Epist.*, 8, 8.

² Cf. Ennod. ed. Vogel, pp. 27, 18; 92, 32; 105, 12; 210, 20.

³ Cf. Ph. Thielmann, "*Woelfflin's Archiv f. Latein. Lexicogr.*," I, p. 70.

⁴ Cf. C. Pauker, "*Suppl. Lexicogr. Latin.*," s. v.

⁵ Cf. Hartel ad loc., "*Corp. Script. Ecclesiast.*," Vol. XXX.

⁶ Cf. H. Goelzer, op. cit., p. 88.

⁷ Cf. Vogel, *Woelfflin's "Archiv f. Lat. Lexicogr."*, I, p. 268.

⁸ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 98, II.

⁹ Cf. L. Quicherat, "*Add. Lex. Lat.*," s. v.: *infamium*.

¹⁰ Cf. *Concil. Toletan.* (L. P. Migne 84), XII, 504; XIII, 515; XIII, 531; XVII, 592.

¹¹ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 103, II; 228, 8.

¹² Cf. C. Pauker, "*Suppl. Lex. Latin.*," s. v.

predecessors. Yet it is used too freely¹ by Ennodius to warrant our considering it his own arbitrary or unnecessary formation. Concellaneus as a masculine adjective employed substantively is found for the first time in Ennodius.² The feminine form is used by Augustine.³ The form ineluctatus seems to occur in the writings of Ennodius only.⁴ The present participle ineluctans is found in a Pseudo-Fulgentian work.⁵ Conflatus (cf. conflatio in Hieronymus) and suffectus⁷ do not appear in the written language before Ennodius. Must we therefore regard these words as new formations of Ennodius? Hardly. There was a strong tendency in the period of which we speak to use doublets in -tus of nouns in -tio,⁸ and conflatus and suffectus could easily have been by-forms of conflatio and suffectio. Finally we meet with the rare word scabridus in Ennodius. Still as he employs this adjective twice⁹ without any hesitation or commentary and as it is found in the works of Fortunatus Venantius,¹⁰ I should be reluctant to consider it a coinage of Ennodius. These words, then (cautelitas, plectura, infamium, commeatio, præloquium, concellaneus, ineluctatus, conflatus, suffectus and scabridus) can not be looked upon with absolute certainty as Ennodian coinages. If Ennodius may be charged with any new formations, they must be sought among these few words: abiuratio, adnuntiatrix, casellula, destinator, elocutor, evisceratio, inriguitas, inelimatus, nemoreus, perlatrice, prævisio, perinmensus, subdiaconium. Now were these formations necessary or even apropos? Do they follow the laws of derivation in the Latin language? I think that both of these questions can be satisfactorily answered in the affirmative. Abiuratio

¹ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, pp. 45, 5; 49, 30; 130, 30.

² Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 13, 8.

³ Cf. Aug. Qu. hept., II, 39: 'Et mulier a vicina sua et concellaria vel concellanea (si ita dicendum est) vel cohabitatrice sua.'

⁴ Cf. "Woelfflin's Archiv f. Lat. Lexicogr.," I, p. 281.

⁵ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 12, 8.

⁶ Cf. H. Goelzer, op. cit., p. 65.

⁷ Cf. Ennod., ed. Vogel, p. 7, 20.

⁸ Thus we find in Ennodius alone (cf. Index of Vogel s. vv.): adfectio and adfectus; aditio and aditus; ambitio and ambitus; apparitio and apparatus; circuitio and circuitus; congressio and congressus; discursio and discursus; dominatio and dominatus; abiectio and abiectus; processio and processus; profectio and profectus; relatio and relatus; etc.

⁹ Cf. Ennod. ed Vogel, p. 75, 30; 173, 31.

¹⁰ Cf. Fortun. Venant. Carm., II, 9, 7.

had no corresponding noun. Ennodius would seem to have given the Latin language this noun. His formation is quite correct. *Evisceratio* (from *eviscerō*) with the meaning *actus eviscerandi* is stamped with the same justification as *abiuratio*. Besides there is a notable tendency in late Latin to make nouns do the work of verbs. Thus in Ennodius (ed. Vogel, p. 62.14) we read: *divulsione ecclesiastici gregis*, and the meaning is: *eo quod divellit ecclesiasticam gregem*. *Prævisio* for *provisio* is only a confirmation of a peculiar linguistic phenomenon at work in the age of Ennodius and his immediate predecessors—the tendency to interchange the *præ* and *pro* prefixes in composition. We might instance: *proloquium*, *præloquium*; *prodecessor*, *prædecessor*. *Adnuntiatrix* is simply the feminine noun of agency to *adnuntiator*, just as *perlatrix* is the feminine noun of agency to *perlator*. *Elocutor* vice versa is the masculine noun of agency to *elocutrix* found in Quintilian. *Destinator* is the correctly formed masc. noun of agency from the verb *destino*. *Casellula*, a double diminutive from *casa*, offers an exact parallel to the Plautine *cistellula* from *cista*. *Inriguitas* is a much needed abstract noun formed from the adjective *inriguus*. *Inelimatus* finds its counterpart in the many compounded participial adjectives of the Latin language. *Subdiaconium*, after the analogy of *diaconium*, bears the same proportion to the hybrid *subdiaconus* as *diaconium* bears to *diaconus*. *Perinmensus* would be an exact parallel to the Livian word *perincommodus*. *Nemoreus* for *nemorosus* seems at first sight impossible of justification. A moment's reflection changes the tenor of our hasty conclusion. *Nemoreus* can be defended. Denominative adjectives formed by the suffix *-eus* are extremely poetic and best adapted to pastoral descriptions, whether these descriptions be in prose or verse. Now Ennodius uses *nemoreus* in describing a pastoral scene and that too in poetic prose.

We conclude then: first, Ennodius was not perfectly free to choose his phraseologies and to cultivate a style based on thoroughly Classic models. He was influenced by the tendency of his age to separate the written from the spoken word. Not infrequently therefore did he sacrifice the clear and

simple classical sentence to the artificial and obscure rhetorical periods of his time. Secondly, Ennodius was at liberty to choose his diction. Hence its close approach to the Classic standard. Apart from the few abnormalities and late formations discussed in the foregoing pages Ennodius' diction is surprisingly pure and classical. Though a century later than Jerome Ennodius surpasses this "*dilatator linguæ latinæ*" in purity and stateliness of diction. The proof of this assertion as set forth in the preceding pages is further strengthened and confirmed by Ennodius' exclusive use of the more classical words *susurrator*, *extinctor*, *defensor*, *proditor* and *sine* for Jerome's *susurro*, *exterminator*, *defensator*, *traditor* and *absque*. Ennodius is one of the last representatives of the old classical literary culture. He is one of the last sparks, one of the dying embers of the brightest and warmest intellectual fire that illuminated the mind and cheered the heart of antiquity.

J. J. TRAHEY.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Histoire Des Dogmes. I. La Théologie Antenicéene. Par J. Tixeront. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. Pp. vii + 475.

This volume on the history of dogma covers the ante-Nicene period and is to be followed by a second volume. It is written by the Dean of the Catholic Faculty of Theology at Lyons, and forms part of the "Bibliothèque de l'enseignement de l'histoire ecclésiastique," the object of which is to realize the project confided by Leo XIII to Cardinals De Luca, Pitra, and Hergenroether, namely, the composition of a universal Church History in accord with the best scientific methods of the day.

The author follows a synthetic method throughout, constructing the entire doctrine of each author or document directly from the text. An analytical index at the end of the volume enables the reader to put together for himself with little or no inconvenience the history of any particular dogma. The exposition of each author's doctrine in its full context has advantages which a study of special points by themselves does not always secure either for reader or writer.

As conceived by the author in the Introduction the history of dogma is chiefly concerned in showing how Christian thought worked over and elaborated, without however substantially changing, the primitive data of Revelation; it studies the line of march and development which Christian thought has followed from the original elements of doctrine to the fuller expansion of theology, and endeavors to make manifest that this development is one of intellectual equivalents, not one of successive deviations. A history of Christian dogma is not quite the same as a history of Christian doctrine, the latter being much wider than the former which comprises only those truths that have been made the matter of solemn definition. Yet practically the two run into each other if the portrayal of the teachings of the Church is to be complete.

Nor should a history of dogma be confounded with that detailed exposition of theological thought and method into which a history of theology enters; much less should it usurp the special functions of the subsidiary sciences—positive theology, patrology, and patristics—or degenerate into a mere theological history indifferent alike to the truths it recounts and to their actual apostolic origin and descent.

Not the initial derivation, but the actual elaboration and development of the revealed data by Christian thought should form the subject matter for a history of dogma. An historical inquiry into the unfolding of Christian thought will afford the best means for determining whether there is development, or, as Harnack claims, substantial alteration. The author has no theory of development to set forth, contenting himself with the remark that we are still far from having any that is precise enough to be satisfactory.

The author completes the Introduction by a description of the sources, methods, and literature of his subject before entering upon the first chapter which contains a clear, succinct account of the religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines of the Greco-Roman and Jewish world, in the midst of which Christian dogma first appeared and received its initial development. It is impossible in this review to do much more than summarize the author's appreciations, or indicate the topics treated.

The first influence to be felt was that of Palestinian Judaism which lasted till the beginning of the second century and left its traces in the Synoptists, in certain interpretations of St. Paul, and in Christian eschatology. Its worst legacy was millenarianism. Hellenic Judaism had a more lasting influence. It was the bridge uniting two civilizations and furnishing Christianity with its first point of contact with paganism. The Alexandrian school of Clement and Origen fell heir to its conception and methods of exegesis. Hellenism proper, by means of its philosophy chiefly, and by its general culture as well, exerted an influence on the Apologists who set themselves to the task of thinking out in Greek the Palestinian gospel, recasting in a Greek mold and enclosing in Graeco-Roman forms and categories of thought the matter of Revelation which they conceived and reasoned upon after the fashion of the Greeks.

By a slow process of assimilation what was broadly human, profoundly thought out, or keenly analyzed in Greek moral and metaphysic passed into the evangelic doctrine to enliven and bind together its teachings. Christianity would never have won the world, become a universal religion, and obliterated racial distinctions, if it had remained shut up within Jewish forms of expression and not secured for itself by contact with the Grecian mind a universal outlet for its manifestation. How far Christian doctrine was modified by this alliance with Greek philosophy and culture, whether Hellenism furnished merely the thought-forms, or penetrated even to the heart of Christian teaching in some instances so as to alter it, are questions which demand infinite delicacy of analysis and correct appreciation,

says the author, when the historian tries to resolve them. The history of dogma can only lend its aid and contribute its share to the solution.

In the second chapter the author treats the first stage of Christian doctrine in Christ's preaching. The preaching of Christ and the Apostles is the immediate source of all Christian dogma, whatever may have been the influences later exerted on its development. The Gospel revelation not being finally closed until the death of the last Apostle, and over fifty years having elapsed between the preaching of Christ and the end of the Apostolic period, the teaching of the Master had time to become the subject of much reflection and to receive important developments. It has always been admitted that the Apostles, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, were empowered to complete and harmonize the personal teaching of Christ, the first and necessary foundation of all their doctrine. This important observation, the author says, should reassure those theologians who feel disinclined to acknowledge that the Apostolic teaching on certain points was more complete and extensive than that of Christ, or that the Synoptists could have added glosses and interpretations of their own in reporting the words of the Master. These glosses are as authoritative as the words they explain and can by legitimate extension be regarded as the personal teaching of Christ himself. The author accordingly distinguishes five layers in the historical content of the gospels: the personal teaching of the Lord; the teaching of the Apostles before the appearance of Saint Paul; the teaching of Saint Paul himself; that of the Apostles after him; and finally that of Saint John.

The central idea in Christ's preaching as reported by the Synoptists is the kingdom of God. The character of this new kingdom is non-political and spiritual. The idea of a divine reign of justice and truth on an earth that is to be finally renewed is not excluded by the Lord's words, but only the narrow, human conception which the Jews framed of it. The head of the kingdom is God, and also Christ, whose Messianic consciousness never wavers. The title "son of God" as described by the Synoptists means more than a moral filiation and anticipates the full revelation of Christ's divinity later made. The contemporary Jewish view that the end of the world and the coming of the Messiah are coincident was not taught by Christ who wished to inform neither his disciples nor us of the moment of its coming but counselled us to be vigilant. The kingdom of God is a complex idea, marking an era of justice already at hand with

Christ, and an era of blessedness that was to come only after the gospel had been preached to the entire world.

In Saint John the idea of the kingdom of God gives place to the idea of eternal life and becomes more intimate and personal. The judgment is not only a future event, it is already present in the conscience of him who believeth not. At the same time the Son's essential relationship to the Father, His divinity, mediatorship, and the doctrine of the Holy Ghost are brought out into relief. All this teaching is not outside the line of Christ's thought, but must be considered as the faithful and consistent interpretation of it, despite the manifest differences of tone between Saint John and the Synoptists.

Then follow studies of the teaching of Saint Paul, of the rest of the Apostles apart from Saint John and Saint Paul, and lastly of Saint John himself whose teaching marks the culminating point of the religious revelation in the New Testament. The treatment is plain though considerably condensed, and always with the historian's point of view and limitations in mind. We may content ourselves with a sketch of the author's appreciations.

In the Synoptists, Christ's words are conditioned by the quality of his hearers and have to be kept well within the horizon of Jewish thought. Christ indeed enlarges this horizon, but not so as to make his words too strange to those who formed the body of his hearers. Saint Paul breaks the Palestinian mold of this first catechesis and accommodates the thought to the Hellenist Hebrews and the Greeks. Saint John in his epistles and letters parts definitely with Jewish particularism and symbolism to proclaim the universality of the religion of the Gospel and to go to the bottom of the realities which it contains. The Messiah of the Jews, the Lord's Anointed, is the Word made flesh, God eternal as the Father who comes to give life to men, to liken them to the Father, and to make them capable of seeing God finally as He is, face to face.

The third chapter deals with the testimony of the Apostolic Fathers, examining each author or document in contextual detail, and summarizing at the close the doctrine professed by the Church between the years 100 to 150. Incidentally, the constructions put by modern critics on many classic passages are shown to be lame and unwarranted.

The heretics of the second century form the subject of the fourth chapter—the Judaizers, Gnostics, Marcionites, Encratites, Montanists and Millenarists. The author's condensation of so much material does not detract from the clearness and distinctness of his exposition.

The fifth chapter on the Apologists—on the doctrinal struggle

against Paganism, and the beginnings of speculative theology—gives a general view of the literature, methods, conception of revelation, and Christian doctrine of these writers.

The anti-Gnostic Fathers who repelled heresy from within, notably Gnosticism, while the Apologists were warding off persecution from without and endeavoring to secure a hearing for Christian belief, are well-treated in the sixth chapter; the seventh dealing with the first theological systems constructed in the East by Clement of Alexandria and Origen.

In the eighth chapter, the Christological and Trinitarian controversies in the West—Adoptianism and Monarchianism—at the end of the second and the beginning of the third centuries, form the subject matter under consideration. Hippolytus, Tertullian and Novatian, called the founders of Latin theology, are studied in the ninth chapter, while the tenth is devoted to the question of Penance in the West and in Africa during the third century. Here the author brings out well the clear consciousness which the Church possessed of her universal power to forgive sins, and the fuller exercise of that power upon which she entered after a period of restriction.

The eleventh chapter is taken up with Saint Cyprian and the baptismal controversy; the twelfth being given over to a review of theology in the East from Origen to the Council of Nice. The Eastern heresies of Adoptianism and Manicheism at the end of the third century, and the Western theologians of the same period, are considered in the next two chapters, the last containing a review of the doctrinal and theological condition of the Church on the eve of Arianism.

"Multum in parvo" feebly expresses the content of this comparatively small volume which combines severity of scientific form with abundance of material. Quality is harder to achieve than quantity. An extensive literature accompanies each topic treated, and there is a terseness of style, and limpidity also, which makes the book readable as one runs. One might truly say that this work furnishes an almost continuous translation of the authors studied. The most striking feature is the sympathetic method employed by the author, who treats Christian thought as a living continuity animated by the soul of the "traditio semper viva." It is a method of this kind which will deprive the mechanical treatment followed by rationalists of its force. These are pleased to regard Christianity as a fossil to be exhumed out of early documents; for with them Christianity is primarily a book embodying beliefs that need to be reconstructed in their original simplicity. Hence their favorite geological similes of "layers,"

“strata,” “additions,” “foreign elements,” and “corruptions.” The author effectively destroys the force of this mechanical method by the principle of living continuity which is the Catholic stronghold. Christian faith is not a problem of addition, but one of growth and development. He points the way for many who will follow. We bespeak for him and his volume the attention of all our readers.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Nouvelle Théologie Dogmatique. I. Dieu dans l’histoire et la révélation. II. Les Personnes Divines. III. La création selon la foi et la science. V. L’Eglise et les sources de la révélation. Par le R. P. Jules Souben. Paris: Beauchesne, 1905. 8°, pp. 106, 126, 192, 136.

As the general title indicates, these volumes are certainly “new” in matter and manner. The reverend author has imitated his brethren across the Rhine in selecting his own vernacular in preference to the Latin tongue for the communication of his ideas. He has laid the modern sciences generously under contribution for his material. The result is a freshness and originality which cannot fail to interest as much as it instructs the reader. The order followed, though not slavishly, is that of the *Summa* of Saint Thomas, enriched and enlivened by the additions made to human knowledge since the days when the prince of the Schoolmen wrote. There is an air of actuality about each of these “fascicules” thus far published that will lead many to follow along the same modern lines of presentation which the author has so happily chosen. He has in mind a simple, clear, precise, and fairly complete manual, in which each topic is assigned the relative amount of exposition and treatment which its importance demands. He asks a fair judgment on his venture and is entitled to congratulation far more than to criticism.

I. The first volume opens with chapters on the idea of God in the history of religions and in the history of philosophy. The existence, essence, and attributes of God form the subject of three separate and suggestive chapters. The historical material is well presented in the first part of this volume and the style is descriptive throughout. The arguments for the existence of God are carefully restated, the argument from finality especially, and the causes of disbelief no less than the nature of our knowledge of God are inquired into more concretely than is the case with manuals of the stereotyped variety. This first volume is positive as well as reasoned and produces a decidedly good impression.

II. The scriptural and traditional proofs of the Trinity are de-

scribed with care and at length in the second volume. The expositive part follows and is abundant in positive detail and suggestive views. The theories of the Greek and Latin Fathers, and of the Schoolmen, are finally considered. It is good for the student to have his theological horizon enlarged by an exposition of the views of the Greek Fathers who are too often summarily dismissed with a few remarks of a general nature. It was De Regnon who said that the theories of the Greek Fathers should at least be entitled to a shelf in our museum of theological exhibits. The beautiful psychological theory of the divine processions, which has been classic almost from the day Saint Augustine first gave it utterance, will lose nothing by comparison with the Greek theory of the essential productivity of the divine nature. Those acquainted only with the forms of Latin thought and expression are likely to forget that the Greeks, too, had their gifts, and in this case, are not to be feared while bringing them. The author opens up wide views to the student, furnishes him with canons of criticism, and imparts information in this volume calculated to arouse further interest.

III. The introduction to this volume contains a criticism of Monism, and shows the reasonableness of the theory of creation which resolves the problem of reality without doing violence to logic, metaphysics, or morals. The first chapter, after rejecting the idea that the doctrine of the angels was an importation of Persian origin into the Hebrew Scriptures, treats of the existence, fall, hierarchy and functions of the angels. The second part exposes what modern science has to say on the work of the six days.

In the inorganic world, the author finds the nebular hypothesis the most beautiful and the most scientific of the attempts thus far made to explain the constitution of the universe. With regard to the growth of organic life, the author rehearses the scientific data for the four periods. Man, probably of Asiatic origin in the quarternary period, is contemporary in Europe with the mammoth and rhinoceros. His remains show that he was not newly come upon the earth at this time, because two races had already been formed, and races require time for formation. The author finds no serious difficulties against the common origin of the race, and discusses rival views in a judicious and likewise entertaining manner, relying upon the influence of environment and the plasticity of the early human forms to bring about gradually that variety of races which it is now so hard for us to reduce to unity, because our experience is no longer of races "in the making."

The author next turns his attention to the mode of creation. He

discusses in the light of science, philosophy, and theology the theory of the fixity of species and the theory of evolution; calls attention to the scientific movement which the evolution hypothesis inspired, and notes with pleasure the disappearance of the extreme views which marked its introduction. He is careful to distinguish between evolution mechanically and spiritually conceived, acknowledging that towards the latter moderate conception there is no need for the theologian to assume an uncompromising and hostile attitude; his combativeness should be reserved for evolution of the godless type.

In the second section, after furnishing an exact translation of the first chapter of Genesis, the author enters upon an exposition of the work of the six days, discusses the relative merits of concordism and idealism, and concludes that the best solution to the apparent conflict between the Bible and science is to acknowledge that the Bible is not a scientific book.

The second of the two stories of creation told in Genesis is next considered, the origin of man being the central feature of the tale. Revelation furnishes us with the picture of a human pair, still ignorant of the arts of civilization, but endowed with intelligence, will, and the faculty of speech. Between the first parents and quaternary man there is necessarily a great gap. Science has no right to replace the man of Genesis by the savage of a later epoch. The individuals are not the same; one is man as he came forth from the hands of God, the other is man subsequently modified by the great fact of original sin. The scriptural and traditional sources of original sin are indicated and commented on by the author who, when he comes to the theological explanation of original sin, finds no essential difference between fallen and natural man. The volume closes with a chapter on the supernatural order and divine providence.

This volume, like the others, is full of positive instructive material, and it is to be regretted that the self-imposed limitations of the author compel him to treat all too briefly what one would like to see expanded more in detail, notably, what concerns the progress made by theological thought in understanding original sin as a privation, and not as a direct and positive element of deterioration. It is the reviewer's opinion that the author might improve his presentation of original justice and sin by emphasizing more distinctly the two types of humanity which reason and faith respectively construct, and by showing the inherent differences in conception which attach to the historian's and the philosopher's points of view. Those who read this volume will forget that they are reading a manual, so different are its

contents from the lenten fare which the ordinary manual usually serves up to the reader.

V. The fifth volume is on a par with those preceding. It treats of the notes of the Church, the teaching body and the believing body, the primacy and infallibility of the Pope, Providence and the Church, Tradition, Scripture and the harmony between the Church and Holy Writ. The presentation of the subject in each of these chapters is continuous and flowing, a decided relief from the "disiecta membra" of the old text books. Worthy of especial notice is the chapter on Scripture where the author makes good and pertinent use of the Leonine Encyclical concerning the scientific and historical questions raised by the interpretations of Scripture.

Enough has been said during the course of this long review to acquaint our readers with the new matter and manner of these volumes. The author is a pioneer and deserves credit for having undertaken to incorporate the best results of modern knowledge and methods into this manual of theology. By the very nature of the case the treatment has to be restricted. But the spirit animating the entire matter of exposition is such as to give new life to old bones and to bring together in harmonious relationship many truths that have long existed apart for lack of sympathetic assimilation.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

The Lausiatic History of Palladius. By Dom Cuthbert Butler. Vol. I, 1898. Pp. xiv + 297. Vol. II, 1904. Pp. civ + 278. Cambridge University Press (Texts and Studies, Vol. VI, nos. 1 and 2).

The historical origins of Egyptian Monasticism have occupied many pens in the last half of the nineteenth century. The most extreme view is that of Weingarten and Lucius who see in the earliest historical sources for this ecclesiastical institution mere fairy tales, invented at a late date, in order to furnish a background of fact and miracles to the fifth-century monasticism of the East. All fourth-century accounts of Egyptian monasticism—the parent stem—are according to them "Tendenzschriften," or consciously falsified narratives about primitive hermits, of whom the most that can be admitted is that they existed, *e. g.*, St. Anthony, St. Paul the Hermit and others. These views have obtained quite widely in Germany and England, where Canon Farrar and the more learned Mr. Gwatkin accepted and popularized them. One meets them, therefore, frequently in manuals of history and elsewhere in our English historical literature, beside the exploded fables about the Popess Joan and

Ebrard's anti-Roman Culdees. This thesis of Weingarten, Lucius, and others is every way false, and leads directly to historical pyrrhonism.

Its principal support was the asserted unhistorical character of two works, the "*Historia Lausiaca*" and the "*Historia Monachorum in Egypto*,"—lives of Egyptian monks that purport to have been originally drawn up in the last decade of the fourth century or rather to be based on personal knowledge and experience gained at that time by journeys through monastic Egypt. The former work was written in Greek by Palladius, bishop of Helenopolis in Bithynia, in the year 420; the latter, a Latin work, bears the name of the famous priest Rufinus, and was supposed, even in his own day, to be his personal composition, executed perhaps very early in the fifth century. There are other historical sources of Egyptian Monasticism, *e. g.*, the *Vita Antonii* by St. Athanasius, the writings of John Cassian, the "*Vitae*" of St. Jerome, certain Coptic "lives" and "rules," and the "*Apothegmata*" or sayings and anecdotes of the earliest monks variously collected in the latter half of the fourth century. All these, however, are apart from and independent of the lengthy and formal works of Palladius and Rufinus that may well be described as a biographical encyclopædia of Egyptian Monasticism, the first ever executed, and therefore the influential source whence spread, East and West, for many centuries that absolute devotion to the great Coptic ideal of spirituality which affected so profoundly and so picturesquely all Christian life until the great St. Benedict arose and turned this religious current in other directions and used it for other purposes.

It is clear, therefore, that any reliable history of Egyptian Monasticism must begin with an assured and purified text of the two chief writers just mentioned. This is the task to which Dom Cuthbert Butler sets himself in the two stately volumes before us. In the first volume he undertakes to unravel the many knotty problems connected with the origin and use of the *Historia Lausiaca*. He shows that the current Greek text of that document is not the original; that it is not, even in its true prototype, a translation from the Latin of Rufinus' "*Historia Monachorum in Egypto*," that the original Greek text of the *Historia Lausiaca* was very soon overlaid and interpolated (perhaps by Palladius himself), that it is best represented by some very ancient Latin versions (the earliest of which was probably made before the end of the fifth century, the second not later than the seventh); that quite reliable Syriac versions existed as early as the sixth century; that the current (long) recension of Palladius is a

conglomerate text and "a prolific source of misconception and confusion in the investigation of monastic origins,—filled with anachronisms, contradictions, confusions, doubtlets," etc.; that the "*Historia Monachorum*" of Rufinus is not an original work but a translation from an homonymous Greek work, written at Jerusalem, by a monk named Timothy who had travelled through monastic Egypt in 394. The current text of Palladius is a fusion of this Greek original and the original of the *Historia Lausiaca*, but both of these had been variously tampered with at a date considerably previous to the fusion. In spite of the "intermixture of texts" and the many hidden cross-currents of use and transcription, the original work of Palladius is yet recognizable in the Short Recension, *i. e.*, the Latin *Paradisus Heraclidis*, as printed in the eighth book of Rosweyde's "*De Vitis Patrum*," to which corresponds more closely than any other Greek text the one printed by Meursius at Leyden in 1616. Two Syriac versions carry back the text of the *Lausiaca* History to the early sixth if not to the fifth century; they too, exhibit particularly the Short Recension or the "genuine personal memoirs" of Palladius. This primary thesis is proved from a comparison of certain chapters common to the current text of Palladius (Long Recension), the Short Recension, and the Greek original of the *Historia Monachorum*. These pages are the backbone of the work, for on their result depends the historical standing of Palladius.

"The arguments by which Lucius seeks to show that it (the *Lausiaca* History) is but a second-hand compilation, practically worthless as a historical source, are all based on phenomena peculiar to A (Long Recension). If B (Short Recension) then prove to be the real *Lausiaca* History, the arguments of Lucius simply fall, and the book may be accepted for what it professes to be, a first-hand authority, the personal memoirs of the writer" (I, 21).

The original fusion of the Greek *Historia Monachorum* and the *Lausiaca* History of Palladius was very probably done by that writer himself, and its result is visible in the Short Recension. The organic corruptions of both texts in the Long Recension, the source of all the historical scandals connected with the work of Palladius, were not done by him, but by "a later and blundering Redactor who fused together pre-existing works relating to matters concerning which he had no personal experience or knowledge" (I, 50-51). Not the least interesting and decisive pages of this investigation are those in which (I, 16-18) it is made evident that the *Lausiaca* History of Palladius and the Greek *Historia Monachorum* are "in all cases independent accounts, having nothing whatever in common"; the few (eight) cases

of apparent overlapping are easily explained away. This result is clear from the Latin texts, but "stands out still more clearly from the examination of the Greek texts" (I, 19). In a brief account of this complicated piece of patristic research one can do no more than emphasize the chronological, philological, and critical skill with which many lines of argument are marshalled to show that the current text of the *Lausiaca History* is a post-Palladian text. And as most of the charges against Palladius are based upon this corrupted and posterior text of his work, they fall to the ground when it is shown that not Palladius, but an army of later compilers, redactors, interpolators, monastic scribes innumerable, are responsible for the actual condition of the *Lausiaca History*. Two theories are punctured by Dom Butler in this introduction—the theory of Amélineau that Palladius used Coptic originals for his biographies, and the theory that he used Greek originals in their construction. What Palladius saw and heard he narrated faithfully; his asserted unreliability is only apparent, based on a much and often disfigured text. The true text of Palladius is his complete and sufficient defense.

II. The second volume of Dom Butler's work aims at reproducing with substantial correctness the original text of Palladius. As the *Lausiaca History* was almost at once a kind of text-pattern on which fifth and sixth century and later writers wove, at their good pleasure and in many curious ways, more or less similar ideas and facts, the most that can be expected from a critical revision of all accessible manuscript material is an approximation to the original, completeness and accuracy in the collection of all variant readings, and fulness of learned apparatus for the guidance and comfort of all future investigators. Dom Butler had shown in his critico-literary study of the authorship of the *Historia Lausiaca* that "the curiously composite and mixed character" of that work, as we now read it, is the result of manifold later interference with the text of Palladius, and that the true autograph of that writer, though no longer perfectly restorable, is substantially represented by the Greek text in Meursius' edition (1616) and by the Latin *Paradisus Heraclidis* in the eighth book of Rosweyde's *Vitae Patrum*, first printed at Antwerp in 1615 (Pl. 73–74). Independently Dr. Preuschen had shown (1897) that the Long Recension of Palladius was an "interpolated redaction." Since then he has edited the Greek "*Historia Monachorum in Egypto*." He holds, however, that the Latin of Rufinus is the original, and the Greek a translation, while Dom Butler maintains the contrary, and is now supported in his view by the best modern critics (II, p. xiii). Dom Butler's critical reconstruction of the text of Palladius is based

on a collation of nearly all the known Greek manuscripts and fragments. From a comparison of the citations by fifth and sixth century writers, and of versions of the same date, he concludes that more than half the manuscripts represent a Greek text that was current in the middle of the fifth century, and most of the others a text of the second half of the fifth century or the early part of the sixth (II, p. xlv). The earlier text, he thinks, is substantially the Lausiaca History as written by Palladius; at the same time the later so-called "metaphrastic" text may be the work of Palladius himself, since it reproduces carefully his environment and even some of his expressions and vocabulary. However, as the earlier text "represents what Palladius wrote in the first instance, and is the only text of which the authenticity can be predicated with certainty or even likelihood" (II, p. xlvii). It is the one selected by Dom Butler for critical revision and establishment "with such purity as the somewhat intractable materials at his disposal will allow." As a matter of fact an editor of the Lausiaca History is in presence of "a double text, both forms of which as early as the year 500, or earlier, stood as far apart as they do now, and have not diverged from any intermediate form. It would therefore be an unhistorical method to construct a text resulting from conjectural combination of both." As to the later quasi-original text, its readings and additional facts may be used, but with caution, and as valid and useful evidence for the earlier text that (*ex hypothesi*) once lay before this metaphrastic reviser of the latter part of the fifth century. The contents and structure of the *Historia Lausiaca* are vouched for by substantial agreement up to c. 39; the remaining thirty-two chapters or biographies show two distinct sequences, both of which are vouched for by manuscripts representing the two fifth-century texts already mentioned. Which is the original order of Palladius? With much acumen Dom Cuthbert Butler conducts a brief analysis (II, pp. liii-iv), psychological, historical and philological, leading to the conclusion that the original order is very probably that of the tenth-century "Codex-Sessorianus 41 (Rome)" and "Codices Casinenses 348 and 50 (Monte Cassino)." They represent the earliest known Latin translation of the Lausiaca History, made perhaps not later than the sixth century, possibly in the fifth century and in Africa (I, p. 63; II, p. lxxvi). For the actual reconstruction of the text Dom Butler relies particularly on two ancient and important Greek manuscripts containing nearly the whole text, Paris 1628 and Turin 141; several other valuable and ancient Greek manuscripts furnish large portions of the text, and are very useful for collation and control. While they present the same substantial text, these and

similar authorities differ frequently in matter of detail, and the laws of relationship between these manuscripts can only be learned by induction and after much experimenting. For this purpose Dom Butler selects portions of the book extant in all six of the chief manuscripts that represent the earliest Greek text, compares the readings of some 410 lines of text and constructs schedules of the combinations of readings. Not only original Greek texts are called on but also the earliest Latin and Syriac versions. "We are evidently in presence of a textual problem of unusual complexity" (II, p. lvii); nevertheless certain facts emerge from the chaos. It is clear that the principal extant Greek representatives of the original Lausiaca History fall into two clearly defined groups, with one of which the earliest Latin version is closely related while the earliest Syriac is evidently derived from the other. Dom Butler now describes minutely the extant Greek manuscripts of the Lausiaca History, also the manuscripts of the versions, Latin, Syriac, Coptic, Armenian and Arabic (II, pp. lxxvi-lxxxix). Finally, having traced so far the origin, genesis, contents, structure, and interrelations of this complicated volume of monastic biographies, and from many points of view, palaeographical, philological, psychological and general-critical, he closes his lengthy introduction with a section (pp. lxxxix-xcvi) on the method of editing all these ancient materials. Suffice it to say that he follows the concordant testimony of the Greek manuscripts Paris 1628 (sæc. XIV) and Wake 67 (Oxford. sæc. XI). If the latter did not exhibit so many and so great gaps, it would be the principal manuscript; as it is, Paris 1628 must be the chief guide in the re-establishment of the original text of Palladius. Their eccentricities may be eliminated by the use of other manuscripts representing more or less the original of Palladius; thereby the editor gains a text that corresponds with fair accuracy to an original represented by the Codices: Paris 1628, Wake 67, Turin 141 (lately destroyed by fire), and a Syriac text of the sixth century. Every reader of this scholarly and painstaking introduction will agree with the author (II, p. xcvi): "One criticism there is which I feel the work will not deserve—the charge of failure on the part of the editor to take trouble, even in a measure which has at times caused a sense of oppression, as being perhaps disproportionate to the importance of the results achieved." The introduction is completed by a map of monastic Egypt, a chronological table illustrating early monastic history (250–500), and a list of the manuscript-symbols used in the minute technical discussions of the introduction. Then follows the critical Greek text of the "Historia Lausiaca" (pp. 3–169), with its copious provision of variant

readings. Very interesting notes, critical and historical, to the number of 116 (pp. 182-236) are destined to render this text of Palladius valuable to the general scholar and especially to students and teachers of early ecclesiastical history. The student of the origin of the breviary and liturgy will find them especially helpful. Other appendixes are devoted to the Palladian chronology (cf. I, p. 293) and to his (possible) use of a few unimportant Greek materials. As a matter of fact, it was shown in the first volume that Palladius was under no literary obligations: what he saw and heard he narrated so well that the lynx-eyed and pitiless Tillemont could say (*Mémoires* XI, p. 524) that there are few narratives more reliable than the *Lausiaca* History. When we add the appendixes on the literary history of the "*Historia Monachorum in Egypto*" (I, pp. 257-278), on Lucius' theory of early Egyptian Monasticism (ib. pp. 277-282), and Amélineau's theory of Coptic originals (cf. ib. p. 108), it will be seen that in Dom Butler's two volumes are collected many of the "*instruments de travail*" needed for a critical history of the monastic life in fourth-century Egypt, *i. e.*, of the earliest native flowering of Christian mysticism in a territory that was neither East nor West, but a kind of neutral ground, and therefore well adapted to develop general, not particular, Christian concepts of the life of progressive spiritual perfection.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Le Monde Juif au Temps de Jésus Christ et des Apôtres. Par l'Abbé E. Beurlier. Paris: Bloud, 1902. 8°, pp. 60, 63.

These brochures of the Bloud collection entitled "*Science et Religion*" are written by a scholar who has long since demonstrated his capacity for such theses by his excellent work on the emperor-worship at Rome. For those who cannot find the time to read the exhaustive works of Doellinger and Schuerer, of Weizsaecker, Lechler, and others on this period, the pages of M. Beurlier will be a satisfactory substitute; they will find there the substance of many larger works, well-digested and ordered, and set forth in pleasing narrative style. The author says rightly that Christianity reposes neither on a doctrinal treatise nor on a code of laws but on some historical books, the Gospels, whose primary purpose is to exhibit the public life, sufferings, death and resurrection of a descendant of David, Jesus of Nazareth, in whom we adore God made man. The Gospels are a biography of Our Lord, written by contemporaries for men like themselves, too well acquainted with the habits and institutions of their own time and land to need any instruction concerning them. Similarly, such a knowledge was common in the first century or two of the Christian

religion. But the modern mind is ignorant of the setting, political, social, and religious, of the gospels. Perhaps this ignorance is one reason why so many Catholics do not turn as lovingly and frequently as they ought to the perusal of the pages that narrate the life of the Founder of the Church. Whoever will read this little work need no longer fear the reproach of ignorance of the times of Jesus Christ; he will also surely be stirred to meditate often and earnestly on the inspired story of that life. How many reflect that it was the telling of that story which shook paganism to its foundations, and that it is yet an essential element of the Eucharistic sacrifice? Whatever, therefore, makes it more clear and intelligible to us is worthy of attention and study.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Le Christianisme dans l'Empire Perse, sous la Dynastie Sassanide (224-632). Par J. Labourt. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 372.

So little is popularly known of the early growth and conditions of the Christian religion outside the Roman Empire that this volume of M. Labourt ought to excite a general interest and find a very wide circle of readers. Coming after the "Afrique Chrétienne" of Dom Leclercq, it introduces us to a romantic chapter of religious life in the middle Orient, long before the shadow of Islam fell upon our Aryan brethren of Persia. Since the publication of De Vogüé's book on the old Christian churches of northeastern Syria no work has appeared that reveals to us so abundantly the details of primitive Christianity in the Orient. Let us say at once that it is not question of the Greek or the Roman Orient, but of a land and a people that lay outside the vast circumference of that "orbis terrarum" which in its pride seemed to include all civilization, but did not. The Christian history of Persia has its dim and uncertain origins, its region of legend, unconscious or deliberate, quite like the contemporary Christian history of several other lands. Modern critical science is gradually drawing the correct lines between the certain and the uncertain, between historical truth and the fabulous in its varying degrees. It is only in the fourth century that we behold an organized Church in Persia. Almost at once we see it suffering under the reproach and suspicion of disloyalty to the Sassanid power. The authoritative Magi clergy and the Jews, much more than the presence of a fringe of Greco-Roman population in once Roman cities and territories like Edessa and Nisibis, were responsible for these political accusations, that were nevertheless a perpetual source of weakness and suffering to the Persian Church. M. Labourt describes in great detail the long

series of persecutions beginning with the reign of Sapor (Schapur) II (339-379) and continuing, with interruptions throughout the fifth century. The jealousy of the Magi seems to have been the chief source of all anti-Christian agitation. The number and standing of the Jews brought about the development of a remarkable anti-Jewish Christian literature. The account of the numerous and valuable Syriac acts of the Persian martyrs, and of the Syriac writings of Christian Persians in this period, lends this work a specific value. Eventually Persia became the refuge and home of the followers of Nestorius; their unhappy heresy and schism still drag out a wretched and dishonorable existence. In this work the reader will find a description of two other interesting phases of early Christian history, the peculiar monasticism of the Persian Church and the great theological schools of Edessa and Nisibis, so flourishing in their time that they excited the envy of a Cassiodorus, and moved him to plan the establishment of a similar theological university at Rome. M. Labourt has made good use, at first hand, of original Syriac chronicles and historical materials, also of the epoch-making labors of Assemani. In the last three decades the researches and publications of French Catholic writers in the field of Syriac ecclesiastical literature and history, notably among the Nestorians, have made it possible to undertake such a work as the one before us. M. Labourt confesses at every page his indebtedness to such distinguished scholars as Bedjan, Gräffin, Parisot, Duval, Chabot, François Martin and others. We are pleased to notice in the bibliography the titles of two of our doctorate dissertations, Dr. Carr's on Thomas of Edessa (1898) and Dr. Vasschalde's on Philoxenus of Mabbogh (1902). The house of Victor Lecoffre deserves congratulation and encouragement for the zeal and enlightened spirit with which they have undertaken the creation of a general ecclesiastical history that shall in some way correspond to the fulness of modern knowledge and the ripe perfection of modern critical method.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Die Elemente der Erbsünde Nach Augustin und der Frühscholastik. Von Dr. Joh. Nep. Espenberger. Kirchheim: Mainz, 1905. 8°, pp. 184.

This investigation into the notion of original sin as conceived by St. Augustine and the earlier Schoolmen—faithful echoes as these were of the master—is a welcome contribution to the history of dogma. Perhaps the best feature of the work, aside from the scientific value of the research itself, is the sympathetic spirit in which it is conducted. Saint Augustine more often had in mind the discomfiture of his ad-

versaries than the systematic treatment of his subject. The hesitations, conflicting statements, and even doubtful assertions which have puzzled so many students of the great Latin Father in their efforts to ascertain his view of original sin can only be understood by making due allowance for the different opponents with whom he had to deal, the nature of the various controversies in which he was engaged, the growth of his own mind in the meantime, and the lack of a clear objective plan in his earlier writings. All these influences the author has taken into account. Justice is done to the shifting points of view which the ardent Bishop of Hippo was compelled to take in response to his intellectual environment, and the result is that his views are reconstructed in their actual historical framework and concrete setting.

The author first studies St. Augustine's attitude of mind during the controversy with the Manicheans, who held to the eternal coexistence of a good and evil principle. Here the African Father's mind is aflame with indignation. He protests that evil is not necessary, but an outcome of free will; that no nature is injured by sins other than its own; and that whether the origin of the human soul be through parental descent, preëxistence, or creation, there is no such thing as substantial evil in man's constitution. Of course, Saint Augustine in the second case had actual sin only in mind, and could consistently affirm later, when taken to task by the Pelagians, that there was a racial sin which all men inherited at birth, contracted, but did not commit. Yet the sweeping character of these phrases has led some critics to think that Saint Augustine himself during this early period did not unhesitatingly accept the reality of original sin.

Not so our author who is careful to show that Saint Augustine held this doctrine firmly even then, although laying less stress upon it. He was content at this time to show the absurdity of believing that human nature was substantially compounded of good and evil principles. The very character of the Manichean pessimism, which he was refuting, called for no emphatic insistence on the reality of inherited sin. But when the Pelagians soon after set forth their optimistic views on human nature, it became necessary for Saint Augustine to insist emphatically on the inheritance of guilt and evil which they were trying to suppress. The expressions which seem so incompatible with an admission of original sin should be read in the light of this Manichean controversy. Tourmel is wrong, says the author, in interpreting Saint Augustine's vacillation as due to mental indecision. The objective fact in the matter is that Saint Augustine is not betraying his doubts on the existence of original sin, but striking hard at the central issue raised by his opponents. This preoccupation

it is which explains why, when arguing with the Manicheans, he nowhere identifies original sin with concupiscence, a favorite procedure with him when combating the Pelagians.

It must be acknowledged that the exigencies of debate had much to do with the greater or less stress laid by Saint Augustine on certain topics. The explanation is human, psychological, and fair. Consistency may be a jewel, but few special pleaders care to wear it in their crown. We are all over-insistent when it comes to establishing a point in the teeth of opposition, and Saint Augustine himself found it no easy task in the evening of his life to reconcile all his statements, and to make the lion of controversy lie down peacefully with the lamb of contemplation.

The Pelagian controversy shows St. Augustine in a new rôle, and to this our author next turns his attention in the second chapter. "It is as clear as sunlight," to use Saint Augustine's own expression, "that all men were seminally precontained in the first man and became a mass of sin in him, Adam's sin changed, vitiated, and rendered obnoxious all human nature." This was the view which Saint Augustine gathered from the scripture texts and the writings of his predecessors and contemporaries. It was heresy pure and simple for the Pelagians to hold that Adam's sin affected himself alone, and not his posterity. All men were potentially in the first man's loins, and there was a physical and moral solidarity between them and their chief. They perished with him, because his sinful nature became theirs at birth. The parallel which St. Paul drew between Adam in whom all men sinned and Christ in whom all men were again restored to justice, left no room according to Saint Augustine for the fine-spun evasions of Julian and Pelagius.

It was not true, therefore, to say that men are in the same condition now as Adam before he sinned, or that his sin had to be recommitted by imitation before it could be contracted. Sin and guilt, not merely the penalties of sin, passed from sire to son, and it remains in them until remitted. Only the first sin of Adam was so inherited. "Gout is transmitted and bodily ills also; why then should we find difficulty in thinking that the evil state of the first man's will is inherited by his descendants?" It is another who committed the sin, but yet that sin becomes truly ours and is inherent in us by the very contagion of our descent. It is as absurd to speak of an imputed concupiscence as of an imputed sin. True, as Julian says, a sin without free will is impossible. But original sin is from Adam's will, and need not, therefore, be the object of ours. Had human nature not sinned in the free prevarication of Adam, it would have been trans-

mitted sinless. Original sin is, therefore, one in all, and in all is truly sin.

What view does Saint Augustine profess with regard to the nature of this racial sin? Into this question the author next enters. It is the possession of that vitiated nature which Adam handed down that makes every man a sinner, and it is concupiscence especially that constitutes our inherited vice. This remains even after baptism, which remits the guilt and penalty but does not actually remove the evil of carnal desire within us. Unbaptized children, because of the guilty concupiscence inhering within them, are cut off from God and made subjects for condemnation.

This idea of "concupiscence as guilt" is a hard one to investigate in Saint Augustine. He cannot have meant by it a substantial evil, because there was no idea so abhorrent to him as this Manichean fiction, no idea more repeatedly disavowed. It was a privation, a sickness, a languor, an accidental half-something, not a foreign evil substance conjoined to our nature as the Manicheans imagined. Nor was it a positive evil quality, although he frequently calls it such in pretty strong terms.

The exact relation which Saint Augustine conceived between concupiscence and guilt is a matter of much controversy among critics. Our author's view, supported by a large number of texts and considerations, is that Saint Augustine regarded original sin as guilty concupiscence within us, the cause of this inherent guilt of concupiscence being the privation of original justice. He takes issue sharply with those critics who hold that the great Latin Father so far forgot himself as to try to derive the notion of guilt out of the irresistible character of concupiscence itself. He contends that Saint Augustine laid so much stress on the evil power and guilt of our inherited carnality in order to refute the Pelagian claim that the "war in our members" was an unmixed natural good. But it was far from Saint Augustine's thought to identify original sin completely with concupiscence, and so to forget its relation to Adam's transgression.

The second part of the volume is devoted to a study of the earlier Schoolmen, the Anselmic, pro-Augustinian, heterodox and miscellaneous groups. The historical results of the investigation are added at the close. Here it is especially pointed out that neither Saint Augustine nor the earlier scholastics kept clearly apart the constituent and the consequent in the guilt of original sin.

The volume is the fifth in the series of "Investigations into the history of Christian literature and dogma" edited by Drs. Ehrhard and Kirsch. It is the clearest and fairest presentation of Saint

Augustine's views on original sin that we have thus far seen. It is to be regretted that the author did not prepare an analytical table of contents.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

La Famille Celtique, Etude de droit comparé. Par H. D'Arbois de Jubainville. Paris: Bouillon, 1905. 8°, pp. 221.

To the discovery of the Laws of Hammurabi, first edited (1902) by the Dominican savant, Victor Scheil, we owe this little book of a great scholar. In the light of the Assyrian text of Hammurabi de Jubainville studies a portion of the most ancient Keltic legislation as now preserved in "The Ancient Laws of Ireland" and the "Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales." The law-treatises and documents in these works do not date, in their present form, beyond the eleventh century, but they seem to embody and to rest on much older materials, and even to represent in a large measure the legislation of the Keltic world while yet pagan. The savant who executed with such brilliancy the comparison of the Homeric and the ancient Keltic culture and civilization, might justly consider himself not unequal to the task of studying comparatively the earliest laws of Ireland and the earliest laws of the Semitic world. He has confined himself to the examination of the most ancient texts concerning the family among the Kelts, and his material is divided into two books. In the first he studies the ancient Keltic family, in its formation, its responsibility for crimes and its disposition of property. In the second book he studies the pagan Keltic marriage and the irregular relations between the sexes. It is well known that there was current in the Greco-Roman world no little malicious gossip concerning Keltic immorality; St. Jerome, in writing against Jovinian, makes some ugly statements that in another age would cause him to be ranged with Gerald Barry as a calumniator of the Keltic races. M. de Jubainville says (9, 192): "il ne faut pas toujours accepter sans reserve ce que les historiens grecs racontant d'après des récits de voyageurs." As an illustration he adds that the famous statement of Herodotus (I, 199) concerning the enforced immorality of the women of Assyria must be henceforth read with considerable reserve in view of articles 129 and 181 of the Laws of Hammurabi. We recommend this little work to all who are interested in the history of comparative legislation, ancient sociology and morality, or the institutions of pagan Kelticdom. There is food for all such in its learned pages.

THOMAS J. SHANAHAN.

Justin, Apologies, texte grec, traduction française, introduction et index. Par Louis Pautigny. Paris: Picard, 1904. 8°, pp. 198. (Textes et Documents pour l'étude historique du Christianisme, publiés sous la direction de MM. Hippolyte Hemmer et Paul Lejay. Vol. I.)

The publishing house of Picard undertakes with this volume the production of a series of early patristic writings, Latin and Greek, primarily for the use of seminaries and universities. The text of each selected work will be taken from the latest or most approved edition, and each work will be provided with such necessary "subsidia" as an introduction, a translation into French and an index. The introduction will furnish at first hand what is essential to a literary history of the work in question—date, author, analysis, doctrinal peculiarities, manuscript-tradition, text-criticism, and such other preliminary information as may be called for in particular cases. This series is destined for the use of students of ecclesiastical history and institutions, not for general academic use. It can very well, however, be introduced in the higher classes of our colleges, until such time as we bestir ourselves and produce its counterpart in English. Placed in the hands of the more serious students, it would perhaps rouse an interest in the most ancient literature of the Christians. Our Catholic youth are only too often left in ignorance of the glories of their religious ancestry. It is needless to say that in every Catholic seminary of theology this series should be at once introduced, and the students encouraged to purchase the volumes regularly. As they cost only fifty cents apiece, there is no reason why the entire series should not become the personal possession of every young ecclesiastic. Every priest on the mission could well afford to purchase this series; its handy form and the convenient disposition of the material, make it a pleasant companion in the hours of quiet study or during the tedious and often wasted hours of travel.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Le Grand Schisme D'Occident. Par L. Salembier, 3d ed. Paris: Lecoffre, 1902. 8°, pp. 410.

Le Cardinal Louis Aleman, président du concile de Bâle, et la fin du grand Schisme. Par Gabriel Perouse. Paris: 1904. 8°, pp. 513.

The Council of Constance (1414-1418) will forever attract the attention of historians, ecclesiastical and profane. It drew the virus that had been gathering in the ecclesiastical body for fully two hundred years, and it re-established the fundamental unity of ecclesi-

astical direction and administration that had been criminally interrupted by the election (1378) of Robert of Geneva as Clement VII in opposition to the legitimate pope, Urban VI. For forty years the papacy was a bone of contention thrown down in the great arena of the world, and the struggles for it went on in ever-increasing dramatic confusion, until the Catholic heart sickened unto death during the first decades of the fifteenth century. Martin Luther is the first-born of this unholy period, for though he appears in the flesh only a century later, all the conditions of his being were now laid. The all-dominant papacy of the thirteenth century was socially insulted and abused by Philip the Fair at Anagni, and no lightning of moral retribution consumed him. Its popular standing was deeply affected by the financial abuses of Avignon, and the numerous sacrifices and betrayals made by the contending claimants for the high office, in the effort to sustain a following. All the ancient heresies concerning the constitution of the Church found tolerant listeners and eloquent exponents. With the unity of the Church went her dignity and prestige—small laymen of every ilk clambered aboard the mighty hulk that was drifting heedlessly on the stormy waters and pillaged it from top to bottom. It is truly the drama of the ecclesiastical ages, in whose quick succeeding scenes love and terror, indignation and apathy, sudden elevation and as sudden abasement, splendid renouncement and finical chicanery—in a word, all the virtues and all the vices, all the passions and all the motives, of Christian humanity, lay and ecclesiastical, come to the front. It was like some solemn and exhausting diagnosis of an ailing imperial patient, while outside raged an indescribable warfare, a "*bellum omnium contra omnes*." The Protestant Reformation is unintelligible without a clear sense of what led up to the Council of Constance, and what were the results of that assembly. M. Salembier has condensed into nineteen crowded chapters the principal events of the Great Western Schism (1378–1418). His exposition is luminous and sufficient, well-ordered and strongly documented. He is one of the last-comers in a line of scholarly investigators like Finke (1889, 1896), Ehrle and Denifle, Eubel (1894, 1900), Kneer (1895, 1901), Pastor (1890), Valois (1896, 1902), Gayet (1889), Fages (1892, 1901), Rocquain (1897), Guiraud (1897), Mandonnet (1900), Rosler (1893), Souchon (1899), and Scheuffgen (1899). M. Salembier is himself a meritorious investigator, as is shown by his work on Cardinal Peter d'Ailly, the ecclesiastical soul of the entire period (Lille, 1886) and by other contributions. In this period French writers have hitherto waited on Italians like Dom Luigi Tosti, in his "*Storia del Concilio di Costanza*" (Naples, 1853)

and earlier Germans like Lenz (1874) and Constantin Höfler (1861–1871) whose numerous writings on the fourteenth and fifteenth century relations of the papacy with France and Germany are known to all students. This scholarly and accurate volume of M. Salembier is well worth the perusal of all students and teachers of ecclesiastical history. It may be added that a sincere and enlightened ecclesiastical spirit dominates the book, without interfering with the frankness and honesty of the author's historical judgments.

2. In five hundred pages M. Gabriel Perouse sketches for us the career of Cardinal Louis d'Aleman, who died archbishop of Arles (1450), and was almost immediately the object of a popular local veneration which took on eventually such proportions that in less than a century Clement VII issued a formal bull of beatification (April 9, 1527) and gave to his ancient "cultus" in the Church of Arles the authority of the Holy See. Yet this man was the soul of the schismatic council at Bâle, and for ten years (1439–1449) led the forces of conciliar parliamentarianism, preached the return to Avignon, was the center of all anti-Italian combinations, caused the ridiculous deposition of Eugene IV, and selected as his successor Felix, ex-Duke of Savoy, the last of the antipopes, and a member of the family of that other Clement VII who had first entered on the broad paths of the Western schism! It is true that he died in union with the Apostolic See, and that his mildness, patience, hospitality and other personal virtues were admitted by his contemporaries, and especially applauded by the population of Arles and the neighboring territory. He is a somewhat perplexing figure in history. Though clearly in good faith in the ten years of energetic pursuit of the ideals of ecclesiastical parliamentarianism and French supremacy, with which he closed his agitated life, he had nevertheless accepted fully in practice the traditional Roman interpretation of the work of Constance that Martin V made daily plain and clear to every one. Aleman served under that pope in the financial bureaux of the Curia, was papal legate in Bologna, cardinal in 1426, and remained always personally attached to Martin V. He was one of the fourteen cardinals who elected the Venetian Gabriel de' Condulmieri as Eugene IV (1431–1447). It is possible that personal pique against Eugene had something to do with his attitude at the Council of Bâle, though M. Perouse (p. 117) denies it with firmness. In any case, after his appearance at Bâle (1434) Aleman entered with spirit into the work of this ecclesiastical parliament, considering it as the divinely given means of restoring peace among Christians, extirpating heresy, and executing long-delayed projects of reform. After the departure of Cesarini

(January, 1438), Aleman became the president of the council, put through the deposition of Eugene IV (June 25, 1439) in the thirty-fourth session, and brought about the election (November 5, 1439) of Amadeus of Saxony, as antipope, under the name of Felix V. He had now reached the acme of his career; the next decade was one of disappointment and humiliation. It closes with the abdication of Felix at Lausanne (April 7, 1449) and the rehabilitation of Aleman (May 19, 1449, but antedated January 18). The Council of Bâle had lasted eighteen years, one month and twenty-four days. It was the most momentous, stubborn, and protracted struggle of the lower orders of the hierarchy to capture the administration of the universal Church. During the greater part of that parliament its speaker had been Aleman. His life is therefore practically the history of the actual doings at Bâle. The work of M. Perouse is written throughout at first hand. The materials are taken from the best lives of Aleman, notably those of the Bollandists (September, V), of the *Gallia Christiana* (1715) and the *Gallia Christiana Novissima* of MM. Albanés and Chevalier (1899-1900). The history of Aleman's financial administration in the service of the Curia is narrated with the aid of the special works of Gottlob and Ottenthal, the Bologna legation from the city histories and the chronicles in Muratori's "*Scriptores*," the life of Aleman at Arles from the above-mentioned documentary supplement of Albanés and Chevalier, also from the departmental archives of the Bouches-du-Rhône. The account of the proceedings at Bâle is very largely drawn from the minute and conscientious chronicle of John of Segovia (*Historia gestorum generalis synodi Basileensis*), with the aid of the introduction of Haller to the volumes of his "*Concilium Basileense*" (1896) and the seventh volume of Hefele's *History of the Councils*. M. Perouse has in turn labored assiduously in the Roman archives, also in those of Paris, Florence, Munich, Geneva, and Bâle, with more success for the first years of the council than for its period of decline. He has also utilized the studies of Cecconi on the Council of Florence (1869) and the "*Commentarii de gestis Basileensis Concilii*" of Aeneas Sylvius (*Opera*, Basileae, 1551) very favorable to Aleman and reflecting the general attitude of the members of the Council toward the Cardinal. M. Perouse furnishes also very curious and rare information about the antipope Felix V, his career previous to his election and his short-lived tenure of office. A good bibliography and a conscientious index make the work very serviceable to all students of history. The spirit of the author is an impartial one, and his numerous judgments are usually based on contemporary materials "*de bon aloi*." It is really one chapter of the

history of fifteenth-century ecclesiastical parliamentarianism, but minutely narrated and solidly documented.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Life of Saint Elizabeth of Hungary, Duchess of Thuringia. By Count de Montalembert, translated by Francis Deming Hoyt. New York: Longmans, 1904. 8°, pp. 493.

The life of Saint Elizabeth by Montalembert long since conquered its place as a classic of nineteenth-century hagiography. It is the work of an ardent and chivalrous soul; throughout its pages one detects a constant interfusion of the author's noble personality with the quaint and remote times of the saint. It is also a chef d'oeuvre of French narrative style, and a work consecrated by the universal approval of scholarly Catholics of every tongue. Its delicacy of sentiment, its sweet graces of exposition, its grasp of the strong and healthy mysticism of Elizabeth's soul, its picturesque "vision" of mediæval life, its solid learning, local color, and philosophico-historical description of the social, artistic and religious background against which Elizabeth lived out her few but eventful years, lend the book an undying charm: it is hard to imagine an age so barbarous as not to admire this gem of pious and elevating narrative. The translator has done his part well; the vigor and grace of the French are rendered with fulness and accuracy. An index would have been a very desirable addition.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Saint Odon (879-942). Par Dom du Bourg. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. 8°, pp. 214.

The career of the famous founder of Cluny coincides with the first invasion of the fierce Northmen who put an end in France and Germany to the last lingering phases of the old classical life and culture and ideals, and opened the true Middle Ages. They were finally conquered, not by the sword, but by the gospel, and by the gospel as preached in the lives of men like Odo and his successors, first at Cluny in the iron years of the tenth century, and then in the countless homes of monastic piety that acknowledged the rule and lived the life of Cluny. Odo is at once reformer, statesman, and ecclesiastical writer. His life fits in at many points with the public history of the Church in France and Germany and at Rome itself. An ardent student and an indefatigable traveller in the interests of religion, his soul is possessed by many noble ideals, the noblest of them being the absolute devotion of self to the divine service in the footsteps of the great Benedict. The reader will easily recall the pages of Thierry's

"Récits Merovingiens" or Montalembert's "Monks of the West," as he peruses this work, in which piety, grace of expression and learning have each their part. St. Odo will always exercise a fascination on the historian, if only as the founder of the great mediæval "seminary of Popes" whence issued the illustrious line of men who knew intimately what rights belonged to the Church inalienably, and had learned by precepts and example and practice how to so live as to defend those rights "usque ad sanguinis effusionem." The papacy of the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries is truly the work of Odo and the Benedictines who after him maintained and confirmed the most influential of the numerous mediæval reforms of the Rule of Saint Benedict.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

The House of God and other Addresses and Studies. By Rev.

Thomas J. Shahan, D.D. New York: The Cathedral Library Association, 1905. 8°, pp. 428.

The latest contribution from Dr. Shahan to Catholic literature, already deeply indebted to him, might, at first sight, seem to consist of parts that have little to connect them into a cohesive whole. What, for example, can there be in common between an address that sets forth, with exquisite analysis, the symbolism and the practical uses of the material church in Catholic truth and worship, and another discourse devoted to the undying memory of Ireland's best beloved martyr, Robert Emmet? But, in looking beneath the surface, we find a unifying thread of thought and sentiment. The thought is Faith and Fatherland—two disparate ideas, it is true, but in the Irish Celtic mind, as closely connected as the convex and the concave circle. And, it is needless to say, Dr. Shahan, while an American of Americans is also *Hibernicis ipsis Hibernior*. Heredity more peremptory than any oracle has imposed on him the command: *Antiquam exquirite matrem*; and historian of the Church's glories and tribulations need not change his rôle when he exploits the history of Erin.

The greater part of the book's contents consists of addresses delivered before audiences of a very mixed character, as far as intellectual standards are concerned. Dr. Shahan's skill and mastery over his subject are seen in the fact that while his treatment of each topic is simple enough and lucid enough to entertain and instruct the unlearned, the scholar can perceive in it the grasp of mind that indicates the trained historian. Is it an accidental coincidence, that an address, perhaps the finest of all, has a title that corresponds to that of a chapter in Mr. Davitt's "Fall of Feudalism in Ireland" *Rome and Ireland* with the position of the two terms inverted—*Ireland and*

Rome? The antithesis of the titles is not greater than the contrast between Dr. Shahan's point of view and that of Mr. Davitt. And we recommend this one as a corrective for what is distorted in the point of view represented by the other.

No one can read these beautiful discourses without a feeling of pleasure. Those who know him, however, will feel a tinge of regret caused by the reflection that circumstances do not permit Dr. Shahan to devote his talents to produce a work that would rival the fame and counteract the anti-Catholic bias of Hallam. Here and there one observes some oversights that ought to disappear in a second edition. For example, inspiration for a witty dialogue between the ghosts of Byron and Moore might be drawn by a new Lucian from a passage which ascribes the *Irish Avatar* to "the greatest master of Irish emotional thought."

JAMES J. FOX.

Studies in Religion and Literature. By William Samuel Lilly. London: 1904. 8°, pp. 320.

Studies Contributed to the Dublin Review. By the late Dr. J. R. Gasquet, with an introduction by Bishop Hedley. Westminster: Art and Book Co., 1904. 8°, pp. 349.

Etudes de Critique et d'Histoire Religieuse. By E. Vacandard. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. 8°, pp. 390.

That indefatigable Catholic publicist, Mr. W. S. Lilly, presents us in his latest volume with a series of papers that deserve to attract the attention of all cultured readers. They are all reprints, but are not therefore antiquated or uninteresting. Our author has a correct and Catholic taste in the choice of his subjects. We might say that the essays on Ghost Stories and The Ludicrous are not quite in the same category as Shakespeare's Religion, the Mission of Tennyson, Walter Savage Landor, Honoré de Balzac, Savonarola and Cardinal Wiseman. Hence the unity of the volume is broken; one cannot with entire satisfaction add it to his collection of historical essays. Mr. Lilly belongs among the British essayists, no slight praise when we recall the noble line of his predecessors. His style is simple, clear and picturesque; his views are sane and modern, while old and established things have his respect and sympathy. Above all, his writings are marked by a certain kindly humor and tolerance that he seems to be proudly conscious of if we trust to the fine lines of Goethe on the title-page.

2. The late Dr. Joseph Raymond Gasquet was an English physician whose time and thoughts were not entirely absorbed by the practice of his profession. He was educated at Oscott and at London

University College School, and was a lifelong and intimate friend of Cardinal Manning. Patristic literature and the great schoolmen were his beloved studies, apart from his professional interest in mental diseases. Many of our readers will no doubt remember the articles that are here reprinted from the "Dublin Review." They deal with such subjects as the Apostles' Creed, the Early History of the Mass, of Baptism and Confirmation, the Canon of the New Testament, St. Ignatius and the Roman Primacy, Hypnotism, the Physiological Psychology of St. Thomas, the Arguments for the Existence of God, and Taine's French Revolution. Bishop Hedley says rightly that they present a very large amount of research in a clear and readable form, are never misleading, and were when written well abreast of all that was important in the books or periodical literature of ten or twenty years ago. We recommend in a particular way the lengthy study on the Early History of the Mass (129-209). The average student will learn from it to appreciate the labors of a host of scholars who have been devoting themselves in this generation to that most attractive of historical themes. The remark of his Benedictine friend, Father Birt, is apposite: "This corpus of ecclesiastico-archæology will be found of special value, because being the work of a layman, it may possibly appeal to a class which looks with habitual suspicion at anything that proceeds from a clerical source."

3. This volume of the Abbé Vacandard contains the following studies: The Origins of the Apostles' Creed, the Origins of Ecclesiastical Celibacy, Episcopal Elections in the Merovingian Period, the Church and Ordeals, the Popes and the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, the Condemnation of Galileo. In general his methods and the conclusions are what we might expect from the learned historian of Saint Bernard. The essays on the Massacre of St. Bartholomew and on Galileo are admirably well done: they can be read with profit by Catholics and Protestants. The tone is throughout correct, the narrative critical and calm, the result seldom much different from the usual Catholic positions, but reached scientifically and therefore unassailable. M. Vacandard possesses the gifts of an historical essayist; breadth of knowledge, skill in the treatment of dry and ancient material, sympathy with his subject and his time, and an historical style that can be commended to all youthful students as worthy of analysis and imitation. Every such volume of ecclesiastico-historical essays is a positive gain, not only to Catholic circles, but to that liberal-minded section of the non-Catholic world, which grows daily larger, and whose rational adhesion to historical truth in long-controverted

matters is a matter of prime importance if we would ever destroy in the English-speaking world the evil legend of anti-Catholic history.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Lezioni di Diplomazia Ecclesiastica, dettate nella Pontificia Accademia de' nobili Ecclesiastici. Da Monsignore Adolfo Giobbio. Rome: Fr. Pustet, 1904. Vol. III, pp. 646. Ten francs.

This third volume of the well-known work of Mgr. Giobbio deals with the administration of the sacraments from the viewpoint of the relations between Church and State. Naturally, with the exception of matrimony, such a work finds no subject-matter in lands where the separation of Church and State is complete, fundamental, and honestly carried out. It is different, however, in all those lands where there yet exists a politico-ecclesiastical union of some kind, as in Europe. In these lands baptism and ordination, *e. g.*, are surrounded by not a few ordinances established by the state, and accepted, with more or less freedom of action, by the Church. Our author describes and appreciates all such legislation; his work is therefore, primarily of inestimable value to those young ecclesiastics who are destined one day to represent the Holy See and Catholicism in the various states that acknowledge yet the ancient close political relations with the Church. The greater part of the work is devoted, as might be expected, to the sacrament of matrimony. After an account of the historical origin and present character of civil matrimony in the various Christian states of the world, and a similar description of the origin and growth of the juridical concept of civil matrimony, Mgr. Giobbio discusses the theoretical question of the rights of the state with regard to the matrimonial contract. He then proceeds to exhibit the civil legislation concerning certain impediments of marriage, both diriment and prohibitive, also concerning dispensations, and the celebration of marriage. Several paragraphs are devoted to civil legislation in connection with the Tametsi. Particularly interesting and useful to all ecclesiastical readers and students are the pages (384-502) on the dissolution of marriage or divorce. He follows at some length the growth of divorce in the civil law, notably since the Reformation, of which it is a direct result. The various reasons for absolute divorce, put forth by all its ancient and modern partisans, are set forth and sufficiently refuted, and the evils of this habit made plain. This is at once the best and the timeliest material that the book offers. Students of theology and social questions will find here a good conspectus of Catholic theological doctrine concerning divorce. Procedure in matrimonial cases is also affected by civil legislation,

the details of which are set forth by our author. Finally the growth and present condition of civil legislation concerning the "civil records" or official registry of births, deaths, and particularly marriages, is exhibited with the usual fulness and sufficiency. Eleven important documents are printed at the end of the volume in Italian translation. Among them certain *postulata* presented to the Vatican Council concerning the number of marriage impediments and mixed marriages are of general Catholic interest. The American reader will appreciate the liberties of the Church in the United States when he reads (p. 579, 584) a few of the dispositions of Russian civil legislation concerning the hearing of confession and the ordination of ecclesiastics. *Usquequo, Domine, Usquequo?*

We strongly recommend the three volumes of Mgr. Giobbio to all our readers; they will enlarge their theological culture, even if they do not offer any immediate and practical advantage in a land where the Church enjoys her original and innate freedom, and asks from the civil order only justice, without privilege or exceptional favor. At the same time, as this treatise is meant for young ecclesiastics, it is so constructed that the doctrine of the Church and her irreducible rights and claims are carried along from section to section, and interwoven as it were, with the exposé of the civil legislation. We await with pleasure the fourth volume on public worship and Church property.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Das Buch der Bücher. Gedanken über Lektüre und Studium der heiligen Schrift. Von P. Hildebrand Höpfl, O.S.B. Freiburg: Herder, 1904. Pp. 284. \$1.00.

This book should be read especially by our parish priests. They will find in it what they are looking for: a solid exposition of Catholic doctrine on the burning questions of the day, a great love for the Sacred Scriptures, and a clear explanation of the methods to be followed in either reading or studying them. The work is perfectly up to date.

What the learned Benedictine says (pp. 167 ff.) on the literary character of Hebrew historiography does not by any means differ from the recent decision given by the Biblical Commission regarding the appeal to implicit quotations. The fact that a biblical text is quoted, even explicitly, from a preëxisting source, is no proof that the sacred author did not affirm what is found in his book. Since there can be no error on the part of the inspired writer, the only question is, whether or not he speaks *as author*, that is to say, whether or not he addresses himself to his contemporaries and to his readers

“*proprio nomine*.” (See our articles on History and Inspiration.) When Father Höpfel denies the strictly historical character of some sources quoted in the Bible, he first proves that the sacred author has the intention to make use of those sources for a religious purpose, without guaranteeing their strictly historical character. Thus then Höpfel shows that the inspired writer does not affirm “*proprio nomine*” the historical details of his contradictory sources.

H. POELS.

De Sacra Traditione, contra novan hæresim Evolutionismi. Auctore L. Billot, S.J. Romæ: 1904. Pp. 137.

In the last number of the BULLETIN we called attention to a work by Fr. Lacome, who not only points out the false philosophical principles of some apparently “historical” theories, but at the same time indicates the way to solve the great historical questions, which are nowadays so eagerly discussed and which touch upon the root of Christian belief. Since Fr. Billot is not a historian but a philosopher and theologian, he confines himself to the mere refutation of modern “evolutionism.” He speaks, *e. g.*, in such a way of the rôle assumed by Tradition in the centuries before Abraham (pp. 20–21), that we must suppose the learned scholar did not even intend, in writing this brochure, to deal with the positive facts, at the present time generally acknowledged.

Regarding critical studies, Fr. Billot in point of fact proves two things: first, that we must carefully distinguish the historical data from the assumptions of false philosophical systems; secondly, that the results of our critical investigations of the Bible and Church History can and must be controlled by the infallible doctrine of the living Church itself.

The Church is not merely an aggregation of individuals and nations. It is the divine and everlasting institution of Christ: the Holy Ghost abides with her “forever.” At all times the Church is the authorized and infallible witness of divine revelation. In the sense in which it is understood by the Evolutionists, “relative truth” implies the denial of the inerrancy of the Church. We, Catholics, know that no hypothesis set forth by critics can be true which is opposed to the teaching of that infallible witness of Christian revelation, either in the first or in the twentieth century. Opinions, however, held by all the theologians of our age, or even of several centuries, are not *per se* the doctrine of “the Church”! (Cf. BULLETIN, 1905, pp. 160 ff.)

It stands to reason that this divine character of the Church does

not affect "criticism." The same may be said of every hypothesis set forth by philosophers, scientists, geologists or astronomers. The shipwreck of some few critics proves nothing against the lawfulness and need of a truly critical and apologetic treatment of scripture and church history. There is no one who would interfere with Catholics in the philosophical study of Christian revelation, because of the failure of so many representatives of the scholastic methods!

Therefore Fr. Billot cannot be supposed to address himself to Catholic critics at large. His work does not contain a single argument against those Catholic scholars who maintain that in the apologetics of our day there is need of a thoroughly critical investigation of the historical foundations, on which the scholastic divines build their philosophical and theological systems.

Concerning the "living faith" and "evolution," we refer our readers to the preceding number of the BULLETIN, pp. 158 ff. There we have explained why "Evolution," in the modern and full sense of the word, cannot be admitted by Catholics. But some theologians do not seem to realize that no theories, nowadays, are more dangerous to the Catholic Church than those of the apologists, who exclude every kind of "evolution" from the history of the origins of Christian institutions and teachings. Historical science is forging the strongest defense of Catholicism against Protestantism that has yet been offered; let us hope that our own theologians will not treat history and criticism as an enemy of the Church, because of the ruin of some scholastic systems.

The readers of our studies on "History and Inspiration" know sufficiently in what light we view the theories of Fr. Loisy. But, in our opinion, Fr. Billot ought to have laid more stress on the fact that a writer does not necessarily deny either the historical character of an event related in the Gospels, or the possibility of proving it, if he denies the possibility of proving such a determinate event according to all the requirements of merely historical or critical methods, without appealing to the *special* reliability of the witnesses and the special character of the Church, the belief in which is already supposed to be an "obsequium rationale."

HENRY A. POELS.

Liber Jesu Sirach Sive Ecclesiasticus Hebraice, secundum codices nuper repertos, vocalibus adornatus, addita versione latina cum glossario hebraico-latino, edidit Norbertus Peters. Freiburg: Herder, 1905. Pp. xvi + 163.

The title of the work sufficiently indicates the importance of this publication which redounds to the credit of Catholic scholarship.

Since Peters' previous studies on *Ecclesiasticus* are known to every reader interested in this kind of work, it is almost needless to say that his edition of the newly discovered Hebrew text of this biblical book will be found eminently satisfactory. A comparison between his edition and the text edited by L. Strack and J. Knabenbauer shows the excellence of this new publication.

H. POELS.

Die Parabeln des Herrn im Evangelium exegetisch und praktische erläutert. Zweite vielfach verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage. Von Leopold Fonck, S.J. Innsbruck: Rauch; Regensburg: Rom; New York: Pustet, 1904. Pp. xxviii + 903.

This work has within two years reached its second edition. Possibly, the urgent need of a work on this subject, written by a Catholic, has been a factor in obtaining its success. For the study of the parables of the New Testament has, for a long period, been almost entirely neglected by us. Others have not been so inactive though, in many instances, a diligent search will scarcely reveal the result of the labor expended and in other cases the sole fruit has been the specious presentation of pet theories.

In his exposition, the author has kept in view the profit of the preacher and the catechist. But it has been one of his aims, also, to show the gratuitous elements in the exegesis of Professor Julicher, of Marburg, who is ever ready to find in the parables, in the form in which we possess them, the reflections of the first Christian generation. The author is equipped for his work with information gathered during several years' sojourn in the East. This knowledge of the manners and customs and the habits of thought of the people of Palestine shows itself on every page. Among the dogmatic conclusions placed at the end of the exposition of each parable there might be room for further discussion. The changes in this edition to which the author calls our attention are the substitution, in the German version of the parables, of the account of them given in each of the gospels for the harmonized arrangement used in the first edition, additions to the store of information concerning the Orient, selections from the expositions and homilies of the Fathers and an increased bibliography. The richness of the bibliography would, of itself, make the book valuable. It covers sixteen pages and before each parable is placed a list of those works bearing directly or indirectly on its interpretation.

In the preface to this edition, the author tells us that his book was ignored by three leading German reviews to which it was sent. No doubt such treatment of Catholic writings is, in many instances,

prompted by the conviction that our efforts can be of little service to biblical criticism. Our sole way of changing this attitude of indifference is to compel attention by works of solid scientific worth. Happily, in many lines of scriptural investigation, these are now not wanting to us and we can fairly claim the respect and consideration that have so long been withheld.

FRANCIS I. PURTELL.

The gospel according to St. Mark, with Introduction and Annotations by Madame Cecilia, Religious of St. Andrew's Convent, Streatham, S. W. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1904. Pp. 494.

This is the first of a projected series of Catholic Scripture Manuals primarily intended for the preparation of Catholics for the university local examinations and for use by Catholic teachers. The Vulgate and Rheims versions are used. The commentary is supplemented by a section containing longer notes on those portions of the gospel which the author considers of special importance. This is followed by a description of various Jewish religious beliefs and institutions. The long experience of the author as a teacher should have made her acquainted with the needs of those for whom this work is intended.

FRANCIS I. PURTELL.

Ireland's Story: A Short History of Ireland for schools, reading circles and general readers. By Charles Johnston and Carita Spencer. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1905. \$1.40.

It is not to be expected that we will find in something less than 400 octavo pages more than the merest outline of Ireland's story which, according to tradition, extends from the year 2000 B. C. and which is made to include the story of Irishmen outside of Ireland. One cannot fail to feel in reading this book that the authors had a great deal to tell in the smallest possible space. The result, however, is a very readable story. The legends and facts which make up the earliest periods of the history are pleasingly combined, in fact it is often impossible to separate them, but it is to be hoped that readers will not accept the purely legendary as history. The historians are apparently impartial in narrating the events of Ireland's tragic story and the causes and results which led up to and grew out of them. Among the commendable features of the book are the arrangement of the chapters, which are short, with the names of the ruling English sovereigns at the head of each chapter, the running dates at the top of each page, the half-page summaries at the end of each chapter,

the half-dozen maps, the numerous illustrations and a very full index in which the locations of places mentioned on the maps are also given. These are all elements which make the book well adapted for a child's history or a class or school book. The style, too, is well enough suited to such a purpose, still, it might have been made more attractive to younger and even to general readers. It may be suggested that the pronunciation of the more difficult Irish names should have been indicated, for, in this matter, the reader is hindered rather than helped by such spellings as Cuculaind, Concobar, Usnac, Deirdre, Naisi, which, by the way, should be Cuchulainn, Conchobar (or, even Conor), Uisneach, Noisi or Naoisi.

The four last chapters are a feature which distinguishes this story of Ireland for they give in a few pages much interesting and valuable information about the Irish on the Continent, the Irish in America, the Irish in the British Empire and the Irish Literary Revival. The second of these topics is perhaps the one on which most investigation remains to be made, especially on the Irish in America during the colonial and revolutionary periods. The last chapter will seem too short to the Gaelic Leaguer but, after all, it is too soon for a history of the Gaelic movement which, although it has already accomplished much, has still a long road to travel before the goal of an Irish Ireland is reached.

JOSEPH DUNN.

Socialism, Its Theoretical Basis and Practical Application. By V. Cathrein, S.J. Revised and enlarged by V. F. Gettelman, S.J. New York: Benziger, 1904. 8°.

This is a translation of Father Cathrein's treatise on Socialism. Originally a chapter in his large work on Moral Philosophy, it was published as a monograph, and later enlarged into a distinct volume. It has gone through eight editions and has become a book of 370 pages. The Encyclicals of Leo XIII on the Condition of Labor and on Christian Democracy are printed as an appendix.

The work of Father Cathrein has received universal praise for its accuracy, scholarship, searching criticism and effective presentation. No antagonist of Socialism who holds the Christian view of life can afford to neglect it. The book has been so long before the public that detailed account of its contents need scarcely be given. It is a pleasant task to recommend it most highly.

Whatever limitations there may be to the usefulness of this work, they are due not to the author but to the nature of refutations generally. If the propaganda of Socialism were a purely intellectual process and directed to minds largely independent of sympathy and

interest, a treatise such as that before us would be adequate to all practical needs. But the intellectual is a minor element in the propaganda of Socialism. There are undeniable social facts, personal experience in the workman's life, feeling shrewdly used and carefully appealed to, all of which are directed to awakening in the minds of the masses the impression that the administration of our government is selfish, capitalistic and insincere; that the institutions of government promise no relief. When this despair is engendered, the work of turning out finished Socialists runs on easily. After conversion, study begins, zeal develops, lessons are repeated. Those who sincerely differ with the best that Socialism offers, should not, therefore, think that when a refutation is written the movement is refuted. Much more is needed; the process of engendering despair must be checked.

In the United States, where Socialism is unlike the Continental type, it is a question whether or not it is wise to assume a necessary relation between Socialism and Atheism and free love. There is among us a widespread socialistic sympathy that repudiates both. There are many atheists who are socialists, there is a form of Socialism that is logically and professedly atheistical, yet Socialism does not necessarily or always connote atheism and free love. Father Cathrein recognizes this when he says "Socialism, at least as it is conceived by its modern defenders, is in the first instance an *economical system* and only secondarily and subordinately a political system affecting society, the state, the family, etc." (p. 18). There is a tendency among us to rest our case against Socialism by charging it with atheism and free love. It appears wiser to catch the essential tenet and native spirit of Socialism, stripped of accessories and to determine the Catholic attitude to it. Then we may add the secondary phases, and resist them, always growing in strength in our presentation.

The essential tenet—primarily industrial and ethical—may be judged by its spiritual bearings. If the Church as spiritual guardian of man has opposition to make, it should be pointed, discriminating, and reserved. If the Church finds no necessary spiritual evil in the essential tenet of Socialism, it is due to clear thinking and safe leadership, to establish that point and direct opposition to the accessories. That a satisfactory spiritual argument can be made against the central and essential tenet of Socialism seems evident, in view of actual historical circumstances. If the reader of Father Cathrein's able work will take chapter IV, sections I to VI, wherein the author treats the Impracticability of Socialism, he will find it purely practical and industrial, containing the statement that the "economic aims" con-

stitute "the very marrow of Socialism and differentiate it from other systems" (p. 258). The argument which the author makes here is mainly practical and sociological or economic, and hence one for which Church authority would scarcely be invoked. We may study the chapter closely and get from it great assistance, but that reading must be supplemented by actual observation of Socialists, careful study of spiritual bearings and the development of an attitude which is distinctively Catholic. The very excellence of Father Cathrein's work may tend to mislead us into the feeling that in doing so much he has done enough. The spiritual leaders of the people have much to do in life and among the masses if they would understand the real genesis and spiritual meaning of Socialism. No man embraces revolution without grave reason, and Socialism is mental revolution. If sympathetic knowledge of people, of facts, and of popular aspirations accompany the study of refutations as able and complete as this one, we shall soon have a most effective guidance to save the people from the fascinating delusion that Socialism contains.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

Socialism and Christianity. By Rt. Rev. Wm. Stang, D.D., Bishop of Fall River. New York: Benziger, 1905. 8°.

Portions of this volume appeared some time since, in the American Ecclesiastical Review. The work is rather a plea for the Catholic philosophy of reform, than an argument against Socialism. While unsparing denunciation of Socialism is not lacking the two chapters devoted to it are short and cursory. Practicable reform measures are treated in one chapter, after which Bishop Stang devotes his attention to the relation of the Reformation to social decay. The Catholic Reform Movement, False Theories in modern life, A Happy Home, The Surest Way to Happiness, are there discussed in a practical and pointed manner.

The work is full of human sympathy and it is manifestly an expression of genuine love for the laboring classes. There are thoughts and portions of the style that remind one of the imagery and noble ethical pages of Ruskin. The author has the practical judgment which comes from contact with life. Hence a feature of the work which possesses special charm is the teaching of little, homely, neglected habits as important in dealing with the social question. We have to thank the author for many lessons on the value of neatness, cleanliness, good cooking, simplicity and economy. A spiritual atmosphere pervades the work and renders the reading of it most fas-

cinating to one who shares both the faith of the author and his sympathy for those who toil.

WILLIAM J. KERBY.

Constitutional Law in the United States. By Emlin McClain, LL.D., Justice of the Supreme Court of Iowa. New York: Longmans, 1905. 8°, pp. 438.

In this volume of the American Citizen Series there will be found a good analysis of the Federal Constitution and a useful exposition of its more important provisions. Of the "small reference library" not much can be said in commendation. Even the select bibliography of constitutional law makes no mention of many excellent treatises on the Constitution. The references which precede the successive chapters, however, will enable the general reader to make a sufficiently exhaustive study of our fundamental law. The author, indeed, nowhere claims completeness for either his bibliography or his illustrations.

In such a work as the present but little that is new can seriously be expected. The volume, however, recognizes those recent developments of constitutional law which could not have been examined by earlier writers.

Topics which are now of less importance than formerly, such as *ex post facto* laws, bills of attainder and treason have been treated in a manner not far removed from the commonplace. A more interesting subject, eminent domain, is admirably discussed. Taxation, too, is ably examined, but the Constitution, as will presently be seen, is carelessly quoted. Considering their very great importance, the financial power of the states and the power of the Federal Government as to money are very inadequately treated.

The author shows no very firm grasp of the great questions which arose during the era of reconstruction. On page 260 it is asserted that regular state governments were established in the seceding commonwealths "under the provisions of the so-called reconstruction acts (1867)." To this statement of fact there is a very important exception in the case of Tennessee, whose normal relations to the Union had been restored as early as July, 1866. This was a recognition by Congress of the Presidential theory of reconstruction.

On page 32 it is stated that in "a few months" after Washington's inauguration the remaining states ratified the Constitution. Rhode Island did not accede to the more perfect union until May 29, 1790, more than a year after the first President had entered upon his office. Elsewhere in the volume, page 69, a paraphrase of the Constitution introduces an obscurity where there is none in the text of that document. It is there stated that by provision of the Federal

Constitution senators and representatives "are privileged from arrest in all cases except for treason, felony or breach of the peace during attendance at the sessions of their respective houses and in going to and returning from the same." Another instance of obscure writing will be found on page 182, where it is said that "Congress may undoubtedly make railroads, steamship lines, and other methods of transporting the mails, post-roads." The meaning of the author is sufficiently plain to those familiar with the Constitution, but the work is designed for a different constituency. The reader will find on page 139 the following provision quoted from the Constitution: "Representative and direct *taxation* shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to *servitude* for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." In the Constitution "taxation" reads *taxes*, and "servitude" is *service*. Congress, as appears on page 173, shall have power "to establish *an* uniform rule of naturalization." Farther on, page 177, in quoting the Constitution the word *bankruptcy* is substituted for "bankruptcies," and on page 184 "the seat of the government" is made to read *the seat of government*. On page 301 it is stated that Congress is restrained from "abridging the freedom of speech *and* of the press." The familiar provision that "no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause" is changed on page 313 to "proper" cause.

No attempt has been made to verify every provision of the Constitution quoted in the work of Justice McClain. The errors noticed are such as would occur to any student fairly familiar with the language of the Constitution, but they should not occur in a text-book.

An instance of loose writing is found on page 204, where the author mentions "offices for life." The careless quoting of the Constitution can be explained upon the theory that it was done, at least in part, from memory. This theory, however, does not explain how there could find place in a serious and rather able exposition of the Constitution such a statement as is found on page 30: "The government thus provided was a league or confederation for common defence, and the Congress was to consist of delegates without limit as to number chosen and paid by the legislatures of the different states, those from each state acting as a unit." Turning to the "Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union," page 390 of this volume, we read: "No state shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor by more than seven members." To account for this slip one must assume that a part of the book was written by deputy and that

the industrious editor sometimes abridges his labors by skipping a paragraph or a page.

In the references which precede the various chapters the works of neither the editor, nor the author are discriminated against. *Actual Government as Applied Under American Conditions* is frequently mentioned. The modesty of the author led him to mention *McClain's Cases* only about two hundred and fifty times. This, however, is neither uncommercial nor unconstitutional. Notwithstanding the peculiar method of quoting the Constitution and the existence of an occasional error of the character mentioned, the book is not without considerable value.

CHAS. H. MCCARTHY.

Le Ministère Pastoral de Jean Jacques Olier, Curé De St. Sulpice, 1642-1652, nouvelle édition. Par G. Letourneau, Curé de St. Sulpice. Paris: 1905. 12°, pp. viii + 223.

Over fifty years ago there appeared an anonymous biography of Olier, under the heading: *The Model Parish Priest, or the Salvation of the People*; it was an extract from the extended life written by M. Faillon. Six or seven years ago a valuable history of the Church of St. Sulpice by M. Hamel was published. It was fitting that the portrait of the model parish priest, to whom the Church of St. Sulpice is so much indebted, should be retouched and given a new setting. M. Letourneau has done so with that delicate and sure skill that experience alone can give. In this parish of St. Sulpice which the Bretonvilliers, the Languets, the Pancemonts, and the Hamons had raised so high he found parochial institutions which though over two centuries old were yet like full grown and vigorous trees, yielding abundant and life-giving fruits. His admiration for the work led him to acquaint himself more thoroughly with the wonderful founder of such a thorough and systematic parochial organization. In this way he came face to face with Olier transforming St. Sulpice, which he used to call his little Geneva, into a model parish, as St. Pierre Fournier had done at Mattaincourt in Lorraine. It is with truly filial affection that our author has drawn the features of this great sacerdotal figure, and yet with a modesty and reserve characteristic of St. Sulpice he has not done full justice to his hero. The Jesuit scholar Rapin, so dreaded for his acute and keen sense of sarcasm, gives vent to his enthusiasm, when he evokes in his memoirs the majestic figure of Olier. He shows him trampling under foot the aristocratic prejudices of his family, and refusing the episcopacy in order to become one of these parish priests so despised by the great ones. He was a man admirable for his sacerdotal virtues and his remarkable probity, probably the only parish priest in Paris who did not disgrace himself by communion with Port Royal, or bend the knee

before the idol of a new doctrine,—as pure in his faith as he had always been in his life.

Letourneau, we must acknowledge, does not show us with what prudent and ardent zeal Olier protected his parishioners against the subtle and insidious manœuvres of the famous Jansenist Hamel. We realize that in Olier are resplendent all the virtues of the good shepherd as described by Christ. In order to obtain a better and more complete knowledge of his flock his zeal led him to invent most felicitous expedients, *e. g.*, the division of his vast parish into several sections, the institution of his famous "*catechismes*" so highly praised two centuries later by Dupanloup, his system of instruction for every class of society, his zeal for the formation of the teachers in his schools and the establishment of sodalities and associations for the relief of misfortune and distress; in a word, no member of his parish escaped his vigilant eye or failed to find a place in his sacerdotal and fatherly heart. He spared neither pains nor expense in order to enhance the beauty and order of the divine worship. The divine offices are even yet carried on in the Church of St. Sulpice, with so great a sense of decorum, so fervent a spirit of religion and piety, and the faithful are so assiduous in their attendance, that it may be said without exaggeration, that if St. Charles Borromeo were to reappear on earth, he would find few parishes that would more vividly bring back to his memory the glorious days of his own Milan.

In casting a rather rapid glance over this short biography of J. J. Olier we cannot but remark the justness and appropriateness of what an eminent member of the French hierarchy said to the writer: That great servant of God, Olier, will always be a true master for the parish priest of our age. Everyone might meditate with great profit on the lessons and examples of a zeal so intelligent, so active and so fruitful.

Annexed to the biography is a short sketch of the entire parochial system of St. Sulpice in our days. This sketch is instructive, and suggestive and demonstrates that the parish of St. Sulpice has not degenerated. It is yet a faithful copy of the original. We need not wonder that its influence is felt, not alone in Paris and France, but in foreign lands, owing to the apostolate of those who have studied at the Seminary and have an opportunity to see the whole system in actual operation, so true is the saying of the Cure of Ars: Where the saints have trodden God has trodden with them.

F. M. DUMONT, S.S.

Le Rôle de la Femme dans la Société Contemporaine. Par Raymond Janot. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 8°, pp. 244.

In fourteen excellent discourses the Abbé Janot presents a body of solid and timely doctrine concerning the position and duties of

Christian womanhood in our modern society. Girlhood, Christian marriage, the duties of a Christian wife, the mother as educator, priestess of the household, Christian woman, and member of the State—such are the points of view from which the *conférencier* approaches his important subject. The teaching is reliable and sensible, Catholic and rationally liberal in all that pertains to the civil progress of woman and her enjoyment of all the gains and improvements of modern life. There is a notable absence of rhetoric and “*emphase*” in these discourses. The author seems too deeply in earnest, and too strongly affected by the gravity of the actual situation in France.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Prælectiones de Sacra Ordinatione, Auctore S. Many, S.S. Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1905. 8°, pp. 667.

Too high praise cannot be given Professor Many for the successful way in which he has treated this difficult and important subject. The accuracy and thoroughness which he displayed in his earlier treatises, *De Eucharistia* and *De Locis Sacris*, are evident in this his latest production, and will win for it an equally high place in our canonical literature.

Those who are officially concerned with ordinations will find the work especially serviceable. It is the most recent discussion of the discipline regarding the sacrament of orders; it takes into account the very latest decisions; it neglects no point of practical interest. The manner of treatment, full and yet not diffuse, together with the helpful emphasis of the headings of paragraphs by means of larger type, facilitate reference and increase the usefulness of this work to those who are frequently under the necessity of solving doubts and difficulties regarding ordination.

Two general titles, *De Legibus Sacræ Ordinationis* and *De Ritibus Ordinationis*, indicate broadly the field covered by the author, but one must read the matter found under the numerous sub-titles before he can realize the richness of historical information, the soundness of judgment, and the exactness of statement which give to these *Prælectiones* a very special value, and make them as interesting as they are useful.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

The Gentle Shakespere: A Vindication. By John Pym Yeatman. Third edition. Dedicated to Appleton Morgan, President of the Shakespere Society of New York. New York: The Shakespere Press, 1905. 8°.

This volume, a modern folio of over three hundred pages, deserves serious consideration. It is not so well constructed as it might be,

yet it is too important to be easily dismissed. Therefore, it is held for a careful review. It is a plea for Carlyle's announcement that "Catholicism gave us Shakespere," and it shows from facts, not very philosophically arranged, that Shakespere was a Catholic.

M. F. EGAN.

Reflections from the Mirror of a Mystic. Translated from the work of John R  sbr  ck by Earle Baillie. London: Thomas Baker, 1905. 8  , pp. 98.

The contents of this book are taken from the original Flemish of John R  sbr  ck (Ruysbroeck), a famous fourteenth century mystic. The work itself has been done into English by Earle Baillie from Hello's "Oeuvres Choiesies de R  sbr  ck." It is a neat little volume, tastily arranged, printed on good paper in very legible type. Although the meaning is rarely obscure, still the book is not one that will always instruct or stir up devotion in the mind of the average reader. Its pages seem to be rather the spontaneous expression of an individual soul closely united to God than a studied and deliberate expression of the workings of divine grace. However there is little doubt that those attracted to the study of this branch of theology will find in these "Reflections" some helpful suggestions on the interpretation of spiritual phenomena in the mind of the mystic. M. J. LARKIN.

The Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. By the Rev. H. Noldin, S.J. From the German. New York: Benziger, 1905. 8  .

Deep piety and a thorough knowledge of the subject treated are the characteristic notes of this recent work. Fr. Noldin gives us a clear, terse and logical exposition of the main features of his theme embracing the origin of the devotion, its rapid spread despite opposition, motives for its practice and the duties and privileges of its directors and members. The third chapter, entitled the "Object of the Devotion," is perhaps the best of the volume. Here the author explains its dogmatic basis in language quite free from the technical phraseology of our text-books.

Missale Romanum, jussu editum Clementis VIII, Urbani VIII, et Leonis XIII. New York: Pustet, 1905. 8  .

The well-known firm of Pustet and Co. may well be proud of the handy edition of the Roman Missal which they have just published. The book is excellently bound, printed in clear bold type, and evidently intended for those priests who at times find it necessary to carry a mass-book on their missions.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- The Transplanting of Tessie. By Mary T. Waggaman. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905. Pp. 186.
- Skeleton Sermons. For the Sundays and Holidays in the year. By John B. Bagshawe, D.D. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1905. Pp. 239.
- Bob Ingersoll's Egosophy and Other Poems. By Rev. James McKernan. New York: Pustet & Co., 1905. Pp. 65.
- A Daughter of Kings. By Katherine Tynan Hinkson. New York: Benziger Bros., 1905. Pp. 317.
- The Race for Copper Island. By Henry S. Spalding, S.J. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905. Pp. 206.
- The Senior Lieutenant's Wager and Other Stories. By the Foremost Catholic Writers. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905. Pp. 256.
- Callista. A Sketch of the Third Century. New York: Benziger Brothers. Paper bound edition.
- That Man's Daughter. By Henry M. Ross. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905. Pp. 190.
- Juvenile Round Table. Stories by Foremost Catholic Writers. Second Series. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905. Pp. 174.
- The Red Inn of Saint Lyphar. By Anna T. Sadlier. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905. Pp. 179.
- The Meaning of the Idylls of the King. An Essay on Interpretation. By Condé Benoist Pallen, LL.D. New York: American Book Company. Pp. 115.
- A Spoiled Priest and Other Stories. By the Rev. P. A. Sheehan, D.D. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905. Pp. 213.
- Shadows Lifted. By J. E. Copus, S.J. (Cuthbert). New York: Benziger Brothers, 1904. Pp. 264.
- The Spirit of Sacrifice and the Life of Sacrifice in the Religious State. From the original of Rev. S. M. Sorana; revised by Rev. Herbert Thurston, S.J. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1905. Pp. 500.
- In the Morning of Life. Considerations and Meditations for Boys. By Herbert Lucas, S.J. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1904. Pp. 298.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees.—A special meeting of the Board of Trustees was held on May 3 and 4. Some matters of grave importance to the University on its academic as well as its financial side prolonged the sessions of the Board to two days.

The Chair of German Literature.—The Reverend A. H. Walburg, of Cincinnati, has contributed \$5,000 in addition to \$10,000 already acknowledged for the purpose of founding a chair of German Literature. Father Walburg's warm interest in the University as testified by his magnificent donations, is especially valuable at this time, showing as it does his thorough confidence in the institution. The venerable priest was present at the Commencement and was warmly greeted by the Professors and students.

Bequest to the University.—In addition to the sums mentioned in the Vice-Rector's report (see below) Miss Margaret H. Gardiner, who died recently in Baltimore, left the residue of her estate, amounting to about \$100,000, to the University.

Lectures on the A. O. H. Course.—Four public lectures were delivered by Professor Dunn in the Assembly Room, McMahon Hall: March 22, The Celts and the Celtic Languages—I. The Origins; March 29, The Celts and Celtic Languages—II. In Modern Times; April 5, The Voyage of St. Brendan; April 12, The Celtic Theatre.

Resignation of Dr. Hassett.—Readers of the BULLETIN will very readily share the feelings of regret which every one connected with the University felt at the departure of the Reverend Maurice M. Hassett, D.D. His presence was urgently needed in his diocese of Harrisburg, Pa., to which he returned to become Rector of the Cathedral. Dr. Hassett's career at the University was short; but in the two years he spent here he gave such evidence of devotion to his work that the results he already achieved were considered to be but a faint indication of larger things to come. The best wishes of all who are connected with the University follow Dr. Hassett to his new field of labor.

Appointment of a Vice-Rector.—One of the most important results of the meeting of the Board of Trustees in May and one which is likely to result in immediate good to the University was the appoint-

ment of Very Reverend Doctor Charles P. Grannan, Professor of Sacred Scripture to the office of Vice-Rector of the University. A useful and enlightened policy was thus inaugurated in selecting men for administrative positions in the University who are in sympathy with University ideals and who have the training and experience to be safely entrusted with the management of an institution which is national in character. Dr. Grannan has been associated with the University from the time of its foundation. He has written extensively on Biblical subjects, and his writings have been translated into German, French and Italian. He is a member of the Pontifical Commission for Biblical Studies. The unanimity which prevailed among both Trustees and Faculties in selecting him for the position of Vice-Rector was a noble tribute to his success as a teacher and a graceful acknowledgment of his character and achievements. Notwithstanding the many onerous duties laid upon him, Dr. Grannan will still continue to be Professor of Sacred Scripture.

Commencement Exercises.—The ceremonies in connection with the closing exercises at the University have always been marked by extreme simplicity. This year, which was no exception to the rule, will, in all probability, mark the end of this custom, as the opening of the undergraduate department next year will necessarily introduce new methods. On Sunday, June 4, the Baccalaureate Sermon was preached by the Rev. E. A. O'Connor, S.T.L., of Albany, New York, who is President of the University Alumni Association.

A distinguished audience assembled in McMahon Hall on June 7 to witness the commencement exercises. Dr. Grannan commenced the proceedings. He said:

It is a pleasant duty to welcome you to the University and to these exercises which mark the closing of the academic year. In the name of our professors and students, I desire to express heart-felt appreciation of the interest which you show in our work and thereby in the entire system of Catholic education.

We are especially honored to-day by the presence of the Apostolic Delegate. As the representative of the Holy See, it is fitting that he should preside at the chief academic function of this University, which was established by the Sovereign Pontiff, Leo XIII, for the education of our people in all branches of knowledge. And it is most appropriate that he should confer on our graduates—clerics and laymen alike—those academic honors which have been earned by diligent study and painstaking research.

We are also fortunate in having as the principal speaker, on this

occasion, one who, in the midst of pastoral duties, has always been a staunch friend of the University, and who has given proof of his attachment to its ideals, not only by the eloquent language for which he is so well known, but also in earnest endeavor and successful work. The address to the graduates will be delivered by the Rev. Dr. Stafford, of St. Patrick's Church, Washington.

During the past year the University has widened its sphere of activity in various directions. The teaching of Celtic language and literature was resumed in October, under the most favorable conditions. Dr. Joseph J. Dunn, who had spent three years of special preparation in Europe, was placed in charge of the work. It is a source of much gratification to the University that it is now able to realize, in a worthy manner, the aim which inspired the Ancient Order of Hibernians in the generous endowment of the Gaelic Chair.

To another great Catholic organization we are indebted for an important addition to our academic work. The Chair of American History, established by the Knights of Columbus, was filled without delay by the appointment of Dr. Charles H. McCarthy. As a Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania, as the author of important works on the history of our country, and as a teacher of long experience in the Catholic High School of Philadelphia, he entered upon his duties here well qualified to carry on the work of research and to inspire our students with a love of historical study.

The Faculty of Theology has been strengthened by the appointment of Dr. Henry Poels, Associate Professor of Sacred Scripture. Dr. Poels is a graduate of the Catholic University of Louvain, a recognized authority in Biblical science, and a member of the Biblical Commission, established by Pope Leo XIII. His work, in the department of Scripture, is specially helpful, in view of the many problems which this subject presents.

In the Faculty of Theology also Rev. Dr. Patrick J. Healy, Instructor in Church History, has been promoted to the position of Assistant Professor.

In the Faculty of Philosophy Mr. David A. McCabe, Bachelor of Arts of Harvard University, Instructor in the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction, Dublin, Ireland, has been appointed Teaching Fellow in Political Economy.

In the Faculty of Law Dr. Wm. H. Delacey, of Washington, has been actively engaged teaching for some time past. He has recently been appointed instructor for the coming year.

Since the last commencement, distinctions of many kinds have come to persons connected with the University.

Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, a member of the Board of Trustees, has received from the President of the United States his appointment as Secretary of the Navy. Rev. Dr. John T. Creagh has been appointed by the Holy Father a member of the Pontifical Commission for the codification of the Canon Law.

Dr. Charles P. Neill, Professor of Political Economy, has been appointed United States Commissioner of Labor.

Dr. Albert F. Zahm, Associate Professor of Mechanics, has received from the Carnegie Institute an appropriation of \$1,000 to enable him to pursue his research in aeronautics.

At the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, held in St. Louis in 1904, the Exhibit of Catholic Charities, prepared by Professors Neill and Kerby, was awarded a grand prize and two gold medals. The exhibit has been secured by the University and placed in McMahon Hall.

Two of our professors, Dr. Shahan and Dr. Pace, have been selected as Editors of the Catholic Encyclopædia, which is designed to be a comprehensive work of reference on all matters pertaining to the Catholic Church.

The vacation work of our professors for 1904 included a course of lectures at the Maryland Summer School by Dr. Egan; two papers on Oriental Literature at the International Congress of Arts and Sciences in St. Louis by Dr. Bolling; a course of lectures before the Teachers' Institute, Los Angeles, California, by Dr. Maguire; eighty-five lectures on educational topics, given chiefly to the Christian Brothers and other communities in different sections of the country, by Rev. Dr. Shields; the classification and division of the Collection of Christian Oriental Writers, by Rev. Dr. Hyvernât.

Of the students who received the degree Doctor of Philosophy from this University last year, Rev. Romanus Butin is teaching at the Marist College, Rev. Leo Dubois at the Marist Seminary, Rev. Julius A. Nieuwland, Rev. Michael M. Oswald, and Rev. James J. Trahey at the University of Notre Dame. Rev. Nicholas A. Weber, Licentiate in Theology, is teaching at the Marist College in this city.

As it is a special object of the University to prepare its graduates for the work of the College and Seminary, we follow with close interest the careers of those who are engaged in teaching and we rejoice at the success that crowns their efforts in behalf of more thorough education.

The candidates for degrees this year include: Five Bachelors of Arts, one Civil Engineer, one Electrical Engineer, five Bachelors of Laws, one Master of Laws, one Master of Philosophy, one Doctor of

Philosophy, ten Bachelors of Theology, and nine Licentiates in Theology.

From this enumeration it is evident that the University has by no means lowered its standard of work. Not only are our students encouraged to qualify for the advanced degrees, but the requirements for those degrees are maintained at the high level which was established at the beginning of the University. And it remains our determination for the future to make scientific investigation a central feature of university work and a prime requisite for university honors.

In order to attain this purpose it is needful that our students should come in contact as early as possible with the work of the University, that they should be trained, even as undergraduates, in its spirit and methods. This need has become quite obvious to us since the opening of McMahon Hall ten years ago. But it has also been brought home to us in a variety of ways. Catholic parents have asked the very pertinent question: "What is the University doing for our young laymen who are not destined to become priests, and who yet ought to be educated under Catholic influences?" It has also been pointed out that the funds provided for the University, in the shape of endowments, were not intended for the benefit of the relatively small class of graduate students, but that they were meant for the advantage of the largest possible number of young men. And finally, it has been urged that something, or some one, must be at fault, when so many Catholic students are enrolled in the non-Catholic colleges of the country. Briefly, there has grown up within the past decade a demand for undergraduate work in connection with the graduate work which the University has conducted since its foundation.

To meet this demand and to supply this actual need, the Trustees of the University have directed us to establish courses of study leading to the degree Bachelor of Arts. A full statement of these courses is contained in the Year Book for 1905-1906, which has just been published. They are arranged in nine groups, any one of which the student may select according to his preference, ability and the character of the work which he intends to take up after receiving the Bachelor's degree.

These courses are open to all students who pass the Entrance Examinations indicated in the Year Book, or present a certificate showing that they have already finished the courses of study which these examinations presuppose. Generally speaking, any student who graduates from a first-class high school is qualified to enter upon the undergraduate work of this University.

The time required to complete the work for the Bachelor's degree

will vary according to the preparation which the student has received before coming to the University. As a fair average, three years may be considered sufficient, but the length of the course will depend, in a large measure, upon the student himself, his ability and his diligence.

As already stated, this undergraduate work has been undertaken in response to a general demand that the facilities of university study should be offered to a larger class of our Catholic students. But I should now add that this demand has been emphasized in a very practical and acceptable fashion. During the last two years, the Catholic people of the United States, obedient to the wishes of the Holy Father, have contributed freely to the support of the University. The collection for 1903-4 amounted to \$105,051.58, and the collection for 1904-5, which is still incomplete, amounts to \$113,513.40. This generosity on the part of our Catholics, and especially on the part of the laity, calls evidently for some return. And the most fitting return that the University can make is to provide, in every possible way, for the education of the sons of its benefactors.

Our obligation must appear all the more serious when we reflect that there are, in our Catholic parochial schools, over one million children whose education is paid for by voluntary contributions. A certain number of these children will go later on to college and university. Naturally and logically, they should receive their higher education in Catholic institutions. And this institution, the Catholic University of America, must take its share in providing that education.

By this means the University is brought into vital touch with all our institutions of learning. It comes to understand, in a very practical way, their needs and their possibilities. It is in a position to exert a wholesome influence upon them, to direct the work of their teachers to elevate their standards, to improve their methods. It is no longer a far-off, isolated academy of a few chosen men; it reaches out to the people, to parents and teachers and pupils, bringing them guidance and suggestion and a knowledge of the wider educational field and its ceaseless movements. And from them, in turn, it expects that hearty coöperation which is indispensable for common success. Such, I take it, is the real meaning of the phrase, "our Catholic system of education." To bind more closely all the elements of that system and to endow each element with its full measure of strength is the purpose which the University has set for itself and for the attainment of which its whole effort is now directed.

No one, however, should suppose that, in establishing undergraduate studies, the high ideals heretofore maintained for post-graduate work have been lowered in any degree. For, in establishing

undergraduate courses, we but follow the example of the three American universities which started as exclusively postgraduate, but which, in the course of a few years, found it necessary to establish undergraduate courses.

As a matter of fact, nearly all our American universities grew out of colleges and each still retains the college as a feeder to the university proper. In most cases, the college is still the most vital and important part, it is the very heart and soul of the university.

This is particularly true of England, whose great universities, Oxford and Cambridge, are almost entirely undergraduate. The same is also true, to some extent, even of Germany, the home of universities. For instance, at the great University of Bonn last year out of a total of 2,900 students 500 were undergraduates, and at Berlin, during the same period, 1,100 students were undergraduates.

As regards finances, the year just closing has been unusually prosperous, the University having received from all sources, from April 1, 1904, to April 1, 1905, the sum of \$339,047.52. Some of the items follow: From the Knights of Columbus, for the Chair of American History, \$50,000; from the Cardinal's Fund, \$82,943.79; from the general collection, with balance from 1903-4, \$108,805.11; from other sources, \$97,298.42. Including his previous donations, the contribution of Rev. A. H. Walburg, of Cincinnati, to the Chair of German Literature, amounts to \$15,000.

Of the sum mentioned above \$201,008.06 have been permanently invested in standard railroad bonds, through Mr. Michael Jenkins, of Baltimore, Treasurer of the University.

The ceremony of conferring the degrees was then performed by the Apostolic Delegate, the Most Rev. Diomede Falconio, who handed diplomas to the following:

Doctor of Philosophy—Rev. Matthias Aloysius Schumacher, C.S.C., Washington, D. C.; dissertation, "The Knowableness of God: Its Relation to the Theory of Knowledge in St. Thomas."

Licentiate in Sacred Theology—Rev. James Michael Burke, diocese of Springfield; dissertation, "The Appointment of Administrators." Rev. Frederic William Burget, diocese of Indianapolis; dissertation, "The Protoevangelium," Genesis 3:15. Rev. Matthew Joseph Dugan, archdiocese of New York; dissertation, "The Son of God." Rev. Eugene Anthony Heffernan, diocese of Los Angeles; dissertation, "The Causes that Brought about Catholic Emancipation in Ireland." Rev. Bernard Aloysius McKenna, archdiocese of Philadelphia; dissertation, "Cassiodorus: An Educational Study of the Sixth Cen-

tury." Rev. James Patrick McPeak, diocese of Syracuse; dissertation, "Recent Psychology and the Thomistic Theory of Habitual Grace." Rev. Ernest Aloysius Pfleger, S.M., Washington, D.C.; dissertation, "Appeals to the Roman See Before the Time of St. Leo I, A. D. 440." Rev. Henry Clement Schuyler, archdiocese of Philadelphia; dissertation, "Sebastian Rale, Jesuit Missionary in Maine, 1694-1724." Rev. Francis Xavier Unterreitmeier, diocese of Indianapolis; dissertation, "The Infallibility of Scripture as a Consequence of Inspiration."

Master of Philosophy—Rev. Nicholas Michael Wilhelmy, S.M., Washington, D. C.; dissertation, "The Discharge of Electricity in Gases."

Master of Laws—George Moore Brady, Baltimore, Md.

Civil Engineer—George William Lucas, Jr., Washington, D. C.; dissertation, "A Study of Fire-resisting Design."

Electrical Engineer—George Francis Harbin, Jr., Washington, D. C.; dissertation, "A Study of the Lighting, Heating and Power Plant of the Catholic University of America."

Bachelor in Sacred Theology—Rev. William Joseph Lallou, archdiocese of Philadelphia; Rev. Michael Joseph Larkin, archdiocese of New York; Rev. Patrick Joseph McCormick, diocese of Hartford; Rev. John Joseph O'Brien, archdiocese of Boston; Rev. Joseph William Reilly, archdiocese of New York; Rev. John Francis Walsh, archdiocese of Boston; Rev. William Thomas Walsh, C.S.P., New York, N. Y.; Rev. Benedict Boeing, O.F.M., Washington, D. C.; Rev. William Edward Downes, diocese of Altoona; Rev. Miecislus Thaddeus Szalewski, C.S.C., Washington, D. C.

Bachelor of Arts—Richard Stephen Burke, Boston, Mass.; George Anthony Grace, Syracuse, N. Y.; Robert Joseph Kennedy, Scottdale, Pa.; John Joseph McLoone, Philadelphia, Pa.; William Joseph Murphy, Erie, Pa.

Bachelor of Laws—Rev. Frederic William Burget, diocese of Indianapolis; Boutwell Dunlap, Auburn, Cal.; Daniel Patrick Callahan, Worcester, Mass.; William Martin Kilcullen, Scranton, Pa.; James Alphonsus Nugent, Braddock, Pa.

ADDRESS BY REV. D. J. STAFFORD, D.D.

I feel like making an apology for my appearance here to-day. Only my desire to accede to the gracious invitation of the Rector must be my excuse. For I presume that this occasion calls for a learned and technical discussion of some scientific or academic subject, and of such disquisition I am not capable. The great love I bear the

University must, however, plead for me in your estimation; and I can only hope that the lips of an intellectual babe may unwittingly speak wisdom; or that, like some truth-stammering oracle all unconscious of the message, I may say that which will lead others, more capable, to think better and love more. Nor may I forget the propriety in the circumstance of the Rector of St. Patrick's speaking here, for he who laid the foundations of these splendid buildings and began the work of these eminent faculties, belonged to that church and got his experience there. The best years of his life, the best efforts of his will, nay, I may say the blood of his heart are in these walls and in these faculties; and his going threw a halo over all—making a thing holy still more sacred, and was as a clarion calling us all to heroic deeds which, after all, are the final end of education.

The growth of the University thus begun, has been most remarkable. I have no patience with those who faint and become weak-hearted at the first breath of opposition. Life is a struggle for existence with institutions as well as individuals. As it develops the individual and brings out all that is best in him, reveals him to himself and calls into life and activity dormant power which before he recked not of, so does it strengthen, solidify, and develop an institution. No individual can escape—no institution be free from it. It is involved in the idea of existence itself. Every being in the world occupies space in the world, and every such occupation leaves less space for all others; and though God and nature have provided most bounteously for all, in our selfishness we turn from the contemplation of God's munificence to the consideration of that petty morsel which our neighbor has and enviously desire to possess it. It seems more precious to us than all the rest. The moment we are born the struggle begins, and it endures to the end. The greater the institution the greater the opposition. The Catholic Church, the greatest institution here below, has been the most bitterly, constantly, and powerfully opposed. Its existence would have been a miracle, its continuance a greater miracle; but its existence and continuance under this tremendous opposition, fighting for every inch and battling for every advance, makes it evident that there is a divine principle of vitality in it. If the learning and eloquence, and virtue and heroism of her children did not suffice—the work of her enemies would.

This then being the law of life, how could you expect an institution such as this is to escape. Would it not have missed something of the element of real greatness which is born only of suffering and persecution? To have succeeded at all would have been great. To have succeeded under such circumstances is a double glory, for it is

a greater work to build a university than to build a state. Sixteen years it is since she first opened her doors to students, and during those sixteen years the work has gone steadily on. I don't think any of us quite appreciate what has been done. In fact, I hear of it more from those outside the Catholic body than from our own members. I hate that narrow-mindedness of so-called faith which cannot see anything in the efforts of those who differ from us; but I despise still more the tendency among us to underrate our own, and to find perfection and progress in educational matters only outside. If we judge it fairly we need not be ashamed of it. Nay, if we judge it fairly we shall be proud of it.

What then has the University done besides putting up some buildings and starting some five or six faculties, in more or less successful operation? This: It has elevated the tone of the Catholic body all over the United States. It has raised the standard of every Catholic college in the country, and many of them who were shamefully deficient have become most respectable. Its influence has radiated and found its way into every parish school, even down to the smallest village, and every teacher and every pupil has heard something of higher culture. It has encouraged the educated layman all over the country, and it has filled the breast of every priest battling against mighty odds, with the hope of the better champions that are to follow him and do the work of God, not with more zeal but with greater ability and better equipment. And at this moment every right-thinking Catholic of the United States is looking to this Mountain of God, from whose summit the light is to shine out upon the future, with hope and love. The recent great calamity has been a benefit; for under the skilful management and devotion of the Rector and the intense devotion of the Cardinal, it has been remedied, and it has drawn the hearts of all of us closer to one another and closer to the cause. Out of this very great tribulation the University is born anew. It was dear to us before—it is twice dear to us now. Let it go on and do its work. What is that work especially to be?

The Catholic Church in the United States is confronted with the fairest opportunity in all her history. Not when she met the pagan world, not when she met Greek philosophy, not when she met the barbarian, not when the feudal system fell to pieces and she laboriously placed the foundations of modern Europe, has she had such an opportunity as here. As far as the mind of man can see into the designs of Providence, the future of civilization and world-power is to be here. What mighty progress! What stupendous advances! What unparalleled development? What incalculable resources and

limitless strength! The consideration staggers the mind. And here the Catholic Church is free. Free to make her own laws; free to do her own work; free to do it in her own way; free to call into activity all her universal machinery and to evoke, as she has ever done, the heroism and zeal of multitudinous children—call them to great deeds for God and man—and thus meet one of the greatest crises of history. I do not believe I overstate the situation. Well, how are we going to prepare for the work? What are we going to do to meet the crisis? What are we doing now to get ready for it? What will be the supreme need then and what is the supreme need now? *Leaders.*

We need leaders. Not only great bishops and great priests; not only great and learned ecclesiastics, but great laymen. Certainly the Church needs—the Church always will need great and learned ecclesiastics. Men of broad mind; men of deep culture; men of great heart, sympathetic with everything good in the age and country; men of deep thought and intense purpose, whose words will stir or still a whole nation. But this is not all—it is only half. The clergy are not a caste, nor are they the whole Catholic Church, and side by side with such bishops and priests there must be found the laymen leaders of like culture, purpose, and devotion, in order to do the work well. And, perhaps, at this moment the greater need of the two is the latter. There is a very remarkable dearth of such men amongst us. Every priest can tell you of this difficulty. Lacordaire once cried out in the pulpit of Notre Dame, "Oh! God, give us saints, give us saints. It is a long time since we had any." I say, "Oh! God, give us leaders, give us leaders. It is a long time since we had any." Where are we going to get them? This is the very purpose, as it seems to me, of university education. And if we are sending out such laymen into the world we are preparing for the future. I want to see the lay element of the University emphasized. I have heard of the sacrifices and labors of the clerical professors. No man honors them more than I. But I want to take this occasion, as a priest, to thank the lay professors for their splendid zeal, ability, and devotion. I am glad the undergraduate department is to be opened. This will increase the lay attendance. The colleges of the country were to feed the University. They have not done it. The University must feed itself.

With these new departments the University will enter upon a new career. But let us remember, may I be pardoned if I say it, the real work of the University is not to stretch out hands for external aids, but to develop from within. Every man here must do his work well—to the best of his ability; he should strive to become famous in his branch and thus attract students from every direction. I believe there is learning enough and talent enough and, if you will, genius

enough here to make this place famous, all permeated, vivified, and motived by the spirit of religion. So shall we build up Godlike characters. The philosophers of Alexandria asked St. Catherine the question, "You have studied many things?" "Yes," she answered, "geometry and philosophy, but above all, Jesus Christ." That is our motto. That is our spirit. Philosophy and science, chemistry and history, psychology and literature, but above all, Jesus Christ. So shall we make great priests and great laymen leaders for the future, and so shall the University do its work.

You young gentlemen who have reached your degrees to-day, you are called to this sublime mission. You should not, you cannot walk the ordinary paths of men. You are called to greater things. You are to be leaders in Israel; the leaders of God's people, whether in the church or in the world, and if you do your part well I have no fear for the future of the country, the future of the Church, or the future of the University. You must lead. You must form and direct public opinion. You must live lives of disinterested virtue and stainless probity, and thus reflect honor on your Alma Mater.

This University will succeed, it will grow—and I can picture it as it will be fifty years from now. Caldwell Hall has grown old,—and McMahon Hall shows the work of time. A cluster of buildings have risen on all sides around these two elder sisters; halls and laboratories, museums and galleries with every device and equipment, and dwellings for a multitude of students. As you enter on the right a noble university church lifts its twin spires, pointing like science and religion, the soul of man up to the *Deus Scientiarum Dominus*. On its façade I see carved in stone the prophets of the Old Law with all the doctors of the Church, and in the middle Paulus, Doctor Gentium. High up between the twin spires stands Christ, the Light of the World, with His hand lifted in benediction over the scene below. On the left hand the dome of a great library meets the morning sun and reflects back his ray; and in it in alcove and corner, throngs of students bent in patient investigation—and around them white-haired scholars from different parts, coming for knowledge to the greatest ecclesiastical library in the New World. The bell sounds, and out of all these buildings come the thronging youth, who converge towards the central buildings to sit at the feet of masters famed all over the world. Along the city avenues which reach the gate comes the public, hurrying too and eager for knowledge, to listen and to learn. Among them a stranger, who asks of a youth, "Do you study many things here?" The youth answers, "Yes; all the philosophies, all the sciences, all the literatures, all the histories." Then surveying the scene with pride he points towards the statue between the twin spires and adds, "but above all—Jesus Christ."

THE PONTIFICAL COMMISSION FOR BIBLICAL STUDIES.

It gives us much pleasure to reprint from the *Revue Biblique Internationale* for April, 1905, the following documents lately issued by the Pontifical Commission for Biblical Studies. The first communication is a reply of the Pontifical Commission to the question of implicit citations in the scriptural books; the second makes known the date for the licentiate examination in the new academic department of Sacred Scripture; the third publishes the names of the successful competitors for the Braye Prize in the same department, and the fourth announces the title of the scriptural dissertation for the same prize in 1906.

I.

Cum ad normam directivam habendam pro studiosis S. Scripturæ proposita fuerit Commissioni Pontificiæ de re biblica sequens quæstio vid.:

“Utrum ad enodandas difficultates quæ occurrunt in nonnullis S. Scripturæ textibus, qui facta historica referre videntur, liceat Exegetæ Catholico asserere agi in his de citatione tacita vel implicita documenti ab auctore non inspirato conscripti, cujus adserta omnia auctor inspiratus minime adprobare aut sua facere intendit, quæque ideo ab errore immunia haberi non possunt?”

Prædicta Commissio respondendum censuit:

“Negative, excepto casu in quo, salvis sensu ac iudicio Ecclesiæ, solidis argumentis probetur: 1o Hagiographum alterius dicta vel documenta revera citare; et 2o eadem nec probare nec sua facere, ita ut jure censeatur non proprio nomine loqui.”

Die autem 13a Februarii an. 1905, SANCTISSIMUS, referente me infrascripto Consultore ab Actis, prædictum Responsum adprobavit atque publici juris fieri mandavit.

FR. DAVID FLEMING, O.F.M.,
Consultor ab Actis.

II.

De Periculo subeundo ad consequendum Prolytatus gradum in Sacra Scriptura.

Candidati, qui jam laurea in S. Theologia insigniri debent, periculum juxta *schema* jam evulgatum subibunt Romæ a die 5a Junii usque ad diem 10am ejusdem mensis, loco et horis postea indicandis.

III.

De Præmio Prænobilis D. Braye.

Hocce anno, juxta sententiam trium iudicium e Pontificia Commissione super re biblica selectorum, præmium ex æquo dividendum inter auctores duarum Dis-

sertationum præstantiorum, nempe inter R.D. Cæcilium Delisle Burns, sacerdotem Archidiœceseos Westmonasteriensis in Anglia, Baccalaur. Universit. Cantabrig. Professorem in Collegio S. Edmundi apud Ware in eadem Archidiœcesi et R.D. Wenceslaum Irus, Diaconum, Seminarii Pragensis in Bohemia alumnum. Quæ quidem sententia tum a Pontificia Commissione, tum a Sanctissimo adprobata fuit ac a prænobili D. Braye libenti animo acceptata.

IV.

Thesis circa quam Dissertatio conficienda est ad assequendum præmium ejusdem prænobilis D. Braye anno 1906 concedendum iisdem servatis conditionibus ac an. 1905.

THESIS.

“Ostendatur quantum auctoritatis et luminis versioni Vulgatæ Libri Ecclesiastici accesserit ex illius hebraica littera recens reperta, comparatione inter easdem instituta, prolatoque ubi opus fuerit, græcæ versionis testimonio.”

Latine conscribi debet prædicta Dissertatio ac ad alterutrum ex Consultoribus ab Actis ante finem m. Martii transmitti.

Contendere possunt pro dicto præmio omnes juvenes in Ordinibus majoribus constituti ac in Instituto studia perficientes quod facultate polleat gradus academicos in S. Theologia conferendi.

Comitem habeat Dissertatio attestationem sive Ordinarii sive Antistitis qui Institutum moderatur.

FR. DAVID FLEMING, O.F.M.

Cons. ab Actis Com. Pontificiæ de re biblica.

ROMÆ, die 27a Martii 1905.

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“Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion.”—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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I.

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR AND ENGLISH LITERATURE.

English literature owes very much to France,—not only to France as the source of literary material and as the refiner of the English language,—but to France as the exemplar of the finest method of classifying the philosophical tendencies of our literature. It is true that Shakespeare was not well received by his Gallic neighbors during his life time, but it must be admitted that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries he was nearly as well valued in France as he was in England, and that when appreciation, in the critical sense, did come, it arrived with an enthusiasm which was only bounded by the limits of French comprehension of a genius of very alien qualities.

No philosophy of English literature could be written without taking Taine into account, and since M. Jusserand has interpreted English literature so sympathetically and luminously no adequate volume on English literature can be written without reference to his labors. And we are grateful to him for saving us the trouble of reading many minute monographs on subjects more or less important, which the conscientious student would otherwise use much time in considering.

M. Jusserand has the carefulness of a German University worker of the most scrupulous school, with a lightness of touch,

a breadth of sympathy and a perception of values, as well as a delicacy of expression, which German University research workers seldom possess. *L'Histoire Litteraire du Peuple Anglais: de la Renaissance a la Guerre Civile*, contains, including the indices, nine hundred and ninety-four pages. This sounds imposing and even appalling to the modern reader who is in the habit of devouring condensations and who complains that even condensations are not sufficiently condensed, but, if there is any objection to the form of this book, it is that the eye has not been considered. It seems difficult simply because it looks large. Since this is not merely a book for references, but one which has a charm of style and a literary interest that raise M. Jusserand from the character of a mere chronicler into that of a magician who makes a picture of every epoch and gilds even the dullest subject, a less ponderous form might be advisable; nevertheless, the form cannot daunt those who know that his power of coloring with beauty and interest is like that of William Morris' mage in "The Earthly Paradise." This is the more wonderful when we consider the quality as well as the quantity of his material.

Succeeding a remarkably clear analysis of the epoch of the Renaissance in Europe come several chapters of particular charm in which the effect of the art of printing, the Renaissance in England, Humanism in England and the religious question as it affected literature and social conditions are treated from a point of view very unusual even in the most impartial books of this kind. It is difficult to eradicate the prejudices that have been sedulously inculcated for five hundred years, and it is not until very recently that English and American writers on literary history have begun to free themselves from historical traditions which were nothing less than a conspiracy against truth, although the point of view resulting from this conspiracy has often been only subconscious. M. Jusserand, whose ancestors were not brought up under the pressure of Foxe's "Book of Martyrs," is entirely free from these influences; and what gives his great volume another important value is that he is also free from any determination to force conclusions from premises which will not stand them. The very apparent animus in Taine which obliges us to agree

or disagree constantly with his philosophy, and distracts our attention from his facts, is absent in this *Histoire Littéraire*.

M. Jusserand pays great attention to the position of Henry VIII. in the movement toward the new learning in England. "The new king," he says, "who had succeeded his father in 1509, was nineteen years of age. He was handsome, instructed, and full of vitality; he loved hunting, amusements and the arts. He knew as much Latin as the Oxford clerks." In a word, he was well fitted to lead with acuteness of brain and gaiety of heart in that movement which was to give England Shakespeare, Spenser, and later, in spite of the neutralizing influence of Puritanism, even Milton. He was in advance of his time in his love of painting; architecture was one of his favorite pursuits. He loved all sorts of public celebrations. To quote M. Jusserand, "he disguised himself as a Roman Emperor, as a Knight of the Loyal Heart, as one of Robin Hood's archers; to judge by its beginning his reign would be a perpetual field of the cloth of gold and a perennial 'Romance of the Rose.' He knew the merits of the English language; he encouraged the national drama, and 'showed his disapproval of those ill-conditioned auditors who left the theatre in the middle of the play when it was too tiresome.' Gay, vital, brilliantly married to the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, Catherine of Aragon, which assured him the powerful support of the house of Spain, he smiled at life. He loved to be seen by the people. He wished to be admired and he desired that all eyes should turn toward him: those of the Pope, of the English people, of the King of France, and of the foreign ambassadors. He sought occasions to shine in public: the most important as well as the least. Hardly on his throne he dreamt of renewing the glory of the Plantagenets; he wanted to take Guyenne and begin the war of a hundred years. He attempted to dazzle the envoys of Venice by speaking four languages to them. He showed himself to them covered with jewels; his hands were one mass of rings and precious stones."

This vanity as to his appearance and strength delighted his people who saw in it only royal youth rejoicing in its power. "Proud as he was of his figure, he was equally proud of his knowledge. If an audacious German monk astounded Chris-

tendom by the temerity of his attacks, Henry did not leave to theologians the honor of crushing the 'serpent'; he rushed to the front, turning for a time from the warlike occupations and state affairs, to which, as he wrote the Pope, 'he had consecrated his early years.' He confounded the heretics by his arguments; he would be the rampart of the Church and the object of universal admiration." Nothing pleased him better than the news that Leo X. had uttered delighted exclamations on reading certain passages in the volume, and had sent it to all the kings in Christendom. Henry was as pious as he was learned in theology. "He heard three Masses on each of the days when he hunted, and five on the other days." He loved music as much as he loved architecture and in this very musical age he played various musical instruments and sang at sight. He composed both the air and the words of songs; he devoted himself to medicine and protected the famous Italian, Gemini. He even compounded certain prescriptions against the plague. He attracted learned men. He set up the table of the gods, as it were, in his palace. Erasmus, Polydore Vergil and Holbein were among his favorites. In a word, if anybody doubted that Elizabeth was the daughter of her father, his character at this time, his colossal vanity, his illimitable pride and heartlessness,—later reflected in her,—would give the lie to a detraction which might otherwise have seemed well founded.

Another splendid figure in this renaissance of all the sciences, both gay and serious, was Wolsey, who early in Henry's reign began, while ostensibly crowned with honors, the procession of victims to the monstrous selfishness of Henry. Wolsey was willing to take the responsibility for all the despotic and arbitrary acts of Henry, while the young king played the part of a beautiful and beneficent deity. Wolsey was at once a son and precursor of the Renaissance, and with the young Apollo leading the steeds of the morning, and the potent and cultivated dictator following him in an auroral blaze of glory, letters and art awakened. As M. Jusserand says, "scholars arose in England. Grammars, dictionaries and all the paraphernalia of Humanism were in every student's hands. The English began to be Italianate in their frenzy for the revived learning of the continent. They went to Italy and France to learn Greek.

Lily to Rome, Latimer to Padua, Colet to Paris and Italy. On returning to their country, they concerned themselves with the education of the nation. Grocyn taught Greek at Oxford; Colet, rich, ardent, generous and resisting the natural passion which drew him toward pleasure and amusement, became Dean of St. Paul in 1505, and founded a school which soon became celebrated, and which still flourishes today." This school was not entirely clerical and was dedicated to the Honorable Company of Mercers of London, who administered his temporalities. Erasmus' letter, "*Jodoco Jonae Erphordiensiae*" was dedicated to the character of this wise, good and learned man, who saw that the best aid to the progress of religion was through the culture of tolerant and high-minded men. The names of Fisher, Colet and More stand out in luminous contrast to the background of dark rapacity and intolerant ignorance of the time. William Lily wrote for this school a Latin Grammar which has not been forgotten. Erasmus composed several learned treatises in honor of Colet and England.

Dutch Humanism congratulated Colet on the foundation of this academy; "the handsomest and most magnificent imaginable." Wolsey began a school at Ipswich which he endowed munificently. At Oxford he founded Cardinal College which, on his fall, became King's College and which today is Christ's Church. He determined that the best professors should be chosen to teach the British the most elegant literature and at the same time to form the character of the pupils. He had eight classes. In the first were placed the students for the work of preparation. In the second Cato was studied; in the third, Aesop and Terence; in the fourth, Vergil himself, of all poets the chief, "whose poems should be read aloud in a beautiful and sonorous voice in order that their grandeur may be valued." And then came Cicero, Cæsar, Horace and Ovid, accompanied step by step with various portions of Lily's Grammar. This was before the reformation, it must be remembered; and Jusserand aptly remarks that this field of studies for a preparatory school was surely remarkable. It was so vast that the Cardinal feared its weight and prescribed certain amusement in order that the minds of the students would not be depressed by too many lectures and immoderate

tension. Classical education appeared to Wolsey, who represented the cultivated Catholics of his time, to be a holy work. Bishop Fisher at Cambridge heartily agreed in this opinion.

M. Jusserand is not a special pleader; his scientific impartiality is very comfortable for the reader who wants to feel safe, and who dislikes partisanship. And yet one can perceive a touch of good-natured irony in his manner towards these illogical English; and at times one is not sure whether it is their lack of logic on the part of the English in the sixteenth century or their lack of humor where their rulers are concerned. There is a certain twinkle of the eye when M. Jusserand chronicles the fact that Henry VIII. dies, though excommunicated, "always Catholic, recommending his soul to 'the glorious and blessed Virgin, Our Lady Holy Mary,' and founding by his will, as if he were in the good old times a chantery like those he had suppressed by the thousand" with an altar on which Masses should be said for his soul perpetually, each day, as long as the world should last. This is attested by the evidence of the will in the *Faedera* of Rymer, December 30, 1546. Henry died on January 28, 1547.

M. Jusserand's description of the process by which England became Protestant is admirably acute and graphic. The real progress of the reformed religion was feeble; only the outside was changed, "the ancient order was hidden, but the new was not sincerely adopted." The new services were looked on by the traditionalists and the people at large as "Christmas games." The rebels of Devon did not hesitate to use this phrase. A less rigid queen than Mary might have kept the conservative English in the Church, a St. Charles Borromeo or a St. Philip de Neri might have revived what little mysticism remained in them. And, in this, M. Jusserand seems to be right. There were two facts which appealed to this illogical and comfort-loving people,—conservatives are always in love with comfort,—the weight of authority and the love for the Church in so far as it was that of their ancestors. But the "divine right" of the English kind had obscured the authority that lay in Rome, and English literature from the precursors of Chaucer down had represented the national spirit as at war with Italian influences. Wolsey, in his policy of dividing and

conquering, had cut the ground from under his feet. The Venetian ambassador said, later, in the reign of Elizabeth, that, "generally speaking, the English live as their prince lives and believe what he believes; they obey his orders, yielding not to moral conviction, but to the fear of displeasing him; they would follow with equal zeal the Jewish or Mussulman religion, if the king commanded them to adopt it." Giovanni Michele's statement is extreme, but it was justified by the aspect of the times. When Elizabeth came to the throne, she saw that the English,—who seemed to have ceased to be mystical,—were inclined to a middle course. This middle course of the Anglican Church was, as M. Jusserand remarks, with careful politeness, somewhat incoherent; the basis of the Thirty-nine articles was rather a jumble, but Elizabeth saw that her safety lay that way, yet she despised the married clergy, looked on a service of worship in the English tongue as beneath the dignity of a God whom kings worshipped, and scorned the rawness of the new dispensation. She saw how the current ran, and she desired to seem to direct it. "Elizabeth ne brusque rien; elle a des pourparlers avec Rome qui attend beaucoup de sa moderation, la voit lutter contre les Protestants extreme, se plaire aux ceremonies at preter l'oreille a des projets de mariage avec tous les princes catholiques du continent. Le pape retenait ses foudres; il les lancera plus tard, trop tard: 'Et privamus eandem Elizabeth de praetenso jure regni, 1570.' A cette date, la partie est gagnée, le courant est nettement etabli, parfaitement visible, et les anathemes de Rome sont de nul effet."

To this entirely utilitarian attitude of Elizabeth is due the great commercial progress of England during her reign. The English wanted to become rich. Mental agitation, which disturbed the farmer or the country squire, theological disputes which logically produced political agitation, must be calmed,—England must be idealized and made the center of all effort,—England represented by the Queen. She, the most astute woman of her time, knew that the rage for riches could kill both parties,—the party for the restoration of the Catholic Church and that other party which she heartily hated, the party of Puritanism.

The sane influences of culture which Henry VIII. had encouraged, and which More and Colet and Fisher, aided by Wolsey, had strengthened, were not impeded by Elizabeth. She loved the elegancies of life and literature was one of these elegancies. Besides, literature added to her splendor and flattered her vanity; again, she was her father's daughter, and the cause of culture, which added to the joy of life, flowed under her smiles. The patriotic and amiable Ascham had not inspired her with enthusiasm for English prose or poetry:—but she liked the spectacle, and “Elizabeth ne brusque rien.” Shakespeare was but one of many, and the buffooneries of his clowns were more to her taste than the psychological moments of his heroes. It is not recorded that she gave the poet who did not egregiously flatter her any token of her esteem. In this, as M. Jusserand remarks, she was an exception to the princes of her time, who, like James V. of Scotland, showed men of letters and literature high favor. Elizabeth favored no writer; her father had favored a score of brilliant humanists at his court.

The “Arcadia” of Sir Philip Sidney was the persiflage of sentiment and romance; the “Utopia” of Sir Thomas More was the wisdom of sentiment and romance. It was an audacious plunge into sociological matters which Elizabeth would not have tolerated in her time. Shakespeare might sketch an ideal society in the “Tempest,” but then Shakespeare was neither Lord Chancellor nor a great scholar. In her heart, Elizabeth probably had scant reverence for the mere writer in the vulgar tongue.

Of More, “the man for all hours,” M. Jusserand writes with insight and even affection;—certainly, with entire comprehension,—as the first of the English humanists. “The laugh of Erasmus,” he says, “is cruel; the smile of More is tinged with pity.” More speaks out for mercy to animals in an unmerciful age. “Il est pour le peuple contre les grands et pour les pauvres contre les riches. Ni La Bruyère, ni Rousseau, ni Adam Smith n’ont parlé avec plus de chaleur.” He paints a pathetic picture of the English countries even then troubled by a great economic change,—the transformation of agricultural lands into grazing fields.” “Un seul berger suffisait pour

d'immenses troupeaux praqués dans des propriétés closes; les laboureurs chassés mouraient de faim." The "Utopia" had not, however, furthered the progress of English prose. Nevertheless the tyranny of Greek and Latin weakened. More wrote treatises in the vernacular. There was the translation of the life of Pico Mirandola. Then, too, was his essay on the reign of Richard III. His style is oratorical after the manner of Cicero. He is not an impartial historian, and he aims for eloquence. His sub-acid humor and his whimsicality of phrase are great parts of his style. He is full of metaphors taken from common life, and his common sense is evident. He dislikes the manner of writing which conceals thought, where "you cannot see the woods for the leaves." His polemical writings are full of movement; he is even "lyrical," as M. Jusserand puts it; he rails wittily at his adversary; his wit is peppery; he laughs frankly,—but his interminable sentences make his prose hard to read. "They fatigue the reader," says M. Jusserand, "but they pleased the hearers." Stories abound and the lighter, more personal, simple character of English prose, which had hitherto been a harsh instrument, dates from More. Educated men, who had before this despised it, would now perfect its melodies and harmonies. From More to Hooker, who made the best of an illogical case, the progressive movement is rapid.

This movement, which made for the purity of language and the perfections of style, was at its height in Queen Elizabeth's time. Shakespeare and Ben Johnson, Spenser and Fletcher, Sidney and Campion did not live in an age when gentlemen were careless in their speech. The ladies of the court might swear, it is true, but the gentlemen of the playhouse used words,—when not profane,—with nice discrimination. Sir Thomas Smith, a man of mark, wrote a treatise on English spelling and pronunciation. "Henne," "denne," "fenne" did not suit him. He felt, as our own lexicographer, Webster, felt about "honour." He must have "hen," "den," "fen." Richard Carew announced that the teutonic words in the English language might have as great a pedigree as if they were Greek or Latin. The English language, he said, with marvelous boldness for the time, concentrated the best of all lan-

guages. "And, finally," says M. Jusserand, "the regent of Parnassus, Ben Jonson, did not disdain to compile, for the good of all foreigners, an English Grammar."

Foxe reached the people through the simple English of his "Book of Martyrs," chained for their use in every important church. Had it been written in Latinized English, it would have failed of its effect. And that effect, in spite of corrections, denials, attacks,—remains to this day in the hearts of the middle classes of England. George Gascoyne precedes Herbert Spenser in his plea for short words,—"The moste auncient English wordes are of one sillable, so that the more monosyllables that you use, the truer Englishman you shall seeme." Giles Fletcher scorns the borrowers of foreign words.

Prosody became a theme for learned battles. Two schools arose. One for the adopting of the antique rhythm without rime; the other for rime. Sidney fought for the metres of the changeless languages, Spenser followed him for a time. Campion spoke with the authority of a delicate musician for the linked sweetness of rhythm.

Richard Carew, in his epistles concerning the elegancies of the English tongue, declared "The French delicate but even as nice as a woman scarce daring to open her lips for fear of marring her countenance; the Spanish majestic but fulsome, leaning too much on the O and terrible like the devil in a play." The defenders of the application of the classical rules of *scansion* to English verse were not discouraged by the difficulties of such an application in spite of the fact that Campion and other masters of the art of rhythm and rhyme declared against them. Idylls, dialogues and pastorals were cultivated, as Jusserand remarks, by this energetic revival. Vergil was translated in verse exactly similar to his own, in spite of the fact that this imitation bewildered the mind and pained the ear. Ascham and the defenders of the classical system exhausted their vocabularies of abuse on their opponents and were saluted by the same terms in return. "Go," Ascham said, "rime with the Goths, rather than make real verses with the Greeks,—eat husks with the hogs rather than bread with men." Traces of this struggle still remained in Milton's time. He, in adopting blank verse for his great masterpiece, could not re-

frain from alluding to rime as the relic of a barbarous time. The dispute in our day is ended, though there is a new school arising,—a school to which Coventry Patmore and Sydney Lanier, following Champion, have given an impetus,—which is all for the music of Poe rather than the conventionalities of poets who could not see that English poetry will not bear the arbitrary movement of Theocritus and Vergil. But in the days of Queen Elizabeth poetry as an art was taken almost as seriously as it is today among the critics in France, who unfortunately have taken to writing about one another. “Prosodies and treatises on literature followed one another full of injunctions and advice, of curious facts, sometimes full of good counsels and sometimes of false: the work of Gascoigne, simple, practical, reasonable, of Sidney, the most charming of all, of Webbe, enemy of rime, but a great admirer, nevertheless, of a ‘new poet,’ Master Sp. otherwise known as Spenser”: of Puttenham, scholarly, long-winded, full at times of rather coarse anecdotes and of pedantical explanations arranged for the instruction and amusement of Queen Elizabeth; and finally the works of the conscientious James VI., of Scotland, who chose from among the precepts of his predecessors and above all from Gascoigne, and made his little treatise of recommendations, wise and somewhat commonplace. The poets laughed at him unreasonably, after the manner in which poor Polonius was mocked. The same things said by another than this royal wise-acre would have been received by them as oracular. The clash of opinions as to English prosody brought out Sidney’s “Defense of Poesy.” It is a pity that this delightful, graceful and witty treatise is not more generally known. Not very long ago Professor Cook of Yale edited an edition for American readers but it has not been so well circulated as it ought to be, owing probably to the fact that delicate examination of English verse is, for want of time, not the rule in our collegiate courses. This treatise is one of the masterpieces of the great English prose of the time of Elizabeth, and Jusserand well calls it the pearl of the library of English prosodists.

Sidney defends poesy by which he understands all works of the imagination. “There are many excellent poets,” he says, “who have never versified, and we have a swarm of versi-

fiers who do not merit the name of poets." He was sure of the merits of the English language which was superior to the Latin and at least equal to the Greek. He was unhappy over the absence of great contemporary masterpieces. He was to die without having seen Romeo played or heard the music of the Fairie Queene.

In Sidney's opinion poetry was superior to history or philosophy; poetry was a standard of life; it instructed and improved mankind; unlike Shakespeare or the romanticist of the playhouse he would have retained in the drama the three unities, the messenger and the rules of Aristotle. The Mediæval, romantic color of the early nineteenth century poetry is supposed to be due to the influence of Goethe, Percy's *Reliques* and Sir Walter Scott; but before Sir Walter Scott, English literature had Sidney whose heart trembled at the music of the old border ballads as if his being had been shaken by the sound of a trumpet. He loved the popular songs of Ireland and Scotland, of Robin Hood, of Arthur and of Roland. He was never weary of praising Chaucer's marvellous poem of Troilus; of acclaiming Spenser, who had just given the world the Shepherd's Calendar.

Jusserand noticed a curious trend in the writing of this earlier Elizabethan period, the interest of these poets in all that was human. Their imagination embraced the world. Sidney is interested in the Turks and Tartars as well as in the Italians and the Romans. Daniel speaks of the Turks too, and cannibals and Chinese frequently appear in the writings of this period. Still in spite of the high eulogies of the value of the English language and English poetry, the classics were immensely in vogue.

Stonyhurst, who was exiled to the continent because of his religion, made, in English hexameter, a translation of the *Aeneid*. The humorous were delighted by his seriousness, his conviction of the value of his work, and its absurdity. The pedant, Harvey, who never laughed, saw in Stonyhurst a scholar who deserved his benediction. This added to the amusement excited by the man and the work. M. Jusserand gives an example of the manner of Stonyhurst. "As a sample of his manner; when Laocoön hurled his javelin against the

horse—Virgil said,—*Insonuere cavæ gemitumque cavernæ.*”

“Then the jade, hit, shivered, thee vaults haulf shrillye rebounded,

“With clush clash buzing, with drooming clattered humming,” said Stonyhurst, who made Ascham responsible for his hexameter. The Greek retained many faithful souls. Sophocles and Theocritus were translated. The great Homer himself was rendered by Chapman. The literary fecundity of the time was amazing. Puritanism,—which was simply logical Protestantism,—had not yet stepped in to kill all love for beauty in the arts. The influence of More, of Colet, of Wolsey gathered force and the renaissance of literary beauty in England was at its height. At no time had England been more musical. The lute and the recorder hung in every barber shop and feast days were merry with the sound of the glee and the madrigal. Elizabeth, mistress of compromises, but hating some things with a fierce hatred in her heart, would not tolerate the Puritan mar-sports. Had it suited her policy, had she been bold enough to do so, had she not feared the growing power of Protestantism, she would have declared for the ancient Church in whose light the arts had begun to flourish in England under the reign of her father. As it was, for political reasons, she persecuted the Seminary priests and laid a heavy hand on such recusants as were not intimate friends of hers; but it was in anger, contempt and disgust that she sent the Puritan to the stake as the enemy of all that made life delightful and added to her triumphant progress through the age.

Moderns, at whose very names the ultra preachers shivered as at the names of devils, were translated. That popularity of the Spanish literature which later became very wide was begun by translations from Guevara, Montemayor, and Lazarillo de Tormes. The young English became “Italianate.” They were as Roman or as Venetian or as Paduan as our young gentlemen were a short time ago English, only their imitations were intellectual rather than merely instinctive. As Jusserand says, the floods were awakened. “There were many currents and counter-currents, a great shock of ideas; foreigners began to be understood; nationality awakened and patriotism was the rule.” The question of religious reform

was dropped among the scholars. Most of the clever nobility and gentry of England were either Catholics or what in our times would be called agnostic. They either delighted in the beauty of the Catholic Church as it appeared in splendid ceremonies on the continent, or borrowed the religious ideas of Machiavelli's prince, to whom religion was merely a kind of mortar with which to keep together the stones of the social fabric.

They threw themselves with enthusiasm not into seeking the absolute but into the search for a perfect means of expressing the joy of life. There arose, too, a voice above all these musical singers of the joys of earthly love. This was the voice of Southwell. "This unfortunate Jesuit, a true poet, and a young martyr whose imagination was large and growing, who wrote as skillfully his pious hymns as the worldly poets their varied metres; he deplored their frivolity and thought that they deserved his phrase 'lyrist, lover and liar are all the same.'" He sang in prison at the approach of death. His "Burning Babe," full of religious ecstasy, rivalled "Venus and Adonis" in popularity. His martyrdom lasted three years; and thirteen times he was put to the torture and no word extracted from him, and when he perished at Tyburn the crowds complained in pity judging that the cruelties inflicted on this innocent man were too horrible and too long drawn out. "I dye," he said, "but such a death has never end."

It is impossible in an article of this length to give more than a slight impression of M. Jusserand's correctness, interest and power of effective expression. But no late work proves so conclusively the impotence of the ultra reformers in the art of constructing anything beautiful or even interesting to normal humanity than these really charming and intensely interesting chapters on literary life, just previous and just after the reformation.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.



II.

THE REVIVAL OF GAELIC.

I. THE VICISSITUDES OF THE GAELIC LANGUAGE.

One of the most interesting chapters in the History of Language is that which treats of the Latin from its earliest monuments and its relations to the other Italic dialects down to its Classical and Silver periods, its spread with the Roman legionaries and traders over the provinces of the Empire until it became practically the universal language of the greater part of the then known world, at least for administrative and official purposes. But the language which the Roman soldiers and camp-followers carried with them was not by any means all of a piece. It differed, to a considerable degree, according to the place and society in which it was spoken and the birth and profession of the speaker. By contact with speakers of non-Latin tongues and by the regular evolution of the popular speech itself these provincial varieties of the mediæval Latin took on, in the course of time, such pronounced characteristics and peculiarities as to differentiate them into new, distinct languages each again into varieties of its own, forming dialects, sub-dialects and patois. One or other of these dialects, by reason of political events which made its speakers the ruling race, or else by reason of literary prominence derived from a circle or generation of writers, became the recognized standard, the official or court language; hence the preeminence of the French of Paris, the Italian of Florence and the Spanish of Castile.

The story of the beginnings, spread and evolution of the Latin language into existing forms of Romance speech is pretty well known, but, however interesting its study may be, there is another group of languages the study of which, in spite of the fascination it never fails to exert upon those who embrace it and in spite of its importance in philological and historical respects, has received comparatively slight attention from students. These are the Celtic languages; a summary account of

the rise, spread, decline and revival of one of this group, the Irish, especially as a spoken language, will be the object of the present paper.

Irish, as is well known, belongs to the Celtic linguistic family which took its rise, so far as the investigations of Celts have shown, probably somewhere in Central Europe near the headwaters of the Danube. The language, in its different forms, spread with the Celts so that at one time, roughly speaking a half thousand years before the Christian era, it came to be spoken over the wide stretch of territory extending from Asia Minor in the East to the extremity of the European Continent in the West. It even crossed the English Channel, when and whence is not exactly known. In the western islands and in the Breton promontory of France, whither it was carried back in the fifth and following centuries of our era, it lives on to this day in two main branches each with three varieties. One of these is the Irish.

The Irish language can thus boast of a most respectable antiquity. It can produce evidence of its existence for at least two thousand years; it had been in use in the British Isles for possibly centuries earlier. It was spoken not only in Ireland but also by Irish invaders and colonists in Britain and it now survives as a living speech outside Ireland in the Isle of Man, where it is called Manx, and in the highlands of Scotland, where it is known as Erse or Scottish Gaelic.

In pagan times, that is before the evangelization of Ireland by St. Patrick and his predecessors in the fifth century and earlier, Irish, we may suppose, was the only language in the Island. In it, histories, laws, genealogies were written or transmitted by word of mouth. In it, the wonderful tales, some of which have come down to us in collections long afterwards made, were handed down orally or were committed to writing. With an Irish battle-cry troops and heroes went to battle, with an Irish cheer the hunters and Fenians of Erin drove the deer before them in the forest. With the introduction of Christianity into Ireland came the knowledge of Latin, but, such was the vigor of the native speech that the Latin always held a very subordinate place in the intellectual life of Ireland. It never had the faintest chance of becoming the language of the

people as had been the case in the rest of the Roman Empire, with the exception of Greece which, because of her superior civilization, preserved her proper speech despite the Roman conquest. Thus Ireland, in respect of her language, was doubly protected, not only by the good fortune which spared her from Roman sway, but also by the high degree of her native culture of which her language was the vehicle. When, again, in the sixth and following centuries, the Irish monks, Columban and Columb Cille, to mention but two of the best known, left home to spread the Gospel among the heathen of Britain and the Continent, Irish was the language in which they had received their learning in the great schools of Ireland, Irish was the tongue in which they conversed and comforted each other in their wanderings along the Rhine and Danube, over the mountains of Switzerland and Italy and in their monasteries on the Alps and Apennines. That these holy men knew Latin and some also Greek goes without saying and that they acquired and preached in the dialects of the barbarians in whose midst they labored is certain, but Irish, not German, was the tongue in which they prayed for divine assistance, Irish, not Italian, the tongue in which they administered the rule of their establishments, Irish, not Latin, the books they brought with them from Ireland, and Irish were their thoughts as the grey eye looked back over the shoulder to the haunts of their youth in Erin. Ireland's schools were the schools of Europe as, later, Paris was the University of the world. As each nation had its peculiar commodity to offer in trade so Ireland proffered learning. Students from Britain and the Continent were enrolled in the schools of Bangor, Lismore, and Durrow where, simply in return for willingness and ability on their own part, they were furnished with food and lodging and learning, for the mere asking. In these schools the medium of instruction was Irish which, at that time, was as much the academic tongue of the West of the world as was, in later days, French the tongue of polite intercourse in Europe.

Those were the halcyon days of the Irish language. It next withstood the inroads of the Danes although their language could not fail to have made some impression on the Irish. Then the era of Norman Conquest passed, leaving it unharmed.

In fact, such was the assimilative power of the Irish language that, up to the time of the "Protector," the foreigners who had come over to Ireland adopted Irish speech, assumed Irish names, Irish manners and customs and, Saxon or Norman, became as Irish, if not more so, than the very natives of the country.

The first indication of a decline in the fortunes of the Irish language is to be noted about the time of Cromwell as a result of the "plantations," the penal laws and other measures of the great English persecution, and from that time the Irish people have been so busily occupied with the struggle for their very existence, that the fate of their language passed almost unnoticed. Under the blight of the penal code, by which the Irish were forced to choose whether they would become English in speech, thought, religion and everything else or be deprived of all opportunities of education, the active use of Irish as a vehicle of literary expression ceased. The writings and compilations of Doctor Geoffrey Keating and the Four Masters of Ireland represent the swan-song of Irish as a literary language. Among the masses the vernacular lived on almost unimpaired; at first, the English replaced it but to a slight extent and that only within the Pale. The people remained Irish and consequently ignorant, since education was to be obtained only through the medium of English. In the face of ineffectual ordinances, by which a speaker of Irish was fined from 3s. 6d. if a peasant, to 6£ if a lord, probably no more than one per cent. of the Irish people had become English in language in the century from 1600 to 1700. But from that time on, after having opposed a marvellous resistance to persecution, the decline of the Irish as a spoken language has proceeded faster and faster. The causes are not far to seek. The first and foremost must be laid at the door of the so called "National School" system devised by Archbishop Whately and Lord Derby avowedly as the means of assassinating the language which they rightly perceived was the most evident sign of Irish nationality. It was a device by which the native tongue was tabooed. It might not be used in official life nor in the schools nor wherever the "Garrison" gave the watchword. It was a system in principle as vicious and reprehensible as the one under which the Irish had

been persecuted for their religion and it is a wonder and a pity that its revocation was not fought for with the same energy and doggedness with which the Irish had fought for "Emancipation."

Some of my readers may not have heard of the vile methods that were invented to repress Irish feeling and to crush the souls of the Irish children who were the principal victims. The "tally" was a billet hanging from a cord around the schoolboy's neck and for every Irish word the child spoke at home a notch was made in the stick and the schoolmaster meted out the *pro rata* punishment the next morning. It is only within the present generation that this unnational system has been lopped of its most hateful branches; it is not so long ago that this rule of the "tally" was in force and there are, in fact, Irishmen still living who can describe it from bitter experience. It is curious to observe how the narrow-minded oppressors of the native tongue in Brittany hit upon a similar means to stifle the people's speech. Not many years ago in the schools of Brittany, where the same blind infatuation for the dominant speech and the same disdain for the native tongue were, and are still, found as in Ireland, a *sabot* was given, at the opening of the class, to one of the boys who was to pass it over to the first of his comrades caught speaking Breton and he, in turn, was to keep it until he had caught another *flagrante delicto*. And thus the *sabot* passed from hand to hand, from group to group, like a spy trapping the unwary into speaking a word of the proscribed tongue. At the stroke of the bell the boys fell into line and the schoolmaster asked in a severe tone, "Who has the wooden shoe?" The poor culprit was brought in, his schoolmates hooted at him and, as the *sabot* was made and called the "*symbole*" of the old tongue of his fathers so the punishment for its use was equally symbolic, namely to clean the closets.

Now it is easy to see what were the consequences of such a system and how far its promoters succeeded in their purpose. Take the little child born in Ireland of Irish speaking parents. Everything had made him ready to speak. But, at school, knowing no English and the master knowing no Irish, he sat listless and vacant on his bench, the English words called up

no pictures to his mind; he did not open his mouth, and was put down as stupid. At home he was equally condemned to silence, moroseness and sullenness. His father and mother could speak no English and he might speak Irish only with the certainty of a flogging the next day. Parents and guardians were misguided abettors in thus dishonoring and rooting out the ancestral tongue, for they had been led to believe that the only ray of hope for an iota of success in life for their children was to have them brought up to speak English and to utterly obliterate the Irish. The result was that no impression sank deeper in the child's mind than that it was a shame and a disgrace to speak like his father, his mother and his countrymen and he left school stultified, with his intelligence sterilized and, at most, with a mere jargon of a language as the fruit of his years' schooling.

The banning of Irish from the schools of Ireland was one of the greatest causes for the woeful decline of the language. Then followed the series of famines and the exodus of emigrants. With all these agencies arrayed against it the Irish language had but slender chances of existence. If we consider that at the beginning of the 19th century there was probably not a man, woman or child of Irish race in Ireland who could not speak or understand Irish and that their number has dwindled today to about 700,000, or, roughly speaking, one sixth of the entire population, it will perhaps not be too much to say that probably no parallel could be found of such a wholesale, rapid and almost complete blotting out of a language within the limits of a half century.

Such was the condition of the Irish language thirty years ago. Bruised, beaten and battered, it was driven for refuge to the fringe of western coast,

“ . . . where amid the Connaught wilds and hills of Donegal,
And by the shores of Munster, like the broad Atlantic blast,
The olden language lingers yet and binds us with the past.”

Some thought they heard the banshee's dismal wail presaging the not distant end of the Irish tongue and already philologists were preparing to chronicle the death of the last Irish-speaking woman, as they had already immortalized Dame

Dolly Pentreath, who is said, though erroneously, to have been the last that spoke the Cornish. During the early decades of the century lived Irish scholars, some of them the peers of any Ireland has ever seen, but it is plain that they labored over the Irish manuscripts as if they were in any dead language. There were learned archæological and other antiquarian societies, and these, too, did excellent work in their special fields, but all were possessed with the foregone conclusion that Irish was extinct and no longer to be reckoned with as a living force. In the middle of the '70's, it is true, some attempts were made to reintroduce the study of the spoken language and to retard its final disappearance but only in a hesitating, apologetic way and nothing came of it. In '77 the Society for the Preservation of the Irish Language was founded and still exists. It published some easy books and texts for the study of the language but was not remarkably active. In 1880 the Gaelic Union was formed with the same object in view, viz: the awakening of an interest in the language. Two years later the "*Gaelic Journal*" was started to spread these teachings, and, in the next year, 1893, the Gaelic League came into existence. To tell all it has accomplished through its band of earnest workers in the dozen years of its existence would be beyond the limits of the present paper but will be referred to briefly farther on. Suffice it here to say that, chiefly owing to its active propaganda and the resulting awakened conscience of the best of the Irish people, the question of the vitality of the native tongue has passed into a quite different phase. The tongue which was thought to be dying, at last, with all its fire, with all its wild energy, speaks out the noble aspirations of a people who are unwilling to forget their past and who, having a destiny to fulfill, are unwilling to disappear. While cruel schemes were devised at home and abroad to destroy the living speech, its archaic forms were cultivated in silence by French, German and Italian *savants*, and it was doubtless greatly owing to the interest displayed in the Irish language by Continental scholars that the Irish themselves were led to turn their attention to their glorious heritage, and wealth was revealed to them which they had not suspected they possessed.

From the studies and closets of scholars the language has

filtered down among the people, bringing them joy and hope, large thoughts and remembrances of a glorious past. It is no longer a thing to hide, to whisper, to be ashamed of and those who but yesterday blushed to speak it will be found its champions tomorrow. Irish is still the living speech of as many people as speak half a dozen of the modern languages of Europe and if Irishmen would resist with as much stubbornness the invasion of the language of the English as they formerly resisted the progress of their arms they might assure themselves of the conservation of their tongue. Its past, with its resistance against the Latin, Danish, Norman and Saxon, answers for its ability to continue in the future and bears out the saying of Thierry that 'there is a principle of persistence in the language of the Celtic peoples which seems to mock the efforts of time and man.'

But, even with this prodigious obstinacy and longevity in its favor, it is of vital importance at this critical stage of its existence that the Irish language be furthered in practice and given as full a life as possible, for with a language as with a plant or any other living thing merely to remain stationary and not to advance is to retrograde to the advantage of competitors. Nor is it enough that a local idiom find its only support in the people. There it can, to be sure, drag along far longer than one might expect, but if they have not the co-operation of the middle and higher classes, of those in more prominent walks of life and if, above all, it is neglected by the clergy it is irremediably doomed sooner or later to disappearance.

II. THE EXCELLENCIES OF THE GAELIC LANGUAGE.

We have seen that the sources of the Irish language are hidden in the earliest ages of the world, that it belongs to the great Indo-European group of languages and that, in the Celtic family, it is sister of the Scotch-Gaelic or Erse and the Manx, and cousin-german of the Welsh and the Breton and the Cornish, now extinct. It is, besides, not only the oldest member of the family, that is the one that has left earlier and more abundant traces of its existence than the others, but it is even the oldest language still spoken in the West of Europe, having

been in unbroken use for upwards of two thousand years. With the help of the results reached by Celtists since the days of Zeuss one could show that the Irish is as unmixed as any of the other languages now remaining in Europe and one could reconstruct a large part of its grammar and vocabulary at a time when the now flourishing and beautiful Romance languages had not yet emerged from the Popular Latin and when the English and other Germanic languages were only dialects of roving tribes. From these data one could draw up a synoptic table of the phonetic and inflectional laws and all the wonderful richness and regularity of Celtic forms, some without analogies elsewhere. One could trace them from the oldest remains down the centuries to the actual, spoken language or follow the Celtic in its divergent development into the idioms of Ireland, Scotland and Man on the one hand, and the idioms of Wales, Cornwall and Brittany on the other, until they separated so far as to be now mutually unintelligible while still preserving the common word-fund and the essential laws of the common family. Of all the insular Celtic languages it was particularly the Gaelic that escaped the powerful and destructive influence of the Roman domination and for this reason it is of especial value for the unreflected light it throws on those conditions of European life unrecorded by Roman writers or unknown to us from native sources.

The Irish language and its literature is the predominant glory of the Irish race; none can adduce more reputable or better authenticated patents of nobility; none, but the Greek, of all the languages now spoken in Europe, presents a greater wealth of literary monuments of such antiquity. The language, more than anything else, is that work of the race in the making of which all, the millions of the obscure as well as the illustrious, have taken part. It is that reflection of the nature of the Irish people, the language that symbolizes human thought reflected through the prism of the Irish mind, the book, living and never finished, in which are recorded the thoughts and emotions of the race. It is the most permanent heirloom that an Irishman possesses, the voice that will ever be heard in his patronymic, in the names of the furze grown hills, the mist-blown crags, the dark, deep glens, the silvery rivers of *Erin*

and the fairy folk that people them. Memories of heroism and suffering will wrap themselves in its folds and in it the fairy women will entice mortal men to far away *Tír na n-Óg*, 'the Land of the ever Young.'

It has been objected to the use of the Irish language for a modern speech that it is deficient and behindhand in many of the terms peculiar to modern life and relating to the sciences, arts and commerce. This is in part true owing to its repression for so long a time; but it possesses the elements of a language adequate in every respect to serve as medium for all the requirements of the day. All that is needed is its cultivation and practice and it will be found, when the need arises for Irish vocables to designate inventions and discoveries or for other emergencies, that the Irish language has a power of compounding and creating the needful terminology equal to that of any of the foremost tongues of to-day. Another objection that has been adduced to the everyday use of Irish is that its dialects will be a stumbling block to the spread of the language in more general use. But the difficulty here is no greater than in the case of any language soever. There are four main dialects with multitudinous sub-dialects merging imperceptibly one into the other as one finds everywhere. Of these dialects, the two most separated in nature as in space are those of Ulster and of Munster, the former differing only slightly from the Irish spoken across the Channel in Scotland. The dialectic peculiarities are chiefly in the matter of accent in which respect the Munster variety differs most from its neighbors; at most, they are not sufficient to cause such a divergence as exists, *e. g.*, between some of the southern Italian dialects and those of the North or between the Vannetais and the other Breton dialects, while the varieties in grammatical forms and vocabulary are no greater than are to be expected and no more numerous than are to be found in other modern languages. In the written and printed language there has always been an approximation to a standard, fortunately not too rigid, but the first thing that will perplex the beginner in Modern-Irish is the unsettled orthography. It is only with the growth of an influential school of Irish-writing *littérateurs* and a widely circulating vernacular press and perhaps, as a last resort, by the

formation of an academy to discuss and decide such questions, that a literary standard will arise for all Ireland. It would be very much to be regretted, however, if this should be at the cost of the disappearance of the local dialects. There is such an unplumbed wealth of material in those neglected, out of the way idioms for the linguist and for the student of popular literature that, before it be too late, they should be painstakingly studied and recorded and their folklore saved from perdition.

The Irish language possesses an extraordinary copiousness of vocabulary of native words expressing delicate shades of meaning. Because of its old-world connections and the fact that it has been the vernacular in the country for ages and has grown with the passions of the people, almost uncontaminated by foreign influences, it is above all characterized by force, directness, precision; it possesses wonderful melody and wealth of phonetic variety, some types quite unknown in any other European language, and admirable adaptability to metrical and musical forms; it is marvellously rich and subtle in idiom and in figurative expressions and graceful in syntax. Let us add to these qualities that it has, as it were, just awakened from a long, deep, sleep, fresh and unspoiled by triteness, commonness and meanness.

Even the novice in the study of Irish is inevitably struck by the unsurpassed power of the language to express the tender, homely affections and the racial virtues of sincerity, trust and faith; it is the passionate language of love and pathos, the gay language of wit and humor. The native language is not only the mirror in which the national genius is reflected but also the source in which it will seek its never-failing nourishment and inspiration. It is the poor-man's treasure-box in which are enshrined his popular philosophy, his folklore, history and music. It makes him think of that corner of the earth where his ancestors were born, of the cradle songs with which they were rocked to sleep, of boyhood days at school and in the field, of brothers, sisters, father and mother and the tales and songs with which they charmed their leisure and calmed their unrest.

“In it we sing our lays of love,
In it we croon our sorrow,

And when the night is dark above,
'Twill cheer us till to-morrow,
In the old tongue alone we know
The way to seek salvation;
It made a nation long ago
And keeps it still a nation."

III. IRISH CHARACTER AND THE GAELIC LANGUAGE.

Still another plea has been urged in favor of the cultivation of the native Irish language and on other than material grounds, namely, its value in the preservation and development of Irish character.

Ireland, of old, was renowned for her hospitality, courtesy, piety and respect for learning. Ever on the side of truth and honor, even when worsted in battle and in the bitterest moments of her history she was borne up by an unshakable belief in herself and confidence in her destiny. She won the respect and admiration of the world. As a Celtic nation she was the idealist among nations. Whatever was exalted, noble, true or grand appealed to her and found in her a champion. Her unworldliness, faith in holiness and attachment to the spiritual world need not be enlarged upon here, nor would it be a pleasant task to point out how the Irish in their efforts to forget themselves are in danger of losing these qualities and the respect for them. It will not be to Ireland's credit to despoil herself of her own character and to present nothing but what is common to other peoples as well as to herself. Her greatest privilege will be to enrich to the utmost of her power the common fund of humanity by adding to it those qualities—her *Eigenart* in fact—which she alone possesses.

What panacea can there be for the threatened deterioration of Irish character? What will save Ireland from the ditch of materialism, scepticism and irreligion into which foreign ideals have been leading her? The revival of the native language, it is argued, will, more than anything else, accomplish this for it will bring into vogue the simple, old-world virtues. We cannot doubt that between the nature of this tongue and the disposition of the Irish intelligence there is a mysterious pre-established harmony. The simplest lisp, the most rudimentary

affection when expressed in the native tongue expresses a world of meaning impossible to convey in any other. This language has been fashioned by the habits of mind and the *tournures* of the imagination of the race to whom it belongs and, better than any other, it will enable Irishmen to see, to think, to understand themselves, to understand their own nature, in fact, which is in a degree latent through want of the natural, the correlated vehicle of thought and emotion.

It may be worth while, as pertinent to the subject under consideration, to translate from *Le Temps* for March 30, 1898, a report of an address, remarkable because of its source, by the leader of the German socialists, Herr Bebel: "The particular nature of a people is incarnate in its language; it is by this that it is distinguished from other peoples; it is by this that it expresses its sentiments and its needs in that form which is the only true one. To constrain a people to express its sentiments and its needs in a language which is foreign to it, is equivalent to mutilating its most inward being. No doubt it is no mistake for a population to be made to learn the language of another civilized people with whom it is in contact, but this should never be at the expense of the mother-tongue. . . ."

IV. IRISH NATIONALITY AND GAELIC.

If it is important to preserve the spirit that is peculiar to each people and which is called its national genius, its *Eigenart*, it must consequently be important to maintain the language and the customs of the country which are its safeguard and the symbol of the country's nationhood. The value of the inherited language in the formation of the nation cannot be overestimated. It is much to be regretted that still so few realize these undeniable facts: that the political independence of Ireland is impossible or, at any rate, valueless without her intellectual regeneration; that a nation can subsist only so long as it has a language of its own; that if the Irish language dies, the Irish nation dies with it, and, contrariwise, with the growth of the Irish language, Irish nationality and Irish culture, in its widest sense, will flourish and will be followed eventually by independence.

It is a vulgar sophism that it would be well to hasten the day

when English would be understood and spoken by all. This may be very well from the point of view of those who speak it as their own. It is equally unreasonable to object that, if the Irish language succumbs to the English in the struggle for existence, it will be but an instance of the working of the law of the survival of the fittest. Such a law is unknown in the interaction of languages; the predominance of one language or dialect over another language or dialect depends simply on the physical or intellectual superiority of its speakers; for instance, mere political circumstances brought it about that the Continental Celtic, or Gaulish, yielded to the Latin though it is quite possible, if the two languages were to be judged *per se*, on grounds of strength, power and delicacy, that the former would have deserved to survive rather than the latter. No language, then, however perfect or universal it might be, would replace the Irish language *for the Irish people*; no other would render the Irish spirit and instincts or in any way deserve to be called the "National" language.

The truest indication of the survival of a national sentiment amongst a people who are in conflict with a stronger political power is the preservation of their native tongue; so long as they possess that, though conquered, they are not assimilated. The native language and native literature are alone sufficient to mark off the Irish people with a distinct history and a distinct civilization; they constitute their "title-deed in the court of nations," their charter to stand before the world as a political entity.

V. THE GAELIC LEAGUE.

Ireland has now, for some time, entered upon the third stage of her struggle for nationality. She first tried to win her independence by force of arms, then by parliamentary agitation and constitutional diplomacy. She now strives to resuscitate the dying idea of nationality in its last citadel, the native language. It seems that the present generation should be alive to the seriousness of the question it is called on to decide: whether the Irish language, after having been spoken for two thousand years and upwards amid the hills of Ireland and which the great crises of humanity have touched but left unharmed, is finally to pass out of use, to be utterly annihilated,

never again to be whispered on the face of God's earth and leaving no trace of its existence but to be pored over in old books and manuscripts, like the round towers and Ogam stones a memorial of antiquity and one of the most interesting varieties of a once almost universal European language or, whether, on the other hand, it is to be succored and defended with all the might and energy of the Irish from sea to sea and made their language for ages to come.

The full significance of the movement for the accomplishment of this devoutly to be wished end is only faintly understood in the outside world. The campaign for the de-anglicization of Ireland is in the hands of the Gaelic League. The room in No. 9 Lower O'Connell Street, Dublin, where, in July, 1893, the "League" was organized, almost in Ireland's eleventh hour, is ever to be commemorated as the cradle of the New Ireland. Never did a band of young men and patriots come together with a clearer view or with greater enthusiasm to put it into operation. They laid their emphasis on the national language as the palladium of nationality, and, as the degeneration of Ireland began with the abandonment of the old tongue, so its regeneration must begin with its revival. They saw that with proper organization and action it might be possible to rouse the Irish people from their lethargy and to bring back the native speech to their ken from the remote fastnesses in the West and South where it had taken refuge. They accordingly announced their program to be "The preservation of Irish as the national language of Ireland and its extension as a spoken tongue; the publication of existing Gaelic literature and the cultivation of a modern literature in Irish." They wisely left the purely literary and academic questions to the already existing societies for those objects in view. For half the short number of years that mark the life of the Gaelic League the workers toiled slowly and painfully and attracted little notice. Nothing was lacking to its beginnings, the apathy of their countrymen, the disdain of the press, and even the scoffers who must accompany every good work. During the latter half-dozen years of its existence its progress has been astonishingly rapid. First and above all the strength of the "League" has been centered on the upkeeping of Irish as the

language of the hearth and home, the field and farm, in those districts where it is still the vernacular; then, from these centers, to carry it to the borders where it is now hovering between life and death. One means to this end are the genuine Irish schools, the establishment of which it has fought for in those vernacular territories. It may be news to some to learn that thousands of books and pamphlets entirely in Gaelic and in Gaelic type and on a wide range of subjects are now published annually; that, exclusive of religious books, more books are now published in Dublin in Irish than in English. A new literature in Irish has been created and the classics and the almost forgotten poets, Eoghan Ruadh, Raftery, MacDonnell, Ferriter, O'Donoghue, Tadhg Gaedhealach, have risen from oblivion and taken their place at the Irish fireside. The "League" has two organs published regularly, the "*Irisleabhar na Gaedhilge*" ("The Gaelic Journal") monthly, and the "*Claidheamh Soluis*" ("The Sword of Light") weekly, and many papers in Ireland and America print columns in Irish. It appoints and pays organizers to stump the contested districts and to win over the local school and ecclesiastical authorities to a favorable attitude toward the vernacular in their bailiwicks. Under its auspices lectures on Irish antiquities, history, art and literature are given. A national drama in the national tongue has made its *début* with a répertoire at present of some score of plays. To it is due the remarkable industrial revival in the Island. It organizes *feiseanna*, festivals of native music, poetry and song, story-telling, games and dances in every Irish village in Ireland, which afford an opportunity and outlet to the local talent and offer prizes for its best efforts; these festivals reach their culmination in the *Oireachtas*, the annual assembly in Dublin, corresponding to the Welsh *Eisteddfod*.

It is one of the anomalies in the history of this movement that the leadership has fallen more than once upon shoulders where it might be least expected to find support. The path of the Gaelic League in Ireland was blazed by the success of the Irish Literary Society of London; one of the most munificent benefactors and most active workers in the Dublin Society for the Preservation of the Irish Language was the Rev. Euseby

Cleaver, an Anglican clergyman in Wales; the vice-president of the Gaelic League from its beginning until his lamented death was the Rev. Eugene O'Growney, the beloved *Athair Eoghan*, who was as truly the apostle of Gaelic Ireland as Father Mathew was the apostle of temperance. He came from a non-Gaelic speaking district, neither of his parents spoke Irish and he himself was not aware of the existence of a native language of Ireland until he was a student at college where he had to learn Irish like a foreigner. At present the recognized leader of the Gaelic movement is Dr. Douglas Hyde who was one of the founders of the "League." He was born in County Sligo some forty-five odd years ago the son of the Protestant vicar; he was an unusually brilliant student at Trinity College, Dublin, where, despite the anti-Irish atmosphere prevailing at "the silent sister," like Ferdiad, the Firbolg, he

"Drank the strength of dreams,
 Picturing his race's wrong; and trumpet blasts
 Went over him, blown from fields of ancient wars;
 And straightway from his heart to arm and hand
 Rushed up the strength of all that buried race
 By him so loved."

Scholar, poet, folklorist, playwright and vigilant organizer, "*An Craoibhin Aoibhinn*," "The fair little branch," the name by which Douglas Hyde is equally well known in Ireland, now occupies the largest place in the Gaelic movement, something like that of Mistral among the *Félibres* of Provence. He has been fortunate as a collector of Irish lyrics of great freshness and charm and indefatigable in catching from the lips of their last guardians folk-tales which he has treated with scholarship and accuracy. His original verse in Gaelic and English is tender, simple and touching like their themes, nature and peasant life. He is particularly happy in rendering into English the raciness and exact metrical schemes of the Irish original with its intricate rimes and peculiarities of alliteration.

The task before the Gaelic League is one of peculiar nobility and difficulty. It has not yet reached the fulness of its strength and extent and, if it succeeds, it will mean a surprising revelation to the world of the qualities of the Irish race. Yet,

however admirable, however great may be the results already accomplished, thanks to the ardor and intelligence of the leaders, and the active propagandism, the enthusiasm and co-operation of the people; however many Irish hearts may respond to their appeal, it is only too evident that their individual and even their organized efforts are insufficient to check the rising stream of English which threatens to carry away their language, their customs and all that which has made their character distinctive and their life apart among the nations.

If the death of her national aspirations which still threatens Ireland is the dread of all friends of justice and liberty, it goes without saying that such a prospect can be accepted by no Irishman who has preserved a spark of patriotism. The cause of the Irish language is one that ought to appeal to all who ponder upon Irish problems. It is their duty to transmit the patrimony to the future, to hand on the torch, and if the Irish language lives, so shall also the nation live, as the Irish say, *go bruinne an bhratha* ("till the day of doom").

JOSEPH DUNN.

PROTESTANTISM AND AUTHORITY.¹

It is indeed refreshing in these days of unfettered thinking to read this series of studies on the nature, necessity, and function of authority in matters of religion. We have had a surfeit of books on "free" thought; one on "free" authority—however ill-mated this adjective and noun may at first sight appear to be—is unexpectedly welcome; in the words of a homely saying, "it is a cure for sore eyes" to see it. It is a remarkably clear and forceful presentation of the subject by one who is not temperamentally predisposed to his own conclusions, but has lent a willing ear to the muse of history and accepted the results. Exception must be taken to much that the author says, and says pointedly, oftentimes with a war-like vocabulary not pleasing to the pious ears of Catholics. The vigorous bound which his central thought compels him to make causes him at times to "clear his mount" and to land rather hard on the opposite side, hard, that is, for those who happen to furnish, in his estimation at least, so convenient a place of landing. But this is another story. The business of a reviewer is a writer's thought rather than his actions; what he has to say rather than the fine ethical points that govern the saying of it.

The fundamental object of the volume is "to maintain the reasonableness of a man of modern culture frankly and earnestly worshiping in some form of 'authoritative religion'; in any form rather than in no form." We have read so much of late on "the religion of a gentleman," "the religion of a scientific man," and "the religion of the future," that we see a good antidote in the volume before us for those who think that the kingdom of God is wholly within, and seek to lead a churchless life on the warrant of this much overworked and mistranslated text. "Man is by nature an institutional being, a Churchman, and ecclesiasticism is a genuine manifestation

¹ "The Freedom of Authority." Essays in Apologetics. By J. Macbride Sterrett, D.D., The Head Professor of Philosophy in the George Washington University. New York, Macmillan, 1905. Pp. 319.

of human nature." One might amend Aristotle so far as to say that man is an "ecclesiastical" animal.

The fault of the day is the deification of the individual, his isolation from history, his insulation from the great stream of racial life. Ishmaelites there be who "heed the call of the wild against the call of the tame"; who see in the human self a being cut off from all continuity with his kind; who would have us one and all go back to nature and the freedom of the woodland, as if we were born into no environment, and succeeded to no heritage of answered questions and established institutions. Such a view of the human individual is abstract, unhistorical, and anti-social, a survival of the vaunted "Age of Reason" which knew no history and would therefore be done forever with states, and churches, and systems. These were the days of armchair critics who, with their feet on the fender, could rearrange the map of Europe and turn back the course of history at a sitting by merely analyzing the current notions of mankind. They did not know that ideas and institutions have a history, and that "the march of ideas," of which Napoleon spoke, would not break ranks even for the Grand Army.

The scientific conception of the individual to-day is that of an organic member of an organic system to which he must conform to be rational. Conformity and authority are thus correlatives, and the latter may be defined as "the power or influence through which one does, or believes, what he would not of his unaided powers." Collective reason, beliefs, and customs are the medium through which we receive authority, the function of which is to develop the individual, to put into him the racial wisdom and to saturate him with the "ethos" of his kind. The old static conception of individuality must be corrected and the social content of the individual noted and emphasized. Each of us is moralized by the "prejudices" of his school, church, set, fraternity, learned society, political party, and social organization, all of which have quasi-parental authorities, in conscious or unconscious submission to which I am becoming a more cultured man. All these lay their authoritative commands on me; all limit my capricious subjective whims of impulse. In all these I see duties and recognize rights. In these duties I find my freedom, i. e., self-realiza-

tion ; and these duties are objective, not begotten of my caprice, and not foreign.

What room is there for freedom in all this conventional morality, in this organic conception of the individual? The very question almost suggests mechanical determinism for answer, but Professor Sterrett will deal mortal blows to the mechanical theory of the world and morality later on. Freedom consists in playing one's own part. Authority, conformity, and function are organic elements of freedom when the latter is understood in the concrete. The subjective elements of personal conviction and self-determination are elements in concrete freedom. Choice means that man has the power ; to choose rationally one must be good ; and one becomes good by choosing that which pleases the moral societies of which he is a member, i. e., by conforming to authorities not evolved out of his inner consciousness. There is no freedom in choosing to act like the devil. It is this shallow conception of doing as one pleases in order to be free that is the lingering heritage and heresy of eighteenth century rationalism.

On the other hand, there is no absolutely autonomous or self-lawgiving man, except in the sense of imposing upon himself laws which are not of his making, though seen to be laws in conformity with which alone he can realize his essential nature. The autonomous man of Kant, begetting from within the forms that make his freedom concrete and objective, is an abstract, unhistorical individual. It is in others man finds the laws to which he conforms—the typical laws of his kind—and ultimately in God the great Companion and Educator of mankind, by means of social moral institutions. The only way to real freedom is conformity of the empirical selves in me to an ideal self which is a social self ; letting the empirical ego of the moment be the man is sham freedom. A formed state of the will is necessary. There is always morality and there is always authority, and there is no morality without the element of compulsion, not indeed physical and mechanical, but purposive.

This conventional morality of conforming to the prescriptions of one's set is transcended and overcome when we reach the standpoint that "everybody is God's child." The differ-

ence between what we are and what we ought to be constitutes a breach which mere morality—good will, or duty for duty's sake—can never heal. Even if it could, it would not be a full realization of man who has needs, capacities, tastes, desires, beyond the sphere of morality as such. The fitful ideals furnished by morality need a perfectly realized form of the good, and this form is furnished by the religious consciousness that God is perfect and God is real, and his service perfect freedom. Religion thus enters to transform and fulfill morality; not the religion of vague sentiment, but the specific act of worship which alone realizes our religious ideal, and is its source, centre, and sustenance. "The Church that does not make much of worship does not make men very religious, and is sure to degenerate into mere ethics or some form of ecclesiastical quackery."

It would hardly be in place here to discuss the value of the social theory of morality which Professor Sterrett states so cogently; we are more interested in what he is to build on this foundation. The presupposition with which he works is reason employed in a concrete sense as including and fulfilling both abstractions of intellectualism and practicalism. This concrete reason in mankind is, to use his own words, the progressive utterance of the universal concrete reason in the dialects of various peoples and ages. It is a vital organic universal on which he builds rather than on a number of abstract particulars. He has no patience to exercise on the compartment theories of the human mind with their separate chambers for intelligence, will, feeling, and, should we not add a new one out of reverence for the *Welt-Geist*, of commerce?

His method is transcendental; his thought moves from within outward, upward, and onward, and will not satisfy the lovers of "proofs," "reasons of fitness," and "syllogistic battalions." He is not a relativist by any means; he merely approaches old truths by less trodden paths, and tries to contribute his substantial mite to the new apologetic which has made its need felt even in Catholic quarters, especially in the French school of Blondel, Laberthonnière, Fonsègrive, not to mention the entire cloud of witnesses. The influence of Hegel on his chosen method is clear, but his conclusions are vigorously car-

ried far beyond those of the master. Let the reader grasp his appeal to "reason in a corporate process," and he will see that the individual is not wholly submerged in the race, or his personality unduly discounted. Many men do not think things out for themselves; and it is not for such as these that the author writes, but for the cultured. The continuity of the individual with the race is insisted upon only to accentuate his personal acceptance of what history has worked out for him. This idea of voluntary, personal acceptance need not affright us. The terrific onslaught made by scepticism on established belief, especially institutional, has compelled religious thinkers to investigate the moral side of faith more carefully and to rest discontent with the sufficiency of abstract reasonings alone. It is merely a piece of Napoleonic strategy—throwing in the Old Guard where the line of battle was thin; with what success remains to be seen.

It will be recalled that the Council of the Vatican insisted on the external signs of revelation and refused to determine what part education and history played in our knowledge of God. Its solemn vindication of the power of reason, unaided, to know the Source and End of all reality was expressed in an objective, impersonal way, and the historical process which man's knowing has undergone was not considered by the Council, except in so far as Traditionalism was concerned, which it condemned together with the prevailing Subjectivism. Professor Sterrett falls back upon history for his main support, and does not make of it, as so many of our manuals do, a sort of addendum to the work of pure reason; rather is it with him the public referendum decisive of all questions. He pools all issues together in one great, sweeping, historical view. The result is that everything comes out the peer of everything else, and Church and State are equally of divine origin.

Is it fair to enclose ourselves in this large circle without the privilege of drawing a diameter, or at least a few special radii? He dismisses infallibility and leaves only an approximation to the truth that is "ever more and more," according as we approach that one far-off divine event toward which the whole creation moves. The method which he pursues compels him to take this view. And yet, it strikes the reviewer that a

very profitable distinction might here have been drawn, with no violence to the method employed, the distinction, namely, between faith and knowledge. The psychological effect of his method is stronger on some of his conclusions than a more articulated, less sweeping view of history would lead to. In other words, his method is more hospitable than he conceives it, and at times proves too strong a preconception even for him to withstand.

It is quite true that the whole swing of the pendulum to-day is toward the social point of view, and that the abstract individual no longer haunts us with his grim and gaunt features. Yet all thought of "externals" need not be so abhorrent to Professor Sterrett. May we not work our way up through morality, corporate reason, if you will, and the stream of history to find at the close that we have only reached from the inside what our forbears established from without? Whether thought moves from centre to circumference, or the reverse, it impinges on something not itself, and in so far forth external to it. But we must not press a refinement. Let us turn back from these scattered appreciations to the main line of the author's thought. Protestantism is not to be identified with the Age of Reason, it is authoritative, and its principles are not subjective and negative. It is not a "paper-pope" substituted for one of flesh and blood. Free-thinking is an incident of Protestantism, not the essence of it, which is personal conviction rather than private judgment. Its original protest against the abuses and corruptions of the Church and against the Diet of Spires which refused to reform these abuses, is still in force, historically speaking; otherwise there is no reason against reunion with Rome.

This conception of Protestantism as a religion of authority places it upon a level with Catholicity, apparently, and allows the author later on to suggest an amalgamation of the two in his "vision splendid" of reunion. We might remark here in passing, with no intention of sacrificing truth to smartness, or of appearing personal, that this theory of reunion proposed by the author might fairly be called the "visionary theory," so far removed is it from actuality. It is very doubtful if Protestantism would recognize itself in the description which the au-

thor sets such store by. On the other hand, the vital, organic conception of authority which Catholicity must profess can never be exchanged for such a lifeless abstraction as a Parliament of Religions which the author would propose as a sort of perennial *modus vivendi*. It is one thing to go to the Hague, and another to have Rome go there. Has not our author painted Protestantism with a large brush and drawn its portrait with a free hand when he describes it as authoritative, thereby hiding in a phrase its lack of cohesion and of the inner spirit of organization?

Protestantism and Catholicity cannot be contrasted as personal versus corporate Christianity. Our author is too keen of sight to fall into this well-worn, convenient, yet false antithesis, which ought after so many years of service to be allowed to rest in peace on the back shelves of some museum. It would seem, however, that the best gift which Protestantism could bring to the proposed international conference, is, in the author's mind, the intense personal quality which characterizes it as a religion. No one will deny, and the author plainly asserts, that the personal element is strong in Catholicity; nor will any one who has studied the history of religion fail to see that the personal side of Catholicity needs more accentuation than it sometimes receives.

Yet the fact of the matter is that Christianity has had from the very beginning a distinctive life of its own—as distinct from that of the world at large now as it was when the infant Church lay cradled in the capital of the pagan empire of Rome. This unworldliness of Catholicity, its slowness to accept secular results until fully worked out, its insistence on living its own life unhindered, has allowed it to retain its own identity and to resist absorption. Can the same be said of Protestantism? A more personal religion is a consummation devoutly to be wished on all sides, but for the Catholic the intensity of his personal religious life must come from within the Church of his fathers and not from a process of secularization, or amalgamation.

Professor Sterrett is plain spoken with regard to the necessity of a visible, organized Church. "Vital, progressive, missionary, and educating Christianity always has had and

always must have a body." "History shows no equal to the vitality and efficiency of Roman Catholicism." "Total distrust of ecclesiastical Christianity is pathological." "Those who hate Christianity and would fain have it perish could ask for no more speedy form for its destruction than the destruction of its body." "The staunch Churchman occupies the normal rational standpoint." "Man is by nature a Churchman." "Ecclesiasticism is a genuine interpretation of human nature." "The rational ideal to-day seems to be that of a critical ecclesiasticism, that is, of a visible working church, fully recognizing the results of the modern criticism of its own historical elements, and yet basing itself upon these criticized elements as answering to human nature and needs on their religious side." He says, however, that he is very far from identifying the truth of ecclesiasticism with all truth, or of giving it an undue supremacy. He distinguishes the Church from the Kingdom of God; the latter is the organic sum total of the developments of the human spirit in all phases of activity; the former is a term of less extent, and signifies a definite, visible organization, not identical with moral and spiritual goodness wherever found, though a very real and lively member of that total organization of the true, the good and the beautiful among men which we term the Kingdom of God.

His criticism of Harnack and Sabatier who try to shift the thought-centre of the Gospels from Christ and the Kingdom to a filial emotion felt by believers toward God the Father is a fine piece of work. The only objectivity he discovers in Harnack and Sabatier is the recognition that "in me lives one greater than me." Loisy he finds more objective far than Harnack, although Loisy is as over-insistent on the body of the Church as Harnack is on the soul—both of which when viewed separately are abstractions, mischievous half-truths. Harnack's attempt to extract the pure essence of Christianity is unpardonable in a professed historian; so is his attempt to exhibit the development of dogma as a continuous corruption and pollution of this well of evangelism undefiled. Our author has only a feeling of fine scorn for those who utter the "crab-cry," Back to the simplicity of the Synoptists. He says that an absolute return to the most primitive form of

Christianity is a moral and historical impossibility. He puts his finger on the sore spot in Loisy's theory when he says that the development of the faith and the historical development do not seem to be clearly put in vital relation by the former professor of the Sorbonne. It is a case with him of casual parallelism rather than of organic interaction. The criticism of churchless Christianity goes straight to the mark in these trenchant chapters.

We wish that space permitted an outline of the author's wise reflections on the mechanical theory, the limits and functions of the historical method, and Aristotle's fourfold causality. They may be read with intellectual pleasure and moral profit by all who love to think themselves out of the imprisoning formulas of modern "scientific" philosophy. The notions of "potentiality" and "Actus Purus" are restored and made respectable; the superiority of Aristotle's theory of development is clearly set forth; and modern science and history are asked to drop positivism as a metaphysic while retaining it as a method. These bits of criticism are precious.

We are sorry that the author admits the refutations of the "lapse theory" in general. The theological conception of man's having originally been the recipient of special divine favors, lost subsequently through sin, has nothing whatever to do with the law of progress discovered in history; it is not bound up with the admission of a primitive civilization, and is not ruled out of court by the general abandonment of the theory of degradation. The Catholic theologian, at least, leaves primitive man normal and naturally intact after the Fall, letting science deal with him as to the subsequent course of his history. Here again it would seem that the author has allowed his general historical principle to decide a particular instance, hastily conceived as at variance with it.

The author's method throughout is from the relative to the self-related, absolute Personality. The universal throbs through the particulars. The Church is a kingdom of persons where all are kings because all are persons, and not an abstract external authority. The abstract conception of the authority of the Church as a ground of certitude he regards as the "infinite falsehood of mediæval ecclesiasticism." That's the worst kind

of falsehood we have ever heard of. And yet it seems that the reason why so extensive an adjective is applied in this instance was the bare, empty universal as understood by mediæval churchmen, who sought grounds instead of seeking *the* ground of certitude.

The Middle Ages, it is true, confined its philosophy largely to the objective and abstract side of reality. The subjective side was not investigated until practically our own days, and the end is not yet. Because, however, the author employs a method which combines the subjective and the objective in what might paradoxically be called a "concrete-general," hardly justifies so severe a condemnation. The social content of the individual, his baptism by immersion into the stream of history, formed little part of scholastic thought. The individual was Barebones then if you will. But in any event, the Schoolmen explored the objective side of authority from the received point of view, and knew next to nothing of the newer avenues of approach to the weather-beaten problems of philosophy which we follow to-day. St. Thomas, however, succeeded in uniting the stream of purpose in history with the stream of finality in Nature, to his credit be it said. We, like him, must reach the objective somehow; and because one conceives the individual to-day as the heir of the ages, or regards the basis of morality as social, is every previous point of view thereby invalidated, an "Ueberwundene Standpunkt"? Let the personal side of belief be investigated, and emphasized, if you will. The institutional side will have its place in the system when thought out, and it will be found that the Church is its own witness within and quite apart from the general stream of history. Are there no special divine springs to feed this stream along its course?

The author states his belief explicitly in the early œcumenical formulas. He suggests as a rule: to believe in all that is implied in the Incarnation. It is the Church, he says, that gives us our authentic record of the life of Christ. The ultimate ground of authority is not in abstract dogma. Christianity is more than thinking or feeling; it is also willing, and the will is the man. The Divine Immanence is the key to history. "The Romanist (sic) conceives of instituted Christianity

as a mechanical, unethical form of authority," instead of recognizing it as an ethical and historical process of the spirit immanent in Christian nations and communities. This saying is hard because not true, and we are surprised to see such an antithesis drawn. Surely we, too, are God's children capable of willing service; capable of personally working out for ourselves and freely accepting the faith of our fathers; capable also of seeing the conservative genius of the Church whose mission is not to lose itself in sudden readjustments to modern culture, or to let even the best-gifted of her sons force her, before ready, into paths that are beset with stumbling.

Catholicity is a life that is much more than dry intellectual assent, much more than an impersonal series of objective ideas strung together like the beads of a rosary and eternally imposed upon the faithful. Catholic thought can move from within outward, upward, and onward, too, and is doing so now pretty vigorously in the new school of Immanentists. Apologetics is always a relative science. Why should our author first make it static and mechanical, and then blow us all up with the dynamite of his progressive method? Is he still haunted by the "bloodless ballet" of abstractions in the old apologetic? Has Catholicity no life, no heart, no personality, in addition to "the heritage of answered questions" which it makes over to those of the household of faith?

This is truly a remarkable volume considering the "psychological climate" in which it was written. It is not sympathetic with Catholicity except in so far as the Roman Catholic idea of the Church fits into the author's view of universal history. It is a trumpet call to Protestantism to seek some form of authority and avoid dissolution, because the future of Christianity is with organized religion. It suggests no *via media*, but holds out an international "*tertium quid*" far beyond the point of possible concession for Catholicity, or of accession for Protestantism. The reviewer has already expressed his appreciation, and criticism, and might say much more if space permitted. Let us hope that this volume indicates the beginning of a reaction from that purely subjective type of religion which many find it so convenient to-day to profess, because they discover in it the sanctification of their own conceits and a sort of tangential freedom.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

THE TEACHING OF PEDAGOGY IN THE SEMINARY.

The question of establishing a course of education in the Seminary is at first sight rather simple; but when we examine it more closely we discover a number of factors which demand careful consideration. Central among these is the qualification of the man by whom such a course shall be given. The course itself, unquestionably, is of prime importance; and if we were called on to say what subjects shall be taught, in what order and for what length of time, we should have upon our hands an interesting but also a complex problem.

Now, in the case of the Seminary, as at present organized, much must be left to the discretion of the person in charge of the course. He has to exercise a selective judgment and therefore to bear a certain responsibility in choosing from a vast store of fact, principle and theory. But for this very reason, it is all the more needful that he should have at his command a thorough knowledge of the subject itself and a thorough appreciation of the needs of those to whom that knowledge must be imparted.

The Seminary teacher of Pedagogy, whom I shall hereafter speak of as "the professor," will naturally keep in view the field of work upon which his students are to enter after leaving the Seminary. He will foresee, as they cannot well foresee, the conditions and the problems which they must encounter. And he will so shape his teaching that the young priest coming to the practical work of the parish, is familiar, not only with the college and seminary through which he has passed, but also with the entire field of education in this country.

Our professor, in other words, is thoroughly informed on all matters concerning the parochial schools. He knows how these schools are organized in the different dioceses, who the teachers are, what means of superintendence are employed, how the curriculum is arranged, what text-books are used, what methods are applied. He is not afraid to study the needs of

the schools, nor does he set aside as dull reading the statistics that show what percentage of our children are attending Catholic schools, what their education costs and what results are obtained by the outlay and labor. This knowledge, moreover, he has acquired, not merely from books or by hearsay, but also and chiefly by personal contact with the schools. Through his own observation he has learned their strong points and their weak points. He is acquainted with the details of the school-room, with the difficulties that beset the teacher, with the drawbacks from which the pupils so often suffer.

In a word, he is as much at home in the classes where children are taught as he is in the lecture-hall where he speaks to men mature in years and training.

What such knowledge implies is clear the moment we reflect on the extent of the parochial school system. It means unremitting study and constant attention to details quite sufficient to absorb the time and activity of any man. This indeed would be the case if the parochial system were the only system of education. But we know, as a matter of fact, that it exists alongside of that other great system, the public schools. With these it is in daily competition. From them it has much to learn—of things to be adopted or of things to be avoided. What these things are the professor of pedagogy well knows. He may not carry in his head the annual report of the Commissioner of Education, nor even the statistics for Greater New York. But he *is* familiar with the structure of the system. He follows the movements which affect its growth. He sees what influences are brought to bear from various sources upon the life of the public school, and in what directions the public school is exerting its influence. Above all, from his comparative study of the two systems, he has clearly before his mind this most important fact: *the boy and the girl who are trained in the parochial school must compete with the boys and girls who are trained in the public school.* The rivalry is not merely between school and school. It does not cease on the day of graduation. It is continued in college and university, in business and in professional life. And the success which comes, early or late, to the graduate of our parochial school, is one of the best arguments in favor of that school.

Our professor realizes this. He knows that he is preparing his students not only to make the work of the parochial school *good*, but to make it *better* than the work of any other school.

This conviction is in no way lessened when he considers what is being done in every direction to make the public schools more efficient. He knows it is not the machinery of education that counts for most, nor the erection of costly buildings, nor their more costly equipment. All these are important and in a way necessary. But the main thing is the *preparation of teachers*. What is done in normal schools, in teachers' institutes, in university departments of education—this is the really vital part, the heart and brain of the system. Our professor is in touch with all this. He is aware how the teachers do their work in the schools; but he also knows how they are trained for that work.

Now their training is on a small scale the very training that he has received. What they have studied, perhaps in summary fashion, he has thoroughly mastered—with deeper insight and larger view. And he is therefore able to consider each problem in the light of a knowledge that is rich and varied and drawn from many sources.

Let us consider briefly the more important items of this knowledge. To begin with concrete facts, we may ask what it is that makes the difference between the good teacher and the poor teacher. Why is it that one succeeds so well in the school-room, while the other, in spite of earnestness and patient effort, is often a failure? The answer, as you well know, is easily given: *it is the difference of method*. Whatever other results may have been gotten in centuries of educational experience, certain it is that right method is essential to good teaching. In fact, there is no teaching without some sort of method; the only question is whether the method be of the right sort. Our professor is familiar with the methods employed in teaching the various school subjects. He knows just how a lesson should be given in geography and how it differs from a lecture in philosophy. He is acquainted with the so-called "devices" which so many teachers seize upon with eagerness as short-cuts to success. But the important point is that he knows how to estimate each device and each special

method at its true value. He has in his wider knowledge certain criteria which enable him to discern both the excellence and the weakness of any scheme no matter by whom it may be proposed.

Among these criteria, we may set in the first rank the question: how far does a given method conform to the nature of the pupil's mind? And this we may translate into the other question: how far does this method further the development of the mind? The answer evidently presupposes a knowledge of the laws of mental development. It is not sufficient to understand in a general way that the mind grows and then take our chances on having our method fit in more or less perfectly with that growth. The mind develops in definite ways—according to laws that are, in part at least, already formulated. To make the statement of these laws perfect is now the principal business of Psychology. And, therefore, the tests which are applied to educational method must be, in the first instance, psychological.

Psychology, I need scarcely say, deals with one form, and that the highest, of vital function. The laws of mental activity are special forms of the larger laws which govern all life. The very fact that man is substantially one being must lead us to expect a close correspondence between organic function and mental process. And the further truth on which Christian philosophy insists, the truth, namely, that the soul is the source of all vital manifestation, implies harmonious action and harmonious development of the bodily life and the mental. The study, then, of Psychology, quite naturally opens out into the wider realm of Biology—to find in the science of life as such the interpretation and the deeper meaning of the laws which we first discover in the mind itself.

Thus, the examination of any method inevitably takes us away from the empirical, from the mere matter of detail—first to the laws of psychology and then to the more comprehensive principles on which biology rests. Need I add that both these sciences receive their final interpretation from philosophy—the science that deals with the nature of mind, its origin and its destiny? In the light of these ultimate truths, we judge, not indeed of any particular method of education, but of the funda-

mental assumptions on which education as a whole is based and by which its aims and ideals are determined. The professor of the science of education will certainly be led sooner or later to dwell upon these underlying truths. He will realize, the more he ponders them, that there is the closest connection between philosophy and education—or rather that education is the systematic and concrete expression, at any time, of the philosophy which then prevails.

If there could be any doubt on this point, it would easily be dissipated by turning to the past. For whether we survey the centuries that are nearer to us or look beyond them to the Middle Ages, the beginnings of Christianity, the pre-Christian time of Greece and Rome, the same lesson invariably comes home to us. Parallel to the history of philosophy is the history of education; and not simply parallel but interacting and intertwined. If we would understand in its fulness the meaning of modern thought, we must trace its development from the beginning to our own day. And if we would fully appreciate modern theories and methods of education, we must follow their historical growth. And more than anything else, if we would realize in a very concrete way what the Church has done for education we must read over and over the story of those ages in which the Church was literally the teacher of the nations.

But even while we are studying the past, the present in which we live is moving on into the future for which we have to prepare. The teacher who profits best by the lessons of history is the teacher who discerns before their time the things that are to be—the changes that are to take place, the new social conditions that are bound to arise. However slowly or rapidly these changes may occur, it is certain that the child on leaving school is thrown into an environment to which he must in some way adapt himself—an environment, moreover, which is not static, fixed or stationary, but constantly in flux, constantly presenting new opportunities and new dangers. If education is to prepare youth for contact with this environment, it must build up a character, a power of will and action, strong enough to resist the onset of evil, steady enough to pursue the right amid all temptation. But here again we are

not dealing with pure chance or mere possibility. Social conditions and their changes are governed by law. The science of sociology, imperfect as it is just now, has brought to light many important truths that have a bearing on education. And none is more vital than this: viz., that the school must impart to the mind of the pupil such strength and flexibility that it may throughout all changes in its environment adhere steadfastly to that which is good.

It is thus evident that he who teaches the principles of education does not keep his vision focussed on any single point, but rather lets it sweep over a wide range which embraces the science of life and the science of mind, the science of the individual and the science of society, the science of the past and so far as may be, the foreknowledge of the future.

School methods, psychology, biology, history and sociology, this, you will remark, is a large store of knowledge. And yet reflection will show that it is not too large for the professor of education. On the contrary, I would say, that such an amount and variety of knowledge is necessitated by the very circumstances under which he works in the Seminary. For, in all probability, the course in education will be limited—perhaps to a single year. It must also fit into a curriculum which is already quite full of important professional subjects. And it must be given to men whose previous training has imparted certain definite modes of thinking.

Under such conditions, the main question for our professor would seem to be: how can I treat this subject of education in such a way as to use my knowledge to the best advantage of the students who come before me? In reply I would offer these suggestions:

First, the professor of education will endeavor to stimulate his students—to arouse in their minds a serious interest in the subject, to open up lines of thought which they may follow in their personal study, to acquaint them with the methods of handling educational problems, and to bring to their attention the best literature of the subject.

Second, he will correlate his work with the other work that is done in the Seminary by showing how philosophy, theology, scripture and history abound with fruitful ideas which need

only be applied in an intelligent way to modern education. In this way his course will become a direct aid to the other Seminary courses, because it will enable the student to cast his knowledge in a shape that is both definite and practical.

Third, he will accustom his students to look beyond the surface of things to the reality, beyond the results to the processes out of which these results issue. For it too often happens nowadays that people, and even teachers, are content to seize upon *facts* without even asking or suspecting how these facts have been brought about. Like the old-time physician, they see the symptoms and prescribe accordingly—yet never trace these symptoms to the underlying changes in organ and tissue. But just as modern medicine wins its triumphs by penetrating into the hidden causes of diseases—the structural and functional changes that lie deep down in the organism—so modern education, by its careful study of mental processes, has been able to remedy many defects and even to set aside as abnormal certain practices which from time immemorial had been taken as matters of course, as essentials in the work of teaching and of learning or as unfortunate conditions which the teacher might regret but could not remove.

Fourth, the professor of education will impress upon his students the necessity of realizing more and more completely the true character of *Christian* education as distinct from all other forms of education. And this means that we have to consider whether those who go out from our schools into the various walks of life are just the products that we as Christian teachers desire; whether, in any given practice or measure adopted in the school-room, we are seeking the immediate benefit or the ultimate good of the pupil; and whether, in our rivalry with other schools, we lay sufficient stress upon that superiority of character which is, after all, the one reason for which our schools exist.

These suggestions are offered rather to indicate the character of the work which awaits the professor of education than to map out in detail his course of instruction. What has been said and much more will occur at once to the mind of a professor who has been properly trained for his position. I say "*properly* trained"; because it is my conviction that in

an affair of so great importance as this it is essential that the work should be well done from the start. Better delay the start, if need be, for some time, than make a poor beginning. Better by far to let the future professor of education devote years to his own preparation, laying deep his foundation in the sciences that treat directly or indirectly of mental life.

Supposing now that with this thorough preparation our professor entered upon his duties; upon what will his success depend? Upon himself in great part; upon the qualifications of his students; upon all the conditions which affect the existing Seminary course; but it will depend in a special way upon the sympathy and cooperation of those who in each diocese are charged with the direction of the schools. A superintendent who has received the same preparation as our Seminary professor will render effectual aid to the Seminary work. He is in daily contact with the school, he knows what the teachers need and he understands the value of the training which the Seminary gives. In those dioceses particularly which have no Seminary of their own, the need of affording the superintendent every possible advantage in the way of preparation is obvious.

But in proportion as our schools develop—in number and quality—the need will be felt—or rather it is now felt—of men who are familiar with the science of education, who are interested in its problems and able to discuss them on the public platform or in the educational review. We need men in every diocese who are prepared to give our teachers those occasional lectures and those systematic courses of education which so many of these teachers are now seeking in non-Catholic institutions.

And yet in a larger way, we need men, not alone in the schools where children are taught, but also in the highest of all schools, the Christian pulpit—men who are deeply versed in the science and art of teaching. To expound the truths of the gospel is no easy task. It was the task of the greatest of all teachers. It becomes, at ordination, the duty of every priest. And this duty will be fulfilled just in proportion as the priest has taken into his own mind the doctrine of Christ and with that doctrine an intelligent grasp of the divine method which stands out on every page of the Gospel. THOMAS SHIELDS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

La Théologie de Tertullien. Par Adhemar d'Alès, prêtre. Paris: Beauchesne, 1905. Pp. 16 + 531.

Tertullian has become in recent years the object of much painstaking study largely owing to his having been so notable a witness of the ancient faith and so strong an influence on Latin tradition. Estimates of him have varied; fragmentary studies of so many-sided a character existed in abundance, and some that were fuller in their presentation. But analysis, however penetrating, is likely to lack that judicious quality which seems to make itself manifest only when a writer is studied in all his parts. Judgment then becomes more mellow and a balance is struck between conflicting estimates,—the consistent creature of logic disappears, and a concrete man of many selective interests emerges in his individuality. That is why a volume such as the one here under review, which aims at presenting a complete mental portrait of the lawyer-theologian of Carthage, is most valuable and welcome, even apart from the clear-cut bits of analysis in which it abounds, and the scientific spirit which broods over its pages. *Totum maius sua parte.*

It is clear at a glance that the best way to unravel the contradictions of Tertullian—and they are many—is to reconstruct the order of time in which his works were written. This the author does in the introduction by studying Tertullian's own quotations of himself, the allusions which he makes to contemporary history, and the traces of Montanism in his writings. This third criterion is applied with none of that "straining at gnats" so often met with in the literary criticism of the day.

Tertullian was first and foremost an Apologist; his Apologetic, though practically his maiden effort, was also his masterpiece,—a sure sign that he did not attain any very remarkable development of intellect in his subsequent literary career. He was not much of an initiator, and his knowledge, however encyclopedic, did not include the quality of deep metaphysical insight. He was a Christian at heart before he became one in mind and spirit, and his "*testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ*" is true, strikingly true, of himself. His ardent nature offered a fairer field for moral considerations than for speculation pure and simple. His hostility to philosophy and to the spirit of inquiry in religious matters; his weakness in dogmatic exposition and his towering strength as a delineator of the moral

beauty inherent in the Christian scheme of life, show in what direction his abilities really lay.

Of course, this hostile attitude must not be so far pressed, as some indeed have pressed it, into a glorification of unreason. The famous formula "*Credo quia absurdum*" has served to put Tertullian in a bad light, making it appear that absurdity was for him the chief criterion of Christian belief. This formula is not found in the Carthaginian's writings. He has indeed expressed its equivalent; but when he did, he was addressing heretics who were already convinced of the divinity of Christ, yet still insisted on interpreting revelation to suit their fancy. He assumed a different tone when arguing with the pagans; and to represent him as suppressing reason altogether in the final test of faith is to misunderstand most grossly this lover of paradoxes and master of style.

The author in this first chapter shows very plainly how Tertullian, turning with disgust from the philosophers of paganism, yet finding in the human soul a natural witness to Christianity, undertook to establish the divinity of the Christian religion on the historic foundations of the old and new testaments, and the annals of the Church; how he laid stress on the providential history of the old testament, established its divine authority on the basis of prophecies fulfilled, and insisted on relating these prophecies to the gospel miracles as their best commentary; how he finally pointed in triumph not only to the homage which even demons paid to the divine power of Christianity, but also to the transcendent purity of Christian morals in which the meekest and most delicate of virtues existed alongside the most heroic intrepidity.

To Tertullian's mind the existence of God was sufficiently attested by the popular conscience, although he over-estimated the contents of the latter by failing to keep distinct what was manifestly due to education and authoritative teaching. The justice and goodness of God were the products of a sort of divination which might be called intuition. The unity of God called forth his best efforts against polytheism, the materialistic dualism of Hermogenes, the scriptural dualism of Marcion, and the idealistic pantheism of Valentinus. He declares the essence of God to be spirit, yet mars this statement in the next breath by saying that God, and all that is, is body. Benignly as one might interpret him here, the trail of materialism is over his pages; he could not rise to the idea of the purely immaterial and bodiless.

The doctrine of the Trinity he defended with ardor, even after his lapse into Montanism, against Praxeas and others who sacrificed

this truth in the interests of the divine unity. The eternal generation of the Son is held by Tertullian, although he has much to say on the temporal generation of the Word to puzzle the fairest-minded of critics. He fails to distinguish clearly the person of the Holy Ghost from that of the Son, largely perhaps because of his pre-occupation with the views of the Monarchians and Patripassians which he wished to overthrow. He cannot be said to have clarified this great theological question of the Trinity, although his application of the legal term "persona" to the divine hypostases showed what a lawyer could accomplish when turned theologian. He talks throughout most disconcertingly, especially to ears grown accustomed to the precision of later days and unused to the "*verbum prolatum*" of the Eastern Fathers. The fact of the matter is that Tertullian speaks after the manner of the Greeks, has more in mind the cosmogonic questions rife in his day, than a description of the divine inner life, and was too weak in philosophic insight to interpret a mysterious truth, the substance of which he never doubted, however grossly inexact his expressions may have been; sometimes, when it is a question of the hierarchical order between the divine persons, amounting almost to a profession of subordinationism, which is the construction rather unfairly put upon his language by Harnack. It is too much to expect the precision of a post-nicene theologian in the generous efforts of this pagan convert, and the judicious critic, like our author, will neither whitewash nor blacken him unduly.

Tertullian rejected the eternity of matter and taught the doctrine of creation, although his analysis of the creative act, and of the divine mode of action, leaves much to be desired. While holding fast to the substantial unity of the soul, he nevertheless takes sides against the spiritualist school in proclaiming that the soul is made up of matter. Born of the breath of God, the soul is immortal, corporeal, of definite shape, intelligent, free, and sprung from the single soul of Adam. He even appeals to tradition in support of this crude traducianism, although his whole essay in psychology is written with the pages of Genesis before him. Elements are borrowed from the Stoics, from Plato, and many other sources which the author traces. Although he rejected pre-existence, he recognized neither the immediate creation of the soul, nor its fitness to attain its end when released from the body.

He taught that every soul, to which paradise had not been made accessible by martyrdom, sojourned "*apud inferos in diem Domini.*" The need of a final purification of souls destined for eternal beatitude is strongly brought out. The doctrine of the bodily resurrection is

firmly professed and supported by arguments based upon the demands and requirements of divine justice. However faulty Tertullian's "De Anima" may appear, it marks the starting-point in the development of Christian psychology. Only a sound philosophy, which came much later, could have saved the African jurist from his many stumblings. We who enjoy the fruits of centuries of labor forget the difficulties that bestrew the path of a pioneer.

How Tertullian refuted the Marcionite heresy of the two Christs, inspired as it was by a supposed antagonism between the severe God of the Old Testament and the benign God of the New; how he triumphed over Docetism and defended the divine maternity of Mary only to call in question her virginity in and after the Savior's birth, is strongly developed in the fourth chapter.

The treatise "De præscriptione hæreticorum" is in many ways a remarkable document which our author rapidly analyzes before reconstructing Tertullian's views on the Church, Scripture, and tradition. Truth was in possession against heresy which came too late for a hearing. The agreement of the apostolic churches is not the result of chance, but the index of primitive tradition. "Quod apud multos unum invenitur non est erratum sed traditum." By means of this two-edged sword, he kept back intruders, and at the same time established a criterion of Christian truth. He expresses clearly the idea of the Church as the society of the Christian faithful, accredited by Christ to be the depository, guardian, and interpreter of the Scriptures. This Church is one, apostolic, catholic, hierarchical, and holy, "domina mater Ecclesia." He recognizes the primacy of the Roman See only to retract this admission in the days of his bitterness of spirit. His views on the inspiration, the canon, and the exegesis of Scripture next receive at the hands of the author a most interesting treatment of great value to the biblical student inquiring into the origins of the Latin bible. The fifth chapter is closed by a number of important reflections on the doctrinal formulas mentioned by Tertullian.

The moral and Christian life as viewed by Tertullian is exposed in detail by the author—nature, grace, original sin, the virtues, and Christian practices—in the sixth chapter. The seventh is devoted to Tertullian's views on prayer and the sacraments. Space forbids our saying more than a few words in this already lengthy review. These few words concern Tertullian and the sacrament of penance. The administration of the sacrament of penance according to the discipline prevailing in Africa in Tertullian's time had three phases; the first secret, a private confession made to the bishop; the two others public,

namely, the exomologesis, an external satisfaction and declaration of repentance before God, and before the Church; and finally the episcopal sentence which put an end to the public penance and reconciled to God both inwardly and outwardly at the same time the well-disposed penitent.

This is substantially the view of Mgr. Battifol to whom the author acknowledges his indebtedness. Our author finds no evidence for the existence of an entirely private sacramental penance. Tertullian admits for the post-baptismal sinner no other way of salvation than the public exomologesis. From the pardon of the Church the sins of relapsed Christians are excluded, and perhaps also certain sins of a heinous nature, although this last is not so clear because Montanism had already invaded Tertullian's mind when he wrote the "*De Pudicitia*." Nothing remained for the lapsed but to have direct recourse to the divine mercy, and to the intercession of the martyrs whose merits, in the judgment of the bishop, could be applied to sinners so as to open for them, or as the case might be, to shorten, the course of public penance. In this communication and interchange of merits we have perhaps the origin of indulgences. Too much cannot be said in praise of the author's clever handling of this slippery material which has eluded the grasp of so many critics largely perhaps, to use a legal expression, because they did not "come into equity with clean hands."

The eighth chapter depicts the polemical Tertullian, who, tired of pleading, turned to play the part of prosecuting attorney against his pagan judges. The unjust persecutions of the Christians, the groundless accusations against them, the true relations of the Christians to the civil power, to the empire and life of Rome, the divine philosophy of the Christian life in contrast with the empty vaporings of paganism, and finally the challenge flung full in the Roman's face, or the earnest homily addressed to the faithful, to take heed of the blood of martyrs,—all these are brought out into relief, together with their effects on the life of the Church and on the conduct of the Roman rulers.

And then comes that severe Phrygian illuminism to change the uncompromising Tertullian into a rigorist and to reverse his views and somewhat to sour his character—a last and sad chapter to so strenuous a Christian life. The author is not one of those who would judge Tertullian from the last chapter of his life. Instead of any such one-sided appreciation, he traces the evolution of Tertullian's ideas and the influences to which he fell a prey. Despite all his

faults and errors, he is a precious mine of information and one of the most important witnesses of the ancient faith.

This volume is the second which has appeared thus far in the "bibliothèque de théologie historique" published under the direction of the professors of theology in the Catholic Institute of Paris. It is a very worthy contribution to the history of theology and deserves the full measure of success. Three convenient indices enhance its value.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Summa Theologica—VI. Tractatus de Deo Creatore et de Angelis. Auctore Laurentio Janssens, O.S.B. St. Louis: Herder, 1905. Pp. 24 + 1048.

This sixth volume of the author's "Summa Theologica" is divided into three parts, all of which are treated in the characteristic way of the learned Benedictine rector of St. Anselm's. The method of presentation which the author follows has already been described in the Bulletin; we content ourselves in consequence with a brief review of the subject-matter treated in this volume.

The first part deals with the production of things and the four-fold nature of causality. The necessity of creation is established by positive considerations, and in two appendices over fifty pages in length, a searching examination is instituted into the various forms of materialism and pantheism. These pages are rich in criticism of current views and display to advantage the author's wide range of information. He is concerned to show that the doctrine of creation is an essential part of Christian faith, and this concern elicits from him a sharp criticism of those who endeavor to break the continuity between the Old Testament and the New, seeking for some wholly unrelated and unborrowed "essence" in which to seal Christianity hermetically against all the influences of the past, present and future. He is careful to point out, too, that the authority of science is not to be invoked, nor its patronage claimed for the idea of emanation; the doctrine of creation cannot in this lame fashion be argued out of its claim to recognition. The accepted axioms of science have been largely cast in a material mold, and this has led those whose observation was keener than their insight, whose philosophy was colored by the working principles of scientific research, to regard the physical explanation as adequate, exclusive, and final.

The concept of creation, the analysis of the creative act, the temporal origin of the world, and the possibility of eternal creation, complete the subjects treated in the first part of the volume. With

regard to the last mentioned topic, St. Thomas, as is well known, felt compelled to deny the cogency of the arguments put forth in the schools of his day to establish the temporal beginning of the world. In this he seems to have been influenced somewhat by the writings of Moses Maimonides, and by the fear of bringing theology into ridicule through over-insistence on the value and force of defective proofs. It must be confessed that the trend of theological thought has long since, though not without strenuous and distinguished opposition, been rather away from, than in line with, the view expressed by Saint Thomas. Our author frankly admits that some of the objections urged against the possibility of eternal creation are unanswerable but does not go the length of some in denying the Thomistic conception outright. In this the thoughtful scholar shows to advantage beside the special pleader.

In a footnote (p. 58) the author makes a touching reference to the work and memory of Doctor Bouquillon, which we may be pardoned for reproducing, especially as the horizon is now clear of battle-clouds, and things said of him in the heat of conflict have lost all meaning, if indeed they ever had any that will bear the light of the years. "*Lege de hoc argumento (the necessary dependence of moral theology on dogma) eruditam ac undequaque solidam dissertationem Cl. Thom. Bouquillon (Moral Theology at the end of the nineteenth century.—Cath. Univ. Bulletin, 1899), viri sane ob fidem integerrimam, vastissimam eruditionem et acutissimum ingenium inter primos huius ævi theologos adnumerandi. Cuius mortem præmaturam utraque continens luget.*" This trinity of great qualities our late lamented professor of moral theology possessed in a remarkable degree. It takes a theologian possessed of like qualities to frame so neat and true an estimate. It is a pleasure to record this appreciation of the dead scholar written by a member of that Benedictine order which he loved so well.

The second part of this volume deals with the distinction of things, their multiplicity, inequality, and unity in general, their goodness and evil in particular; to which are added considerations of the origin and constitution of corporeal things together with a long, thorough, and very interesting dissertation on the Mosaic Cosmogony followed by a detailed exposition of the work of the six days. Much might be said in praise of the author's scientific presentation if space were not wanting in which to say it. The history of the various constructions, Jewish, patristic, scholastic, and modern, put upon the Hexæmeron is orderly portrayed and vividly discussed in the light of our best knowledge. The exposition and criticism of

modern theories of interpretation serve to clear up in the student's mind a number of bewildering issues and lead him gradually by means of a thorough sifting process, to form a scholar's judgment on these "debatable lands" jointly owned by religion and science.

The author is no champion of the "periodistic view" strictly understood; he thinks that the great intervals of time between the appearance of the different beings on nature's graded scale are more easily explained on a theory of inner development under constant divine guidance than on a theory of abrupt interventions from without; yet he does not wholly reject the "periodic" view if it be relaxed so as to allow for the simultaneous appearance of animals and fishes in certain regions. He is also willing to admit the secondary part which science plays in the sacred books of the Old Testament. Of myths he will have none in these narrations, rightly claiming that the resemblances between the Bible and Babylonia regard rather the literary form than the substance of the things therein narrated. The treatment of this part is everywhere full, dispassionate, and critical; in fact it seems to be a characteristic of the author to mete out to every opponent his rightful due, and to close no question prematurely. The abundance of details, of citations, of valuable points of criticism, thrown here in a little footnote, or there in the text, makes it pleasant as well as profitable to follow our author through the labyrinthian maze which he so carefully treads.

The third and last part of the volume is given over to the doctrine of the Angels, their existence, nature, creation, ministry, and powers. Here the author generally follows the topical order of Saint Thomas, enriching the text with many valuable contributions from his own large store of information.

Enough has been said to point out the merits of this sixth volume in the series. The flowing style, synoptical tables, references, and indices make it easy matter for the reader to follow its contents. A good commentary of St. Thomas should be on every shelf, and here is one which brings the older and the newer knowledge into close companionship.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Clemens Alexandrinus, I, Protrepticus und Paedagogus (Griechisch-Christliche Schriftsteller). Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 8°, pp. lxxxiii + 351.

The new critical edition of the Greek text of the *Protrepticus* and the *Pædagogus* of Clement of Alexandria (d. before 215 or 216), adds much to the utility of the Berlin edition of the early Greek Christian

writers. The principal manuscript used is the famous tenth-century Codex Par. 451, known as the Arethas-Codex and of supreme value, otherwise, for the tradition of the Christian Apologists. The internal evidence of this manuscript seems to indicate that as early as the fifth century the text of Clement of Alexandria served as a theological classic in the Christian schools of the time. In his introduction Dr. Stählin enumerates first the "testimonia antiquorum" from Julius Africanus and Alexander of Jerusalem to Photius. He then describes the manuscript-evidence for the *Protrepticus* and the *Pædagogus*, the *Stromata*, the *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, the *Eclogæ Propheticae*, the *Quis dives salvetur*, and the *Adumbrationes*, in a word for the works of Clement as they are now extant after seventeen centuries of use and abuse. It is well known, of course, that modern criticism has found no small amount of patristic material in the *Catenæ* and the *Florilegia* that Greek compilers put together from the early sixth to the end of the eighth century. Together with the "Bibliotheca" of Photius they often take the place of originals now utterly lost or undiscoverable.

This new edition owes much to the labors of previous editors, and Dr. Stählin does not hesitate to acknowledge the fact. After the "editio princeps" of 1550, the Sylburg edition of 1592, the Paller edition of 1715 (p. viii-ix) and the Oberthür edition of 1778-1779, represent the zeal and skill of patristic scholars previous to the nineteenth century. In the last century Dindorf (1869) brought out an edition of Clement; Theodor Heyse had begun another when death interrupted him; it was announced in 1885 that K. J. Neumann and E. Hiller would execute it, but it remained for Dr. Stählin to incorporate in this first volume not only his own learning but that of a number of other prominent scholars. Very interesting are the details concerning the Latin translation added in 1551 by Hervetus to the editio princeps, and gradually perfected by this venerable canon of Rheims until 1590. Dr. Stählin recalls (p. lxxvii) the recent theory of Chapman in the *Revue Benedictine* (XXI, 240, 269) that the Muratorian Fragment is a remnant of the Hypotyposes of Clement, a lost scriptural commentary known only through a few citations by later writers. Among the translations of Clement, Stählin notices the complete English translation by W. Wilson, in the Ante-Nicene Library. Worthy of note also are the new edition of the *Stromata* by Fenlon John Hort and Joseph B. Mayor, with an English translation, introduction and notes (London, 1902) also the edition of *Quis dives salvetur* by P. Mordaunt Bernard (Cambridge, 1897), in both of which much improvement was made on the

current text of this valuable ancient author. Every seminary library at least should possess this new edition of Clement of Alexandria. His writings abound in important materials for the history of Christian philosophical thought, the refutation of ancient heresies, the social life of the primitive Christians, and the attitude of cultivated Greek Christians toward the best and worthiest elements of society in the Roman Orient about A. D. 200.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften I, Die Pistis-Sophia, Die beiden Bücher des Jeû, unbekanntes altgnostisches Werk. Von Dr. Carl Schmidt (Greichisch-Christliche Schriftsteller). Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1905. 8°, xxvii + 410.

The indefatigable scholar who lately astonished the learned world by the ingenuity of his researches into the true character of the second-century "Acta Pauli," confers another service by the present critical edition of certain old Coptic texts of a Gnostic character. They were already known to the savants in that tongue, through the famous Codex Askewanus (Br. Museum, Add. 5114) and the Codex Brucianus (Bodleian, Oxford), and have been more or less perfectly made known, in a particular way to the reading public by the French translation of the Pistis Sophia owing to Amélineau (1895) and the English translation of the same published by Mead (1896) and made by him from Schwartze's Latin translation (1848), with the aid of Amélineau's French. These old manuscripts were probably written in the seventh, perhaps even in the sixth century (Hyvernât). But they represent a much older text, a native and original Gnostic propaganda-literature of the third century, Ophite or Barbelo-Gnostic in character rather than Valentinian. Every such publication reveals to the critical student the great good sense and the sure wisdom of the orthodox opponents of Gnosticism. It was an immense deception of humanity, then moving toward better things, an attempt to confiscate the merits and sufferings of Catholic Christianity in favor of a cryptic aristocracy of proud scholars. Not a few of their glaring sophisms were laid bare by Plotinus himself in his discourse against the Roman Gnostics, as Dr. Schmidt has elsewhere pointed out with much acumen. Our modern Theosophy recognizes only too quickly the close relation between itself and the false philosophers who disputed with Clement and Origen in the Museum at Alexandria.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

A Short History of the Westminster Assembly. By W. Beveridge, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1904. 8°, pp. 165.

In the Westminster Assembly (1643-1652) the Scotch supporters of Cromwell hoped to secure the pay they wanted, i. e., the transformation of the episcopal government of the Anglican Church into their own presbyterian system. Puritanism, beaten back by Elizabeth and James, and feebly held in restraint by Charles I and Laud, seized on the psychological moment to accomplish in England what Knox had done in Scotland in 1560, i. e., the fastening on the English people of a yoke held down on the one side by a lay parliament and on the other by an ecclesiastical assembly, in such a way however, that the Genevan papacy should dominate in both bodies, and the cruel theory of the divine kingdom excogitated by John Calvin affect most intimately every relation of social and political life. Once more the English nature showed itself, rejected Scotch government, but compromised on doctrine. That lesson had been learned so well from Thomas Cromwell and Thomas Cranmer that it had passed into the consciousness of the people, and has stuck there ever since. Mr. Beveridge has compiled an entertaining and spirited story of this famous event that, as he rightly maintains, affected profoundly the Anglican Church and that may well be looked on as a middle chapter between the Book of Common Prayer of 1552 and the Latitudinarianism of the eighteenth century.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

The Letters to the Seven Churches of Asia, and their place in the plan of the Apocalypse. By W. M. Ramsay. New York: Armstrong, 1905. 8°, pp. xix + 446.

The author of the "Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia" and of "St. Paul the Traveller" is well qualified to compose an historical commentary on the remarkable group of letters in the Apocalypse directed to the seven principal Christian communities of Asia Minor. Dr. Ramsay emphasizes the Græco-Asiatic elements in the Apocalypse, in this differing considerably from most previous commentators who have usually laid stress on the Judaic element, even to the entire neglect of the Greek element in that remarkable book. The topographical and geographical references of the Apocalypse are illustrated with the skill of one who has lived much in those parts of Asia Minor. A novel element of the work is the interpretation of the Apocalyptic symbolism in the light of Græco-Asiatic coins and other survivals of the public civil and religious life of the first Christian century (pp. 57-74). The book is marked by a reverential and conservative spirit,

and may be read, generally speaking, with profit. Perhaps, Dr. Ramsay attributes too much influence to certain traditional pagan views of religion in the formation of the style of the Apocalypse. The work still seems to us substantially Judaic in coloring and mannerisms. There was indeed, a certain "syncretism of Jewish and native Asian thought," but its positive influence on Christian expression was far from being as powerful as Dr. Ramsay would have us believe. The readers of Lightfoot's *Apostolic Fathers* will find this volume helpful for the study of St. Ignatius and St. Polycarp.

A Source-Book for Mediæval History, Selected Documents illustrating the history of Europe in the Middle Ages. By Oliver J. Thatcher and Edgar H. McNeal. New York: Scribners, 1905. 8°, pp. xix + 619.

Professor Thatcher of the University of Chicago and Professor McNeal of the Ohio State University, present us in this volume with a series of three hundred and twenty-five documents, in whole or in excerpts, translated from the (mostly) Latin sources, and meant to illustrate: The Germans and the Empire to 1073, The Papacy to the Accession of Gregory VII (1073), the Struggle between the Empire and the Papacy, The Empire (1250-1500), The Church (1250-1500), Feudalism, Courts, Judicial Processes and Peace, Monasticism, The Crusades, Social Classes and Cities in Germany. The idea of a Source-Book of mediæval historical materials is a good one, though it may be questioned whether the field covered be not entirely too broad to give a clear insight into the vastness and complexity of these materials, also their changing character from one period to another. A general introduction on the nature and kinds of mediæval historical sources would not be out of place. The descriptive summaries prefixed to each section make up in a way for the lack of this general orientation. Though aiming at objective fairness they seem to us to betray occasionally the sympathies of the compilers. It is only natural to imagine that a Catholic compiler would enlarge considerably the number of documents in the second section that deals with the influence of the papacy previous to 1073. If we are to effectively use such translations in the class-room or seminar, it will be necessary to have separate source-books for the papacy, the empire, monasticism, canon law, and the episcopate, the five great factors of mediæval life. It is easy, of course, to formulate one's desiderata; we ought really to be thankful for this first step in the right direction,

while looking forward to improvements, both in the quantity of documents and the general appreciation of their nature and their drift.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Justin, Apologies. Texte Grec, traduction française, introduction et index, par Louis Pautigny. Paris: Picard, 1904. 8°, pp. xxxvi + 198 (Textes et Documents pour l'étude historique du christianisme publiés sous la direction de Hippolyte Hemmer et Paul Lejay.

Increased interest in patrological studies, and the example of non-Catholic schools and publishers, have induced MM. Hemmer and Lejay to begin the production of a series of patristic texts, Greek and Latin, for handy use in our Catholic seminaries and advanced schools, as also for self-help in the direction of private study. Selected Latin and Greek writings, as far as Gregory I (d. 604) will appear from time to time. They will be chosen from those that are moderate in extent and important for the history of primitive Christianity. The price is purposely made quite low. All necessary "subsidia" concerning the author and his work will be furnished in introductions prepared according to the best modern criteria. Several suitable indexes will accompany each volume. The best accessible text will be reproduced in each case. The editors state that they will take part "à aucune polémique religieuse, voulant se renfermer dans le rôle modeste qu'ils ont défini et ne présenter aux lecteurs que des textes surs et des traductions exactes, des faits et des documents." The text of each work will be accompanied by a French translation. We recommend the work to all our readers. It follows in the wake of Fr. Hurter's "Opuscula Selecta," though constructed on a different plan, of Dr. Rauschen's "Florilegium Patristicum" and of other similar enterprises. There is henceforth no reason why patristic studies should not flourish in our seminaries.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Histoire D'Heraclius. Par l'évêque Sebêos, traduite de l'Arménien et annotée par Frederic Macler. Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1904. 8°, pp. xv + 166.

All students of the beginnings of Islam know how scarce are reliable contemporary materials. A cursory reading of Gibbon and Bury suffices to confirm this conviction. For this reason alone the work before us possesses a special value. Sebêos was an Armenian bishop of the seventh century who wrote under the afore-mentioned

title an account of the civil and religious events of his own time, as far as 661. The wars of Heraclius with Persian generals, and the Arab invasions of Armenia alternate with accounts of Zoroastrian persecution and partisan Monophysite apology. Its pages offer a fair and sufficient outlook upon the distracted Armenia of the seventh century—anti-Persian, anti-Arab, anti-Greek, a buffer-state too weak to sustain itself, politically at least, amid the clashing interests of the period. The Armenian text was printed in 1851 and again in 1879. Of the three books attributed to this history, only the third is the genuine work of Sebêos. This writer does not indicate his authorities; they were probably Byzantine writers, and he resembles both them and the Arab annalists in his method and the use of his materials. But he is a contemporary and an eye-witness of the first invasions of Armenia by the now fanaticized Arabs, of the wars between Heraclius and the doomed Sassanides, of the last cruelties of the Magian priesthood, and of the long duration of hatred for the Council of Chalcedon. He is also the only one to narrate these matters from the point of view of a learned and pious Armenian. We have no doubt that all future Western histories of this period will make a generous use of the pages of Sebêos. They are often picturesque and dramatic.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Theodora, Imperatrice de Byzance. Par Charles Diehl. Paris: Rey, 1904. 3d ed. 8°, pp. 312.

When a scholar of the capacity and experience of M. Diehl undertakes to draw a popular portrait of the great Byzantine empress (527–548), we may be sure that all the genuine historical elements will be presented to the reader, and that the writer will spare no effort to hold the balance evenly between the extremes of flattery and reprobation. Our principal source for the inner life of the imperial palace at Constantinople in the first half of the sixth century has always been Procopius, soldier, courtier, writer, statesman. Had he left us but one set of opinions, all might have been well. But he has left two diametrically opposite accounts of the public and private life of Justinian and thus furnished the annals of historical literature with one of its most tantalizing curiosities. Only a minute acquaintance with all the writings and monuments of the time, and a critical spirit long exercised in their study, could enable a modern writer to appreciate with equity the rôle and attitude of the principal figures of the curia of New Rome on the Golden Horn. The workings of Byzantine law and government in Italy, and the personality of Justinian have so long occupied M. Diehl that few if any of the historical sources of

the period have escaped him. He possesses at the same time in a high degree that historical imagination which enables the writer to construct, and that sure sense of analogy which enables him to fortify his hypotheses, as an experienced advocate buttresses his case with precedents and arguments. We commend to the reader the little chef d'œuvre of a preface in which M. Diehl sketches his general impressions of the dancing-girl who became an empress, this "caractère ondoyant et multiforme" who showed much statesmanlike ability, and so affected for good or evil the imagination and heart of a great ruler like Justinian that for twenty years after her death she was still, in his mind, at the helm of state, still influential on all his decisions, both civil and ecclesiastical.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

English Monastic Life. By Abbot Gasquet, with numerous illustrations, briefs and plans. Second edition, revised. New York: Benziger, 1904. 8°, pp. xix + 326.

Dom Gasquet has found time, amid other engrossing tasks, to compile an account of the monastic life in mediæval England. Its eleven chapters are entitled: The Monastic Life, The Material Parts of a Monastery, The Monastery and its Rules, The Obedientiaries (officials) of the Monastery, The Daily Life in a Monastery, The Nuns of Mediæval England, External Relations of the Monastic Orders, The Paid Servants of the Monastery, The Various Religious Orders. Four maps of monastic England accompany the volume and exhibit the relative strength of the principal orders. The teacher of mediæval English history will be grateful for the long list (pp. 252-318) of English monastic houses, so executed that one can see at a glance to what order or rule each belonged. There is also a list of the principal manuscript materials and printed books used in the compilation of the work. May we not hope to have some day from his pen a complete bibliography of English monasticism? We recommend this work cheerfully to our readers as an authentic and highly interesting account of one of the powerful forces that made the Middle Ages, and that so blended itself with all Christian life and thought, that it continues to live on in their survival and to affect the world more potently than the latter suspects. Numerous illustrations of monastic life taken from rare and valuable old manuscripts decorate the volume. It could well be used as collateral reading in all advanced classes of mediæval history.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

John Knox. His Ideas and Ideals. By Rev. James Stalker, D.D. New York: Armstrong, 1905. 8°, pp. 246.

The fourth centenary of the birth of John Knox, called by Dr. Stalker, the "greatest of Scotsmen," has given rise to quite a deal of historical literature concerning this apostate priest and ring-leader of rebellion and sedition. Dr. Stalker adds nothing to the standard life of Knox by Thomas McCrie, according to which he was the shining light of true faith lifted up among the degraded Scotch of the sixteenth century. As a matter of fact, he was a self-called revolutionary demagogue, who abetted and preached assassination, conspired against lawful authority, fled when personal danger threatened him, and used great oratorical gifts to delude a peculiar people. He was a burner of churches and a rude Vandal amid the refinements of ancient Scottish Catholicism. His success was chiefly owing to the wretched condition of Scotch Catholicism, as depicted by Canon Bellesheim, and not at all to the inherent truth of his stern and inhuman doctrine. Old Ninian Winzet, Quintin Kennedy, and Alexander Bailly are the true witnesses of the circumstances that led to the dictatorship of Knox, as well as of the genuine Catholic faith of the Scotch people. "The fathers ate sour grapes, and the teeth of the children stood on edge" might well be written over a true account of the life of Knox.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

L'Italie Meridionale et L'Empire Byzantin, depuis l'avènement de Basile I. jusqu'à la prise de Bari par les Normands (867-1071). Par Jules Gay. Paris: Fontemoing, 1904. 8°, pp. xxvi + 636.

Twenty years ago (1881-1884) the three charming volumes of Charles Lenormant on "La Grande Grèce" awoke in Europe much enthusiasm for the history of Southern Italy in the long forgotten centuries that stretch from Charlemagne to Robert Guiscard. Since then, domestic and foreign writers have turned in growing numbers towards a land and a time in which took place events of surpassing importance for the history of Europe, both civil and profane. Italian, German and French writers have unearthed not a few important documents, while the architectural and palæographical treasures of the period have been studied with fresh zest and great success. In the traces of Muratori and Ughelli and the workers of the *Monumenta Germaniæ Historica* have followed such writers as Capasso, Hirsch, Schlumberger, Rambaud, Diehl, and a multitude of local savants and investigators. Of late noble flambeaux have been erected for the aid of this army of toilers, e. g., Duchesne's edition of the *Liber Pon-*

tificalis, Krumbacher's *Byzantine Literature* (2d ed. 1901) and the stately volumes of the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*. University centres like Munich, monastic centres like Monte Cassino, and academico-scientific centres like the French School of History and Archæology at Rome, have taken up these studies with much energy. The volume of M. Gay is only the last in a series of volumes that the French School has put forth through its laborious disciples, with the purpose of illustrating all the antiquities of this period of South Italian life. M. Gay has composed it at first hand from the Greek and Latin Chronicles of the period, the lives of the Basilian monks and saints, the Byzantine laws, treaties, and charters, as well as the miscellaneous writers of the period. The list of his authorities covers several closely printed pages, and a study of any chapter of the work shows that it is written directly from the original sources. Here may be traced the conflicting interests of Lombard, Roman, Greek, Arab, Frank and Norman during three centuries, also of popes of Rome, and emperors of Constantinople, of the clergy, Eastern and Western, and in general the reasons of the final adhesion to Western ideals and institutions of those extensive Mediterranean territories, that on the eve of the Iconoclastic troubles still looked with affection and confidence toward New Rome as their over-lord and the keystone of civilization.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Owen Roe O'Neill (1582-1649). By J. F. Taylor. Third Impression. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904. 8°, pp. vi + 250.

If one were asked to point out a fatal decade in modern Irish history it would, in the opinion of most historically-minded persons, be that which elapsed from 1640 to 1650, the period of the Kilkenny Confederation. Then appeared at last on Irish soil a combination of all the elements pro-Irish and anti-English, that had been more or less active since the death of Mary Tudor (1558). Then, too, came to a head in England the long-gathering opposition against the despotism of Tudor and Stuart, intensified now by a stern convinced religious temperament that had been variously fed and nurtured since the rejection of papal authority by Henry VIII. The religious warfare that had been raging on the Continent since the early consolidation of the North-German Protestant power in the League of Schmalkald was entering upon the final stages that culminated with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). The old rivalries of France and England and Spain were exhausted to give way to others whose roots were perhaps

the same but whose catch-words and stages were quite unlike those of former days. No man of Irish race was more keenly alive than Owen Roe O'Neill to all the elements of hope and danger that the Irish cause presented in those days. Soldier, diplomat, patriot, scholar, he amply justified his descent from a princely race that acknowledged no superior in Europe. This last of the great Irish chiefs fell upon evil times, on a period of treason, disunion, selfishness and divided councils. But he did a work that measures up to the standard of permanent greatness judged by the criteria of duty and faith, and not by those of success and glory. Alone he rises above the civil and most of the ecclesiastical figures of contemporary Ireland, as wise counsellor and as man of action. After his death the great Irish histories of the Four Masters and Geoffrey Keating might well be published: *fuit Ilium*. Mr. Taylor has told the story of Owen Roe with a truthful and sympathetic pen. The subject, however, is one of much grandeur and awaits yet a historian who shall treat it with critical acumen, documentary fulness, and philosophic freedom of judgment.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

Studies in Early Irish History. By Professor John Rhys. From the *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. I. London: Henry Frowde.

This paper, full of interest and learning, contains Professor Rhys' latest *dictum* on the subject to which he has given so much investigation, viz: the linguistic evidence of the pre-Celtic population of the British Isles. The memoir is centered upon an inscription from Co. Kildare, in Ogam and Latin which shows curious case-endings. In the course of his remarks on the meaning of this inscription, Professor Rhys observes that "Druidism was not of Celtic origin . . . and that the word for 'druid' was not Celtic but adopted by the Celts from some earlier population of the countries conquered by them" (*cf.* d'Arbois de Jubainville, *La Civilisation des Celtes*, p. 93 and note). The origin of many Irish place and tribe names and of the personages of the saga-cycles is discussed. The names for Ireland, *hErin* and *hErenn* with the aspirate are to be preferred, says Professor Rhys, to those without it, the *h*, in the Irish words (which in the Latin *Hibernia* is due simply to popular etymology) being phonetic and representing the initial consonantal *i*. Another interesting word whose meaning had already been studied in *iarn-belra*. It is only the first word of the compound whose meaning is obscure. Professor Thurneysen (*R. Celtique*, XIII) and most Irish scholars, had translated it "the lan-

guage of iron." Now Professor Rhys proposes "the primitive Irish language," thus bringing the word into relationship with one of the primitive names for Ireland. This translation undoubtedly gives excellent meaning to the expression but, as M. d'Arbois de Jubainville points out (*R. Celtique*, XXVI, 185) it is open to objection on grounds of phonetics.

One conclusion we may draw with Professor Rhys from his researches (as also from an article of M. Loth in the *R. Celtique*, XVIII, 304) is that there was probably more intercourse between the Goidelic portions of the British Isles and the Continent than is usually supposed.

J. DUNN.

Essentials in English History. By Albert Perry Walker. New York: The American Book Co., 1905.

In describing briefly the chief movements in the history of England the author's generalizations are stated somewhat boldly. It is said, for instance, that the Romans left Britain "but little advanced in political or social development." If, as Macaulay asserts, the inhabitants at the coming of the Romans were but little superior in civilization to the natives of the Sandwich Islands, Mr. Perry's statement requires some qualification. Indeed, in his chapter on the Roman occupation of Britain he indicates very sensible progress made by the natives. He fails, however, to point out the defects of the Roman system of instruction, and thus leaves the reader to infer that the Anglo-Saxon conquest was simplified by the natural lack of military qualities in the Britains whereas their overthrow is rather to be ascribed to the fact that they had become strangers to the use of arms, an art in which their Latin conquerors gave them no instruction.

Of the introduction of Christianity during the era of Roman occupation little is said; indeed, its very existence is only alluded to, and it is important to remember that the religion of the Romanized Britains was not without its influence upon the character of the subsequent conquest.

Again, after paying the customary compliment to the political skill of the Germanic conquerors, it is said that "they promptly changed their government from the tribal to the monarchical form." As a matter of fact almost four centuries elapsed from the coming of the Jutes until Egbert, about 827 A. D., became king of the Angles.

Another of Professor Walker's comprehensive statements describes the Norman conquerors of England as of 'the same stock as the Anglo-Saxons and Danes.' If the great masters of English history are

correct, this statement, too, requires an important qualification. The followers of Rolf, who settled along the Seine, went without their women into Gaul; they intermarried among the natives, a Romanized Celto-Germanic population, and at a distance of more than a century must have formed a new race. Then, too, all the followers of Duke William were not Normans, for several other provinces of Gaul contributed to swell his ranks. The victory at Hastings was won by a people of French language and institutions over a people more purely Teutonic.

The existence in Britain after the second century of our era of a great body of Christians is not noticed. It is, however, well known that they were numerous enough to excite the fears of some of the pagan emperors of Rome; that they were represented in the Council of Arles and that they were prosperous enough to afford the luxury of a heresy. In other respects the section of this book which discusses the Roman occupation is as good as that usually found in school histories of England, both the illustrations and maps are better.

The chapter describing the Anglo-Saxon conquest is ably and fairly written, but with a hint from Green the desperate character of the struggle and the thoroughness of the victory could have been more impressively stated. The sections treating of the Danish and Norman conquests are beyond reasonable criticism. The author's account of the Feudal System is satisfactory, and the importance and organization of the manor is properly emphasized. In describing conditions under the descendants of the Conqueror the volume shows clearly the influence of the monastic orders upon arts and letters. The section upon economic and social progress is vastly superior to the meagre accounts to be found in any of the school histories which we have examined.

There are careful students of English literature who will not altogether agree with the author's estimate of the influence and the services of Wyclif. This volume presents the traditional view of the reformer. Perfect fairness would require the historian to add that concerning the Master of Baliol and his writings little is certainly known.

The touchstone by which Catholic teachers are likely to try Professor Walker's book is his treatment of the epoch of the Reformation. In this there will not be found, as in some school histories any unmeaning sneers at things Catholic. There appears on the part of the author an endeavor to be fair in dealing with those troublous times, and if his conclusions cannot always be accepted, there is added to this part of the work a list of the authorities upon which those

conclusions are based. Among the references will be found mention of Catholic historians such as Lingard and Gasquet. In a word, this volume presents the development of English history in a concise, fair and interesting manner.

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY.

Historical Records and Studies. New York: The United States Catholic Historical Society, 1904. 8°, pp. —.

Neither in interest nor value is Part II of the third volume inferior to those which preceded it. This section is happily introduced by the brief but eloquent sermon preached, November 16, 1902, by the Most Rev. Archbishop Farley at the consecration of the Albany Cathedral. The entire discourse abounds in valuable historical information, and the compiler of ecclesiastical annals will be delighted to find it arranged with exquisite literary art. To be appreciated, the discourse should be read in full, for any paraphrase would destroy its charm.

Not unrelated to the same theme is a useful register of the clergy laboring in the archdiocese of New York. These biographical sketches will be appreciated by the writers upon church history.

The first American pilgrimage to Rome is the subject of a very interesting narrative from the pen of the Rt. Rev. Dr. Benj. J. Keily. While the purpose of the writer was evidently to trace the successive steps which led to this event, he shows incidentally the spirit which animated American Catholics a generation ago. The article includes the address of the pilgrimage committee and the reply of the Holy Father, which contained a simple and beautiful allusion to America. In the same number of the *Record and Studies* the reader of contemporary annals will find an able and exhaustive history of the Marquette statue. To the literature upon anti-Catholic movements in the United States this is an excellent contribution.

Mr. Thomas F. Meehan should be encouraged to continue his researches in the field of American Catholic history. His sketch of Andrew Parmentier, horticulturist, and his daughter, Madame Bayer, is interesting and instructive as well to the student of history as the general reader. Scarcely less entertaining is the same writer's article on the first charity concert for the Catholic Orphans in New York.

Students of American history will find much that is suggestive in an able essay by Rev. Joseph M. Woods, S.J., on the earliest Jesuit Missionary explorers. Rev. Dr. Henry A. Brann gives a brief but very instructive biographical sketch of the late Mr. Patrick Farrelly. As supplemental reading for young people engaged in the study of

American history these little essays are admirably adapted. This is especially true of Mr. Paul Fuller's elegant notice of the late Frederick R. Coudert, Second President of the United States Catholic Historical Society. Different in subject matter from these essays is a short study by Rev. Joseph Fischer, S.J., on the difficulty of collecting in Greenland the tithes allotted for the crusades. The author is evidently a master of this as well as the related topics.

In this number is also found an exhaustive essay by Dr. Charles G. Herbermann on the naming of America. His examination of a very intricate question is one of the ablest contributions to Columbian literature which has appeared in many years. The article which includes a splendid reproduction of Martin Waldseemüller's Mapemonde, of 1507, the first map bearing the name America, shows at once excellent judgment and wide scholarship.

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY.

Histoire de Nazareth et de ses Sanctuaries. Par Gaston Le Hardy. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. 8°, pp. xvi + 235.

M. Le Hardy has done well to gather in one volume all known statements of pilgrims concerning Nazareth since the fourth century. It is a unique and touching tribute to the influence of the God-Man's personality, this ever-growing devotion to the site of the Annunciation and of His Hidden Life for thirty years. We have here as it were a literary history of Nazareth, written by men of many races and nationalities, priests and laymen, poor and rich, ignorant and learned. A common consensus of love and faith and gratitude exhales from so many quaint and ancient pages, all distinctive of their own time and country, and yet all bound by the tie of a common Catholic Christian devotion. Such a book might well be used as a volume of historical reading in the upper classes of Christian doctrine.

Last Letters of Aubrey Beardsley. With an Introductory Note by the Rev. John Gray. London: Longmans, 1905. 8°, pp. —.

The sympathetic preface to this book by Father Gray is a piece of good literature, but whether this is true of the scrappy notes of a tired invalid,—such as Aubrey Beardsley was when he wrote those letters,—is a question. It may have been, as Father Gray says, Mr. Beardsley's chief pre-occupation to communicate to his drawings "the surprise and delight which the visible world afforded" him, but it is certain that the element of "delight" is not found in the meretricious exaggerations of a debased art which he left to the world. It is regret-

table that even a deathbed conversion casts, with the sentimental, a glamor on the past life of the penitent; the conversion of a famous man before his death is almost certain to make most of us condone much in the past which good morals and good taste might otherwise force us to condemn. Certain of the psychological documents of Paul Bourget,—half the science of the mind and half the art of millinery,—are receiving gentle treatment since the clever author of “*Le Disciple*” wrote “*Un Divorce*.” And Mr. Beardsley’s illustrations to “*Salome*” may in time, under proper and careful scrutiny, be discovered to have a religious value. These scraps of notes would have more interest could they be composed with utterances that represented Mr. Beardsley’s state of mind before illness had begun to work on him. It is evident that he regarded religion and art and literature as in conflict, that he felt that an artist must choose between art and religion. “I am interested in your Dominican artist,” he writes, “because I have been wondering more than I can say what this can be like. Your letter has really made me curious. Do you know Fr. Philpin of the Brompton Oratory? He is, I believe, the poet of the community and a considerable painter. But what stumbling blocks such pious men must find in the practice of their art.” Beardsley’s notes on books are interesting. Aphra Behn, Veuillot,—a copy of the “*Parfum de Rome*”—Theophile Gautier and Faber shows a catholic taste. It is to his credit that he does not admire Huysmanns. He admits this apropos of “*La Cathedral*,” which he did not expect to like.

MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN.

L’Art a Toulouse ; Matériaux pour servir à son histoire du XVe au XVIIIe siècle. Par C. Douais, évêque de Beauvais. Paris: Picard, 1904. 8°, pp. 214.

The scholarly bishop of Beauvais is well known for several works of importance in the field of mediæval ecclesiastical history; in the volume before us he appears as the editor of a number of documents (88) that illustrate the history of the fine arts at Toulouse between 1452 and 1725. These documents are drawn from the notarial archives of the city, and are mostly contracts between artists and architects on the one hand and civil or religious authorities on the other. A hasty perusal reveals their content as interesting and instructive; they treat of the foundations, reparations, and constructions of churches; of their decoration and preservation; of ecclesiastical furniture, banners, bells, crosses, organs, clocks, and the like. Equally

interesting are the contracts in which we behold the provisions made for the construction of several of the noble private palaces that graced Toulouse in the period of the Renaissance, a development of architecture that Mgr. Douais describes as particularly "large, intense et heureux," and marked by the strong individualism of the Tolosan. Confined mostly to the use of brick, he was still an artist in thought and desire, and sought to stamp on all public and private work the seal of good taste, whether it were the portal of some proud "hôtel," or the iron-work in the gate of some private chapel or a processional banner "à l'entorn de frangas rogas tenchas en cremesi, las quals deven esser bonas sufficiens, etc."

Progress in Prayer, translated from Instructions Spirituelles par le R. P. Caussade, S.J. By L. V. Sheehan. Adapted and edited with an introduction by Joseph McSorley, C.S.P. St. Louis: Herder, 1904. 8°, pp. 178.

The well-known and precious little book of Père Caussade (d. 1751) is here presented in an English dress. Together with his little book on Abandonment, translated in 1887, it offers us the substance of a sane and irreproachable religious teaching on the uses and methods of meditative prayer. Amid the abundance of more or less modern works on the subject, we may be tempted to lose sight of the importance and influence of a work that was composed during the lull that followed the condemnation of the Quietism of Molinos (1688) and the painful contemporary French controversies apropos of the orthodoxy of the spiritual works of Madame Guyon. The introduction by Fr. McSorley is an excellent piece of work, in which the qualities of style are as apparent as those of moderate temper and fair appreciation. The translation commends itself by its clearness and simplicity; countless examples have shown that it is no easy task to turn into natural and idiomatic English spiritual emotions and reflections that originated in circles dominated by other racial, national, and intellectual influences.

La Mission de M. de Forbin-Janson, évêque de Marseille (Beauvais), auprès du Grand-Duc et de la Grande Duchesse de Toscane Mars-Mai 1673: Recit d'un témoin. Par C. Douais eveque de Beauvais. Paris: Picard, 1904. 8°, pp. 204.

The indefatigable bishop of Beauvais makes known in this volume a curious incident of Tuscan political history that took place in the

latter quarter of the seventeenth century, the separation of the Grand Duchess of Tuscany from her husband. This great lady was Marguerite d'Orléans, a cousin of Louis XIV, daughter of Gaston de France, and half-sister of Mdle. Montpensier "la grande demoiselle." She had been married, unwilling, at an early age to the heir of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and from the outset exhibited an irremediable incompatibility of temper. Louis XIV sent to Florence the bishop of Marseilles, de Forbin-Janson, with the hope of reconciling the unhappy pair. His efforts were vain. On his return he was made bishop of Beauvais, eventually cardinal, and died in 1713 at the age of eighty-three. A member of his suite wrote an interesting and hitherto unedited "Relation" of the embassy to Florence. With its aid Mgr. Douais has retold the story of this delicate mission and has added several hitherto unknown fragments of correspondence that throw light upon its object and course. We may add that the original "Relation" is valuable for its account of the court-manners of Tuscany in the seventeenth century.

Albrecht Dürer, Sein Leben, Schaffen und Glauben. Geschildert von Dr. G. Anton Weber. Mit vielen Abbildungen. Third edition. New York: Pustet, 1903. 8°, pp. xii + 235.

Dr. Weber has told us with much charm of diction the story of the noblest character and the most brilliant artist among all German painters. Indeed, Dürer is one of those artists who belong to no nation, but to the world at large, so profoundly human is their interpretation of life, and so broad were the sympathies that they exhibited in their masterpieces. The life of Dürer has been often presented to the public, but never with such an abundance of proof that the great artist lived and died a genuine Catholic. Dr. Weber has gathered and interpreted numerous evidences of this fact (120-226). His work ought to long enjoy a certain finality, if it were possible to remove prejudice, interest, and feeling from the breasts of his opponents.

La Question qui nous Divise le Plus. Par Albert Lavallée. Paris: Lavallée, 1905. 8°, pp. 118.

M. Lavallée examines with calmness some phases of the actual religious situation in France. What is the true root of the unhappy national situation? It is political, social, or religious? What is the power of a "scientific" morality as compared with religious morality? Is it possible to overthrow the religious sentiment in modern France,

to move forever from all men's hearts the Christian idea of God? Is it impossible to find a margin of mutual tolerance, a common freedom enjoyed by all men of good will in which all shall work out practically the best ideas of their systems, old or new, without violation of peace or charity? If such a régime were established, would not men soon come to understand one another more intimately, hence to respect one another, perhaps in time to borrow largely from one another. Alas! the French mind is so naturally doctrinaire in temper and bureaucratic in exercise that such a large and generous practical fiction as M. Lavallée suggests, though possible, seems very far away.

Régime Intellectuel des Clerics au Sortir du Séminaire. Par M. Guesdon. Paris: Lecoffre, 1904. 16°, pp. 186.

We recommend very earnestly the study of this little work to all seminarians and to the younger clergy—not a few of the older clergy might also profit by the reading of it. The author is an experienced educator of French ecclesiastics, and his little work contains the ripe fruit of many years of devotion. He begins by laying down certain accepted rules for such scholarly study as befits ecclesiastics. Thence he passes to more special advice and suggestions, dealing in turn with the principal ecclesiastical sciences, and including such rubrics as “Questions Sociales,” “Sciences et Critique,” “Voyages,” and “Notes Personelles.” Pages 110–159 offer suggestions for an up-to-date ecclesiastical library, naturally such as would fit in with the needs of a French-speaking clergy. Finally he sketches a number of “*Selecta Studia*” in the principal ecclesiastical sciences, indications of living problems, outlines of work useful in the daily ministry, etc. The little brochure is both cheap and portable, and deserves a wide circulation.

An Abridged History of Greek Literature. By Alfred Croiset and Maurice Croiset, translated by George F. Heffelblower. New York: Macmillan, 1904. 8°, pp. 569.

The classical History of Greek Literature of the brothers Croiset is too well known to all modern students of Greek to need any commendation. At the same time its great length and exhaustive character prevent it from exercising its due influence on “students of secondary schools, and readers who wish to inform themselves quickly as to the essential facts of Greek literature.” Professor Heffelblower of Carroll College has prepared an excellent abridgment of

the work of the Croisets. It gives the substance of their researches and appreciations, reduces the citations to a very reasonable proportion and includes an account of the masterpieces of Greek Christian literature. Professors of Greek, advanced students and the small but select world of Hellenizing souls generally, will enjoy this good summary of the best history of Greek literature in existence.

L'Infaillibilité du Pape et le Syllabus, Etude historique et théologique. Par Paul Viollet. Paris: Lethielleux, 1904. 8°, pp. 115.

The spirit of this brochure is indicated by its dedication to those Christians whom inexact notions concerning the papacy retain outside the unity of Catholicism. M. Viollet is a well-known French Catholic layman, a historian of Canon Law, a professor of the Ecole des Chartes and a prominent defender of Catholic interests. His discussion of the condemnation of Pope Honorius and of other popes in the course of ecclesiastical history deserves attention. M. Viollet is at once a critical historian, well grounded in his knowledge of the essentials of Catholic theology. This work may be read by all with profit; it bears the imprimatur of the archbishop of Besancon.

The Life and Times of St. Boniface. By James Williamson, M.D. London: Henry Frowde, 1904. 8°, pp. 137.

This is, generally speaking, a reverent popular account of the life of St. Boniface, with a title that promises more than it fulfills. The Protestant author still holds to the antiquated language of Exeter Hall, and speaks of the Romish (!) Church. His notions of papal history in the eighth century are very hazy—Gregory II was no rebel nor did he undertake to set up an independent republic. The true story of the relations with Byzantium and its Iconoclastic rulers may be seen in Duchesne's edition of the *Liber Pontificalis*, or in Fr. Mann's *History of the Popes of that period*.

English Church History, from the Death of Archbishop Parker to the Death of King Charles I (1575–1749). Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1904. 8°, pp. 179.

These lectures of Dr. Plummer represent the substance of a series of popular discourses delivered to English reading circles. They are an attempt to justify the English Reformation and to patch up,

as best may be, the rents made in its character by many modern historians of great fame, both Catholic and Protestant. If the reader will peruse the works of Frederick George Lee, James Gairdner and James Brewer, as well as the great history of Lingard, he will have no difficulty in seeing e. g., that the Elizabethan persecution of Catholics was not primarily political but religious in purpose.

Lectures on the Historians of Bohemia. By Count Lützow.

London: Henry Frowde, 1905. 8°, pp. 120.

The historiography of Bohemia is quite well set forth by Count Lützow in this small volume. It is a handy work of reference to be placed beside the noble works of Wattenbach and Lorenz on German mediæval historians. Here and there the author betrays a Protestant animus. As a rule the exposé of the spirit and characteristics of Bohemian chroniclers and historians seems fair and equitable.

L'Etude de la Sainte Ecriture. Lettre de Mgr. l'Evêque de Beauvais, Noyon et Seules au clergé de son diocèse. Paris: Lecoffre, 1905. 8°, pp. 83.

We recommend earnestly to all interested in biblical questions this wise, calm, and learned review of the situation written in a pastoral and homiletic spirit, as a judge of faith, by a very learned and distinguished bishop of France. His temper is critical and historical, yet Catholic and conservative in the true and proper sense of the word. Would that in all parts of the Christian world such authoritative voices were frequently raised in accents at once correct and religious!

The Conclave of Clement X (1670). By His Excellency Baron de Bildt. Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. I. London: Henry Frowde, 1905. 8°, pp. 26.

In these few pages the Swedish and Norwegian Minister to England sketches from the contemporary correspondence of the Catholic convert, Queen Christiana of Sweden, an account of some cursory and interesting episodes in the conclave that terminated in the election of Cardinal Altieri as Clement X (1670-1676). The human element, as always, is visible enough; the divine element, the assistance of the Holy Spirit, is visible also in the secular unity, consistency and uprightness of pontifical government.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Bequests and Gifts to the University.—By the will of Miss Margaret H. Gardiner, of Baltimore, the University received the residue of her estate, amounting to \$99,003.52. A bequest of \$2,287.34 was also received from the estate of the late Mr. John McGinn, of Lockport, Ill. The Reverend Patrick G. Murphy, pastor of St. Patrick's Church, Olyphant, Pa., gave \$5,000 to found a scholarship for the diocese of Scranton. Mr. Thomas P. Fay, of Long Branch, N. J., donated \$300, "as a contribution to the University for the purpose of establishing a beginning for a trust fund for a school for the study of international law and diplomacy."



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